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ARCHIVES

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART 29.

JULY-DEC. 1831.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXIX

JULY TO DECEMBER 1931

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Correction in No. 66 on p. 209: for "group omitted" read "extradition."

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Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXIX.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 3414/387/25]

No. 1

Sir J. Chancellor to Lord Passfield.—(Communicated by Colonial Office July 1.)

(No. 69.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, June 20, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my Transjordan telegram No. 55 of the 12th June, reporting that a meeting had taken place between Sheikh Abdel Aziz-bin-Zeid and Captain Glubb in connexion with the settlement of raids between Transjordan and the Nejd, and to forward herewith a copy of a letter addressed by the Officer Commanding the Arab Legion to the Chief Minister of Transjordan, which describes in detail the proceedings of the meeting and summarises its results.

2. As Ibn Zeid had no authority to conclude an agreement without reference to King Ibn Saud, the meeting was confined to an exchange of views. Nevertheless, it served a useful purpose in establishing friendly relations between the delegates, as the result of which Ibn Zeid has expressed his willingness to continue direct correspondence with Captain Glubb.

3. I invite your Lordships' attention to the attitude adopted by Ibn Saud as regards the settlement of claims arising out of raids perpetrated between the 1st August, 1930, and the 1st February, 1931. The grant of a cash payment of £P. 6,000 by His Majesty's Government to the Howeitat is presumably out of the question. In the circumstances, I trust that His Majesty's Government will not assent to any arrangement which will not ensure that the restitution of loot in the cases at issue is simultaneous and reciprocal.

4. It appears from the declaration of Ibn Zeid that the Hejaz Government would not forgo the right to collect taxes from non-Nejdian tribes temporarily within its territory; that the Hejaz Government maintains in this respect a point of view entirely contrary to the principles of the Hadda Agreement.

I have, &c.

J. R. CHANCELLOR,

High Commissioner for Transjordan.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Officer Commanding Arab Legion to Chief Minister of Transjordan.

His Excellency Chief Minister, Amman.

June 15, 1931.

1. I BEG to inform you that Captain Glubb met Abdel Aziz-bin-Zeid at Hazim Wells on the 3rd June, 1931.

2. The meeting was cordial and friendly, each party entertaining the other to a meal.

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3. During the conversation the following subjects were discussed:—

- (a) The need for close co-operation between the two parties.
- (b) The immediate restitution of any loot taken, but the sending of victims with a letter to the representative of the other Government.
- (c) The method by which victims should substantiate their claims by the production of two witnesses, who, if possible, would be the sheikhs.
- (d) Compensations for persons killed:—

(1) If the killed person was the aggressor, the compensation should be seven young camels.

(2) If the person killed was not the aggressor, the compensation should be twenty-eight young camels.

These fines should be compounded for 15 liras in the first case, or in the second case for 60 liras. Relatives of the killed would not have to identify the actual murderer, but simply prove that the victim was killed by a certain party.

(e) The question of taking commission on loot returned:—

It was suggested by the Transjordan representative that this be done away with; the Nejd representative, however, doubted whether his Government would agree to forgo it, and was informed that, if the Nejd Government did not abolish the practice, the Transjordan Government could also not do so. If the practice continued, the compensation should be in terms of cash per camel.

4. Abdel Aziz up to the point agreed to all suggestions, but suddenly torpedoed all the proceedings by saying that he had no authority to make any agreement without reference to Ibn Saud, and he absolutely refused to allow any paper embodying the terms to be drawn up for mutual signature.

Abdel Aziz, however, stated that he had received a letter from Ibn Saud saying that he hoped that powers to treat with the Transjordan Government representative would shortly be given.

It appears that Ibn Saud was not prepared to give his delegate any powers until he knew what our intentions are.

Settlements of Claims between February 1, 1931, and June 3, 1931.

5. The Transjordan representative suggested the immediate mutual restitution of loot taken since the 1st February, 1931, as it was ridiculous to expect Transjordan to hand back loot unless the Nejd Government did the same. Abdel Aziz frankly agreed to this, but said he as yet had no authority to take over or hand back any loot.

A list of raids since the 1st February, 1931, was then given him, and he agreed that all loot should be retained by the present owners until he had received instructions from Ibn Saud.

Settlement of Claims between August 1, 1930, and February 1, 1931.

6. This question is of great difficulty, and the Nejd delegate quite obviously did not wish to discuss it, and expressed doubt at the possibility of liquidating raids which happened so long ago. Indeed, it is likely that, if such an issue were forced upon the Nejd Government, then the Transjordan authorities would have to work honestly to return all the loot, while there is a grave doubt if the Nejd representatives would do so; and it would be more than probable that Transjordan might in the end lose, in spite of the fact that some 600 camels were raided from Transjordan and some 300 camels by Transjordan during that period.

It would therefore appear that it might be better for the peace of the frontier to bury these claims and concentrate on future co-operation.

The Arab Legion intelligence officer points out that the parlous state of starvation of the Howeitat is still a matter of grave concern, and, until something is done to alleviate this state, the peace of the frontier cannot be permanently assured. He therefore suggests £6,000 being given to the Howeitat.

I am, however, not able to endorse this request, as, if given, it would cause all Arabs who have lost in raids to make similar demands. Moreover, I am of opinion that the state of the Howeitat will improve gradually, since, by the enlistment of their men and by employment in intelligence work, they will gradually get sums of money which they have never before been in possession of nor ever hoped for.

Migrations of Tribes from one Territory to Another.

7. The Nejd delegate emphasised the fact that his Government would never agree to forgo the right to collect taxes from non-Nejd tribes while within their frontier.

It was also pointed out that a Transjordan subject had been arrested in Jof and deprived of his rifle and money in retaliation for a raid which happened two years ago. As this raid had been dealt with at the MacDonnell Conference, the impropriety of such action was not conducive to security; the Nejd representative agreed.

Conclusion.

8. Nothing definite had come of the meeting, as Ibn Zeid obviously had no power to decide anything.

The cordial relations maintained throughout have produced some good, and Ibn Zeid agreed to continue direct correspondence with the Arab Legion intelligence officer.

Ultimate success, however, must rest with Ibn Saud, and if he gives Ibn Zeid some authority there seems no reason to doubt that the friendly relations now commenced will be continued.

9. I would be grateful if you would send two copies to the British Resident.

F. G. PEAKE, *Al Fariq*.

Officer Commanding Arab Legion.

[E 3421/387/25]

No. 2.

Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 1.)

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 27, 1931.

REFERENCE your telegram No. 84 of the 17th June regarding the formula on the subject of raider criminals. I prefer first alternative, viz., abandonment of formula and negotiation of formal extradition agreement. Desired measure of latitude might be more easy to obtain in a formula than in formal agreement, but this advantage is outweighed by disadvantages inherent in a formula, which necessarily must be more loosely drawn than an agreement that is likely to provoke disputes on points of interpretation and application, and so defeat its primary object. It is probable, moreover, that unrestricted freedom of authorities of Transjordan summarily to punish raiders intercepted in Transjordan in course of raiding can be obtained more easily by a formal agreement than by a formula. I recognise that, on the other hand, it may not be possible to secure Ibn Saud's consent to conclusion of a formal agreement. I suggest, therefore, that Transjordan delegate to Jedda should be fully empowered to negotiate a suitable formula if opposition of Hejaz to formal agreement cannot be overcome. The delegation would consist only of Kirkbridge. He has the necessary first-hand knowledge of local and frontier conditions, and Amir is, in any case, not disposed to send a Transjordan official. I am of opinion that, if a formal agreement proves possible, it should be concluded between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud supplementary to the Hadda Agreement. The Amir almost certainly would raise an objection to direct negotiations between Transjordan and the King, and Ibn Saud's views appear to coincide (see telegram from Jedda No. 138 of the 16th May).

I presume if that course is accepted, negotiations will be undertaken by Ryan, with Kirkbridge's co-operation so far as may be necessary. Kirkbridge

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cannot reach Jedda before the end of October, as Cox is on leave until the 10th of that month. In the interval, however, the settlement of raiding questions by Glubb and Ibn Zeid may have created a more favourable atmosphere for negotiations.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

[E 3449/1098/25]

No. 3.

Sir R. Graham to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 485.)

Sir,

Rome, June 29, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 375 of the 29th May, I transmit herewith a translation of a note which I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the status of Asir.

2. I also enclose for convenience of reference a copy of the aide-mémoire which, in accordance with the desire of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was left after the verbal communication based on the instructions in your despatch No. 554 of the 11th May had been made.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

Note verbale from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(Translation.)

IN an aide-mémoire of the 30th May His Majesty's Embassy informed the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the British Government had received a note from the Hejaz Government, soliciting British acquiescence in what must, in the opinion of the British Government, be regarded as the *de facto* and *de jure* status of Asir. In these circumstances the British Government, believing that they could not refrain from answering the note, proposed to recognise the absorption of Asir by the Hejaz, but before doing so, desired to receive the observations of the Italian Government on the subject.

2. The Royal Government warmly thanks His Britannic Majesty's Government for having, in conformity with the understanding reached in the conversations in Rome of January and February 1927—at which both parties agreed that it was desirable that the two Governments should remain in contact regarding all questions affecting the Red Sea and Southern Arabia—asked the opinion of the Italian Government in regard to a question of such importance and delicacy, which might have repercussions on the maintenance of pacific relations between the Arab potentates of the Red Sea. It is a question, moreover, in considering which the Royal Government cannot but take account of the interests of the Yemen, in view of the special treaty and the relations of friendship which, as is well known to the British Government, bind the Kingdom of Italy with the Imam of the Yemen.

3. The particular interest which the Italian Government attributes to the question of Asir has already been fully explained to the British representatives during the conversations at Rome of January and February 1927.

It is opportune to recall the declarations which on that occasion were made in this regard.

At the sitting of the 12th January, 1927, the Italian representatives showed how the Protectorate Treaty concluded in September 1926 between King Ibn Saud and the Amir Idrisi of Asir had modified, but had not simplified, the situation. Asir could usefully serve as a buffer State between the Hejaz and the Yemen, so as to avoid frontier friction which sooner or later could be a cause of conflict between the two Arab States. The Italian representatives added that the Treaty of 1926 clearly could not be recognised by the Imam Yahia, all the more that it referred to the boundaries of Asir, as fixed in 1921, whereas the Imam Yahia had not only already retaken possession of one part of the territory then occupied by Asir and which reached as far as Hodeida, but also claimed other territories. The Italian representatives, therefore, drew attention to the

desirability, also in regard to the political collaboration between Italy and Great Britain, that the attitude of Italy should not be openly contrary to the aspirations and to the interests of the Yemen, as would have occurred had any recognition in whatsoever manner been given to the validity of the treaty between the Hejaz and Asir, which the Italian Government therefore could not recognise. The British representatives saw the force of the statement made by their Italian colleagues and realised that the new treaty had in part modified the situation. They finally declared that they would ask London how the treaty had been interpreted there.

At the subsequent meeting of the 31st January the British representatives made it known that the Government of London did not propose to take active steps for the recognition of the treaty between the Hejaz and Asir, but that they could not return a refusal, in the event of Ibn Saud, with whom the British Government was in the process of concluding a Treaty of Friendship, asking them to take act of the treaty, since a refusal would have compromised the conclusion of the treaty under negotiation, to which the British Government attached great importance. In any event, the British Government declared "that the recognition of the treaty would not have signified recognition on their part of the frontiers of Asir, and that every territorial question was regarded as an internal Arab question, which did not interest the British Government." The Italian representatives objected that the treaty between the Hejaz and Asir had regard only to territorial questions, inasmuch as it assured to the Hejaz the Protectorate over Asir. The Hejaz would, on the contrary, have believed that in virtue of the English recognition they were authorised to attribute to themselves also the possession of Tehama, claimed by Asir as their own territory.

4. The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs thought it important to recall in detail the contents of the *procès verbaux* of the conversations of Rome, inasmuch as it believes that whilst the situation *de jure* has not been changed in any way, the situation *de facto* has been aggravated through the action of the Hejaz in consequence of acts performed last October by King Ibn Saud in regard to those territories of Asir which he already occupied.

Indeed, the agreements concluded last October between King Ibn Saud and the Amir of Asir, if they signify in substance the annexation to the Hejaz of the territory of Asir occupied by King Ibn Saud, do not eliminate the question of the boundaries between Asir and the Yemen, nor do they solve the conflicting claims of each of the two Arab Powers, the Hejaz and the Yemen, as to the part of Asir occupied by the other. The annexation performed by King Ibn Saud therefore aggravates the conflict between the two Arab potentates and increases the danger of grave consequences which it is the common interest of the British and Italian Governments to avoid by all the means in their power. This danger has already been brought by the Royal Government, through their Embassy in London, to the attention of the British Government; and the Royal Government recalls these warnings made in the spirit of mutual and trustful collaboration established since the Rome conversations of 1927, because in their opinion they should be borne in mind when considering the question of the recognition of the situation created by the Hejaz in Asir.

5. The British Government declares now that it is not possible to refrain indefinitely from answering the communication from the Hejaz Government.

The Italian Government, however, recall that during the conversations at Rome summarised above, the British representatives made it known that the London Government could not have refused a Hejaz request for the recognition of the Treaty of 1926 because they were in the process of concluding with the Hejaz a Treaty of Friendship, and a refusal would have compromised the conclusion of the said treaty, but that the treaty was nevertheless concluded in 1927, although the British Government still refrained from recognising the situation in Asir.

In any event the British representatives, in the name of their own Government, declared that the eventual recognition of the Treaty of Protectorate on the part of the British Government did not signify recognition on their part of the frontiers of Asir, and that every Arabian territorial question was regarded as an internal question which did not concern the British Government.

The Italian Government must consider that these declarations still have their full value, in view also of the fact that the territorial questions arising from the Ottoman succession in the territories of the Arabian Peninsula belonging to the

ex-Empire, were solved only partially internationally by the Treaties of Peace and the relative agreements. The Italian Government considers, however, that the juridical international situation must be taken into account in examining and eventually solving the questions concerning the Arabian Peninsula.

6. In the aide-mémoire left by the Embassy of His Britannic Majesty, it is pointed out that the Italian Government would presumably recognise the situation created by the Hejaz in Asir at the moment when the negotiations are concluded for the treaty which the Royal Government is negotiating with King Ibn Saud.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs desires to declare to the British Government that the Italian Government does not intend the recognition of Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and dependencies to prejudice the territorial questions concerning Asir.

7. In conclusion the Italian Government, desirous, as always, to proceed in this, as in all other questions, especially regarding the political situation of the Red Sea, in a spirit of frank and cordial collaboration with the British Government, feels obliged to call attention with the greatest frankness and loyalty to the repercussions on the pacific relations between the Hejaz and the Yemen, which might flow from the act of recognition which the former of these two States solicits in regard to Asir; repercussions which might be still more dangerous if, as the Italian representatives said at the Rome conversations, the Hejaz desired to interpret such recognition as an acceptance, not only of the annexation of Asir to the Hejaz, but also of the Hejaz claim to Tehama. An eventual and deplorable conflict between the two States concerned would, at the moment, be all the more grave for the reason that, as His Britannic Majesty's Embassy commented in their note of the 6th July, 1926, the British Government has felt obliged to allow, within the limits of the Convention of the Traffic of Arms of 1925, the free importation of arms and munitions into the Hejaz, and Italy has followed an analogous course for the importation of arms and munitions into the Yemen.

On all these grounds, which the Italian Government have thought it their duty to consider, they hope that the British Government will suspend action in regard to the request for recognition, in the interest of the maintenance of peace between the two potentates of the Arabian Peninsula, the principal aim of the conversations of Rome, which Italy has done, and is doing everything possible to achieve.

Rome, June 25, 1931.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Aide-mémoire.

BY an arrangement concluded last October and embodied in treaty form the Idrisi of Asir entrusted King Ibn Saud with the internal administration and financial organisation of his country, which will henceforth be governed by an Amir and a Financial Director appointed by King Ibn Saud with the help of an elected legislative council. By the Treaty of Mecca of September 1926 the Idrisi had already handed over the control of his foreign relations.

In the course of the Rome conversations of 1927 His Majesty's Government undertook not to volunteer, but to postpone as long as possible, recognition of this treaty and in any case to defer recognition of its territorial provisions and implications. But the situation has materially changed since the date of this undertaking as a result of the complete surrender by the Idrisi of all his powers of internal government to King Ibn Saud and the resultant change in the status of Asir which, it seems clear, can now only be regarded, from the point of view of international law, as a part of the latter's dominions, having, for practical purposes, been ceded in full sovereignty.

His Majesty's Government are in receipt of a note from the Hejazi Government which assumes their acquiescence in what must, in their opinion, be regarded as the *de facto* and *de jure* status of Asir. It is impossible indefinitely to abstain from replying to this communication or to refuse to communicate with the Hejazi Government regarding Asir. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government would propose forthwith to recognise the effects of the new arrangement between King Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, but, before doing so, they would be glad to receive

the observations of the Italian Government. They trust that they may receive an early and favourable reply on the matter, more especially as the complete absorption of Asir into King Ibn Saud's dominions is a fact which the Italian Government themselves will presumably have to accept if the treaty which they are about to negotiate with Ibn Saud is to be concluded.

Rome, May 30, 1931.

[E 3460/100/25]

No. 4.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 173.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 13, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the usual annual report on the pilgrimage of 1930. I greatly regret the delay in furnishing this report, which has been held up owing to the absence of the Indian vice-consul on leave, his subsequent illness, and the paucity of career staff. An effort will be made to furnish the 1931 report in the autumn.

2. This report has been prepared in its final shape by Mr. Wikeley and myself from material supplied by the officers in charge of the special pilgrimage sections of the Legation, Munshi Ihsanullah, Haji Abdul Majid and Captain B. W. Seager. I wish to record my appreciation of the excellent work done by those officers, and may, without making any invidious distinction, draw your special attention to that of Munshi Ihsanullah, who had to deal with very large numbers of pilgrims of a different type. The work of Dr. Abdul Hamid, the Indian medical officer attached to the Legation, also deserves high commendation.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to India, Singapore, Cairo, Khartum, Lagos, Jerusalem and Bagdad.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Report on the Pilgrimage of 1930.

(1) *Introductory and General.*

THE close of the 1929 pilgrimage season coincided with a recrudescence of the rebellion under Faisal-ad-Dawish and other leaders in Nejd. It was not finally quelled until early in January 1930, when the principal leaders, having escaped across the frontiers, surrendered in Koweit and Iraq. This long continuance of unsettled conditions might have had an adverse effect on the 1930 pilgrimage, and consequently on the finances of the Hejaz-Nejd Government, at a moment when they were emerging from an acute internal crisis. The revolt in the region between Mecca and Riyadh had, however, been crushed in the autumn of 1929. Sufficient secrecy was maintained regarding the general situation to prevent its becoming known to intending pilgrims in such a way as to alarm them. The Javanese, always the earliest to arrive, came forward normally, as did other pilgrims in due course.

2. The Haj festival in 1930 began on Wednesday, the 7th May, although, as on other occasions, there was controversy in India and the Hejaz regarding the date of the new moon's appearance. It had been hoped by many that the feast would begin on a Friday, and that the pilgrimage would therefore be a source of sevenfold blessing. This brought to the Hejaz many pilgrims, who had already accomplished the pilgrimage in previous years. Much disappointment resulted.

3. The climatic conditions at Muna and Arafat were favourable. There was no epidemic disease, and the number of deaths at those places was considerably fewer than in previous years. The mortality during the actual festival was officially put at 123 deaths, mainly due to old age and other ordinary causes, among a total attendance of about 100,000 pilgrims. It may be mentioned incidentally that the reduction in the number of deaths reacted unfavourably on the mutawwifs, when opportunities for converting to their own use the effects of pilgrims dying at Muna and Arafat were curtailed.

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4. Detailed statistics of the pilgrimage are given in section (2). The total number of pilgrims from overseas was substantially the same as in 1929, and is estimated at between 81,000 and 85,000. There was some variation in the elements of various nationalities. The numbers from Java and Malaya were not affected by the slump in rice and rubber in those countries. The total of Malay pilgrims, indeed, increased from 1,406 in 1929 to 2,609 in 1930. The number of pilgrims from Indian ports fell from 19,656 in 1929 to 16,697 in 1930; and the number of British Indians from 15,146 in 1929 to 11,061 in 1930. This latter decrease was attributed to political unrest and financial difficulties in India. Although the various increases and decreases more or less cancelled out, the average wealth of the overseas pilgrims was much less than in the previous year. The purchasing capacity of the average pilgrim, who formerly spent a good deal on such things as mementos of the Holy Land, was lower than in the past. It was still further reduced by the increased demands of the Government and other necessary charges. Thus, the camel hire to Arafat was doubled without previous notice, and that from Mecca to Jedda, payable at a time when the pilgrim's resources are already apt to be getting exhausted, was raised from Rs. 15/8/- to Rs. 28. This produced a comparative stagnation of local trade. Sales of goods were stated by merchants to be less by two-thirds than in 1929. The market was overstocked. Traders were compelled to realise at low prices, but even the consequent competition and cutting of prices did little to increase demand.

5. The number of pilgrims from the Hejaz itself and the interior of Arabia was considerably less than in 1929, owing, it is said, to financial stringency in the Hejaz and the unsettlement created elsewhere by the 1929 rebellion. On the other hand, an unusually large number of members of the Royal Family, and officials, &c., from Nejd took part in the pilgrimage. They were allowed the privilege of going to Muna and Arafat by motor car, an unprecedented mode of pilgrim-approach to those places, and one which greatly incommoded others. About 300 cars and buses took the road to Arafat at the same time as the camels, making their way through the lines of the latter. Much confusion ensued; litters were overturned, and a good many pilgrims sustained injury. The commandeering of houses at Mecca and Muna from their owners, or pilgrims who had booked them ahead, in order to provide accommodation for the Nejd visitors was a further cause of complaint, as pilgrims who had secured accommodation, arranged for water supplies, &c., were driven into tents. Among the houses commandeered was that maintained by the State of Hyderabad at Muna. This had happened before in 1929, and the leader of the Hyderabad party was, in 1930, provided with a letter, which it was hoped would afford them protection. They were, however, again deprived of the house and the water which had been stored for their use.

6. The Nejdīs and the motor cars caused inconvenience in other ways. Although a separate road for cars was provided at Muna to facilitate the performance of ceremonies and prevent congestion in the main thoroughfare, the distinction was not observed until the King, on returning from Mecca after the festival, himself saw the state of affairs and personally lashed the drivers who had broken the rules. His slaves in Mecca behaved offensively. The Indian vice-consul saw them pelt pilgrims with melon-rinds. One of the objects of this insult was one Abdul-Hai, a teacher of Arabic at Oxford and a Royal guest. He complained to the King, who was understood to have punished the offenders.

7. The security which Ibn Saud has established on the roads was well maintained, but there were many complaints in 1930 of petty thefts and pilferage at Muzalfa, where pilgrims stop for a night on the way from Muna to Arafat. The state of the roads generally has not improved. The stretch of 10 miles of good road made between Jedda and Mecca in 1927 has been allowed to deteriorate, and was in 1930 no better than the rest of the highway. The usual water-troughs and first-aid sheds were provided on the road from Mecca to Arafat, and an attempt was made at lighting it. Owing to the financial stringency, however, there was a paucity of doctors, and little medical help was available in the sheds. A few cars plied at Muna and Arafat to pick up sick and infirm persons, but there was little demand for them, and they were used by the doctors to transport their friends and fellow-countrymen, to the further inconvenience of other pilgrims.

8. The growing use of motor cars for pilgrim transport has had various incidental consequences. The camel-owners have suffered severely, and are being

turned into a discontented class. Accidents, due to bad roads and the incompetent driving of cars, were numerous in 1930. There were complaints of loss to pilgrims caused by their property falling from cars, and less trouble being taken than formerly by drivers, motor-owners and public authorities to recover it. A serious fire, involving the destruction of eight motor vehicles, broke out on or about the 22nd May at the Masajid halt, on the road between Jedda and Medina. The question of transport will be dealt with more fully in a separate section.

9. There was again no Moslem Conference at Mecca in 1930. The King gave a large banquet, which was attended by Moslems of all nations, including a good many Indians. Syrians were much in evidence; Javanese conspicuous by their absence. The King delivered a speech dealing largely with the need for unity among Moslems. His assertion of Wahhabi tenets elicited a protest from an indiscreet Egyptian theologian, whose outburst brought the party to an end.

10. The dispersal of the pilgrimage was effected in generally satisfactory conditions. Much complaint was caused, however, by the action of the authorities in detaining at Mecca pilgrims who did not intend to go to Medina. Those who did intend to do this were first released; a novel procedure, designed, it was alleged, to make sure that the Government would get the heavy Koshan tax payable on the journey to Medina; the theory being that if they came to Jedda with the other pilgrims many of them would abandon the Medina pilgrimage from lack of funds or a desire to go home earlier. This is a further indication of the effects of unbalanced finance. General depression and the stagnation of trade already referred to drove the Government to extortionate devices, while the extravagance of expenditure in certain directions, including that of a Royal Family increasingly inclined to luxury, does nothing to lighten the debit side of the budget.

11. Homeward shipping arrangements were on the whole satisfactory. Hardship was, however, caused in the case of Indian pilgrims by the transaction whereby Messrs. Turner Morrison and Co. held those ships which had imported Indian pilgrims at the disposal of the Khedivial Mail Company for the repatriation of Egyptians. This and a particular instance in which the conduct of the officers of the steamship "Shuja" gave rise to complaint will be dealt with later.

12. Indian pilgrims were for a time threatened with serious difficulty owing to the circulation of forged Indian currency notes. Local money-changers and merchants were unable to distinguish the forgeries from genuine notes, but confidence was restored by arrangements which it proved possible to make with the leading houses in Jedda. From investigations made with great zeal by the Indian vice-consul, Munshi Ihsanullah, during his leave in Syria after the pilgrimage, it appeared that the forged notes were manufactured in Europe and marketed by intermediaries in Syria. As a result of the Munshi's activity, serious steps were subsequently taken to run the distributors of the forgeries to earth.

13. The arrangements for the recovery of the effects of deceased pilgrims were not so good as in 1929, a considerable proportion of the cash and other property remaining in the hands of the mutawwifs. The average estate of a deceased pilgrim, which in 1928 was estimated at 34 rupees, in 1930 fell as low as 18 rupees; moreover, there was considerable delay in the delivering of the effects to the Legation.

14. The number of destitute Indian pilgrims repatriated at Government expense was large, being 387 as against 139 in 1929. The main causes of this increase were (1) a large number of pilgrims coming by the overland route and (2) an increase in the number of those who travelled on single tickets, having made a "non-return" declaration in India. This latter category come mostly from Karachi.

15. A large number of better class Indians came on pilgrimage; the following names may be mentioned: Nawab Mir Masud Alam Khan, C.I.E., of Belha, Surat; Mr. Badi-uz-Zaman, M.L.A.; Mr. A. Rahim, C.I.E., M.L.G., of Bengal; and Khan Bahadur Nabi Bux, M.L.C., of Bombay. Among Indian political undesirables who came to the Hejaz may be mentioned Moulvi Nesar Ahmed, of Cawnpore, Ismail Ghaznavi and Khaja Ghulum Mohammed. The last named is said to have carried on anti-British propaganda on board the ship in which he travelled to this country.

16. Many of the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraphs threw additional work on the Indian vice-consul and his staff. It must be remembered

that every reform designed to promote the well-being of pilgrims entails a greater amount of routine work in this section of the British Legation; and every deterioration in the conditions prevailing in the Hejaz, whether it be abuse by mutawwifs or transporters, loss of effects by pilfering, &c., the malversion of deceased pilgrims' estates or any other form of hardship, involves a still further increase of work.

17. The published and confidential reports of the Haj Enquiry Committee, which sat in India from April to December 1929, were published early in 1930. These valuable reports cover a very wide range of questions, including many of a difficult and some of a contentious nature which require further exploration. A number of the questions relate to arrangements in the Hejaz or arrangements in India producing effects in the Hejaz. His Majesty's Legation in Jedda has been consulted on several important recommendations made by the committee. It is greatly regretted that their full consideration in Jedda has been delayed by staff changes consequent on the conversion of the British agency into a Legation, by the absence for some months of Munshi Ihsanullah on well-deserved leave of absence and by paucity of career staff throughout a period of considerable political activity.

18. The other elements in the pilgrimage of special British interest call for little mention in this introductory section. Measures for securing better control of the pilgrimage from West Africa were still under consideration throughout 1930, and things remained as they were during that year's pilgrimage. No large number of Nigerian pilgrims has to be repatriated as destitutes, thanks to the operation of the compulsory return ticket system for the passage from Suakin. The pilgrims from Africa included a Nigerian chieftain named Ibrahim Igbirra. Afghan destitutes were repatriated at the expense of the local Government. The Turkish consulate did nothing for them in 1930. The Malay pilgrimage worked satisfactorily. The pilgrims from Malaya included the Prime Minister of Kelantan. Two cousins of the Sheikh of Bahrein also made the pilgrimage and were entertained as Royal guests.

19. The pilgrimage was marred by one great tragedy, namely, the burning of the steamship "Asia" in Jedda Harbour on the 22nd May. This vessel, which was due to sail on that date, but had been detained in harbour for another night, caught fire about 7 P.M. The fire broke out forward, and, as the ship was swinging to wind anchored by the bow, it soon spread to all parts of the ship. Approximately 1,550 pilgrims bound for the Yemen and French Somaliland were aboard at the time, but as a result of the prompt action of the captains and crews of the other pilgrim ships in harbour, who immediately proceeded to the rescue, most of these were saved. The total number of deaths is estimated at 106.

20. As in 1929 and 1928, no "Mahmal" was sent from Egypt in 1930. It is hoped, however, that the Hejaz Government may in future, in consideration of the monetary contributions which would probably accompany the Mahmal, permit this old custom to be revived. In the present circumstances the Hejazi Government have themselves to spend a considerable sum annually on the manufacture of a covering for the Kaaba. It may be noted in this connexion that negotiations are at present being carried on between the two countries, and that the attitude of the Hejazi Government is a conciliatory one. One proof of this is that the Egyptian medical mission this year, although it was not permitted to import its own ambulances, was provided by the local Government with cars—bearing Hejazi flags—and was transported to Arafat and Muna in motor ambulance buses, also supplied by the Hejazi authorities. Permission was given for the Egyptian flag to be flown over the mission's residence at Mecca. After the pilgrimage was over, however, a good deal of ill-feeling was caused in Hejazi Government circles by the action of the Alexandria Quarantine Board in declaring the pilgrimage infected, although the Hejazi Government had officially declared it clean. This was due to the discovery of possible symptoms of cholera among many returning pilgrims at Tor, and the serious view taken by the board was confirmed by a report from Massowah that an unmistakable case of cholera had been ascertained there.

(2) Statistics.

21. The estimated number of pilgrims coming on Haj from overseas in 1930 was approximately the same as in 1929. As usual it is impossible to obtain

exact statistics, as the local quarantine authorities, who should have the best information, classify pilgrims by race rather than nationality, including, for instance, Malaysians, Siamese, Filipinos and others from islands in the Far East under the heading of Javanese; Pathans, Indian frontiersmen generally and Baluchis under the heading of Afghans, &c. There are also discrepancies according to whether the sources of information take account of children or not. These differences will account for discrepancies in the appended tables. An attempt has been made on this occasion to classify the information on a more coherent geographical basis than in previous years. In order to facilitate comparison the figures for the whole five years since Ibn Saud established his supremacy in the Hejaz are given. Further statistical information regarding the sea-borne pilgrimage from the north will be found in the reports of the Alexandria Quarantine Board.

TABLE (A).

NUMBER of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Nationality.

Nationality.	1926.	1927.	1928.	1929.	1930.
India and Far East—					
Indian	18,937	26,514 ^(b)	14,022 ^(c)	15,146	11,061
Malayan	5,500	29,706 ^(c)	4,499 ^(f)	1,435	2,590
Dutch East Indian	5,110	39,704	42,730	31,119	32,000
Chinese and other	66	..	2,246	1,115	1,367 ^(e)
Africa ^(*) —					
North African	115	2,735	2,335 ^(g)	4,328 ^(j)	1,353 ^(h)
Egyptian	16,094	15,547	14,099	18,522	17,127
Sudanese	957	2,014	1,371	1,065
West African	1,377	589	2,051 ^(k)	2,338	3,525
Senegali	14	124	91	73	38
Eritrean	76	33	..
Somali	215	180	266	263 ^(k)	342 ^(e)
Zanzibari and East African	7	104	34	42	69
South African	1	100	112	85	85
Unclassified	490
Arab countries—					
Syrian	499	1,511	1,109	962	1,209
Iraqi	199	750 ^(e)	528 ^(l)	207	278
Palestinian	168	333	471	558	380
Yemeni	565	1,334	1,242	1,867	2,055
Hadrami	360	669	732	772	659
Muscati	215	117	341	229	99
Hejazi	1,729	335	1,169	968	1,279
Nejdi	9	39	74	62	..
Unclassified	187
Miscellaneous—					
Afghans	2,445	3,858	3,022	1,705	1,218
Bukharans	1,470	3,469	1,987	207	1,603
Persians	475	2,248	3,403	3,808	3,337
Russian	315	749
Turkish	157	684	875	214	125
Unclassified	889	1,954
Total	55,725	132,109	100,767	88,538 ^(l)	84,821

Notes on Table (A).

(*) Classification sometimes doubtful in the case of the remoter parts of Africa.

(b) Including 18 Cingalese shown separately.

(c) Including 102 Sarawakis shown separately.

(d) Including 73 Kurds shown separately.

(e) Including 68 Cingalese shown separately.

(f) Including 81 Sarawakis shown separately.

(g) Made up of 183 Tripolitans and Cyrenaicans, 1,401 Algerians, 151 Moroccans, 600 Tunisians.

(h) British and French.

(i) Including Kurds.

(j) Made up of 132 Tripolitans and Cyrenaicans, 2,200 Algerians, 700 Moroccans, 1,436 Tunisians.

(k) Shown as 249 British and 14 Italian Somalis.

(l) Corrected from total in 1929 report.

(m) Including 4 shown as from French Indies.

(n) Made up of 685 Algerians, 163 Moroccans, 470 Tunisians, 35 North Africans living in France.

(o) Made up of 84 French Sudanese, 17 French Somalis, 240 Jirat and Somalis.

TABLE (B).

NUMBER of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Countries of Embarkation.

Country of Embarkation.	1926.	1927.	1928.	1929.	1930.
India and the Far East—					
India	24,331	36,089	22,063	19,656	16,697
Malaya	9,600	29,604	15,279	4,297	6,893
Dutch East Indies ..	2,097	39,157	32,568	28,277	30,587
Africa—					
North Africa	1,855	2,390	4,396	1,246
Egypt	16,750	18,876	11,577	20,409	17,923
Sudan	1,530	1,613	1,874	2,334	5,042
Eritrea	(*)	650	652	635
French Somaliland
East Africa	484	104	123	305	75
South Africa	81
Arab Countries—					
Syria	458	1,977	100	962	2,631
Iraq	222
Yemen	1,429
Aden	326	1,945(*)	786
Hadramout	356	772	177
Miscellaneous—					
Persia	380
Russia	315	749	207	6
Turkey	574	..	317	..
Total	55,584	132,109	87,729	82,584	..

(*) Massowah included in the Yemen.

TABLE (C).

NUMBER of Ships transporting Pilgrims to the Hejaz and Number of Pilgrims carried under each Flag.

(N.B.—This includes the number of voyages made by each ship.)

Flag.	1926.		1927.		1928.		1929.		1930.	
	No. of Ships.	No. of Pilgrims.	No. of Ships.	No. of Pilgrims.	No. of Ships.	No. of Pilgrims.	No. of Ships.	No. of Pilgrims.	No. of Ships.	No. of Pilgrims.
British	29	51,343	102	79,272	104	51,427	109	56,588	116	53,661
Dutch	12	2,087	27	31,353	29	32,568	32	20,199	38	26,956
French	1	987	2	3,805	2	1,346
Italian	4	487	30	18,812	21	1,006	22	652	32	2,264
Soviet	1	315	2	749	1	524	6	5,04
Egyptian	2	1,089	1	977	1	31	2	815
Turkish	1	574
Greek	2	578	1	111	2	961
	49	55,584	163	131,414	160	87,729	168	82,583	194	84,821

(3) Quarantine.

22. The usual quarantine arrangements were instituted at Kamaran, Tor and Suakin for the 1930 pilgrimage.

Kamaran.

23. Compulsory vaccination and inoculation against small-pox and cholera having been enforced by the Government of the Straits Settlements, the pilgrims

coming from that country were in 1930, for the first time in the history of the Malay pilgrimage, allowed to proceed to Jedda, after medical examination at Kamaran, but without landing, in the same way as the Javanese pilgrims.

23A. The pilgrim ships coming from India, with the exception of two steamers, one from Bombay and Karachi, and the other from Calcutta direct, whose passengers were inoculated against cholera, were made to land their pilgrims at Kamaran in order to undergo the usual formalities. This led, as in previous years, to violent criticism and complaints of the same nature as those described in the pilgrimage report for 1929.

23B. Now that the Haj Enquiry Committee has pronounced in favour of compulsory inoculation against cholera (paragraphs 261 ff of published report) it is to be hoped that the Government of India will take steps to enforce this by legislation as soon as possible. The advantages of such inoculation cannot be over-estimated. In view of the difficulties which arise at Kamaran and for other reasons it is most desirable that Indian pilgrims should be subject to the same rules and enjoy the same consequent benefits as the Javanese and Malaysians. The recommendations of the committee in favour of promoting voluntary inoculation pending legislation have had little effect.

23C. After leaving Kamaran all ships were found clean with the exception of the steamship "Arabistan," which arrived in Jedda on the 18th February with two cases of small-pox on board. These two cases were isolated and sent to the local hospital for treatment, while the rest of the pilgrims on board were allowed to land without restriction.

Ships returning to India and Malaya after the pilgrimage were not required to call at Kamaran in view of the satisfactory report on the sanitary aspects of the pilgrimage furnished by the Indian doctor attached to the Legation and an official declaration by the Hejazi authorities that the Haj was clean. A guarded intimation to agents by His Majesty's Minister that it would probably be unnecessary to call at Kamaran was confirmed by the Government of India and tacitly by the Government of the Straits Settlements after they had been telegraphically informed. Sir A. Ryan subsequently raised the question whether the Legation should be empowered in certain circumstances to dispense pilgrim ships definitely from calling at Kamaran on return voyages, in view of the desirability of not detaining ships during the rush period, pending a decision being taken by the authorities in India and Malaya.

Tor.

24. Although the Haj was declared clean by the Hejazi Government, the International Quarantine Board at Alexandria decided, in view of the discovery at Tor of numerous symptoms pointing to the possible existence of cholera among returning pilgrims, to declare the pilgrimage infected. As a result of medical examination of the first shipload, vibrios presenting the appearance of cholera were found in nine specimens out of a total of 140 cases examined. Agglutinating vibrios were detected in one of the suspect cases and non-agglutinating vibrios in the remaining eight. In the event it was found that among a total number of 20,730 specimens of stools examined at Tor, forty-five showed the presence of vibrios; two agglutinating and the rest non-agglutinating. The decision of the Quarantine Board was, in the first instance, provisional, but it was confirmed for the remainder of the season on receipt of news from the Government of Eritrea that a pilgrim had died the same day in circumstances which were regarded as showing unmistakably that he had had cholera.

As a result of this decision all pilgrims returning northward through the Red Sea were subjected to quarantine at Tor, where the Egyptian pilgrims had to stay for eight days and the non-Egyptians for five days. The total number of pilgrims who thus passed was 24,537. Of these, 17,230 were Egyptians and 7,307 were foreigners.

The Hejazi Government, having themselves declared the Haj clean, naturally resented the decision of the International Quarantine Board, and severe criticism was indulged in both in the press and officially to the effect that the Alexandria Board had acted without justification. The Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs forwarded to the British Legation and presumably to other missions a copy of a report signed by thirteen doctors declaring that the Haj was free from all epidemic or contagious disease, together with another report

signed by twenty-six doctors, both natives and foreigners, including the Russian doctor of the Soviet Legation who specialises in bacteriology and tropical diseases. The Hejazi Government also laid its grievances before the French Government, who transmitted the papers to the International Health Office. The latter was embarrassed by certain technical considerations, but gave qualified approval to the action of the Alexandria Board as an emergency measure taken in exceptional circumstances. The Health Office suggested that a formula might be devised for future similar occasions, which would enable necessary precautions to be taken without definitely declaring the pilgrimage infected. The incident led to a suggestion being made unofficially on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the Hejazi Government that they would find it useful to adhere to the Rome Convention of 1907, and thus secure permanent representation in the International Health Office at Paris.

Suakin.

25. Following on the decision of the Alexandria Board, the Sudan Government also took precautionary measures to restrict the number of returning pilgrims allowed to land in the Sudan. Those permitted to do so were subjected to quarantine, normally for five days, at Suakin.

Jedda.

26. None of the pilgrim steamers was quarantined, with the exception of an Italian boat which carried about 900 pilgrims from Hodeidah and had not called at Kamaran. The pilgrims on board were sent to the Quarantine Islands, where, it is understood, they were merely detained; no arrangements for disinfecting their persons or effects were made. A few individuals suffering from small-pox coming by other ships were not sent to the islands, but were removed to the local hospital for treatment.

The local authorities on learning in June that Port Said was declared infected with plague, tried to prevent pilgrims embarking on a Blue Funnel steamer calling at Jedda on its way from Port Said to Singapore. The difficulty was, however, got over by representations to the King.

There were again in 1930 only two official doctors for inspecting ships. It was, therefore, not uncommon that considerable delay occurred to steamers, of which the daily number on occasions reached as many as eight or nine, before they were declared clean.

The quarantine yard at the quay in Jedda provided only limited accommodation and seemed fully packed and overcrowded. Owing to the great congestion the pilgrims had to struggle hard to pass through the little gates leading to the custom-house. Here the dhow hire is collected and declarations of choice of mutawwifs (Su'al) taken before they are allowed to pass. The local authorities, on the unofficial suggestion of the Indian vice-consul, opened a second gate. This, however, did not prove quite adequate. The hardy and rowdy Persians and Egyptians, caring little for the local rules and regulations, often upset every arrangement, and tried to get through first at the expense of the pilgrims of a less robust type. A handful of young and weak police constables posted there could do nothing to control the situation and had often to fly for their own safety. On many occasions the Indian vice-consul and his staff themselves had to control the situation.

(4) *Health.*

27. This important subject has been dealt with in detail in previous years, and it is gratifying to see that it is engaging the careful attention of the authorities concerned.

28. In the Hejaz Administration itself, however, little improvement can be noted. The following list taken from the Mecca weekly newspaper shows the attendance and mortality in the Government hospitals for the ten months ending December 1930.

Name of Disease.	No. of Cases.	No. of Deaths.
Whooping cough	44	17
Dysentery	1,647	388
Para-typhoid	90	62
Typhoid	160	147
Puerperal fever	79	64
Smallpox	217	97
Measles	143	92
Meningitis	53	44
Leprosy	3	2
Syphilis	109	15
Diphtheria	5	5
Fever	3	3
Dengue	20	16
Mumps	8	1
Erysipelas	3	1
Anthrax	1	1
Consumption	2	2
	2,590	958

29. The mortality, it will be observed, is high, and there is no mention of surgical cases. In 1928 a Syrian surgeon was brought to the country by the Government. He performed twenty-seven operations in all, all of which were fatal, some patients dying on the operation table, others within a day or two after the operation. The surgeon then departed and since that date no Government surgeon has been available.

30. The medical officers employed by the Government are nearly all Syrians who, in addition to being unqualified and inexperienced, make it their object to line their pockets rather than afford relief to pilgrims. The high fee of £1 is charged for each visit and sometimes even when the patient comes to the doctor's consulting room; this fee even the local residents cannot afford, not to speak of the average pilgrim of moderate means. The charges for medicines are, moreover, unusually high. The result of these various considerations is to render it practically impossible for pilgrims of average means to visit the hospitals.

31. The hospitals themselves, apart from their inability to meet the needs of the pilgrims, are equally unable to provide sound medical aid for the residents of the country. From a study of the list given above, it will be seen that the total number of patients admitted to all the thirteen hospitals in the country during ten months amounted to 2,590, and this among the whole population of the country plus 82,000 pilgrims, making a monthly attendance of approximately twenty patients per hospital. This by no means implies that the country is free from disease, for it is rather more liable to disease than other countries in view of the annual presence of a large number of pilgrims of all sorts and conditions, bad water supply, abundance of mosquitos, and the general ignorance of the public and their negligence in observing the elementary rules of hygiene and sanitation.

32. As regards the central hospital at Mecca, no improvements have been made on the conditions previously obtaining. The number of doctors employed was inadequate and was even less than in 1929. No arrangements were made to segregate infectious patients from others, and cases of syphilis and leprosy, or of other such contagious diseases, were to be seen lying side by side with other patients. These conditions can only be traced to general financial stringency, although the Hejaz Government collected last year about 6 rupees per pilgrim, through the mutawwifs, in addition to the quarantine fee of over £1 per pilgrim collected through the shipping companies. The sheds erected last year on the Mecca-Arafat Road for providing medical relief were again opened this year, and 1,416 pilgrims were officially shown to have received medical aid from them, but the number cannot be vouched for.

33. The foregoing observations are intended to throw light on the sanitary and hygienic state of the country, and should be considered in connexion with the scheme at present being examined by the Government of India for the provision of better and more adequate medical help for Indian pilgrims.

34. There was no epidemic during the pilgrimage season. The most prevalent diseases among pilgrims were dysentery and malaria, while comparatively small number suffered from respiratory troubles, heat stroke, pneumonia and bronchitis. Sore throats were frequent amongst the pilgrims at the time of their landing at Jedda, which troubles, according to the Legation doctor's report, are to a large extent due to exposure at Kamaran. Malaria, which accounts for a large percentage of cases was prevalent specially at Mecca and Jedda, where tanks and cisterns of water teem with mosquitos. Dysentery is endemic and was responsible for 388 deaths out of 958 from contagious and infectious diseases. A large number of Indian pilgrims suffered from this disease. Flies, contaminated water, and the use of common latrines are the chief causes of this and are likely to remain so until the whole question of water supply and latrines has been scientifically studied; there is little likelihood of this being done in the near future.

Mortality.

35. A percentage of 8.2 or 2,622 deaths were reported among the Javanese; Malaysians had nearly the same percentage, *i.e.*, 203 deaths, while among the Indian pilgrims a marked reduction in mortality occurred, the number of deaths being 295, which reduces the percentage to less than 3, *i.e.*, half that of last year. The total number of deaths during the four days' stay at Muna and Arafat was, according to the official report, only 123 in about 100,000. These were attributed mainly to old age and ordinary diseases; sun-stroke, dysentery and malaria being responsible for a small number. The temperature in the shade at Arafat was 105°, while during the three days' stay at Muna it went down to 100° and below.

Sanitary Conditions: General.

36. With the exception of a little street cleaning and sprinkling of scanty water by a car on the main thoroughfares, no improvements were made by the Government during the pilgrimage this year. Filth, dirt, dust and mosquitos abounded everywhere and made life almost unbearable. No attention has yet been paid to the most important question of the construction of public lavatories. Consequently, as usual, the pilgrims utilised the nearest side of the street or any convenient wall for the purpose. Moreover, the soak pits beneath the ground floors of houses which collect all human excreta and other dirt and filth are seldom cleaned or disinfected; the mutawwifs, it is true, were instructed to use phenyl, but its use being expensive, it was used by very few. Besides this, the houses in which the average pilgrim is accommodated at Muna are for the most part in an advanced state of dilapidation and full of vermin. Arrangements for the slaughter of sacrificial animals at Muna, as reported in 1929, were satisfactory. Nevertheless, a good number of animals were slaughtered near the camps and left to decompose. The resulting stench was so overpowering that an Egyptian pilgrim, in the presence of the Indian vice-consul, in the open Darbar of Ibn Saud criticised the unbearable conditions due to the negligence of the Hejaz sanitary authorities.

Water Supply.

37. There was no difficulty in obtaining water at Jedda, Mecca, Muna or Arafat. The price of a tin of 4 gallons of water varied from 2 to 4 piastres (annas). The abundance of water supply in the two last-named places was mainly due to the efforts of the Zubaida Committee, which had caused the canal supplying water to those places to be cleaned for many furlongs. The Government imposed a tax of 1 rupee per pilgrim for the maintenance and upkeep of the canal, which amount is collected by the committee through the mutawwifs; in addition, many benevolent Indians donated large sums for this purpose. The committee is under the guidance of a British Indian subject domiciled at Mecca, who is an honest worker and who ensures that the amount collected is honestly and rightly spent.

Government of India Dispensaries.

38. The total number of Indian pilgrims who attended the dispensaries from the 10th May to the 1st July, 1930, was 4,810 at Jedda, and 5,008 at Mecca;

while the total number of patients throughout the year, including Hejazis, was 25,359.

The table of diseases given below shows roughly the percentage of cases treated at the dispensaries at Jedda, Mecca, and Muna:—

Medical.	Percentage.
Malaria and its complications...	30
Other infective diseases ...	05
Urinary diseases, including gonorrhoea and syphilis ...	19.05
Digestive troubles ...	16
Circulatory diseases ...	1
Respiratory diseases...	1.5
Nervous diseases ...	2
Diseases of the locomotory system ...	5
Women's diseases ...	3
Children's diseases ...	3
Eye, ear, nose and throat diseases ...	6
Sinuses, fistulae, &c. ...	10
Wounds, contusions ...	9.5
Fractures and dislocations ...	5
Hydrocele and hernia ...	5
Stone in bladder ...	1

39. For many years the Indian doctor has been prohibited from indulging in private practice at Mecca. Well-to-do pilgrims, however, who want his services at their houses, for which they are of course prepared to pay, often object to this restriction, thereby giving rise to a somewhat difficult problem. On the one hand, there is the consideration due to the well-to-do class of pilgrims, especially ladies, who as a result of distance and heat, &c., cannot come in person for treatment. On the other hand, if private practice were to be allowed, the doctor would naturally spend comparatively little time in the dispensary, to the great detriment of the poorer class of pilgrims. Under the circumstances, it was thought best that Dr. Abdul Hamid should attend better-class patients, especially respectable ladies, in their houses free, as an experiment. This privilege was only consented to persons who were known to be deserving of it both as regards their social status and the gravity of their ailment. These domiciliary visits, however, took up a considerable portion of the doctor's time and energy on account of the distance he often had to traverse in order to visit the patients. Before the actual Haj period the doctor was able to use a car for this purpose, but during the Haj, and for a few days before and after it, no cars were allowed to circulate in Mecca, except those belonging to the Government and those used by the Egyptian Medical Mission. In some cases pilgrims who could quite well have attended at the dispensary in person, tried to take advantage of the system of free domiciliary visits and induce the doctor to visit them in their houses. It is suggested that in order to put a stop to this abuse, and to limit the number of calls on his time and energy, the doctor should be allowed to charge a fee sufficient to cover the necessary motor or cab hire—provided always that the system of such domiciliary visits is continued in future.

Staff.

40. A military sub-assistant surgeon was again deputed by the Government of India to work at the Mecca dispensary. He arrived here on the 25th April and left for Mecca on the 27th. He was, as usual, assisted by a Malay dresser. The latter's services, however, proved useful neither to the Indians nor to his own pilgrims because he was unable to speak Hindustani, and because Malay pilgrims live in a distant quarter of the town far from the dispensary. This question is at present under discussion, and it seems probable that—with the consent of the Government of the Straits Settlements—Malay pilgrims shall be attended by the Javanese doctor attached to the Dutch Legation, and that an Indian compounder will be sent to take the place of the Malay dresser on Dr. Abdul Hamid's staff. Dr. Hamid Hussan performed his duties satisfactorily.

Dr. Abdul Hamid, on account of the fact that pilgrim ships continued arriving until the latest date which permitted of pilgrims reaching Mecca in time for the Haj, could not proceed to Mecca before the 28th April. He was accompanied by two compounders, and after his arrival the work of medical relief reached its highest point and was vigorously and efficiently carried out. The daily number of pilgrims attending the dispensary was considerable, and during their short stay there both the doctors and compounders had their time fully occupied. The dispensary was kept open throughout the day and also in the evening. Unfortunately, however, as his presence was required at Jedda, Dr. Abdul Hamid could not remain in Mecca for long, and had to return to Jedda on the second day after the Haj. In his absence the Mecca dispensary was left in the charge of the sub-assistant surgeon.

All told, the Government of India can rest assured that their present medical mission to the Hejaz achieves a great measure of success; if and when, however, the enlarged medical scheme which is now under consideration by the Government of India is realised, then it is hoped that even more adequate and efficient arrangements will be possible. At Jedda, Dr. Abdul Hamid was single-handed. Nevertheless during the pilgrim season, in addition to the usual working hours, he opened the dispensary in the afternoon, which was of considerable benefit to the pilgrims. The daily attendance at the Jedda dispensary was over 100 patients.

(5) Transport.

41. As usual, motor vehicles, camels and arabias were used for the transport of pilgrims.

Motor Traffic.—No appreciable improvement over the conditions prevailing last year was noticeable during the season under review. It is true that the number of vehicles was, according to official statistics, greater than last year, being slightly over 1,000; in point of fact, however, a good number of these were old machines, and, as deterioration is very rapid in this country, were either totally unfit for work during the greater part of the season or so unreliable as to be impossible for long journeys to Medina, &c., being used only for work between Jedda and Mecca. The financial position of the car owners being poor, old and unreliable cars could not be replaced. The number of touring cars showed a decrease, for they, owing to the fact that petrol and other expenses are the same as for lorries which carry thrice as many passengers, bring in little or no profit to the owners. This year touring cars, in more than one case, were used as advertisements to attract potential passengers rather than as actual conveyances. The well-to-do and better class pilgrims, who always prefer to travel by cars and are prepared to pay for it, were, on leaving Mecca for Medina, given seats in smart-looking cars. But on their reaching Jedda they were turned out and transferred to old and uncomfortable cars, while the original cars returned again to Mecca to dupe more pilgrims. This gave rise to many complaints, and it was only with great difficulty that matters could be put right. Motor owners in general who fared very badly in 1929 were even worse off in 1930, there being no "naqaba," a system by which pilgrims were in previous years distributed among the various motor companies in turn. The result of this was that as each pilgrim ship reached Jedda there were a very large number of cars ready to transport its passengers to Mecca. A price-cutting campaign then ensued, and motor car hire went considerably lower than that fixed by the Government. This did not, as might have been expected, benefit the pilgrims, but only the mutawwifs, who gave their pilgrims to the lowest bidders and charged their clients at the fixed rate, putting the difference into their own pockets. The Javanese pilgrims, who follow their mutawwifs blindly, were the worst sufferers. Indian pilgrims, however, paid even less than the Government fixed rate, as the head of the mutawwifs had been warned beforehand by the Indian vice-consul not to make exorbitant charges. Nevertheless the mutawwifs and their agents were no losers, but still made a profit at the expense of the motor owners. Despite this competition, the motor companies were unable to attract all the pilgrims to their own cars, for the mutawwifs who had cars of their own naturally tried to meet their own requirements first.

42. The complaints made in regard to motor transport were far more numerous and of more varied and serious nature than in preceding years. In

some cases the Government alone was entirely responsible, while in others it was the fault of the motor owners or the mutawwifs. As a matter of fact, no other single question connected with the pilgrimage, with the exception of the booking of tickets and shipping affairs generally, caused such trouble as did the question of motor transport. First in the time and foremost in magnitude of the difficulties experienced in this connexion was the Government's order, issued after the pilgrimage, according to which only those pilgrims who intended to visit Medina were allowed to leave Mecca, while the others, a very large number compared to the former, who desired to return to their homes were detained. This caused vehement and universal protest. The practice heretofore was that pilgrims coming to Jedda *en route* for their homes were allowed to proceed first. The journey between Mecca and Jedda being a short one—about three hours by car—the motor vehicles used to bring to Jedda pilgrims who intended to sail immediately to their homes were employed for a week or so only, after which they were free to carry pilgrims to Medina. On the other hand, it takes over a week for a car to reach and return from Medina, so that this order caused great delay to pilgrims who did not wish to visit Medina. This departure from the old practice would appear to have been actuated by a selfish consideration lest the pilgrims who started out with the intention of visiting Medina once they reached Jedda would abandon their intention and thus not enable the Government to collect the "koshan." As a matter of fact, the mischief was the result of the action of certain motor owners who happen to exercise great influence with the Government and who are said to have advised the Government to enforce this regulation so as to increase their own profits. Excepting these few, all the other motor companies had, as usual, collected motor hire for Jedda and Medina in advance for the latter journey; it was promised that cars would be provided a week after the Haj. On the introduction of the new regulation the majority of the vehicles went to Medina; only a small number remaining at Mecca. In the meantime the detained pilgrims were allowed to go, and the Government forced those motor owners who had collected the hire in advance to arrange for the conveyance of these pilgrims. Cars were few, time was short and the pilgrims were numerous and clamorous. Motor hire went up as a natural result. The motor owners had to provide cars at any rate—considerably higher than that which they had originally charged—and to put up with the loss. Great hardships were entailed on pilgrims during their compulsory detention in a hot and unwholesome climate.

43. Another peculiar regulation which formed the subject of complaints was that a driver was only allowed to take 4 gallons of petrol in his car when going to Mecca from Jedda, so that on the return journey he had to purchase fresh supplies in the capital. In more than one case this quantity of petrol, as a result of mechanical disorders, leakage, &c., was consumed before Mecca was reached, and the cars and their passengers had to stop on the way—a lonely, sandy and a shadeless track. The pilgrims therefore, more often than not, had to buy petrol from other passing motor buses at a very high price in order to reach their destination. In this case also it seems that certain influential persons who sell petrol at Mecca were to blame, as, in the absence of any such regulation, they would have had no sale for it because motor drivers when going to Mecca would have taken—as they used to do in the past—a sufficient supply of petrol at Jedda sufficient for both journeys, which is cheaper as well as more convenient. Another reason is said to be that a deficiency had occurred in the tax which the Municipal Board at Mecca levies on the sale of petrol there. This, however, cannot be vouched for, as it is known that the motor owners had offered, but without success, to make up the board's deficit in this respect.

44. The following is a brief account of other complaints made in connexion with motor transport:—

(1) Several reports were received of accidents and over-turning of motor vehicles, resulting in injuries and deaths. Among Indian pilgrims a certain proprietor of the ice factory at Lucknow and an Indian woman lost their lives; while many, including two deputy collectors, received serious injuries. Many of the injuries were the result of rash and incompetent driving on bad roads, not merely of unavoidable accidents.

(2) Many of the pilgrims had their baggage dropped on the road from cars, and no effort was made, either by the drivers, motor owners or the authorities

to search for it. It is not known which, if any, of these three can be held responsible for making good the loss. In previous years this question received much attention. To cite one example it may be stated that once when the Mamur-al-Koshan on the Mecca-Medina road, to whose notice the loss of luggage was brought by a pilgrim, refused to take any action, he was fined for not having compelled the driver concerned to return and search for the missing articles.

(3) The permit which the pilgrims have to obtain before they are allowed to undertake any journey by any conveyance in the Hejaz is called a koshan. The koshan office at Mecca is situated on the outskirts of the city. Pilgrims seated in their cars, &c., come and wait there till the permits are issued; they were again in 1930 loud in their complaints that they had to wait for hours and that money was often extorted from them before the permits were issued. Many of the present difficulties on this account would be obviated if the koshan permits for the return journey were obtainable from the revenue office, Mecca, some two or three days in advance.

(4) Certain pilgrims complained that, despite their having paid the full hire for a whole car, including Government koshan, in order that they should have the car to themselves as they had women with them, they were forced to admit other passengers. This was the result of the combined action of the mutawwifs and the motor owners, who saw in it a way of obtaining more money. Although, in some cases the Indian vice-consul managed to get the excess hire refunded, yet the individuals concerned did not get what they desired—more comfort and freedom.

(5) In certain cases the members of one family were divided between two cars—men in one and women in the other—which travelled at a considerable distance from each other. They had, therefore, to remain separated for hours, which in a foreign and an unknown land was a source of unnecessary anxiety.

(6) There were again many complaints of the mutawwifs having failed to provide cars, both on the occasion of journeys from Mecca to Medina and *vice versa*, resulting in considerable delay and inconvenience. In one case a certain Abdul Wahab Kamaruddin collected motor hire from a party of about twenty-one pilgrims, but did not provide cars till a month after. This has been fully dealt with under head "mutawwifs."

(7) The gain in brokerage for providing cars was so great that even supposedly pious people did not hesitate to avail themselves of this method of lining their pockets. At Mecca there is a certain spiritual teacher, Syed Habashi, a descendant of an old and a famous Mecca family. Malabar and Cingalese form the greater part of his disciples. This spiritual guide in conspiracy with the notorious Syed Soraj Wali, the mutawwif for Malabar, charged motor hire from his followers double that of the current market rate. This particular difficulty could be avoided if pilgrims from both those countries were warned not to trust any such persons in the Hejaz in money matters, but to ascertain the true rate of hire from the Indian pilgrimage office at Mecca or Jedda.

(8) A certain well-to-do merchant of Bombay, who was coming from Medina with his family in a car, complained that his car was commandeered on the way by Nejd soldiers and that for two hours, until his car was returned, he was lying with his family and children on the road without shelter.

General.

44A. The question of obtaining a refund of return motor hire in respect of those pilgrims who died at Medina was taken up with the Hejazi Government in 1929. No final decision in the matter has yet been reached by them, and they appear to be prolonging the investigation unduly. As a matter of fact it is not the motor companies who stand to lose by this refund for only about £3 of the total motor hire of £9 or £10 goes to the motor owners, while the rest is consumed in Government koshan.

The Hejazi Government in preceding years used to commandeer motor vehicles already set aside for the use of pilgrims, much to the inconvenience of the latter. This year the Minister of Finance, in order to safeguard pilgrims' interests and also perhaps to make money for himself, proposed to the motor owners that they should pay 5 piastres miri per passenger for a journey to Mecca and 3 riyals for a journey to Medina, the object of this collection being that the Government should start a motor company for its own use from the proceeds. The motor owners consented to pay tax, which they collected from the pilgrims,

and the company was started, and as a consequence fewer cars were commandeered this year.

On or about the 22nd May a big fire broke out at Masajidn, a halting station on the Jedda-Medina road. About eight motor vehicles, which were halting there for the night, were burnt. Happily there was no loss of life. An Indian driver was as a consequence, without any apparent fault of his, kept in gaol for some time.

Camels.

45. The number of pilgrims who travelled by camels was less than in previous years. This was due to the fact that strict instructions had been issued to the mutawwifs by their chief to discourage pilgrims, as far as possible, from using camels. Moreover, as the mutawwifs themselves stood to gain much by sending pilgrims in cars, they themselves did not wish to send their pilgrims by camels. They had resorted to camels in the beginning of the 1929 season only because the institution of the "Naqaba" had altogether curtailed their brokerage on cars and they were anxious to bring that system to an end in whatever way they could. Camel hire for the journey from Jedda to Mecca and Medina remained the same as in 1929, while on the return journey from Mecca to Jedda it was nearly doubled. Although camels were not greatly used in transporting pilgrims they were nevertheless used for carrying pilgrims' luggage, which according to regulations in force cannot be taken in motor vehicles in which only light kit is allowed. Mutawwifs were again instructed to load camels as lightly as possible so that a greater number of camels might be utilised, thereby bringing in more koshan money for the Government. In hundreds of cases koshan was paid for, say, ten camels, and the luggage was actually loaded on six as the camel men could not possibly load their camels lighter. The Javanese and the Malaysians were the chief sufferers in this respect. The Indian pilgrims whenever they experienced any such difficulty at once brought it to the notice of the Indian vice-consul, who was at least able to obtain for the complainants as many camels as they had paid for. Regarding the journey to Medina, although there was no official prohibition against travelling by camel yet the mutawwifs were secretly instructed to discountenance this mode of transport. That this was so may be judged by the fact that once when certain Javanese mutawwifs, who had charged their pilgrims a lump sum for all their expenses during the pilgrimage, desired, for their own gain, to take their pilgrims on camels, this was objected to by the chief mutawwif. Eventually, although the pilgrims went by camel, the mutawwifs had to pay an extra sum to the Government for the difference between camel and car koshan. Indian pilgrims, however, did not experience any such difficulties. Their mutawwifs as they stood to gain a pound, or in some cases even two or three per head, as brokerage, persuaded them by every possible means to travel by cars. Consequently the number of Indian pilgrims who availed themselves of camel transport was small. Camels were available in plenty for the journey to Arafat. This was due to the fact that the Javanese and Malaysians had left for Arafat some two or three days before the Haj day and the camels which had taken them had had time to return to Mecca. Moreover, there was no great demand for camels for the mutawwifs, who knew beforehand that camel hire to Arafat was going to be increased, and being afraid lest the pilgrims after paying camel hire, &c., should have nothing left for them to obtain, advised them to go on foot.

On the return journey from Mecca to Jedda camel hire was increased from Rs. 15/8 to Rs. 28. Of this increase the camel men got only Rs. 7, while the rest went to the Government in koshan. This was very hard on the pilgrims especially as it came at a time when their purses were already exhausted and the expenses at Jedda were still to be defrayed. Those who could not afford to pay this amount travelled on foot and the number of those who walked to Arafat was considerable.

Arabias.

46. Arabias (a form of cab used between the outskirts of Mecca and the pilgrims' quarters). As motor cars during the rush season are not allowed to enter the city itself, arabias are used to cover the remaining distance. They are mainly used by old and infirm or else by respectable pilgrims, especially by their women and children. The rate of hire is exorbitant, ranging from £1 to £2 during the rush period.

(6) *Customs.*

47. The Hejaz Government during the earlier part of the season found itself faced with a financial crisis, and in order to remedy matters had recourse to every possible means of raising money. The results of this were far-reaching and were felt in every department. Its effect on motor and camel transport has already been dealt with. Its effects on the customs regulations was equally pernicious. Pilgrims' luggage was subjected to the strictest of searches, which prolonged their unpleasant stay in the customs sheds by many hours, especially, as was often the case, when several pilgrim steamers arrived in port almost simultaneously. There were again many cases of theft of pilgrims' belongings, which the customs subordinates of low class and meagrely paid as they are, were not averse to pilfering during the search. The Hejazi Government, fearing that the old customs officials, nearly all Hejazis, did not carry out their duties honestly and allowed merchandise to pass through free on the pretext that it was pilgrims' luggage, appointed a Nejd official along with every Hejazi one. Unfortunately, however, the Nejd proved far more greedy than their Hejazi companions and caused great vexation to the pilgrims exploiting them for their own selfish gain. The mutawwifs when they noticed that pilgrims were subjected to a greater strictness in this respect than before, collected a certain amount from each pilgrim with which to silence the customs officials. As explained in the report for 1929, it has been found by actual experience that pilgrims' difficulties in this respect were, to a greater extent, minimised when the Indian vice-consul or any member of the staff was present at the custom-house during the search. With the present staff of the Indian section, however, no really efficient supervision can be exercised. If and when, therefore, the suggestions put forward in connexion with paragraph 17 of the Haj Enquiry Committee's confidential report materialise, the pilgrims' present difficulty in this respect would, it is hoped, be minimised to a very appreciable extent if not eliminated altogether.

48. In the report for 1929 it was suggested that pilgrims should be advised not to bring uncut pieces of linen for shrouds, &c., for use in the Hejaz, but to have them cut in short pieces in which case they are not subjected to customs dues. This suggestion is repeated in the present report. Another important question at issue in this connexion is that of unclaimed articles which are left or forgotten by Indian pilgrims in the custom-house at the time of their arrival and departure. At present the Hejaz Government take these into their possession and sell them by auction after the lapse of some time. It is suggested that if the necessary arrangements can be arrived at with the Hejazi authorities such articles should be delivered to the Legation in the same way as the effects of deceased Indian pilgrims. The subsequent sale of such articles would bring in a certain sum which could be utilised in the repatriation of destitutes, &c. It appears that the Egyptian special police which come to manage the Egyptian pilgrimage, take possession of all such unclaimed articles in respect of Egyptian pilgrims, and there seems to be no reason why similar action should not eventually be taken in respect of the Indian pilgrimage.

(7) *Religious Interference.*

49. No event worth recording was noticed. This was to a large extent due to the fact that mutawwifs were instructed by the authorities to avoid leading pilgrims to such places as might react unfavourably on their susceptibilities. Consequently the pilgrims mostly remained near the Haram. The religious courts, which are the bugbear of the native population, were instructed not to extend their jurisdiction over the pilgrims. Moreover, the Indian vice-consul and his staff advised all incoming pilgrims to refrain from smoking in the main thoroughfares, not to shave, and generally to comply with the existing regulations. The pilgrims, however, experienced unpleasant treatment at the hands of the committee called Amar-al-Marooof, certain pilgrims, especially Javanese, received severe beating for not complying with regulations. On the whole the committee was not so hard in its treatment of pilgrims as it was to local citizens. This committee, inasmuch as it costs about £40,000 annually, will, it is anticipated, be dissolved in view of the present financial stringency in the Hejaz; the local police being entrusted with the execution of its functions. This committee, it

may be recalled, was formed only to satisfy certain fanatical tribal leaders, who have since lost most of their influence. If and when, therefore, the committee is dissolved the pilgrims will have greater freedom. In the Haram at Medina, pilgrims had to put up with the same difficulties as usual; knowing full well that their attempts to kiss the grave of the Prophet would call down on them the bitter wrath of the Wahhabis, they nevertheless continued to kiss it heedless of the whips of the Nejd soldiers. Many pilgrims, however, desirous of kissing the grave took advantage of the cupidity and avarice of the Nejd soldiery, who are quite notorious in this respect, and managed to bribe them through their mutawwifs so that they looked the other way while the pilgrims embraced and kissed the grave to their heart's content. Similar bribes secured a certain amount of freedom for pilgrims who visited the other sacred places at Medina. As the result of the conclusion of a treaty of friendship between the Hejaz and Persia, pilgrims from the latter country had hoped to be allowed greater freedom in performing their religious rites. In this, however, they were greatly disappointed. They were even charged £1 per pilgrim, being the perquisite of the viceroy, for the journey to Medina in the place of the 10s. taken from other pilgrims.

50. In this connexion it may be interesting to note that the tomb of "Our Mother Eve" (Ummona Hawwa), which has hitherto been accessible to everybody and which had, as a matter of fact, been turned into a public graveyard, has been closed. It is stated that once the King, while sitting in his palace at Jedda, noticed multitudes of people coming in and going out of the tomb and reciting their prayers, &c. It was too much for the King's orthodoxy, and a high wall was consequently ordered to be built at the entrance to hide the grave from public sight.

(8) *Mutawwifs.*

51. The question of mutawwifs formed the subject of special sections in the pilgrimage reports for 1928 and 1929. The abuses enumerated in section (7), paragraphs 2 to 6, of the 1929 report continued in 1930; they were if anything more prevalent. It is not proposed to go into them in detail in this report. As the whole subject calls for consideration in the light of the Haj Enquiry Committee's reports and as the information on which these reports are based differs in many respects from that available in Jedda it seems preferable on the present occasion to deal with the matter more generally, beginning with a description of the system at present in force. The following statement is based on information supplied and views held by the Indian vice-consul attached to the Legation. Munshi Ihsanullah's experience gives great weight to his opinions.

52. The business of guiding pilgrims is distributed in the Hejaz among three distinct classes of persons, viz., mutawwifs, whose proper function is to look after pilgrims during their stay in Mecca; muzawwars, who perform similar functions at Medina; and mutawwifs' agents or vakils at Jedda, who take charge of pilgrims on arrival there, arrange for their accommodation and onward journey and resume charge when the pilgrims return from the Holy Cities. The employment by mutawwifs of one or other of these vakils to handle pilgrims in Jedda is legally compulsory. The vakils act under Government authority and are organised in three corporations, one for the agents of mutawwifs responsible for Dutch East Indians and Malayan pilgrims, one for those of mutawwifs responsible for Indian pilgrims and one consisting of the remaining agents.

53. The mutawwifs proper acquire their rights by inheritance or by obtaining the King's permission to practice the business, either by favour or after serving an apprenticeship as sabee to an existing mutawwif. They form two corporations at Mecca, one for the Dutch East Indian and Malayan pilgrims, the other for Indians and all others. The heads of each corporation is known as sheikh-al-mutawwifin and is nominated by and responsible to the Government. The sheikh-al-mutawwifin of the pilgrim guides in charge of Indians, &c., has great influence in governing circles.

53a. Mutawwifs may be divided into two classes, according as they have a right to take charge of all the pilgrims from a particular district under a system called taqir, which was formerly general; or are employed by pilgrims enjoying freedom of choice. Paragraph 12 of the Pilgrimage Report for 1929 gives a list of districts in regard to which the taqir system still operates. It applies in

a slightly different form to pilgrims from West Africa, for whom the duties of mutawwif and vakil are performed by recognised sheikhs. A proposal put forward early in 1930 to restore the taqir system for all pilgrims was rejected by the Hejazi Government, at any rate for the time being, in spite of the temptation to increase revenue by farming out, as it were, the Moslem world and selling the mutawwifs' rights in respect of particular districts to the highest bidders.

54. It is important to note, as the Haj Enquiry Commission was misinformed on the subject, that every pilgrim going to Mecca must have a mutawwif. The generality of pilgrims, however, still enjoy freedom of choice. This encourages the practice whereby mutawwifs take steps to recruit pilgrims in the country of origin, either by going there themselves or sending their sabees. In certain cases they work also in conjunction with Indian moulvis who, mostly in Bengal, collect pilgrims on their own account and turn them over at the port of embarkation to the mutawwif offering the best price for the right of handling them. The system whereby the mutawwifs recruit pilgrims in the country of origin also prevails in Malaya. Thus the majority of pilgrims of British origin are already, on arrival at Jedda, in the hands of a mutawwif or sabee and are sometimes accompanied as well by the moulvi. This gives the mutawwif, who has himself or by his employees collected the pilgrim, a considerable hold, but the hold does not become definite until after arrival in Jedda, where the pilgrim goes through the formality of su'al, i.e., he is asked to choose his mutawwif. Once he has done so he is finally committed, except in rare cases, in which it is sometimes possible to arrange for a change, if there has been a mistake or if gross misconduct can be proved against the mutawwif. If the pilgrim has no mutawwif in view, the sheikh-al-mutawwifin provides one, either by taking charge of the pilgrim himself or assigning him to another mutawwif.

55. Mutawwifs are as a class predatory and their proceedings both in India and the Hejaz give rise to much complaint. Munshi Ihsanullah fully endorses the trenchant criticisms in the Haj Commission's report of their activities in India. He cites extreme cases in which women have been persuaded to leave their homes, sell out and marry pilgrim guides to find themselves divorced after being stripped of everything; besides more ordinary abuses practised by them as touts in connexion with the booking of passages, inducing pilgrims to make superfluous purchases for the sake of the commission on them, &c.

56. The Munshi deprecates the commission's proposals that the mutawwif in India should be licensed and that he should be brought within the regulations relative to pilgrim brokers. He fears that the possession of a licence might merely increase the mutawwif's capacity for evil and that the profession of pilgrim broker should be treated as entirely distinct and should be confined to British subjects. In this connexion attention must be drawn to a certain misconception as to the national status of mutawwifs. No person who is not a Hejazi subject can practise the profession in the Hejaz and although many of those concerned with India are of Bengali origin, they are resident in the Hejaz and travel apparently with Hejazi passports. His Majesty's Minister records these points for consideration, without feeling competent to form an independent opinion. It occurs to him that some of the mutawwifs of Bengali origin may possess dual nationality. This might account for the Haj Commission having spoken in paragraph 244 of the published report of a considerable proportion of them as being British Indian subjects, whereas in the Hejaz all are considered Hejazis.

57. Many of the abuses practised by the mutawwifs in the Hejaz may be put down to a weakening of the Government control which it was sought to enforce during the first years of Ibn Saud's régime. This weakening is partly attributed to the fact that the increasingly heavy Government taxes on pilgrims travelling in the Hejaz are included in the pilgrim charges which the mutawwifs and their vakils are allowed to levy. As the exigencies of the Government increase and the mutawwif's or vakil's margin of profit diminishes these middlemen are apt to be driven into evil courses, nor are the authorities always ready to repress misconduct on the part of agents who serve them so conveniently as tax-collectors. It is only fair to say in anticipation of the report on the 1931 pilgrimage that, in drawing up the schedule of authorised charges for 1931, the Government have attempted to remedy the situation by issuing to the mutawwif a fixed remuneration of 10 rupees per pilgrim in addition to anything else he may make.

Up to 1930, however, there was a deterioration among the mutawwifs, who are for the most part impecunious, so impecunious that they have frequently to rely on their vakils in Jedda to finance them, e.g., for the purpose of their visits to India. Subject to the special cases noted below, there has not been the same deterioration among the vakils themselves, largely because they are amenable to a certain amount of Legation control and influence, the exertion of which is facilitated by the helpful attitude of the present Governor of Jedda.

It will be seen from what precedes that the favourable view of the effect of the Hejazi Government's measures to control mutawwifs taken in paragraph 10 of the Haj Commission's confidential report is somewhat out of date.

58. The Indian vice-consul draws special attention to the harmful influence of the head sheikh of mutawwifs in Mecca, who stands high in the favour of the Government to the license enjoyed by his protégés among the rank and file of the mutawwifs; to the growing abuse of the agency system in Jedda, under which a single vakil may act for an excessive number of mutawwifs; and to the unfortunate consequences of the fact that the naqib or head of the mutawwifs' agents in Jedda, responsible for Indian pilgrims, is himself one of the largest agents. The agency evil is aggravated by the employment of sub-agents. Thus the clerk of the head sheikh of mutawwifs in Mecca, a man named Abdul Aziz, is by way of being an agent in Jedda. He does his work there through a sub-agent who received one third of the takings. This man is said to have held agencies giving him control of 2,400 pilgrims in 1930 and his wife holds other agencies inherited from her father. The head or naqib of the Indian mutawwifs' agents in Jedda, who also enjoys the protection of the head sheikh in Mecca, is stated to be a pluralist on an even larger scale. This man, one Husein Abu Zaid, is apparently privileged to act as vakil both for mutawwifs responsible for Indian pilgrims and for those in the miscellaneous category. He is said to have held agencies in 1930 giving him control of 2,700 Indian and Afghan pilgrims, 6,500 Egyptians and 1,950 others. It is obvious that he cannot satisfactorily render the services required of him to so large a number of people. The congestion is bad enough when the pilgrims arrive in batches from overseas. It is infinitely worse when they troop back in masses to Jedda after the pilgrimage, eager to get home and requiring attention and accommodation before they can leave. The head agent in question knows no Indian language. He is entitled to receive 3 piastres for each pilgrim, but he can neither cope with his own work nor control other vakils, whom it should be his duty to supervise. It is most unfortunate that when in 1926 Ibn Saud approved of a proposal by the Indian vice-consul that there should be a separate sheikh of the mutawwifs' agents responsible for the Indian pilgrims, as there had previously been for the Javanese and Malays only, the choice made should have been so unhappy.

59. The Indian vice-consul is so impressed by the evils described above that he has suggested that His Majesty's Minister should take the matter up personally with Ibn Saud with a view to securing the following objects:—

- (1) The Indian pilgrims to be taken from the present naqib, Husein Abu Zaid, and distributed among other pilgrims.
- (2) The appointment of a person, not himself an agent and having a knowledge of Indian language, to be naqib of the agents responsible for the Indian pilgrims.
- (3) The number of agencies which may be held by any single vakil to be limited.
- (4) The right to appoint sub-agents to be abolished, so that the clerk of the head sheikh at Mecca should have to choose between renouncing his agencies or coming to Jedda to look after them and some suitable arrangement to be made as regards the agencies held by his wife.

60. This proposal is under consideration at the time of writing, but it is doubtful whether the moment is propitious for broaching the matter with Ibn Saud, who is too jealous of his position in regard to pilgrims to welcome foreign and non-Moslem intervention. Some time ago the Legation took a step forward on its own account by drawing up black lists of mutawwifs frequenting India and Malaya with a view to the refusal of travelling facilities to undesirables. This measure was adopted in consultation with the Governments of India and the Straits Settlements, and, in the latter case, in conjunction with the Netherlands Legation. It had made a certain impression, but it must be noted that it

cannot be pushed too far lest it should be an incentive to the Hejazi Government to generalise the taqir system and thus make it unnecessary for mutawwifs to go to the pilgrims' countries of origin to collect their clientele.

61. The foregoing account does not deal with the Medina muzawwars, who are less important, as the arrangements for the journey to Medina are made by the mutawwifs before the pilgrim starts, and the muzawwar's business consists only in looking after pilgrims during their normally very short stay, in return for a small remuneration, usually 5 rupees, not fixed by regulation. The Dutch East Indian and Malayan pilgrim are free to employ any recognised muzawwar, the choice usually being made by the mutawwif who has arranged the journey to Medina. Indian and other pilgrims are assigned under a system of taqir to particular muzawwars.

(9) Indian Pilgrimage.

62. The first Indian pilgrim ship, steamship "Alavi," arrived at Jedda on the 5th January, 1930, while the last, steamship "Rahmani," arrived on the 2nd May. The number of pilgrims who sailed from Indian ports this season was 16,697, as against 19,656 for 1929.

The following table shows the number of pilgrims from each province of India and also from Burma and Ceylon, classified according to ports of embarkation:—

BRITISH Subjects.			
Province Distribution.	Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.
Bengal	3,137	14	557
Punjab	418	1,585	...
Bombay	1,132	41	...
United Provinces	983	171	...
Madras	566	5	...
Sind	32	475	...
Bihar and Orisa	421
Central Provinces	361	61	...
Baluchistan	39	266	...
North-West Frontier Province	80	215	...
Hyderabad, Deccan	236
Delhi	41	124	...
Burma	72
Ceylon	19
Other provinces	10
	7,547	2,957	557
			11,061

The number of British subjects or British protected persons was 11,061, which is less by 3,936 than in 1929. This decrease was due to a diminution in the number of Bengali pilgrims, who were 3,708, as against 7,227 for 1929, the floods in Assam and the fall in the price of jute and other Indian products being the main causes of the decrease. Other provinces in India, despite political unrest, sent nearly the same number—some even more—than in 1929. The following list shows the number of foreign pilgrims who travelled via Indian ports:—

Nationality.	Bombay.	Calcutta.	Karachi.	Total.
Chinese (Turkestan)	98	...	1,344	1,442
Afghans	53	...	778	831
South Africans	35	35
Bahrainis	38	...	160	198
Russian Turkestan	7	...	5	12
Chinese	4	4
Persians	33	...	977	1,010
Miscellaneous countries	394	...	56	450
Hejaz-Nejd, &c.
	773	...	3,320	4,093

The number of foreign pilgrims was less by 742 than in 1929. Of this decrease, Afghans were responsible for 331, while Persians showed a considerable decrease, their number being 1,010 as against 2,676 for 1929, this being due to the fact that many of them (1,650 in number) came via Iraq. Iraqi pilgrims also came to the Hejaz via Syria instead of India. The deficiency in the number of Persian pilgrims was, however, to some extent made up by pilgrims from Chinese Turkestan, who numbered 1,442 as against 73 in 1929. There were twelve pilgrims from Russian Turkestan as against six for the previous year. In addition to those who came from Indian ports, 150 Indian pilgrims came via Iraq. There were also seventeen Indians who came from England or other northern countries via Suez. One hundred and fifty-one Indians without means travelled overland via Hasa and Riyadh and were eventually repatriated at Government expense.

63. It was hoped that as a result of the smaller number of pilgrims in 1930 no difficulty would be experienced in providing return passages. Unfortunately, however, much delay and inconvenience was caused by the fact that certain of the Mogul Line steamers, which had originally imported Indian pilgrims, subsequently became engaged in the transport of Egyptian pilgrims under contract with the Khedivial Line. According to this agreement, the Khedivial Line agents at Jedda attempted to obtain steamship "Akbar" and steamship "Dara" just at the time when the former was already fully booked and ready to sail for India, while 40 first-class, 18 second-class and 800 deck-class return ticket holders were waiting for steamship "Dara" to sail. Steamship "Akbar" left for India, but the Khedivial agents obtained the services of steamship "Dara" for carrying Egyptian pilgrims back to Egypt, with the result that the Indian pilgrims booked on that ship were detained. There was no other steamer of the Mogul Line in harbour and none was expected from Indian ports within the next twenty days. Great resentment was caused, and deputation after deputation of Indians visited the Legation to protest against this action. This incident, which caused much distress to Indian pilgrims, is one which should be guarded against in future. It is suggested that the best way of preventing its recurrence would be for legislation to be passed whereby companies engaged in the Indian pilgrim traffic would, under pain of severe fine, &c., be forbidden to employ the steamers in which pilgrims were brought to the Hejaz in any other traffic, until all pilgrims who held the companies' return tickets and were awaiting shipment had been embarked for India.

With the exception of this incident, pilgrims were not detained for any long periods.

64. Only two shipping companies, viz., the Mogul Line and the Nemazee Line, were concerned with the transport of pilgrims between India and the Hejaz during 1930. The following table shows the number carried each way by each of these companies and the number of voyages made by their vessels:—

Line.	Brought in.			Repatriated.		
	No. of Ships.	No. of Voyages to Jedda.	No. of Pilgrims brought.	No. of Ships.	No. of Return Voyages.	No. of Pilgrims repatriated.
Mogul	7	13	12,562	7	10	10,670
Nemazee	2	4	4,135	2	2	2,902
Total	9	17	16,697	9	12	13,572

It will be noted that the total number of pilgrims who returned to India after the Haj was 3,125 short of the number that arrived in the Hejaz. These were divided among the shipping companies as follows:—

Mogul Line	1,892
Nemazee Line	1,233
	3,125

Of these 3,125 pilgrims, 192 were Javanese or Malaysians who had come by way of India and returned by direct steamers to Singapore and Batavia; a

certain number were Persians and Bukharis who returned to their homes via Iraq; and 295 can be accounted for by deaths known to have occurred among Indian pilgrims. The remainder were probably Hejazis who returned to this country in pilgrim steamers and did not leave the country again after the Haj.

65. Apart from the Indian pilgrims leaving from and returning to Indian ports, the following number of pilgrims were carried by the Indian pilgrim steamers to the various ports in the Red Sea and Arabian coasts:—

	Mogul.	Nemazee.
Aden	107	...
Mokalla	401	80
Kamaraan	104	...
	612	80

66. The following list gives the number of pilgrims arriving in Jedda and leaving for Indian ports, classified according to ports also for Arabia and Red Sea ports:—

	Arrivals.	Departures.
Bombay	8,291	7,224
Karachi	6,269	5,870
Calcutta	551	...
Arabian and Red Sea ports	1,586	478
	16,697	13,572

The number of 5,870 pilgrims stated to have landed at Karachi cannot be considered as accurate, as many pilgrims who originally booked for Bombay, tired of the sea voyage and aware of the fact that the sea between Karachi and Bombay is rough, decided to land at Karachi, which is the first port.

67. The following statement shows the number of pilgrims who purchased single and return tickets or made money deposits in India:—

	Single	Return.	Deposit paid Passport.	Total.
Bombay	602	7,410	308	8,320
Karachi	2,587	3,440	154	6,181
Calcutta	64	22	471	557
Red Sea ports	1,639
	3,253	10,872	933	16,697

68. The subjoined list shows the number of ships available on given dates for the repatriation of pilgrims, the number of pilgrims of each line waiting repatriation and the number actually repatriated on each date:—

Dates.	No. of Ships in Port.	Pilgrims awaiting Embarkation.			Pilgrims Despatched.			Pilgrims Remaining.			Name of Ship which Sailed.
		Mogul.	Nemazee.	Total.	Mogul.	Nemazee.	Total.	Mogul.	Nemazee.	Total.	
18.5.30	6	4,931	2,572	7,503	1,772	...	1,772	3,159	2,572	5,731	Rahmani.
19.5.30	5	3,317	2,514	5,831	1,503	1,608	3,111	1,814	1,006	2,820	Khoaru and Sarvistan.
23.5.30	3	2,807	1,032	3,839	1,504	1,032	2,536	583	...	583	Akbar and Arabistan.
29.5.30	1	813	16	829	829	...	329	Dara.
7.6.30	1	1,017	91	1,108	1,108	...	1,108	Shuja.
20.6.30	1	903	209	1,112	1,112	...	1,112	Alavi.
27.6.30	1	117	53	170	170	...	170	Jehangir.

Note.—After the sailing of the Nemazee Line steamers their remaining pilgrims were carried by the Mogul Line steamers.

69. From the statistics given above, it will be seen that no pilgrims were detained beyond the period allowed, viz., twenty-five days; consequently, no fines were imposed on the shipping companies. There were, however, some complaints against the shipping companies' staff, which are briefly summarised as follows:—

- (1) When steamship "Shuja" left this port for India on the 7th June, there were eleven first-class and fifteen second-class return ticket holders who could not get accommodation. There was no other ship of the same line available, and, as they could not wait, they had no alternative but to travel as deck passengers in steamship "Shuja." Deck passages were accordingly given to them on the clear understanding that they would receive the same facilities as those to which their original class of ticket would have entitled them and also that they would be accommodated on the upper deck. They agreed that they should receive no refund of the difference between the cost of a deck passage and their respective classes. Unfortunately, however, nothing was done to provide any sort of accommodation or facilities as promised. The matter being brought to the notice of the Indian vice-consul, he invited the attention of the chief officer to the matter, but the latter did nothing. The captain, who was subsequently approached was equally unhelpful. His attitude was, indeed, discourteous. Complaints were freely made on board, and two letters were received from prominent Indians to the effect that the officers had offered their cabins at prices ranging up to 400 rupees, and that the crew had reserved deck space, which they hired out to the pilgrims. The poop, for instance, was roped off, and it was said that 50 rupees were asked by the lascars for deck-space thereon. The first officer denied that this space was included in the survey certificate.
- (2) On steamship "Rahmani" a pilgrim reported that a sweeper on board had stolen his tin of ghee and also charged him 5 rupees for portorage. The matter, with the assistance of the master, was promptly investigated and the tin recovered.
- (3) A first-class pilgrim, named Mohammed Husain, complained that, on steamship "Sarvistan," a first-class cabin, No. 7, of two berths, was given to three pilgrims; a bench being used to accommodate the third man, to the great inconvenience of all three.
- (4) The effects of pilgrims dying on board were handed over to persons other than the next of kin, whose name is given in the passport. A case of this nature was discovered on steamship "Sarvistan." Steps were accordingly taken to recover the effects from the illegal recipients on their landing, and they were forwarded to the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, for disposal.
- (5) There were many complaints of a minor nature regarding distribution of water, light between deck, and latrines, &c. These questions have already been taken up by the Haj Enquiry Committee. Moreover, Mr. Bond, in his report of the pilgrimage of 1929, fully discussed further necessary improvements in this connexion.
- (6) There were two cases of persons being lost overboard during the journey, the first incidents of their kind for the last ten years. The first case was that of a child on board steamship "Arabistan." The second case happened on steamship "Akbar." The pilgrim was an indoor patient of the ship's hospital when the loss occurred. A certain responsibility would, therefore, appear to attach to the ship's staff in this case.

70. Complaints of the nature described above, or else connected with the shipping affairs in general, were fully discussed by Mr. Bond in his annual report on the pilgrimage of 1929. Inasmuch as the suggestions of the Haj Enquiry Committee are now under consideration, it would be opportune if the Government of India be moved to consider simultaneously the suggestions made by Mr. Bond in paragraphs 29 and 30 of his report.

71. While there were comparatively few difficulties in respect of ships and shipping experienced by pilgrims who came to the Hejaz direct from India, many complaints were received from pilgrims who came to the Hejaz via Iraq. These complaints were directed to a general extent against the Mesopotamia and

Persian Transport Company, and were due to the fact that pilgrims, who, in Bagdad, had purchased return tickets direct from Jedda to India by sea, discovered in Jedda that they had been charged different rates by the company. Thus, while the charge for a deck passage was normally 75 rupees, some were charged as much as 135 rupees; pilgrims travelling by second-class paid anything between 155 rupees and 315 rupees. Those who had been charged excess endeavoured to recover the excess from the Jedda agents of the company, but in most cases without success, though in a few cases, on the intervention of the Legation, the agents did refund the money. Many of those who could not obtain a refund, did not utilise their return tickets, but bought new ones from other companies, with the object of applying for a refund from the Mesopotamia and Persian Transport Company on their return to India. The same company, moreover, instructed the Jedda agents not to accept certain tickets issued at Bagdad, which appeared to be quite in order. The pilgrims holding these tickets, although they were Afghans and not British protected persons, caused considerable trouble at the Legation on the ground that the firm responsible for their troubles was a British concern. All this occasioned great inconvenience both to pilgrims and to the Legation. The question has, however, already been dealt with, and it is hoped that complaints on this score will not recur.

Registration.

72. The total number of pilgrims who registered their tickets this year was 10,490. Some pilgrims, for one reason or another, did not deposit their tickets, with the result that many of them lost them. As has been suggested, under the heading of "Destitutes," some sort of preferential treatment accorded to those pilgrims who register their tickets might prove an effective incentive for all pilgrims to register their tickets. Besides preventing the loss of tickets among pilgrims, one of the advantages of the system of registration is that seventy-nine return tickets, worth about 5,000 rupees, to which no claimants had come forward, were sent to the Government of India at the end of the season in 1929, and in 1930 108 such tickets were sent. But for this system these tickets would have fallen into the hands of impostors, and would have been utilised by them or sold.

Local Haj Committee.

73. Again, in 1930, with the concurrence of the Hejaz authorities, a committee was appointed, under the presidency of the Indian vice-consul, to draw up lists of returning pilgrims and to allot them steamer accommodation in the order of their arrival at Jedda after the pilgrimage. This year, even notorious agitators like Ismail Ghaznavi, a declared enemy of the committee, recognised the value of the system and caused his passage to be booked according to the regulations, like other pilgrims. The president of the official Hejazi Committee again acted as vice-president. The shipping companies were represented on the committee, and the Hejaz Government deputed the head of the local mutawwifs' agents to be a member. A representative of the Persian Legation also attended. No Turkish representative was deputed to look after the Afghans' interest.

74. Mr. Bond in the 1929 report discussed this question fully. It is absolutely necessary that the recommendations made by him in paragraphs 11 to 18 should be given practical shape. In addition to the suggestion already made the following few points are submitted for the favourable consideration of the Government of India:—

- (1) The local shipping agents should notify the Indian pilgrimage officer of the date of the sailing of the ships on the return journey, and once this has been done they should not be allowed to alter the date, except in exceptional circumstances, as was done in 1930 in the case of steamship "Dara."
- (2) It is suggested that masters of pilgrim steamers be asked not to sail until the Legation is satisfied that pilgrims are properly embarked and have no complaints, &c., to make before they leave Jedda. This could, perhaps, be best effected by prohibiting the steamer from sailing until the bill of health has been endorsed by His Majesty's Minister or his representative.
- (3) Masters of ships be requested to supply the Legation with a copy of the

medical diary on the arrival of the steamer, as recommended by the Haj Enquiry Committee in paragraph 253, rule 115.

- (4)—(a) The Haj Committee in paragraph 252 of their report suggested that death certificates be forwarded to the Commissioner of Police at Bombay in respect of those pilgrims who die in the Hejaz. It is preferable that this should be limited to cases where application for a certificate is made, otherwise heavy clerical labour would be entailed. Moreover, the effects of many pilgrims, who are often accompanied by their next-of-kin, are taken over by the latter and therefore do not figure in the lists of the deceased.
- (b) In this connexion, attention may be directed to the fact that it is the present practice of the Sharia Courts at Mecca, in cases where pilgrims appoint as executors persons other than the next-of-kin mentioned in their passports, to hand over the effects to these persons. This practice should be discouraged. In the past in Jedda the local Bait-al-Mal used to get such statement verified by the Indian vice-consul. The practice is worth renewing, and some sort of similar arrangements are needed at Mecca too.
- (c) On the pilgrim passes a notice could, perhaps, be printed in the language of the province in which the pass is issued that no pilgrim should appoint in the Hejaz persons other than his next-of-kin to receive his effects in the event of his death.

Destitutes.

75. The total number of destitutes repatriated in 1930 at Government expense was 387 as against 139 in 1929. Of this 261 came overland, 134 were single ticket holders who had made declarations to the effect that they were not returning to India immediately or else had travelled in the off season; two of them were return ticket holders who had come on pilgrimage some six years ago and had already taken refunds on their tickets. The following table will show the proportion of the destitutes according to their provinces of origin:—

Sind	153
Punjab	61
Bengal	50
Baluchistan	43
Madras	33
N.W.F.P.	22
United Provinces	16
Central Agency	2
Bihar and Orissa	1
Ceylon	1
Delhi	1
					387

The total cost of repatriation, including food and sambuk charges, &c., was 14,804.11 rupees. Of this amount the Government of India paid 13,795.11 rupees, while the balance was met from the collection made from such pilgrims as were found to have any money at all. All the destitutes, as in preceding years, were shipped by Mogul line steamers at 35 rupees each. This rate compares unfavourably with that of 15 rupees in 1927, 13.8 rupees in 1928 and 25 rupees in 1929. Nevertheless, Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. complained that the number of destitutes booked at the concession rate was excessive; that the passages were obtained by fraud by rich pilgrims, and that insufficient care was exercised by this Legation in granting destitute tickets. This complaint seems unjustified in view of the fact that even with destitutes on board the steamers in question were not fully loaded, and the extra money paid in respect of destitutes can therefore hardly have been unwelcome to the company. Moreover, this rate was available to everyone by later steamers.

76. Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. derive considerable profit from the pilgrimage every year, and it might be reasonably expected from them to carry a certain proportion of destitutes at specially reduced rates. King Hussein, when in the Hejaz, attempted to make a law that shipping companies should carry

10 per cent. of pilgrims without charge on each returning steamer. This demand was, however, successfully resisted, but nevertheless it seems reasonable to expect that the company should carry destitutes at a special rate when necessity arises. In this connexion it may be mentioned that the company granted 200 passages to the Hejaz Government at 20 rupees each for destitutes whom the Government wished to repatriate; it seems, therefore, illogical for the company to complain that they were asked to repatriate British Indians at the rate of 35 rupees per head. The local paper, the "Umm-al-Qura," incidentally published an article about these destitutes whom the Hejaz Government repatriated, stating that King Ibn Saud in his munificence had come to the aid of Indians, Bokharis and Afghans. The whole matter has, however, been dealt with in detail in a separate despatch to the Government of India, and need not be discussed here.

77. The question of repatriation of destitutes is a problem with which the Government of India and this Legation are confronted every year, and it is most necessary and desirable that some solution should be found whereby this increasingly difficult and ever recurring nuisance shall be stopped. As already pointed out on many previous occasions, the accumulation of such persons in Jedda for any length of time is troublesome, insanitary and damaging to British prestige. When this Legation is besieged by hundreds of destitutes clamouring to be repatriated to India, the question is not to consider the ways and means by which they came to the Hejaz, but to ship them out of the country as soon as circumstances permit. If this is not done the Hejaz Government may well call upon the Legation to remove this nuisance from the town as they did in 1928. This would be humiliating in the extreme and cause not a little talk in the bazaars, where it would be stated that the Government of India were unable to look after their pilgrims.

78. As may be observed from the figures given above, the main factors responsible for this abnormal increase in the number of destitutes were (a) the great number of single ticket holders who had either made a declaration or had travelled in the off season, and (b) the number of those who had travelled overland through Nejd or by dhow from Aden, Muscat or Hadramaut.

(a) The 1930 pilgrimage has shown only too clearly how inadequate and ridiculously obsolete are the regulations governing the grant of single tickets. Out of the total of 387 destitutes, 154 took advantage of the declaration system or else travelled in the non-pilgrim season on single tickets, permissible under rules, and were thus able to come on Haj with insufficient money to meet the minimum expenses incurred thereby. Karachi is a favourite port for this purpose. There are reasons to believe that certain pilgrim brokers in India inform their prospective pilgrims that they can travel cheaply by going to Karachi and making the declaration there and will eventually be repatriated at Government expense. In an illustration of the point he needed, it may be added that from Karachi alone no less than thirty-eight pilgrims, evidently indigent, arrived in Jedda on single tickets for the 1931 pilgrimage some four months before the Haj. Of these, a party of eight indigent Bengali pilgrims, who arrived here from Karachi by the steamship "Alavi" on the 4th November last with single tickets, applied to this Legation for monetary assistance to enable them to proceed to Mecca. This party seem to have deliberately gone a long way out of their more direct route—Bombay—in order to purchase single tickets. Moreover, it is a time-honoured custom among rich Mahometans in India to give alms to their poorer brethren who state that they are going to visit the Holy Land. Such alms generally take the form of a single fare to Jedda, which is permitted by the present regulations, or funds sufficient for living expenses while in the Hejaz. For the return journey such pilgrims expect, or indeed come with the assurance that they will be repatriated at Government expense.

79. It is not possible to produce nor should it be necessary to produce more cogent arguments against both these pernicious practices. It would appear that nothing short of their total abolition and the rigid enforcement of return ticket or deposit-paid passport system—the latter being preferable—will adequately remedy this evil.

80. With regard to the overland route, which this year was responsible for as many as 251 destitutes, much has already been said on many previous occasions. It is feared, however, that with a return to more settled conditions in the interior of this country the number of indigent pilgrims taking to that route, if not

properly controlled, is bound to increase far beyond its present proportions; the increase has, in fact, already begun, and is all the more likely to develop in future in view of rapid and cheap means of transport to the Hejaz obtainable as a result of the opening of the Hasa route to pilgrim traffic, which the Hejaz Government contemplate doing in the near future. It is therefore high time for the Government of India to adopt such measures as they deem fit and practicable with a view to preventing the improvident class of pilgrims from leaving India for the Hejaz by this route.

81. Apart from and in addition to the above main factors there are many other petty causes leading to eventual destitution, which, though responsible for only a small number, nevertheless, deserve some consideration. They are briefly summarised as follows:—

- (1) According to the regulations in force, the holders of a return ticket or deposit-paid passport are entitled to a refund of their return passage money after the expiry of one year after the date of issue. Many such persons who decide to prolong their stay in the Hejaz for more than one year apply for refund later. Although the Legation has discouraged this practice as far as possible, it cannot be legally refused. After having obtained the refund the pilgrims, who are more often than not of poor or moderate means, declare themselves destitutes and have eventually to be repatriated. It is suggested that the period of one year, during which, under present regulations, a refund on the return ticket or the deposit-paid passport may be claimed, should be extended to three years. Or, to ensure a greater success, to leave the question to the discretion of the Legation, which may be authorised to refuse or allow refunds as is considered fit, judging by the financial status of the individual concerned.
- (2) Another pernicious practice which is gaining strength, especially among Bengali pilgrims, is that the local pilgrim brokers while in India prevail on some of their clients to declare themselves as residents of Mecca. Accordingly the passports in respect of such pilgrims are stamped "Foreign." The officials of the Pilgrim Department in India responsible for issuing such passes apparently deal with them without caring to ascertain the exact nationality of the recipient, which must be clearly discernible from the very appearance of the pilgrims, and without realising the grave consequences attaching to this negligence on their part. On reaching here, these pilgrims, by virtue of their being declared "Foreign," apply for refund, which cannot be legally refused. Recently, a case occurred in which the applicants, five in number, applied for refunds on their respective return tickets before the expiration of one year. As they were all known definitely to the Legation to be British subjects, the refunds were refused. They next approached the Hejaz Government, who sent the passes to the Legation officially with a request that the refund should be paid on the grounds that the individuals concerned were Hejazi subjects. As the relative entry in the pilgrim passes confirmed this contention the refunds were paid, as it was considered safer and better to allow the refund at the time rather than raise the question of nationality. In the circumstances the Government of India would be well advised if instructions were issued to the effect that the "Foreign" stamp should only be endorsed on Hejazi passports proper and not on pilgrim passes.
- (3) *Loss of Return Tickets.*—As the deposit of return tickets or deposit-paid passports at the Legation is not compulsory, many persons do not register their tickets here. There are consequently many cases every year of tickets having been lost. If the holders notify the Legation of the loss in time, steps are immediately taken to ensure against the same being used by impostors. If, on the contrary, the news of the loss reaches the Legation too late after the coupon, having fallen into an impostor's hands, has already been utilised, the individual concerned, often unable to purchase another return ticket, has to be repatriated at Government expense. The only remedy for this would seem to be that the advantages of registration should be brought home to all intending pilgrims as extensively and elaborately as possible.

It would be as well if some sort of preferential treatment could be accorded to those who register their tickets with this Legation, *e.g.*, they may be given return passages before those who do not register. This would, it is thought, prove a simple and effective means of persuading all pilgrims to register their tickets.

82. These observations are submitted to the consideration of the Government of India after a deep study of the whole problem, and would, it is considered, if given effect to, go far towards minimising the question of destitution.

Pilgrim Passes.

83. As has been suggested under the heading of "Destitutes," the practice of issuing pilgrim passes stamped "Foreign" or showing the Mecca address should be discontinued. Great inconvenience is caused to pilgrims by the local system whereby the pilgrim passes are collected by the mutawwif's agents at the quay. In more than one case the passports were lost. Mr. Badi-uz-Zaman, M.L.A., also lost his passport, which could not be found until he had left for Mecca, where the passport was sent to him later. He and other notable pilgrims bitterly criticised the system. The agents, it seems, want to retain the passes as security for the payment of their dues. Javanese pilgrims are not subjected to this regulation.

Commissariat on Board Ship.

84. The pilgrims, especially those who had purchased tickets covering food on the journey, complained that the food supplied was far from satisfactory. The Indian vice-consul discussed the matter with a relative of Messrs. Omer Bhai Chand Bhai, the food supply company, who came on Haj; the latter promised to take action against the employees responsible for this bad arrangement. He, moreover, assured the Indian vice-consul that there would be no further cause for complaint on this account on the return journey. The tariff of food charges was hung in a conspicuous place in the office of the local Haj Committee for the general information of the pilgrims.

Forged Indian Currency Notes.

85. Considerable perturbation was caused among pilgrims in 1930 by the fact that early in the season it was discovered that a considerable number of 100-rupee and 10-rupee Indian currency notes in the market were forged. Money changers became chary of accepting notes of these denominations, and a mild panic prevailed. The matter was brought to the notice of the Government of India telegraphically by the Legation with the request that all intending pilgrims should be warned not to bring Indian currency notes with them. Nevertheless, pilgrims continued bringing the notes and, as was anticipated, found themselves in great difficulties on their arrival here. Many notable pilgrims were stranded at Jedda on their way to Medina as the motor companies did not accept the notes. Luckily, the Legation held in cash the proceeds of the sale of certain deceased pilgrims' effects, and it was found possible, in cases of great distress, to change a certain number of Indian currency notes. Furthermore, an appeal was made to the leading Indian merchants at Mecca, who accepted a good number of notes. Messrs. Abdul Qadir Bhai of Bombay, who had come on Haj and have extensive commercial relations with the Hejazi merchants, contributed greatly towards easing the situation. The manager of the Netherlands Trading Society, moreover, was approached by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the matter and, after consultation with his head office, agreed to accept the notes. Thus a crisis was happily averted. That the matter had, in fact, assumed serious dimensions may well be judged by the fact that His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal personally approached His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the subject. Indian pilgrims would, in future, be well advised to bring gold and silver whenever possible, instead of currency notes, to avoid the possibility of any similar troubles.

Publicity.

86. The North-Western Railway has published a pamphlet for the guidance of the Indian pilgrim. Unfortunately, however, no mention has been made

regarding the existence of the British Legation at Jedda or about the Indian pilgrimage offices at Jedda or Mecca. It is therefore recommended that the Government be moved to instruct the North-Western Railway's publicity committee to add the following information for the pilgrims' guidance in their next issue of the pamphlet:—

- (1) As soon as the ships bearing Indian pilgrims anchor at Jedda the Indian vice-consul together with his staff visit the ship. Any information about customs, dhow hire, coolie charges and other formalities to be gone through by the pilgrims at Jedda may be ascertained from him.
- (2) Pilgrims, after their debarkation, should visit the British Legation and deposit their return tickets or deposit-paid passports there for safe custody.
- (3) An Indian dispensary is attached to the British Legation, where pilgrims are treated free. Also during the pilgrim season medical facilities for Indian pilgrims are provided at Mecca in the Harat-al-Bab.
- (4) The Indian vice-consul is stationed in the same building as the dispensary during the Haj days. Moreover, in the off season as well he frequently visits Mecca. Any complaints against mutawwifs, &c., may be reported to him and he will take any necessary action.
- (5) If the pilgrims from Mecca on their way to Medina are delayed at Jedda, the matter should be reported to the Indian vice-consul at once, who is always prepared to afford them all possible help.
- (6) On their way back to their homes, pilgrims usually visit the British Legation in connexion with their steamer passages. They should also note, however, if they happen to lose any of their kit in the sambuk or elsewhere during their way from the quay to the ship, they should report the matter to the Indian vice-consul, who generally visits each ship before sailing.
- (7) In short, the Indian pilgrims can approach the Indian vice-consul in connexion with any matter or difficulty they may contend or experience during their stay in the Hejaz.

Staff.

87. Mr. Syed Nur Hussein Shah, who was seconded for duty at this post two years ago, has worked with commendable zeal and ability, not only in the pilgrimage work, but in routine matters connected with the Indian section. The correspondence of the Indian section has greatly increased, and it is due in great part to Syed Nur Hussein's untiring aid that the work of the section has been carried on so efficiently.

Mr. Shah Johan Kabir, the Bengali clerk, has rendered valuable services in connexion with Bengali pilgrims. In the season proper he has been much occupied with the registration of all Indian pilgrims, and between seasons he has dealt conscientiously and ably with the intricacies of the estates of deceased pilgrims as also with the questions of registration connected therewith.

Pilgrimage Tariff.

88. The cost of the pilgrimage remained the same as last year with a slight increase in mutawwif's fee. The schedule of charges issued by the Hejazi Government for the 1931 pilgrimage season is attached. Roughly, the cost of pilgrimage, including steamer tickets and fares to Medina and back, may be taken at 1,000 rupees per pilgrim travelling by deck class.

List of Charges imposed on Pilgrims for the Year 1349.

	Pt. Egyptian.
(1) Quarantine dues and passport charges on arrival and departure, and fees of the Control Committee at Jedda	106
(2) Sambuk (dhow) hire from the outer harbour on arrival	12
(3) Sambuk (dhow) hire from the middle harbour on arrival	9
(4) Sambuk (dhow) hire from the inner harbour on arrival	7
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	Pts. Miri
(5) Mutawwif's agent's "ikram" (charges) at Jedda on arrival, for all nationalities ...	25
(6) Porterage of baggage from sambuk (dhow) to quay ...	$\frac{1}{2}$
(7) Housing accommodation in Jedda on arrival 3 pts. Miri per night up to three nights and 2 pts. Miri for every additional night ...	3
(8) Porterage of baggage from quay to house ...	2
(9) Municipality fee per "shuqduf" (camel litter) ...	6
(10) To the "naqib" (chief) and "muauin" (assistant) at Jedda, to be collected from pilgrims on arrival ...	2
(11) To the mutawwif's agent for his services at Jedda on the return journey ...	3
(12) Housing accommodation at Jedda on the return journey 3 pts. Miri per night up to three nights and 2 pts. Miri for every additional night ...	6
(13) Sambuk hire to the outer harbour on departure ...	3
(14) Sambuk hire to the middle harbour on departure ...	2
(15) Sambuk hire to the inner harbour on departure ...	12
(16) Sambuk hire to the quarantine island for the first three days 14 pts. Miri and $2\frac{1}{2}$ pts. Miri daily thereafter... ..	9
(17) Porterage of luggage from house to sambuk on departure ...	7
(18) By every Javanese pilgrim for hospitality at Mecca, housing accommodation at Mecca, housing accommodation at Muna, hospitality during the days of "Tashriq," hospitality at Arafat, tent hire at Arafat, cost of water, fuel, light and servants, fees for numbering and cleaning, and sheikh's charges ...	14
(19) By every Indian and Bengali pilgrim for hospitality, housing accommodation, servants, tent hire at Muna and Arafat, fees for numbering and cleaning and mutawwif's charges. Pilgrims who wish to rent houses by themselves will be entitled to a reduction of 12 rupees in the accommodation charge and those who wish to hire tents at Muna and Arafat by themselves will be entitled to a reduction of $4\frac{1}{2}$ rupees ...	$2\frac{1}{2}$
(20) By every Malabari, Sindhi and Suleimani pilgrim for hospitality, servants, fees for numbering and cleaning and mutawwif's charges. House rent at Mecca and tent hire at Muna and Arafat will also be payable by these pilgrims ...	3
(21) By every Persian pilgrim for hospitality, servants, fees for numbering and cleaning, and mutawwif's charges. House rent at Mecca and tent hire at Muna and Arafat will also be payable by these pilgrims ...	£8 sterling
(22) By every pilgrim of any other nationality, including those from Khartum, Omdurman and other places in the Sudan, Adenese and people of Hodeidah for hospitality, servants, fees for numbering and cleaning, and mutawwif's charges. House rent at Mecca and tent hire at Arafat and Muna will also be payable by these pilgrims ...	Rs. 54 Indian
(23) P.S.—Sudani, Yemeni, Somali, Jibuti, and Abyssinian pilgrims (with the exception of those mentioned under other nationalities) will pay their mutawwifs and for the other expenses mentioned what they like.	Rs. 20 Indian
(24) Camel and motor-car hire will be fixed by the Government in due course.	250 pts. Miri
	210 pts. Miri

Afghan Pilgrimage.

89. The total number of Afghan pilgrims was 1,218 as against 1,162 for 1929. Of this total, 1,026 embarked at Karachi and forty-one at Bombay, while 151 came from Suez.

90. Never, perhaps, in the history of the Afghan pilgrimage have so many notables come from that country as in 1930. There were four ex-generals of the Afghan army and one consul-general. The meeting of both the anti- as well as pro-Nadir Shah elements here was a notable feature. The pro-Amanullah party were loud in their praise for the ex-King. This Legation again helped the Afghan pilgrims in various ways, such as issuing emergency passes to those who had lost their return tickets, &c. The troubles of a party of seven Afghan pilgrims who had travelled via Suez and possessed return tickets from Jedda to India issued by the Mesopotamia Persian Transport Company has already been dealt with under the heading "Transport."

91. The Turkish representative this year took no interest in the affairs of Afghan pilgrims. He deputed no one to assist on his behalf on the local Haj Committee, on the grounds that he was no more the official representative of the Afghan Government.

92. There were sixty-nine Afghan destitutes who were repatriated by the Hejaz Government.

Malay Pilgrimage.

93. The season under review began with the sailing of the Blue Funnel steamship "Titan" from Singapore on the 13th November, 1929. The total number of ships carrying pilgrims from ports in the Straits Settlements to the Hejaz was twelve, all of which were of the Blue Funnel Line. The last of these ships arrived in Jedda on the 1st April, 1930.

Number of Pilgrims ex Singapore and Penang.—The total number of pilgrims of the usual various nationalities was 6,333, including 267 babies. The figure for last season was 5,869.

Number of Malay Pilgrims.—The number of registered Malay pilgrims from each colony or State in Malaya was as follows:—

Straits Settlements—			
Singapore	577
Penang (including Province Wellesley and the Dindings)	114
Malacca	139
Labuan	3
Federated Malay States—			
Perak	431
Selangor	246
Negri Sembilan	134
Pahang	79
Unfederated Malay States—			
Johore	403
Kedah	189
Perlis
Kelantan	190
Tringganu	63
Brunei	22
			2,590

This figure shows an increase of 78 per cent. from that of last year, when the number was only 1,455; but it is yet far from normal for an ordinary pilgrimage year.

94. *Pilgrims via India.*—The number of Malay pilgrims who came via India was forty-six. Their general pecuniary condition whilst in the Hejaz was far from satisfactory, as it cost them more to travel by this route than they expected. As their mutawwifs or sheikhs would only be tempted to sin in pecuniary matters against other pilgrims in order to be able to lend money to such "hard-up" ones (and those loans are seldom recovered), it would be to the interests of all if pilgrims were tactfully discouraged to travel via India unless they possessed ample funds for the journey.

Pilgrim Passes.

95. All issuing centres of pilgrim passes adopted the suggestion in my last autumn report in having the names of pilgrims and their accompanying relatives written in the Jawi (Arabic) characters as well as in English in order to enable Hejazi officials to identify them, except Singapore, Lenggong Rasa Bentong Alor Gajah and Muar.

Vaccination and Inoculation.

96. The Government of the Straits Settlements for the first time in the history of the Malay pilgrimage passed and enforced the ruling that all pilgrims should be vaccinated and inoculated against small-pox and cholera respectively before embarking on pilgrim ships, though that for vaccination has been enforced for years. The advantages accruing to the pilgrims from such ruling cannot be over-estimated when one takes into consideration the prevalence of those terrible diseases among the pilgrims in the past.

The Feeding System.

97. The much-discussed feeding of the pilgrims during their journey at sea to and fro was started this season. As in many other newly-introduced systems, it required improvement, though this was not with regard to the supply of food-stuffs, but rather to the way in which the food was prepared. A memorandum on the subject was submitted by the Malay pilgrimage officer, and it was hoped, for the benefit of the shipping companies concerned as well as the reputation of all those responsible for bringing about this innovation, that the suggestion contained therein would be adopted.

Conditions in Mecca.

98. Almost all the mutawwif's charges were the same as in previous years, so that a repetition of the figures showing the various charges in the different items would be superfluous; it may be mentioned, however, that a pilgrim should have at least 600 dollars if he wishes to include a visit to Medina in his pilgrimage or 500 dollars without the Medina visit. On the other hand, it has to be recorded that the Hejazi Government taxes on travelling from place to place, known as "koshan" and collected through the mutawwifs, were raised during the season, thereby causing some inconvenience to pilgrims, who naturally were not prepared for the extra charges. Examples of such increased taxes are:—

- (a) Koshan for travelling by car to Medina and back: Last year, £6; this year, £7.
- (b) Koshan for travelling by car, Mecca to Jedda: Before Haj, 3 riyals 4 pts.; after the Haj, 7 riyals.

Conditions at Arafat and Muna.

99. Much better climatic and other conditions prevailed during the pilgrims' stay at Arafat and Muna, and the Hejaz Government was enabled to report that the number of deaths among pilgrims during these trying days of exposure was very much smaller than in many previous years. A slight flaw in the whole arrangement here occurred, however, and this was the commandeering by the Hejaz Government of several houses belonging to mutawwifs at Muna (where pilgrims stay three or four days for the performance of pilgrimage rites) for the use of their officials or their guests. This greatly inconvenienced some pilgrims, who would have been lodged in those houses and who consequently had to stay in tents instead.

The Use of Cars for Journey to Arafat and Muna.

100. At the eleventh hour, on starting for Arafat and Muna, the Hejaz Government gave the ruling that pilgrims could use cars for going to these

places; and the result was not satisfactory. As the simultaneous use of cars and camels on the road could only result in great inconvenience to the riders of the latter, the best use for cars would appear to be to carry the sick and the infirm with their friends who looked after them, on a particular day, so that they would be able to spend the shortest possible time at Arafat and Muna.

Assistance to Pilgrims.

101. The usual assistance to a number of pilgrims in recovering over-payments and the like from their mutawwifs was rendered by the Malay pilgrimage officer, and the Malay destitute fund was of service to two pilgrims, the first being a case in which a pilgrim with a large family lost all his money on arrival in the country; the second being one in which the pilgrim was impoverished by the dishonesty of a pilgrim-broker in Singapore.

Conditions during the Return Journey.

102. As usual, the Blue Funnel Line made such satisfactory arrangements for picking up pilgrims at Jedda after the Haj that not one of these pilgrims had to stay more than twenty days in Jedda before he could leave the place. One or two of the ship's doctors, however, did not readily recognise the difference between a merely infectious disease and a "quarantine" disease when deciding whether to accept or to reject a pilgrim on board a pilgrim ship. Another point worth recording was the occurrence of an incident which very nearly ended in causing grave dissatisfaction to, and probably trouble among, over a hundred odd pilgrims on board steamship "Troilus." It is reasonable to expect that everyone would be wise after a mishap; yet, a reminder might usefully be sent to the shipping company concerned to the effect that a recurrence of such inefficiency on the part of their responsible agents, resulting in applications to the British Legation at Jedda for excess certificates to cover very large numbers of extra passengers over and above the licensed number, would be held to their discredit.

Return Portions of Non-returning Pilgrims' Tickets.

103. The system whereby the validity of the return portions of non-returning pilgrims' tickets is extended for a further period of three years has proved not quite satisfactory, as pilgrims who have remained in the Hejaz beyond this period of extension, as well as those who intend for the moment to remain in the country for ever, fail to see any reason why they should not obtain refunds on the unused portions of their return tickets, the more so as they had been wheedled into buying return tickets when coming to the Hejaz. A meeting was held on the 20th May, consisting of Mr. Bond, of the British Legation, Jedda, Mr. Van de Poll, the agent of the Blue Funnel Line at Jedda, and the Malay pilgrimage officer, to discuss this longstanding and much-vexed question of refunds on unused tickets, and the unanimous decision arrived at was that it would be to the best interests of both the pilgrims and the shipping company concerned if the law was amended to the effect that: (a) All the pilgrims are to be obliged to purchase return tickets, except only in the case of Hejazi subjects returning to the Hejaz; (b) any pilgrims after two pilgrimage seasons from the date of issue of his ticket shall obtain the refund on the unused portion of his ticket on production of a certificate from the Legation at Jedda to the effect that he is still in the country. It was further pointed out at the meeting that with such a system the fear of having to repatriate stranded Malay pilgrims in the Hejaz (the reason given for adopting the system of extending the validity of those pilgrims' tickets) was unfounded, and this opinion was backed up by years of experience with Javanese pilgrims who have that system of refunds and who are of the mentality as the Malaysians.

Deceased Pilgrims and their Effects.

104. The total number of deceased pilgrims among those who came to the Haj this season, as reported to the Malay pilgrimage officer up to the time he left Jedda on the 14th June, 1930, was 189, made up as follows:—

Straits Settlements—				
Singapore	21
Penang (including Province Wellesley and the Dindings)	8
Malacca	9
Federated Malay States—				
Perak	32
Selangor	23
Negri Sembilan	22
Penang	16
Unfederated Malay States—				
Johore	23
Kedah	9
Kelantan	17
Trengganu	3
Brunic	6
				189

The effects of those deceased pilgrims who had accompanying relatives in the Hejaz at the time of the death were handed over to the said relatives by the Hejazi Beit-al-Mal, but the effects of those who had no accompanying relatives or friends were retained by the Beit-al-Mal, and should reach the Malay pilgrimage officer through the usual channel some time during the 1930-31 season. These effects would then be distributed among the respective next of kin of the deceased pilgrims by the Malay pilgrimage officer on his return to Malaya through the usual channels.

Sundry Occurrences during the Season.

105. The general peace and safety to life and property in the Hejaz, the boast of Ibn Saud's Government, was maintained throughout the season, but quite a number of petty thefts occurred particularly at Arafat, so much so that one fears these thefts may soon become widespread. The recurrence of the case of swindling the pilgrims of their money for the purchase of tickets by pilgrim-brokers in the Straits Settlements ports compels one to advocate again the necessity for demanding bigger securities, either in cash or in responsible securities, from these pilgrim-brokers so as to safeguard the poor pilgrims.

Staff.

106. Haji Abdul Majid, of the Federated Malay States Education Department, acted as Malay pilgrimage officer for the sixth pilgrimage year, with Haji Mohammed Jamil, engaged temporarily for the season only, as his assistant. The need for a permanently-appointed Malay pilgrimage officer, advisedly styled as British (Malay) vice-consul, with a permanently-appointed clerk for the work, is again urged.

West African Pilgrimage.

107. The official statistics published by the Jedda quarantine authorities show the number of West Africans and Nigerians who performed the pilgrimage in 1930 to have been 3,525, an increase of 1,187 on the 1929 figures. The official figure of 3,525 must again inevitably fall far short of the total number of West Africans who visited the Hejaz. There is reason to believe that more than half as many again travelled by sambuk from Massowah and landed at the Hejazi ports of Lith, Qunfida, Birka and Gahm, though, as usual, it has been found impossible to obtain accurate statistics in respect of pilgrims who land at ports other than Jedda.

108. The scheme proposed by the Nigerian Government for a Nigerian pilgrimage organisation, which was mentioned in the 1929 report, has advanced a stage further, though it is still far from fruition; it is hoped that the measure of control envisaged therein will result in the concentration of all West Africans on Suakin, from whence they will travel to Jedda by steamship.

109. In the return season thirty-seven West Africans were repatriated via the Sudan at a cost of £60 odd, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited) were good enough to quote passages to the Sudan at very low rates in respect of these indigent persons, thereby reducing the call on the funds of the Nigerian Repatriation Account held by this Legation.

Sudan Pilgrimage.

110. The number of Sudan pilgrims who entered the Hejaz through the port of Jedda in 1930 is given as 1,065, a decrease of 306 on the 1929 figures.

All pilgrims held pilgrim passes and return tickets and returned to the Sudan immediately after the Haj; those issued with emergency certificates by this Legation having lost their travel documents, while the agents of the Khedivial Mail Line issued free passages to the pilgrims who had lost their return tickets. Seven pilgrims are reported to have died on pilgrimage.

Iraqi Pilgrimage.

111. The Hejaz quarantine authorities report that 278 Iraqi pilgrims arrived in Jedda in 1930, a decrease of 208 on the 1929 figures. Ten Iraqis reached the Hejaz via Indian ports.

Ten Iraqi pilgrims were advanced sums ranging from £2 5s. to £3 15s. against the 100 rupees deposited by each of them in Bagdad to enable them to return home; they experienced no difficulty in finding steamship accommodation on the return journey.

Palestinian and Transjordanian Pilgrimages.

112. The number of Palestinian and Transjordanian pilgrims to whom pilgrim passes were issued is reported to have been 516 and 26 respectively. Actually, 514 Palestinians left for the Hejaz as two of those registered did not proceed.

Advances were made to nineteen pilgrims, who declared they had insufficient means to meet the cost of their steamship fare and subsistence on the return journey.

It is reported that two Palestinian pilgrims died on the pilgrimage.

[E 3462/81/25]

No. 5.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 202. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 29, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 122 of the 1st April, I have the honour to forward herewith the Jedda report for the months of March and April 1931.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, New Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, the Senior Naval Officer Red Sea Sloops, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Jedda Report for March and April 1931

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I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Ibn Saud.

THE King prolonged his stay in Jedda (January-February report, paragraph 1) until the 5th March, when he returned to Mecca. He remained at Mecca until the 19th April, when he again came to Jedda for three nights, returning for the pilgrimage early on the 22nd April. His health during both visits appeared to be excellent, although he gave fatigue as a reason for his second visit. There was no signs of his relaxing his personal control of all important affairs, although he shows an increasing tendency to leave formal discussion of foreign business to his Ministry for Foreign Affairs. One of his wives, who had been in the north of the Hejaz, arrived in Jedda in March and has been installed there permanently.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. The foreign representatives had little reason during March and April to complain of lack of opportunity to discuss business in Jedda. Since his breakdown at the end of February (January-February report, paragraph 3) the Amir Feisal has played no apparent rôle in foreign affairs except that of signing documents. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin continued to act as Under-Secretary until the 14th April, when, contrary to the expectation of many, Fuad Bey Hamza returned. From the 1st March to the 17th April, when Fuad Bey effectively resumed his functions, Sheikh Yusuf spent much of his time in Jedda. His general attitude tended to confirm the more favourable opinion of him formed by Sir A. Ryan (January-February report, paragraph 3), but the French and Italian representatives, with whom it was a question of discussing treaty texts, found him difficult and meticulous.

Finance.

3. There was no improvement in the financial situation described in paragraphs 4 to 6 of the January-February report. On the purely financial side there was no outward deterioration, perhaps because of the influx of pilgrims

even in reduced numbers and perhaps because recourse has been had to the reserve supply of gold supposed to have been maintained by the Minister of Finance. Neither of these factors can afford lasting relief, because the pilgrimage, whatever immediate money it may have brought in, has been a very poor one and the gold reserve, as to the amount or utilisation of which no precise information has at any recent time been available, is understood to have been seriously depleted of late, if not exhausted. In the meantime, however, the position of British claimants, with the exception of the Government of India, has improved. As a result of very strong pressure by His Majesty's Minister the cable account of the Eastern Telegraph Company up to the end of December was paid off in March by arrangement with the Dutch Bank. The outstandings of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Company were reduced to healthy proportions, and the Legation was not called upon to intervene further on their behalf. The question of chauffeurs' wages assumed a new shape which makes it preferable to deal with it later.

4. How little real improvement there is in the financial situation as a whole is shown by the attitude taken up in regard to the Government of India claim. Following on his earlier conversations with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, Sir A. Ryan mentioned it to the King on the 4th March. Next day the sheikh brought a message from His Majesty, in which, with protestations of gratitude for the past kindness and expressions of regret at having to ask for more, he explained that owing to the poorness of the pilgrimage, the Hejaz Government could not meet that debt unless they borrowed elsewhere. The King asked for a year's grace, offering to give the Government of India a "profit" (although it is against his religious principles to pay interest) if it were accorded. He explained, not for the first time, that he would rather owe money to a friend than to strangers. Sir A. Ryan promised to submit this proposal to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, without any suggestion as to whether it should be accepted or refused. He pointed out that he had intervened last autumn to secure delay, the request for which was based on an assurance that the King was working out plans for financial reorganisation. He did not feel that he could do this a second time, although he recognised that the slump in the pilgrimage had been more disastrous than could have been foreseen in August.

5. The exchange situation was restored early in March by various measures, of which the principal were the prohibition of the export of gold and the arrangement with the Dutch Bank mentioned in paragraph 4 of the report for January-February. The latter arrangement broke down in April owing apparently to the insufficiency of the gold ear-marked for the redemption of riyals and nickel currency accepted by the bank, the Government having limited its liability for such redemption to £10,000; and to the freedom with which the redeemed riyals, &c., were thrown back on the market. The bank had sought its profit in a high commission of 1 per cent. on foreign drafts, and had increased this to 2 per cent. About the middle of April the prohibition on the export of gold was relaxed, and the bank did business for a short time on the basis of selling drafts against half gold and half silver, &c. This also broke down and the riyal again declined, but not so seriously as might have been expected. At the end of the month it fluctuated round rates of 11 to 12 to the £ sterling. These developments coincided with a period when all the pilgrims had arrived and the festival season was approaching. The centre of gravity shifted from the market for gold and silver to that for nickel, a very important element in retail transactions. The bottom went out of the nickel currency market just before the pilgrimage, and the crisis in the bazaars was accentuated by a decision of the Government on the 23rd April themselves to take nickel at the market rate. Panic conditions prevailed for a short time. On the 30th April the authorities were contemplating an heroic effort to bring things back to £ sterling = 10 riyals = 220 piastres.

Economic.

6. The poorness of the pilgrimage and the financial crisis have produced a general depression in business circles. The Government are said to be exploring the possibility of developing fresh sources of prosperity. The most definite sign of advance in this direction has been the visit of Mr. Twitchell (see paragraph 66). The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 24th April contained a leading article on the King's solicitude for the general progress of the country, with special reference to "Two Great Projects," namely, the quest for water and a scheme for developing mineral

resources. Mr. Philby mentioned the latter idea in a private conversation early in March, and suggested more recently that Mr. Twitchell might also be working on mining possibilities.

General.

7. There was again no news of any important development in the interior during March and April. A general malaise was said to prevail in native circles in Mecca and Jedda. Economic depression would sufficiently account for this, were it not suggested somewhat persistently (though so vaguely that the statement must be received with great reserve) that the position in the north is a cause of perturbation. The apprehension among the resident upper classes in the two towns is described as being similar to that produced by the final struggle between Ibn Saud and the Hashimites. The Governor of Hail, Ibn Musaad, is said to be restive, and the eyes of some are turned anxiously to the Transjordan frontier area. All this is unsubstantiated, but cannot be ignored at a time of general depression and uncertainty. It may be noted that among the visitors to Mecca for the pilgrimage was Abdullah-bin-Blaihid, whose visit last year (March 1930 report, paragraph 14) was supposed to be embarrassing to the Hejazi Government, but on this occasion he seems to have attracted no special attention.

8. The dances mentioned in paragraph 9 of the report for January-February were followed by a series of somewhat similar demonstrations during the remaining days of the King's stay in Jedda. Various sections of the population took it in turn to organise processions with much drumming and dancing to the palace. This was a passing phase, but there have been minor relaxations in other directions, a greater toleration, for instance, of music and games. Any theory of Ibn Saud's evolution can only be tested by experience, but evidence is accumulating in support of the working theory suggested tentatively in paragraph 10 of the report for January-February. If the King is definitely working on a policy of compromise, one of the objects probably is to efface as far as possible distinctions between Nejd and the Hejaz.

9. The failure of the Government to pay its chauffeurs' wages (January-February report, paragraph 5) led to a deplorable incident in Mecca on or about the 26th March. The precise facts are not certain, but they are roughly as follows: A number of discontented chauffeurs of various nationalities, headed by a Syrian, threatened a strike, attempted to bring their grievances to the notice of the higher authorities and apparently indulged in some molestation either of other chauffeurs who would not join them or of users of certain cars or both. Whatever the exact nature of the demonstration, it culminated in some section of the malcontents being set upon by the King's men, severely beaten, and thrown pell-mell into prison. These included ten British or British-protected persons of Somali and other origins.

10. His Majesty's Minister had on the 16th March spoken in general terms to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin about the non-payment of wages. On hearing of the Mecca incident he refrained from making an official protest for various reasons, including the uncertainty as regards the exact facts, the difficulty of knowing which, if any, of the British chauffeurs involved had documentary proof of nationality and the undesirability of aggravating the tension caused by the Transjordan frontier situation. On the 29th March and the 1st April, however, he spoke categorically to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin in conversation. He urged that, even if the chauffeurs had indulged in any folly, it was due to the default of the Government. He mentioned a rumour that the men were to be deported, and suggested that the wise course for a Government to pursue in such circumstances was to remove the grievance and show leniency after dealing with any immediate disorder.

11. In spite of this sage advice, the Government decided to deport the chauffeurs. On the 7th April the Governor of Jedda requested the Legation to visa the travelling papers of three British-protected persons and to issue papers to seven others who had none. Sir A. Ryan delayed action on the first request, and in reply to the second asked that the seven men should be sent to the Legation for necessary inquiries. At the same time he wrote a strong private letter to Sheikh Yusuf, explaining that he would not be a party to the deportation of the ten British subjects *en masse* without reference to His Majesty's Government, and making a personal appeal to the King to cancel the deportation order if only for

the sake of the credit of his Government and his desire for good relations with Great Britain.

12. His Majesty's Government, while approving Sir A. Ryan's action, felt that they could not contest the right of the Hejazi Government to deport the men and directed that, if the local action failed, the necessary visas and travelling papers should be issued, subject to whatever might be possible being done to protect the men against unnecessary hardship and more particularly against being defrauded of their wages.

13. Up to the end of April the King had not replied to Sir A. Ryan's appeal, nor had the Governor of Jedda produced the seven candidates for passports. The victims were believed to be still confined at Mecca with the possible exception of their Syrian leader, who at an early stage managed to get to Jedda on leaving a surety behind. This man was examined by the British Legation doctor at the request of the French Chargé d'Affaires, and had undoubtedly been most severely beaten.

II.—FRONTIER QUESTIONS.

Transjordan.

Current Raiding.

14. Much correspondence passed in March and April regarding raids related mostly to incidents which had formed the subject of protests by the respective Governments earlier and in two cases dealt with raids alleged to have occurred before March, which had not been the subject of earlier protests. One of these was a further raid from Transjordan which the Hejazi Government believed to have occurred early in February, but about which they admitted not having exact information. The other was an alleged raid from Nejd into Syria via Transjordan, for which the Syrian authorities sought to hold Transjordan responsible. The raids alleged to have occurred in March and April reduced themselves to three from Transjordan into Nejd and one from Nejd into Transjordan. The former were of a normal type. The one raid from Nejd was serious, inasmuch as it was an attack on the 30th March by a party of Nejd Shararat on a patrol of four men of the Arab Legion, who had been detailed to draw water in the course of ordinary patrol work. Three of these men were killed and one wounded. Their camels, rifles and kit were captured. Although they were not in uniform when attacked, it was considered certain by the Transjordan authorities that one had been murdered after the raiders had ascertained that they were attacking policemen. It was alleged later, on the evidence of two men who claimed to have been in Jauf when the raiders returned, that the latter were warmly congratulated by the new Governor Turki-as-Sudairi and were authorised to keep what they had captured as a reward for their prowess.

15. In the course of the correspondence in March and April, the Transjordan authorities made it a practice to suggest that Hejaz-Nejd subjects who had been victims of admitted raids or might be entitled to restitution in more doubtful cases, should report to Captain Glubb. In one such case, the Hejazi Government intimated that the Governor of Al Ula would send an agent to Captain Glubb to take delivery. In three others they stated that, as the victims could not go to him in person, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Zeid had been instructed to discuss the cases with him. (See the following section.)

General Frontier Situation.

16. The discussions arising out of the British memorandum (January-February report, paragraph 18) overshadowed all other questions between the Legation and the Hejazi Government throughout March and April. Sir A. Ryan emphasised the gravity of the situation in a long interview with Ibn Saud on the 2nd March. The King was impressed, but in replies returned on the 3rd March to the Legation's two communications of the 28th February, he maintained a bold front. The reply to the separate note regarding Captain Glubb was reasonably satisfactory in form, and except for a carefully-worded suggestion of arbitrary conduct on his part in one later note no further accusations were subsequently made against him. The reply to the main British memorandum was largely evasive. The King reaffirmed his intention of bringing article 3 of the Hadda Agreement into operation, but maintained that the proposed meeting between

Captain Glubb and Sheikh Abdul Aziz would serve no useful purpose until agreement had been reached as to (a) the method of dealing with raids since Mr. MacDonnell began his investigation, and (b) the principles to be observed by the two representatives. As regards (a), he claimed the return by Transjordan of stated quantities of loot. The most important point laid down as regards (b) was that, in the case of large-scale raids, Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should exchange information and, if necessary, meet, but that any decisions they might take should be *ad referendum*. The King agreed that raids during a meeting like the MacDonnell investigation were scandalously un-Bedouin, but accused Transjordan of having started the new series of raids on the 26th July. He refused to condemn En Neshmi, who had done his duty and whom he had dismissed only to avoid controversy with His Majesty's Government. He undertook to instruct Ibn Zeid to meet Captain Glubb on receipt of a reply from His Majesty's Government. He refused any restoration of loot to Transjordan until a start had been made on the other side. He declined, with thanks, His Majesty's Government's offer of assistance in the Wadi Sirhan, thanking God that he had power over all his subjects. The only help he asked for was that criminals fleeing into Transjordan should be handed back.

17. After carefully considering their next move, His Majesty's Government decided that the Hejazi reply, while in many ways evasive and unsatisfactory, did not exclude the achievement of their essential purpose, namely, that of bringing about an immediate meeting of the frontier authorities and the settlement of the questions at issue on a local and tribal basis. They were unable to accept all the principles proposed by Ibn Saud for observance by the representatives, although they did so very reluctantly as regards the clause providing for reference of their decisions to higher authority. Two further memoranda were exchanged on the 10th and 12th March. Space does not admit of reproducing all their details. The Hejazi memorandum of the 12th March split further hairs, but still did not make the meeting impossible. There ensued from it a British proposal, put forward on the suggestion of Sir J. Chancellor, that Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should hold a preliminary meeting limited to the exchange of information and views as to the best means of policing the frontier. Ibn Saud was again sticky over this. It was eventually agreed towards the middle April that such a meeting should take place, but only after the King had scouted the idea that there need be any discussion of measures of police and stressed his view that the preliminary meeting should only be for the purpose of exchanging information. It was also agreed, without prejudice to the preliminary meeting, that Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should at once begin to communicate with each other by means of the wireless station at Jaufr. The final completion of these arrangements was further delayed by a breakdown of the wireless communication between Mecca and Jaufr. Eventually the Hejazi Government sent a courier by sea from Jeddah on the 22nd April, with instructions to Ibn Zeid. No news of his arrival at the Transjordan-Nejd frontier reached Jeddah up to the 30th April.

18. The main correspondence was resumed on the 18th April, when Sir A. Ryan forwarded a memorandum stating the considered views of His Majesty's Government on points in the Hejazi memorandum of the 12th March, which still required to be dealt with before the further meeting between Captain Glubb and Sheikh Abdul Aziz could take place. It was clearly laid down that the statement was not to effect the arrangements already made for a preliminary meeting. The memorandum emphasised various desiderata in connexion with the later meeting. It pressed for Ibn Saud's consent to a previous public announcement prohibiting raiding under threat of exemplary punishment, not only during the meeting, but at all times. Stress was laid on the importance of empowering the representatives to supervise the immediate restoration of loot on either side, once their decision had been sanctioned by higher authority. His Majesty's Government confirmed their reluctant acceptance of the principle that such sanction should be obtained, but they urged that no further time should be lost over discussions of procedure. They agreed that the representatives should dispense as far as possible with the attendance of tribal sheikhs, one of the points to which the Hejazi Government had been most reluctant to agree. They considered it essential, however, that they should be free to call upon the sheikhs in certain cases, and suggested that the danger of quarrels, with which the Hejazi Government had made play, could be minimised by taking guarantees in advance for good behaviour. They proposed that the raids to be dealt with should be all

those which, by reason of the date of their occurrence, were outside the scope of the MacDonnell enquiry. They regarded the question of the surrender of criminals, which Ibn Saud had raised in his first counter-memorandum and to which he had reverted later, as being one which did not effect the immediate issue. They promised to deal with it in a separate memorandum at an early date.

19. The Hejazi Government replied on the 24th April. The answer was again unsatisfactory in certain respects, notably because it made no reference to the supervision by the representatives of arrangements for the mutual restoration of loot, and because it laid down the principal that sheikhs should only be summoned, if at all, for consultation with the representative of their own sides not for "reciprocal trials or interrogation." A suitable rejoinder to be communicated on behalf of His Majesty's Government was still under consideration at the end of the month.

Administrative Arrangements on the Frontier.

20. According to reports from Transjordan, of which there is no independent confirmation in Jeddah, the general administration of the frontier region has been placed in the hands of Ahmad-as-Sudairi, acting as "Viceroy" at Tebuk and exercising control over Governors at that place, at Al Ula, and at Jaufr. The new Governor of Jaufr is said to be Turki-as-Sudairi, a brother of Ahmad. According to the same reports, An Neshmi was in February in command of the desert forces, but the Hejazi Government denied in March that he held any official post whatever.

Druse Refugees in Nejd (see paragraph 20, January-February report).

21. The Iraqi Prime Minister took this question up with the Hejazi Government during his negotiations in Mecca (paragraph 22 ff). From what he told Sir A. Ryan it was clear that he was not only willing but anxious that the refugees should settle in Iraq. He hinted at, without expressing, a request for Sir A. Ryan's assistance in getting Ibn Saud to write to Sultan Al Atrash in a sense which would ensure his moving thither with his followers. Sir A. Ryan sought instructions on the subject on the 9th April, but the matter was in abeyance up to the end of the month. Both the Foreign Office and Sir F. Humphrys considered that it would be premature to intervene with Ibn Saud until the assent of the French authorities, already given in principle, should have taken definite shape. The High Commissioner hoped to discuss the matter further with the French when visiting Beirut on the 19th April.

Iraq.

"Bon-Voisinage," &c.

22. The situation described in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the report for January-February took a turn for the better in March. Some sort of a correction of the story that Nuri Pasha was coming by invitation to talk to Ibn Saud about an Arab alliance would appear to have been published in the Bagdad press. On or about the 16th March the Pasha telegraphed direct to Mecca his regrets at having had to postpone his visit. The suspicions of the Hejazis as to the reasons for the delay were finally allayed by a further telegram announcing his departure from Bagdad by air. He arrived in Jeddah on the morning of the 5th April accompanied by Taha Pasha Hashimi, the Iraqi Chief of Staff, Munaffak Bey-al-Alousi, a high official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and two subordinates. He was given a good reception, though it perhaps fell a little short of what might have been expected. Not only the King but the Prince-Minister for Foreign Affairs remained in Mecca and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin went no further than the quay, leaving it to minor personages to welcome the delegation on board ship. The Hejazi Government were a little disconcerted to find that Nuri Pasha contemplated only a short stay, all the shorter as the Khedivial steamer by which he intended to return was timed to leave earlier than had been expected. Plans were rapidly readjusted, and instead of staying at least one night in Jeddah, he went on the same afternoon to Mecca, where the whole of the negotiations took place.

23. The negotiations in Mecca lasted three days. They were successfully concluded late on the afternoon of the 8th March. No occasion arose for British

intervention, contrary to the expectation of His Majesty's Minister, who had obtained instructions as to the attitude to be observed, in case he should be called in to compose differences. His only rôle, indeed, was to say "bless you my children" at a dinner party at the Legation on the evening of the last day, at which Nuri Pasha and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin arrived very late but very pleased with themselves. From what Nuri Pasha told Sir A. Ryan, taken in conjunction with the official communiqué published by the Hejazi Government on the 10th April, the agreements reached would appear to have been as follows:—

- (a) The "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement and Arbitration Protocol initialled at Bagdad on the 9th March, 1930, were signed, with minor alterations.
- (b) An extradition treaty was signed after difficult negotiations, in the course of which Nuri Pasha undertook to write a letter in agreed terms giving certain assurances regarding tribal offenders.
- (c) It was agreed to renew the arrangement made on board H.M.S. "Lupin" in February 1930, regarding the disputed posts in the southern desert of Iraq (Jedda report for February 1930, paragraph 3 (1)). The Hejazi communiqué made no reference to this question.
- (d) Nuri Pasha believed himself to have finally placated Ibn Saud as regards Ibn Mashhur (see below). This also was not referred to in the Hejazi communiqué.
- (e) Various questions were reserved for subsequent negotiation. These, according to the Hejazi communiqué, were Hara Mein Wakfs, passport arrangements, customs duties and co-operation in regard to scientific and technical matters. Nuri Pasha also mentioned wells. Just before re-embarking he told Sir A. Ryan that he had that morning made some last moment concession regarding Wakfs, but he did not indicate its nature.

24. Apart from the main negotiations, the parties also discussed the questions of Ibn Mashhur (see paragraphs 27-28) and the disposal of Sultan Al Atrash and his followers (see paragraph 21). Nuri Pasha explained to the Hejazi Government the agreement just concluded between Iraq and Transjordan. He informed the King of his intention of sending Taha Pasha and Muwaffak Bey on from Jedda to Sana (see also paragraph 35 below). Finally, he succeeded, according to his own account, in placating the King's resentment against Dr. Damluji, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs (September-November report 11 (e)), and carried away a kind message to that gentleman.

25. Thus, despite the nipping winds of February, the roses that bloomed in Bagdad in December (January-February report, paragraph 22) came to perfection in Mecca at Eastertide. Both parties showed qualities of statesmanship. It does not appear whether Nuri Pasha broached his Arab Alliance project. He made no express reference to it in his conversations with Sir A. Ryan, although he spoke of having, when in Mecca, represented the despatch of his delegates to Sana as a move calculated to serve Arab interests generally.

26. It was agreed at Mecca that the treaty texts should be published simultaneously by the two Governments at a later date, the idea being to give Nuri Pasha time to prepare the ground for submitting them to his Parliament, the assent of which he hoped to secure before the end of its spring sittings.

Ibn Mashhur.

27. On the 30th March His Majesty's Government approved the language used by Sir A. Ryan in his conversations of the 31st January and the 1st February arising out of the Hejazi note of the 29th January (January-February report, paragraph 23, in which "resented" should read "reasserted"), and laid down the lines of a reply to that note. This reply was intended to define the position of His Majesty's Government before the arrival of Nuri Pasha, and was actually communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 4th April. The main points were that the case had been discussed between the two Kings at the Lupin Conference precisely because it differed from that of the other rebels who had surrendered, that any subsequent intervention by His Majesty's Government had been undertaken merely from motives of friendship for both sides, and that in present circumstances they could only disinterest themselves and leave the parties to settle the matter direct.

28. Nuri Pasha believed himself to have disposed of the matter satisfactorily during his negotiations at Mecca. When replying on the 11th April to a personal letter from Sir F. Humphrys, Ibn Saud recognised, subject to a mild restatement of his views on the question of principle, that the matter was closed. On the 13th April the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a reply not quite so amicable to the British official communication of the 4th April. He again maintained that the Hejazi Government's claim against His Majesty's Government rested on the same promise as that in fulfilment of which other rebels had been surrendered. He admitted, however, that, as a result of the recent negotiations with Iraq, the matter was in process of settlement. It may be hoped that, if Ibn Mashhur remains in Syria, and if there is no quarrel over the surrender by Iraq of his followers and property, the tiresome question will cease to trouble the relations of Great Britain, Iraq and Hejaz-Nejd. In a good day, be it spoken!

Koweit and Bahrein.

29. At an audience on the 2nd March Sir A. Ryan explained orally to Ibn Saud that it would be impossible for the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to visit His Majesty at Jedda (January-February report, paragraph 27 (a)), but that it was hoped that an opportunity for a meeting in Nejd might present itself later. The King was most amiable. He said that he had realised how difficult it would be for Colonel Biscoe to come to Jedda, but that he had suggested it to show his goodwill. He hoped to be able to receive the Resident later in Nejd. He added spontaneously that he would be prepared to discuss matters of common interest.

30. There was no other development of any importance in connexion with the possible discussion of Persian Gulf questions. The suggestion that Colonel Biscoe should take advantage of the King's invitation to Jedda to write him a direct letter was abandoned. A report by Colonel Biscoe to the Colonial Office early in March pointed to a further amelioration in the direct relations between Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Koweit, with whom the King had finally settled a question of frontier camels and whom he had invited to come to Mecca for the pilgrimage. The sheikh had been unable for financial reasons to accept this invitation.

New Trade Route.

31. See January-February report, paragraph 28. Nothing further was heard of the project for an overland route from the Hasa coast to the Hejaz. Early in April the newly-returned Persian Chargé d'Affaires spoke of it to Sir A. Ryan as a matter which had been talked of but could not be regarded for the present as practical politics. In the meanwhile the Persian Government seem to be mainly interested in diverting their pilgrims from the route across Syria to the all-sea route from Muhammarran to Jedda by Russian ships.

Yemen and Asir.

32. On the 11th March the Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote officially to the Legation asking that, as Sabiyan and Jizan were not covered by the agreement between the Hejazi Government and the Eastern Telegraph Company (which agreement precludes the former from using other means of telegraphic communication with the outside world), arrangements should be made to establish wireless communication between Jizan and Aden for commercial purposes. The Legation was also asked to arrange for postal communication with a similar object between Jizan and Kamaran.

33. The primary interest of these proposals was that they assumed His Majesty's Government's acquiescence in the new status of Asir. They compelled a fresh review of the situation in further letters addressed by the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office and India Office (January-February report, paragraph 30). On the 28th March the Foreign Office lent to the view that the new situation in regard to Asir should be recognised, subject to previous consultation with the Italian Government.

34. From information supplied unofficially by Mr. Champion (paragraph 66) to Sir A. Ryan, it seems probable that the establishment of a wireless service

between Jizan and the Admiralty station at Aden, which already accepts commercial messages, presents no great practical difficulty. The question of a postal service to Kamaran may be complicated by the dubious international status of that island.

35. There do not appear to have been any important developments in the situation between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya. According to reports from Aden, which may well be accurate, although independent information is difficult to come by in Jeddah, Ibn Saud has recently been pressing the Imam to agree to a delimitation of frontiers and the Imam has been hedging. The despatch to Sana of two members of Nuri Pasha's mission, viz., Taha Pasha Al Hashimi and Muwaffak Bey, is of some interest in connexion with Hejaz-Yemen relations. They left Jeddah for Massowah on the 13th April and are understood to have visited Asmara during an enforced stay in Eritrea. Taha Pasha was formerly Turkish Chief of Staff in the Yemen and knows the Imam. Nuri Pasha told Sir A. Ryan that he had assured himself that Ibn Saud would not take umbrage at the two delegates being sent straight from the Hejaz to the Yemen. He said that he had offered good offices towards the removal of any resentment in the Imam's mind over Ibn Saud's Asir policy. The King had reacted favourably and charged the delegates with friendly messages to the Imam. Nuri Pasha, however, in his conversation with Sir A. Ryan represented the mission to Sana as being mainly in the nature of a voyage of discovery, conceived with a view to the exploration of a situation of which no one knows very much.

III.—RELATIONS WITH STATES OUTSIDE ARABIA.

British Empire.

36. The Transjordan frontier question hung as a cloud over the general position between His Majesty's Government and the Hejaz-Nejd during the whole two months. It did not prevent the discussion of other business, but it necessitated the postponement of various questions and imposed caution in the handling of others lest an already tense situation should be aggravated. On the 1st April Sheikh Yusuf Yasin sought an interview with Sir A. Ryan, under the King's instructions, with the express object of expressing the perplexity created in Ibn Saud's mind by the recent severity exhibited by His Majesty's Government and the rigour of the Minister's own language on certain subjects, notably the questions of the Eastern Telegraph Company's cable account. Sir A. Ryan explained that there was no change in His Majesty's Government's fundamental attitude towards Ibn Saud, but said that they dealt with questions on their individual merits. The Transjordan question was one of such capital importance that it might affect general relations. The Eastern Telegraph Company question was not on the same plane, but the Legation had taken a strong line because it had become a scandal. The Minister gave examples of the efforts made to prevent an admittedly acute situation from being still further envenomed, e.g., the avoidance by His Majesty's Government of all publicity in connexion with the Transjordan crisis and the restraint which he has himself exercised in dealing with the question of chauffeurs (paragraphs 9 to 13), although he felt very strongly about it.

37. All passages of arms notwithstanding, relations remained as friendly as could be expected throughout the two months. In spite of the electrical character of Sir A. Ryan's audience on the 2nd March to discuss Transjordan, the King invited him to a second audience on the 4th March to discuss more ordinary business. Various social courtesies helped to limit the area of tension, notably the Legation dinner on the 8th April in honour of Nuri Pasha. At the time of and after the pasha's visit, friendly personal communications passed between Sir F. Humphrys and Ibn Saud. They related partly to a gift of two wireless sets, which, after various accidental delays, were offered by the High Commissioner to the King on his own behalf, and that of His Majesty's Government as a souvenir of the Lupin Conference. The message addressed to His Majesty on the occasion of their delivery contained a formal expression of the goodwill of His Majesty's Government in addition to that of Sir Francis's personal sentiments.

Money Order Agreement with India.

38. See paragraph 33 of January-February report. This matter advanced a stage in the direction of bringing the text up to date on lines agreed upon in 1929; but the agreement had not been actually concluded up to the end of April.

France.

39. The treaty negotiations (January-February report, paragraph 36) continued throughout the two months. Both sides continue to be reticent. The French have found Sheikh Yusuf Yasin difficult and complain of his meticulousness over forms of expression. It is understood that the latest phase has been one of slowing down rather than progress.

Italy.

40. The position of the treaty negotiations (January-February report, paragraph 37) appears to be similar to that between Hejaz-Nejd and France; but the Italian consul is even more reticent than the French Chargé d'Affaires.

Germany.

41. Herr de Haas informed the foreign representatives on the 24th March of his appointment as German consul for the Hejaz. He had previously obtained an exequatur from the Hejazi Government, probably the first issued under the Saudian régime. In conversation with Sir A. Ryan he foreshadowed the possibility of a career consul being appointed in a year or so. He left for Germany via Constantinople in April for mixed family and business reasons, and left another German merchant in charge of the consulate. Herr de Haas had not secured the Government benzine contract up to the time he left. He told Sir A. Ryan in March that he had reached a point some little time before at which he believed it to be definitely arranged, but had then been put off from day to day. The reason apparently was financial stringency.

The Netherlands.

42. The Dutch Chargé d'Affaires was absent during the whole two months on the tour mentioned in paragraph 41 of the January-February report. The work of the Legation was carried on by M. Adriaanse, who is to succeed M. van der Meulen later in the year.

Egypt.

43. The Egyptian consul Hassan Bey-al-Achmouni was superseded in obscure circumstances at the end of March. He was obviously disconcerted, and, though he put a good face on it, he considered himself to have been treated cavalierly by his Government, which announced the appointment of his successor without providing him with a new post. The new consul, Hafiz Bey Amer, arrived on the 29th March. He hails from Tantah, where he at one time practised as an advocate. He later held judicial posts at Assiout and Alexandria. He has had no previous diplomatic or consular experience. When he first called he made an unfavourable impression on Sir A. Ryan, but has been agreeable in subsequent intercourse. He knows very little French and has only an indifferent knowledge of English. He appears to be a devout Moslem.

44. In half-revelations to Sir A. Ryan before leaving early in April, Hassan Bey said that his political position had been embarrassing since his visit to Egypt in December (December report, section 12). He said that he had not brought back a written reply to the letter which Ibn Saud had sent by his hand to King Faud. The latter had merely sent a verbal message (*cf.* January-February report, paragraph 39). He had thus been left in the air and he did not know whether his successor had brought back the awaited written reply. According to a rumour, which is probably a mere scandalous invention, Hassan Bey's recall was due to a report having reached Egypt that he had sold himself to Ibn Saud.

Persia.

45. The Persian Chargé d'Affaires returned to Jedda about the beginning of April after an absence of some nine months. He brought with him his secretary and the secretary's wife, who is his own sister. This lady appears to have been responsible for the derelict state of the Persian Legation since the 30th July (December report, section 14). Habibulla Khan, when he left in June, told the secretary that he must hold the fort. The lady was displeased, and, having a pull with both, telegraphed to her husband that she was extremely ill. He closed the Legation and hurried to her side to find her perfectly well. In relating this story, Habibulla Khan displays more appreciation of his sister's enterprise than displeasure at his brother-in-law's desertion.

Afghanistan.

46. Afghanistan provided the surprise packet of the period under review. A mission from Kabul arrived inconspicuously in Jedda on or about the 3rd April, headed by a bearded officer of Nadir Khan's Court. Its ostensible object was to confirm good relations and make the pilgrimage. About the time of its arrival a report reached the Government of India from the bazaars of Lahore that the ex-King Amanullah was about to visit the Hejaz. A similar rumour ran round Mecca and Jedda on the 4th April, apparently as a result of the ex-King having sent a precursor with a letter to Ibn Saud. The news was confirmed from Italy, where he was still making a secret of his movements. There was further confirmation from Egypt in due course, and on the 14th April Sheikh Yusuf Yasin told Sir A. Ryan that Amanullah was indeed coming. He added spontaneously that Ibn Saud liked Nadir Khan better because he was a better Moslem, but could deny no Moslem access to the holy places.

47. The ex-King, with his wife's uncle and brother, embarked in a Khedivial steamer at Suez on the 14th April. He beguiled the first days of the voyage with a gramophone, but on the last he prayed. He landed at Jedda in pilgrim garb on the 18th April. He was received with great ceremony, although it is uncertain whether military honours were rendered. In the afternoon he went on to Mecca. Late that evening he performed the preliminary ritual with great unction, even to the shedding of tears; and pilgrims from Afghanistan and the Punjab shouted "Long live Amanullah!" Ibn Saud had himself intended to visit Jedda on the 18th April. He postponed his visit in order to avoid the appearance of having come to meet the ex-King. They exchanged visits in Mecca on the 19th and Amanullah was accorded the honour of being allowed to take part in the annual sweeping of the Kaaba. He was present but did not speak at the King's international Moslem banquet on the 24th April. In due course he took his part in the pilgrimage and on the 30th April he proceeded to Medina.

48. The ex-King's primary object would appear to have been to rehabilitate himself by proving his excellence as a Moslem and also by purging himself of any possible lapses in the past. Certain activities of his before he came to the Hejaz, including the distribution of a manifesto in India and other countries, indicate that the rehabilitation may be part of a forward policy having for its object his return to the Afghan throne; and his visit to Mecca has served the further purpose of enabling him to make contact with a great variety of Afghans and others. During his stay there he was much frequented and was active in propaganda on the lines of accusing Nadir Khan of black treachery, cursing the British and affirming his resolve never to desert Afghanistan. The Legation has obtained a copy of a long pamphlet in Persian, probably incidental with the manifesto mentioned above, which he circulated in Mecca. Apart from the miscellaneous pilgrims, whether Afghans, especially Kandaharis, and Indians, especially Punjabis, who sympathise with him, the most notable persons concerned in or with Amanullah's visit to Mecca may perhaps be grouped as follows:—

- (1) The King and his immediate suite.
- (2) A group consisting of Ghulam Nabi, late Minister (of Nadir Khan) in Turkey, Shuja-ud-Dowleh, former Minister (of Amanullah Khan) in London, and two lesser diplomats formerly or still employed in Angora. These arrived in the same ship as the ex-King, but Ghulam Nabi is said to have refused Ibn Saud's hospitality to mark disapproval

of his kindness to an enemy of Nadir Khan and afterwards to have asked a favour himself from Amanullah.

- (3) The Kabul delegation, reinforced by a certain Maulvi Saif-ur-Rahman, who came separately from India. These consented to visit Amanullah, but apparently told him that Afghanistan was getting on very nicely indeed without him.
- (4) The Afghan Minister at Cairo, who arrived a few days after the ex-King. He would appear to be old-world and pious, and there is no indication of his sympathising with Amanullah, whom he may, indeed, have come to watch.
- (5) Leading Indian revolutionaries of the type of Moulvi Obeidullah, formerly, if not still, a Soviet protégé, once a "Silk Letter" conspirator, now a preacher in Mecca.

IV.—AIR MATTERS.

Hejaz Air Force.

49. His Majesty's Minister had further conversations with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin early in March on the situation described in paragraph 42 of the January-February report. At one moment he thought he had paved the way for the dismissal of Pilot Lowe and the retention of the other two pilots until the expiry of their contracts, although the King expressed his wish to liquidate the whole of the present staff in due course and a desire for the assistance of His Majesty's Government in recruiting a complete new staff of pilots and mechanics at lower salaries than those originally fixed. On the 19th March, however, the sheikh wrote privately that the King had decided to dispense with all three pilots, and confirmed his request for assistance in recruiting new personnel. The definiteness of this decision was, and remains, confidential as between the Legation and the Hejazi Government, but the pilots could not fail to get an inkling otherwise of the fact that they were in danger of discharge. The result was that the chief pilot and Mr. North tendered their resignations in the first days of April, not because of the non-dismissal of Mr. Lowe, but because of their dissatisfaction with the situation as a whole. The situation remained indeterminate up to the end of April. The King avoided acceptance of the resignation of the two pilots, whom he would like to keep to look after the aeroplanes, until he has made new arrangements, and His Majesty's Government had taken no decision on his request for assistance in making such new arrangements.

50. Action was still delayed on the Foreign Office instructions regarding the Hejazi Government's request for assistance in procuring instructional aeroplanes, &c. (January-February report, paragraph 43).

Arabian Air Route.

51. This question (see January-February report, paragraph 45) also remained in abeyance pending the establishment of a more satisfactory situation in regard to the Transjordan frontier. Sir A. Ryan informed Fuad Bey in general conversation on the 21st April that he would soon be reopening the question of landing grounds on the Hasa coast. Fuad Bey asked that action should be postponed until he had had a chance of remedying the deterioration of Anglo-Hejazi relations during his absence. Sir A. Ryan agreed to go slow for the time being, doing this all the more readily because of the near approach of the pilgrimage season.

V.—MILITARY MATTERS.

52. There is nothing important to report.

VI.—NAVAL MATTERS.

53. H.M.S. "Dahlia" arrived in Jedda on the 25th April for the visit usually made at the pilgrimage season and remained over the end of the month. The visit was a great success and afforded an opportunity for discussing various matters with Commander R. H. Jackson, who, to the regret of everybody, was visiting Jedda for the last time before giving up his command. Nothing that

passed in these discussions calls for special record. There were no other naval visits, British or foreign.

54. His Majesty's Government announced in March their decision regarding naval salutes for Hejazi dignitaries. Apart from those given to Royalty, the only salutes to be given are as follows:—

	Guns.
Ministerial heads of fighting services	17
Governor of Jedda	13
Governors of other ports	7

55. Information was received in March regarding personal conversations between Captain Dicken, Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, and Admiral Deville (January-February report, paragraph 50), when they met at Port Sudan, from which it emerged, of course quite unofficially—

- (a) That the French asked the assent of the Hejazi Government to all visits to Hejazi ports, including Jedda;
- (b) That they took less rigid views than His Majesty's Government of salutes and were willing to accord them whenever they thought they would give pleasure; and
- (c) That they were indifferent to measures for the repression of slave traffic in the Red Sea.

VII.—PILGRIMAGE.

56. The 1931 pilgrimage justified poor expectations. The grand total of pilgrims from overseas was barely 40,000, about half the number in 1930. After several days of doubt, it was held that the new moon had been seen on the evening of Saturday, the 18th April, with the result that the gathering at Arafat took place on Monday, the 27th April. The number of persons present cannot be estimated, but, even allowing for a noticeably large contingent of Yemenis, it is unlikely that there were more than from 10,000 to 20,000 overland pilgrims. Health conditions were excellent, and there were unusually few deaths on Arafat Day or during the ensuing festivals.

57. On the 24th April the King gave his usual banquet for Moslem notables of all nations. He had King Amanullah on his right and Sheikh Ahmed-el-Senussi on his left. He delivered a rousing speech on the need for unity among Moslems, the all-sufficiency of their faith, and the falsity of the idea that the way to civilisation lay in imitation of Europeans. The speech contained, *inter alia*, an indirect thrust at a recent utterance by an Indian leader, Shaukat Ali, about "our brothers the Jews." The King admitted no brotherhood except fraternity in Islam, and affirmed with a triple oath his desire to see all men united in that faith. Another striking passage in a speech too long to paraphrase fully was one in which he pointed to the Turkish Prince Ahmed Tevhid and recalled how his forbears had defied the Turkish Sultans rather than own themselves to be slaves of a "Commander of the Faithful." The vigour of the King's utterances was a little toned down by a statement that he was not at war with the world, and used the courtesy prescribed by Islam, as long as he was not injured, in respect of his beliefs and his country.

58. This speech was rendered into Urdu by the Indian Ismail Ghuznavi. Various other speeches were delivered, including one in English by Sir Abdul Kerim Ghuznavi (paragraph 67). Some little freedom of speech and much diversity of thought prevailed at those banquets, many of the guests at which are far from seeing eye to eye with Ibn Saud. This particular evening is said to have ended in a certain atmosphere of politico-theological malaise.

59. Pilgrims suffered some hardships owing to the effect of the exchange crisis (paragraph 5) on prices. Some of the poorer were hard hit by a regulation suddenly introduced on the 3rd April, compelling foreign pilgrims to hand over their travelling papers to the Jedda agents of the Mecca pilgrim guides in order that they should be sent to the guides at Mecca to be held by them until the end of the season. When this regulation was introduced an attempt was made to apply one of its articles in such a way that pilgrims should not come themselves to their Legations or consulates. The British Legation successfully resisted this, but was unable to get round the provision that pilgrims should be deprived of

their travelling papers. The effect of the new regulation is to convert these into a sort of pledge for the payment of sums payable to the guides by way of remuneration or in respect of taxes for which the guides are in turn responsible to the Government. Sir A. Ryan made strong official reservations and reported the matter home for instructions.

60. Otherwise this unusually small pilgrimage presented few special features. The use of cars between Mecca and Arafat, which caused much confusion last year, appears to have been somewhat severely controlled. There were no reports of the circulation of forged Indian notes (January-February report, paragraph 51, and previous reports).

61. The smallness of the pilgrimage reacted on the number of ships in port at Jedda, but the traditional "Haj Regatta," revived in 1929 after an interval of several years, was successfully held on the 30th April. His Majesty's sloop "Dahlia" and eight merchant ships, all British save one, took part.

62. Arrangements were made by the Legation with the commander of the "Dahlia" to enable Moslem naval ratings to make the pilgrimage, as a small number had done in 1930. This year no fewer than twenty-two Somalis, employed in H.M.S. "Dahlia" and "Endeavour," which was at Port Sudan, took advantage of the arrangement.

63. Advantage was taken of the visits of Major Thomson and Mr. Champion (paragraph 66) to discuss *inter alia* certain pilgrimage matters, notably with Major Thomson, the question of the West African pilgrims. Major Thomson and Sir A. Ryan agreed on a scheme, which they hoped would go a fair way to secure the objects of the Nigerian Government without imposing excessive burdens on the Sudan authorities and the Legation in Jedda. The proposals were in due course approved by the Sudan Government.

VIII.—SLAVERY.

64. Two male slaves were manumitted in March and April. The Hejazi authorities continue to show occasional signs of obstructiveness (January-February report, paragraph 54). In April they objected to the departure of a slave on the ground that his ex-master had claims against him. The matter required careful handling, as there appeared to be something in the allegation, and the main grounds for complaint were the dilatoriness of the authorities and their obvious sympathy with the ex-owner. The case was still outstanding at the end of April. There are signs of difficulty in another direction, as the Italian authorities, who have hitherto facilitated the embarkation of a proportion of freed slaves to Massowah, seem less ready than formerly to receive them there.

IX.—MISCELLANEOUS.

Approaches to Yambo and Jedda.

65. The local authorities completed early in March the restoration of the two beacons swept away at Yambo in December (January-February report, paragraph 60). They made a good job of it. Four new buoys have been procured for Jedda, but had not been laid down up to the end of April.

Visitors to the Hejaz.

66. An unusual number of Europeans and other visitors of consequence came to Jedda in March and April. Among them were the following:—

Major Thomson, Commissioner at Port Sudan and Mrs. Thomson, stayed for a few days at the Legation in March.

Mr. R. S. Champion, Protectorate Secretary at Aden and Mrs. Champion visited the Legation in April.

A German savant, Dr. Carl Ratjens, stayed in Jedda for a few days in April on his way to the Yemen, where he had already done archaeological work and has apparently established a good footing with the Iman.

Another German, Mr. Willy Hansen, the head of a Hamburg firm now permanently represented in Jedda, was here about the same time as Dr. Carl Ratjens.

Mr. Twitchell, the American engineer employed by Mr. C. R. Crane on the

motor-road from Hodeidah to Sana, arrived in April with his English wife. The visit was the outcome of an arrangement made between the King and Mr. Crane, who during his visit to Jedda offered to send Mr. Twitchell to look into water possibilities in the Hejaz. They were allowed to make two journeys, one apparently in the neighbourhood of Jedda, the other it is said northward towards Yambo and Wejh. They had not returned from the second expedition up to the end of the month.

Another American, a Mr. Robinson, who is sailing round the world in three years in a ketch with one South Sea Islander as crew, lay in Jedda harbour for a week or so in April. He related many amusing adventures on the Arabian coast, including one at Lith, where he was forcibly entreated and thrown into prison, partly, it would appear, because he did not realise that he had passed from the Yemen into another country.

Yet another American, an elderly Mrs. Douthirt, arrived later in April. She is said to have played the piano before most of the crowned heads in Europe or the world. She came to the anti-musical Hejaz to gratify a more modest ambition, that of once more seeing Mr. Philby, whom she had previously visited in Jedda.

67. The pilgrimage brought various notables, including ex-King Amanullah and the numerous Afghans mentioned elsewhere; Prince Ahmed Tevhid, a son of Prince Seifuddin of Turkey, who was himself a son of Sultan Abdul Aziz; Sir Abdul Kerim Ghuznavi, a member of the Council of the Governor of Bengal, who is much interested in pilgrimage matters; a prominent sheikh from the Kordofan Province and two stipendiary chiefs from the Aden Protectorate; a former Egyptian Minister of State, Enis Pasha; and some notorious Indian revolutionaries.

Legation Staff.

68. There was no change except in the subordinate ranks of the Indian sections.

[E 3468/1600/25]

No. 6.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 217.)

Sir,

Jedda, June 9, 1931.

IN paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 200 of the 28th May relative to the general situation in this country, I mentioned a report that a council of representatives was to be held at Mecca. I confirmed this in my telegram No. 156 of the 31st May, summing up very briefly the contents of my despatch. I have now the honour to report further on this interesting development. My report is not complete in all particulars, as I wish to forward it by bag to-day, and there has not been time to have all the matter available in the last issue of the "Umm-al-Qura" translated. It will, however, put you in possession of the main facts. That is all that matters at present, for it is too soon in any case to judge of the real importance of the assembly.

2. On the 28th May, after I had drafted my earlier despatch, Fuad Bey Hamza told me that it was formerly the custom to hold consultative assemblies in this country, but that none had been convened in the last two years. The King had now, he said, decided to convoke an elective assembly of representatives of the principal towns to discuss and advise on present problems. Fuad Bey intimated that it would be convened annually and would be in the nature of a constitutional organ. It would sit at Muna, as there was a suitable palace there, and it was desired that the proceedings should be conducted in a tranquil atmosphere. Muna is, as you are aware, a few miles from Mecca on the road to Arafat and is ordinarily heard of only in connexion with the pilgrimage, as it is there that the pilgrims stone the Devil and spend the three days of the festival following Pilgrimage Day.

3. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the following day, the 29th May, had a leading article and an announcement that elections had already been held in various towns in accordance with an ordinance of the King. There was nothing to show on what electoral basis the representatives had been or were being selected and the point is still obscure. So far as I am aware no organic regulations have been

published. Nevertheless, considerable stress was laid on the elective and popular character of the "National Conference." When the well-trained people of Jedda and Medina proceeded to nominate administrative officials their choice was disallowed. It appeared from the "Umm-al-Qura" that the King, acting in an Islamic spirit, wished to follow the example of ancient Caliphs and to establish a broader basis than before for consultation with wise and thoughtful men and to give his people an opportunity of ventilating grievances. He made a distinction, the writer explained, between Bedouin and townspeople. The Bedouin come direct to his door, notably at pilgrimage time, and he went into all their claims, complaints and affairs generally. The conference of urban representatives, henceforward to be held annually in Muharram, would enable him to acquaint himself with matters affecting the townspeople. The task of the conference would be, according to the "Umm-al-Qura's" information, to study matters of religious law and observance, the means of ensuring justice and reforms in the domain of economic life and general progress.

4. The conference met at Muna on the 2nd June, but that place proved either too hot or too inaccessible, and on the second day the meeting-place was changed to Mecca. There the conference has been sitting since and Fuad Bey told me on the 6th June that it might be expected to go on for some time. It is hard to get any information other than that of the "Umm-al-Qura" as to what it is doing exactly. Even Mr. Philby, although he has twice been down from Mecca during the last month, has views rather than news. In his present pessimistic mood, his views are almost cynical, though he is not as cynical as some who suggest that the conference has been assembled with the object of levying contributions on its members. He confesses to ignorance as to what the Government are at, but inclines to think that, having to devise drastic measures to cope with present difficulties, they have decided on a form of popular consultation, in order to be able to tell the townspeople later that they had their opportunity of making themselves heard. He criticises the arrangements in various particulars, *e.g.*, he says that the conference has been saddled with the secretariat of the permanent Legislative Council, a nominated body with an inept secretarial service, and he hints at possible hanky-panky in connexion with the Mecca ballot-boxes.

5. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 5th June was full of it all. It gives a list of representatives, two being the president of the Legislative Council and another person on behalf of the Government; twenty-two for Mecca; eleven for Jedda; nine for Medina; three each for Taif and Yambo; and ten members of the Legislative Council. I understand from other sources, though this is not stated in the paper, that the members include separate representatives of the body of Ulama. It also appears that Governors, &c., certainly the Governor of Jedda, are participating in the labours of the conference. It elected its own president, one Sheikh Mohammed-al-Marzuki, and other officers, after the King had opened the proceedings with a speech and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had read the agenda. Three committees were appointed to deal respectively with (a) public morals and the control of the pilgrimage; (b) judicial matters; and (c) general affairs. The public have been invited to communicate any useful suggestions in writing to the secretary. On the second day the conference drew up a loyal address in reply to the King's speech. The King gave a banquet on the evening of the first day.

6. It will be observed that several of the most approved parliamentary forms have been observed. Has the Hejaz then become a parliamentary country to the extent that autocracy seeks a lead from the people? Has there been another of those bloodless revolutions in a form adapted to the conditions of the Holy Land? The answer to both questions is probably in the negative. It would be unfair to Ibn Saud to suggest that it is all eye-wash. He is confronted with many problems. He would certainly like to solve the more urgent of them, *e.g.*, to appease the many complaints connected with the pilgrimage and to find a way out of the present financial and economic morass. He may think sincerely that it is a useful thing to seek wisdom even among the people. Whoever actually elected or selected the representatives of Jedda, for instance, they have not been ill-chosen. But the King will not and dare not part with power; nor can the best available representatives have the necessary knowledge, even if they were given the power, to solve the financial problems which dominate the position. The locomotive is off the rails. The most that can be hoped of such a conference

is that it will serve as a safety valve and prevent the boiler from bursting, while the engine muddles its way through the desert under the auspices of the King and his advisers, who still remain really in charge of it. This mechanical illustration reminds me of the one concrete proposal which I have heard of so far in connexion with the problems submitted to the conference. It is that motor-cars should be abolished or severely restricted. The money for them goes out of the country and their increased use tends to destroy established trades. If the camel came back into his own, depression would be relieved. The honourable trade of making camel-litters would, for instance, revive.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, and to the honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3542/2237/25]

No. 7.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 233.)

Sir,

Jedda, June 20, 1931.

IN my despatch No. 200 of the 28th May I attempted to give a general appreciation of the situation in the Hejaz. In various other reports I have dealt with particular problems and Ibn Saud's groping efforts to deal with them before departing for Nejd, as he intends to do in the near future. The press of business thus entailed kept him in Mecca long past the date which he had originally fixed for coming to Jedda. In the event he arrived here on the 14th June and left in the evening of the 17th June.

2. The King's difficulties remain unsolved. I have not yet heard what passed at the National Convention which sat from the 2nd to 11th June. I gather, however, that it produced little except some forward suggestions by the bolder members and some consequent Royal displeasure.

3. In these circumstances, the King has been anxiously sizing up his position *vis-à-vis* of Great Britain, viewed both as a possible source of danger, having regard to His Majesty's Government's recent severity, but also as a possible helper. Fuad Bey Hamza preceded the King and arrived in Jedda on the 11th June. We discussed current business on the 12th June. On the 13th June he came to see me with the object of expounding general views on the relations between Great Britain and Hejaz-Nejd and with the more special object of discussing my personal position in regard to them. This has, unfortunately, become a factor in the general situation, as for some time past the King has taken it into his head that I am hostile, and has attributed the policy of His Majesty's Government to my inspiration. Both he and Fuad Bey exaggerate pathetically my influence. His Majesty has become alarmed, but is great enough to give play to a Royal resentment. I owe it to Fuad Bey to say that he has shown sincere anxiety to bridge the gulf, not only, I think, in order to enlist my assistance, though he naturally desires to do that, but from a genuine belief that I am not such a bad fellow if I am taken the right way.

3. I regret to have to lay stress on this matter of my personal position. I do so because it has assumed an absurd importance in Hejazi eyes, and has therefore a more general importance, however factitious. I may say that, although I have been outspoken on various occasions, those on which my language has caused most displeasure have been occasions when I have been carrying out your express instructions.

4. I have the honour to enclose three memoranda describing my various interviews with Fuad Bey and the King during the last week. You will see that I have been at special pains to disabuse the King of any idea that I am personally antagonistic. It was with that object that in the various conversations I used on my own side a freedom of language which may appear to you excessive. That was the only way in which I could appear sympathetic, yet remain non-committal. I made it clear throughout that any views I expressed were purely personal. I came away from my audience on the 17th June with the feeling that, with Fuad

Bey's help, I had reinstated myself in the King's regard to a considerable extent, but that my tenure of it was precarious and would depend on whether I could see him through with His Majesty's Government.

5. I turn with relief to the substance of the matter. The King wants an understanding with Great Britain. He cannot realise that the only possible basis of such an understanding is the settlement of questions as they arise. Exaggerating his power, even in the midst of his present weakness, he conceives the possibility of a sort of permanent *entente*, almost an alliance, and an alliance potentially directed against the Hashimites. He knows that that would be a good thing for him. He imagines that it would be so well worth His Majesty's Government's while that they ought to be ready to help him—and the help he most needs at the present time is pecuniary help in some shape or form.

6. It would be too cynical to suggest that Ibn Saud is offering to His Majesty's Government a "pure and virgin" love for a consideration. He is not himself cynical or brazen enough for that. He is more like the maiden of pantomime in a snowstorm, but proudly conscious of a station, a beauty and a virtue that, given their chance, must cause her to be loved and honourably set up in life for her own sake. There are Christmas parties behind the windows that glimmer through the snow, and she would like to be taken into the nicest of those houses—yours, Sir. The maiden feels, if I may pursue a fancy not entirely idle, that you should not count on those Hashimite girls whom you are already entertaining, pretentious hussies who are with you for what they can get and will want more. "How much happier you would be with me," says the maiden, unconsciously vain in her conscious virtue. "And oh, how happy should I be too!"

7. I have tried to illustrate by a flippant example what I conceive to be Ibn Saud's attitude, because I think it reveals it better than pages of solemn analysis. He is not insincere, but he is fairly desperate at the moment and quite impractical. He admitted towards the end of our conversation on the 17th June that the questions he had asked me to put to His Majesty's Government were too hypothetical to be answerable. That does not mean that he will not expect some sort of an answer. I do not see what His Majesty's Government can do to help him. Political commitments to him, except those of a purely negative kind, seem to be out of the question. It was decided two years ago that there could be no question of a renewal of direct financial assistance. He hinted then at a request for bread, and he was offered a common form of commercial treaty. I can only leave you to consider whether there is any form of kindness which His Majesty's Government could show him without prejudice to their obligations elsewhere and without spending money. I am telegraphing about one point only, that of the possibility of getting a British bank to help him, because that is a concrete proposal, though it seems to me as impractical as all the rest.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

(A) *Conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza on June 13.*

FUAD BEY HAMZA spoke to me at length on the 13th June regarding the general state of relations between Ibn Saud and His Majesty's Government, with somewhat special reference to the effect thereon of my personal position *vis-à-vis* of His Majesty. He had meditated his statement for some time and it was carefully considered.

2. Fuad Bey spoke of the object of my mission. The King's wish to see a British Legation established here was dictated by a desire to have at his Court a representative of such standing that he could represent His Majesty's point of view to His Majesty's Government and speak on their behalf with authority, enjoying a greater latitude in the discussion of affairs than could be expected in the case of a junior official. Fuad Bey stressed the importance of personal factors, and expressed a desire to restore my relations with the King to their former friendly footing.

3. Fuad Bey traced the history of Ibn Saud's relations with His Majesty's Government. They had originated as far back as thirty years ago, when the King

was the guest of Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit. The policy of His Majesty's Government was favourable to Mubarak at a time when the Turks were backing Ibn Rashid. At that time and afterwards they had lent their moral support to Ibn Saud. Their relations with him were strengthened during the Great War. A treaty had been concluded at that time, establishing relations of such a nature that His Majesty had accepted a kind of vassalage of Great Britain, to which it was unnecessary now to look back, as that situation had been ended by the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927.

4. The friendly relations, Fuad Bey said, had passed through periods when His Majesty's Government seemed cooler or even antagonistic. They had supported King Hussein in the dispute over Taraba and Khurma in 1918-19. Ibn Rashid had been given support from the Iraq side before his death in 1921, and afterwards the Shammar had been used against Ibn Saud. When Ibn Saud secured Taraba and Khurma, His Majesty's Government had accepted the new situation, but they pursued a policy which had the appearance of encircling the King. The installation of King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah in Iraq and Transjordan at a time when Ibn Saud was pushing northward, and the use made of frontier tribes, had strengthened the impression, though it may have been erroneous, that such an encirclement was in progress.

5. The pressure of encirclement was relieved when in 1924 the British lost faith in Hussein and the King embarked on the campaign which drove the Hashimites out of the Hejaz. But there was still a pressure from the north. Fuad Bey referred to statements by Sir P. Cox and/or Sir H. Dobbs which implied that Great Britain could look across the frontiers at Ibn Saud and see him reduced to impotence. (When correcting this passage Fuad Bey was rather uncertain. He recollected something which Sir H. Dobbs had said to Sheikh Hafiz Wahba in Bagdad and thought that something had appeared in the press. He offered to look the matter up, but I did not ask him to do so.)

6. Fuad Bey referred to recent controversies, which had arisen during my mission here, as marking a fresh phase of apparent coldness and antagonism on the part of His Majesty's Government. Now for thirty years, he continued, the King had served British interests. He indicated in general terms six ways in which Ibn Saud had done this:—

- (1) He had always placed his reliance on the British.
- (2) He had always kept himself and his country quiet and had not molested Great Britain's allies. He had eventually made war on his own people for the sake of Great Britain and Iraq.
- (3) He had helped Great Britain during and after the war. He had attacked Ibn Rashid. When he knew that Hussein was backed by His Majesty's Government, and that it was a British interest that Hussein should not be interfered with, he had accepted the position and maintained friendly relations with Hussein as far as possible.
- (4) In his attitude towards critical situations in British dependencies, *e.g.*, in Palestine and India, he had used a moderating influence.
- (5) and (6) It had been, and was still, his policy never to go against British advice and to discountenance Soviet propaganda, working in close co-operation with Great Britain in regard to the latter.

7. Fuad Bey did not pretend that the King had studied British interests alone in working on the above lines. He had followed them because it was also in his own interest to do so.

8. Fuad Bey went on to say that the friendship between Ibn Saud and Great Britain rested on a sound basis, unlike the friendship with King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah, which was not, and could not on the side of those rulers, be genuine. Great Britain had in Iraq and Transjordan a privileged position which it was important for her to maintain, but which could not be maintained without prejudice to the national aspirations of these countries. There was a conflict between British interests and those national aspirations such that true friendship was impossible. There was nothing of the sort to mar the relations between Great Britain and Ibn Saud. Except in one matter, which Fuad Bey hoped to see disposed of in the near future, namely, slavery, we did not seek to impose ourselves on Ibn Saud. Was there anything else? he asked me. (I replied that our policy in regard to slavery was important to us, and that I had told him my views. I recognised that there was nothing fundamental to divide Ibn Saud

and His Majesty's Government, though I should have more to say about the details of Fuad Bey's statement.)

9. Fuad Bey described the friendship between the King and Great Britain, in contrast with those other friendships of which he had spoken, as being "pure and virgin." It could be utilised.

10. What did Great Britain want of Ibn Saud? Fuad Bey asked. He supplied an answer under six general heads as follows:—

- (1) The continued maintenance of friendly and peaceful relations.
- (2) The continued maintenance of the security in this country which was essential, *e.g.*, in the interests of British pilgrims.
- (3) The maintenance of friendly relations with the surrounding countries in which Great Britain had special interests.
- (4) The King's dominions so situated as to lie across the line of British imperial communications through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and by the transdesert route to the north of them; it was Great Britain's interest that there should be no menace to those communications.
- (5) In particular, Great Britain wished to be free to use the Hasa coast for purposes of aerial communication, a thing which could only be done on a basis of friendship with Ibn Saud, and which was all the more important because of the possible difficulty of using Persian territory.
- (6) It was in Great Britain's interest to counteract Bolshevik propaganda in the East, whether illegitimate or carried on under a cloak of legality, and in this His Majesty co-operation was needed.

11. Fuad Bey said that these were very general headings, under each of which special questions arose. He instanced the question of Aqaba and Ma'an and questions in the Persian Gulf. He regarded such matters as being of subsidiary importance.

12. The King was on his side, Fuad Bey went on, compelled to rely on the assistance and support of Great Britain.

13. The object of my mission, he said, should be to harmonise and promote the interests of both sides, between which interests there was no contradiction.

14. I observed that Fuad Bey had indicated what, in his view, were the things for which Great Britain looked to Ibn Saud, but he had indicated in a single sentence only the things for which His Majesty looked to Great Britain.

15. Fuad Bey said that he was prepared for questions on his statement. He could not tell me the King's desiderata in detail without taking instructions, but he could tell me his own ideas on the understanding that I should treat what he said as purely personal. He developed then, on this agreed understanding, on the following lines:—

- (1) A settlement of the Hejaz Railway question, which interested the King both politically and economically; politically from the point of view of bringing certain parts of his dominions into closer touch with each other; economically, because of the value of the railway, if reconditioned, as a means of rapid transit. Fuad Bey referred to a private letter which I had written to the King and which was in the file. I said that, while I was not authorised to discuss the question, I was glad to know that His Majesty's advisers had knowledge of the letter, which had taken the form it did for very special reasons. Fuad Bey understood those reasons, and said that, as they had imposed a special course of action, a suitable communication would be made to me in reply in the first instance.
- (2) The question of Aqaba and Ma'an was still unsettled. He did not say that the King wished to reopen it now or to press it, but it was an outstanding matter between him and His Majesty's Government.
- (3) The King desired assistance in connexion with the extensive Wakfs in territory under British control.
- (4) Fuad Bey said that he was on such terms with me that he could speak of a matter, which others might hesitate to broach so frankly, *viz.*, the financial needs of this country. I knew very well, he said, the King's difficulties and liabilities. He was expected to maintain security, to provide a sound sanitary administration; to improve his ports;

to promote economic development; and to seek resources other than the pilgrimage on which the country at present depended and which had become precarious. He reminded me that the Turks in their time had to maintain an army of 30,000 men in the Hejaz, and to subsidise tribes as well. The resources available were known. I observed that I myself had no accurate idea of them.) If the King had to work on the Turkish plan and did things on the Turkish scale, it would now be necessary to spend £1 million to £2 million a year on security alone. It was also necessary to provide for the civil administration and for representatives abroad. Fuad Bey, after enumerating those burdens, observed that both King Hussein and Ibn Saud had enjoyed British financial assistance in the past.

- (5) Finally, Fuad Bey said, His Majesty's Government could help Ibn Saud by ensuring a good attitude on the part of his neighbours, in regard to whom we had a special position.

16. Fuad Bey assured me, and renewed the assurance later, that the King desired a perfect understanding with His Majesty's Government, and that, if such an understanding existed, His Majesty was prepared to meet us on all the points to which he conceived us to attach importance.

17. I thanked Fuad Bey for speaking to me so fully and frankly. There followed a long and intimate conversation which was confined to the question of my personal relations with Ibn Saud, to which Fuad Bey had referred tactfully as being in need of restoration to an earlier and better footing. I said that I myself had been conscious of a strain. I traced in detail the history of relations with Ibn Saud, referring to the various occasions on which, in dealing with particular matters, notably the Transjordan frontier question, I appeared to have given offence. While agreeing generally with Fuad Bey's definition of the object of a mission like mine, and his view as to the importance of personal factors in diplomacy, I pointed out that, in questions of the highest importance, diplomatic representatives were increasingly dependent on their central Governments, and that the importance of personal factors, great as it was, was apt to be exaggerated in Eastern countries. I said, not by way of excuse or apology, but out of my strong desire to disabuse the King of any idea that I was antagonistic, that, if at times I had spoken or written very plainly, it was either because I was bound by quite definite instructions or else because I wished to get certain questions settled without their assuming such importance as to force His Majesty's Government into the necessity of themselves taking a strong line. When instructions assumed final form they had to be carried out. The final form often differed from the original form as a result of consultation with me. I deprecated any idea that the attitude taken up by His Majesty's Government over, e.g., Transjordan frontier question was inspired by me or was due to anything except the serious view that His Majesty's Government found themselves compelled to take up a particular situation, which had been exaggerated to a dangerous point since October.

18. I pointed out to Fuad Bey the special difficulties of a Minister in dealing with a King who was effectively his own Minister for Foreign Affairs and delegated so little authority to his advisers that he handled foreign business himself not only by directing general policy but by going into all the details personally. It was a necessary consequence of this that a Minister might have to address direct to the King communications, sometimes of a disagreeable nature, which, in other countries, would normally be addressed to a Minister of State.

19. Fuad Bey recognised my difficulties and promised to do everything in his power to satisfy the King that my attitude was not one of hostility. He suggested that, when I had strong representations to make, I should make them to himself rather than direct. I said that it was necessary for me to lay certain matters before His Majesty in person, and that I was sometimes formally directed to do so. Subject to this I was quite prepared, and myself preferred, to discuss details with the King's advisers.

20. As it was late, we agreed to reserve anything I might have to say in regard to the remainder of Fuad Bey's statement for a further interview.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

(B) *Further Conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza on June 16.*

FUAD BEY came to see me again on the 16th June. We discussed some minor matters, but his main purpose was to complete our conversation of the 13th June before I should see the King. The following is a much-condensed account of what passed:—

2. Fuad Bey brought me the King's reply to my recent private communication about the Hejaz Railway. (I am dealing with this separately.) He brought also a less formal letter of his own, in which he suggested certain corrections in my record of his statement of the 13th June, which I had let him see. (I have introduced these corrections into the record of our first conversation.) He asked me to add the following points to his original statement:—

- (a) He had spoken to me without instructions from the King, but he was personally convinced that the King's interest lay in a good understanding with Great Britain.
- (b) He knew that the King himself had the best intentions towards Great Britain and relied on her alone.

3. Fuad Bey explained that, in these circumstances, his object was to arrive at an understanding with me as to the objects we should jointly pursue, using our influence with our respective authorities. I replied that I was at one with him in his idea that we should work together to promote good relations, but said that our positions were different. He was the King's adviser on foreign affairs and was the real Minister for Foreign Affairs, in so far as there was any such Minister other than the King himself, for the Emir Feisal, the theoretical Minister, did not, so far as I knew, concern himself with foreign business. He (Fuad) was therefore in the position of a responsible statesman. I myself was a civil servant. I could, and did, advise my Government on particular questions, but normally a diplomatic representative did not shape major policy. I could hardly, therefore, enter into a contract, as it were, to pursue a given set of objects, though I could, and would, collaborate with him.

4. I had promised to give Fuad Bey some observations on his statement of the 14th June. I began with his historical retrospect recognising that all through Ibn Saud had been a friend. Fuad Bey knew more, I said, than I did about the details of the recent history of Arabia. I suggested, however, that he had not paid sufficient attention to the fact that the events to which he had adverted were all parts of a difficult process of readjustment following on the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The position after the Great War was that there were certain parts of Arabia in which we had taken on definite responsibilities and others in which we had a less direct interest, two being areas ruled over by two Sovereigns who were both our friends. We were indebted to King Hussein as well as to Ibn Saud. We had sought to work for a stable Arabia and to compose differences. Ibn Saud had, so far as territory was concerned, come best out of the whole process, not thanks to us but to himself. Fuad had spoken of encirclement. It appeared to me that we had been on the edge of the circle first and that Ibn Saud had expanded until he filled it. For me, I said, history began with the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927, subject to there being a pre-history dating from 1925. Owing to our special responsibilities in Iraq and Transjordan we had negotiated the Bahra and Hadda Agreements at a time when Ibn Saud had not yet completed his conquest of the Hejaz.

5. Fuad Bey suggested that all would have been well had we kept the adjoining countries under our own control and had not introduced into them as rulers the King's enemies. I said that the first alternative was out of the question, because responsible people in Great Britain and British public opinion did not want enlarged commitments but reduced commitments in the East, and because there were nationalist sentiments to be reckoned with in the countries themselves. Those sentiments had been strong in Iraq and they existed in Transjordan, though the position of that territory was different and its evolution was less complete. I demurred strongly to the idea that there could be no real friendship between us and those countries, because we retained a special position,

which in the case of Iraq would be reduced to an absolute minimum when the treaty of 1930 became operative. We wished to be, and thought we could be, friends with everybody. Our ideal was to see settled States in Arabia in friendship with us and with each other. A great measure of equilibrium had been achieved. There were States with definite frontiers, even though the Transjordan frontier, for instance, was in one part still a theatre of difficulty and in another the subject of an outstanding question, as he had reminded me when speaking of Aqaba and Maan. I had never had occasion to deal with that particular question and did not mean to discuss it. It had been in abeyance since 1927, when we had stated a position which the King had not accepted; but he had agreed to a *status quo* and *modus vivendi*, and all I could see for it, if there were an outstanding question, was that the *status quo* and the *modus vivendi* should continue. (Fuad Bey reminded me that he had himself disclaimed any idea of reopening or pressing the question at the present time.) The equilibrium, I said, was such that the King had come into contact with us in every direction save one. Our desire for stability was such that we wished to see peace on all his frontiers, even on the one on which he had no contact with us. We were not concerned with the Yemen and I had never spoken about it, but on that side, too, we should like to see good relations between Ibn Saud and the Imam, with whom we got on quite well, though we had not succeeded in making a treaty with him.

6. Turning to Fuad Bey's statement of what he conceived to be our desiderata, I said that it seemed to me to cover the ground pretty well. We certainly wanted the first four things he had enumerated. I recognised that the King's great achievement was that he had established security, a matter of direct interest to us in the pilgrim area when it was complete and of indirect interest to us in a more general sense. As regards the fifth point on his list, I did not know the position as regards flying over Persia, but we should like to have freedom in agreement with the Powers concerned to fly either way along the Persian Gulf. In so far as Bolshevik propaganda was still an active force in the East, it was our interest to counteract it. (Fuad Bey said he wished to speak to me another time about Bolshevik propaganda.)

7. As regards Fuad Bey's purely personal estimate of the ways in which His Majesty's Government might help the King, I said as little as I could. I said that, if he wished in due course to speak about the Hejaz Railway, I would report what he had to say; I had no instructions on the subject. I had said all I would say about Aqaba and Maan—another question which had not arisen since I came here. He had referred to Persian Gulf questions. There had been a talk of discussing them last year, but eventually the Biscoe incident had held everything up. My Government were anxious that these questions should be handled by Colonel Biscoe, as they were in his sphere. I could not, therefore, speak of the desiderata on both sides, but I might mention the impression produced by the King's prolonged blockade, as it were, of Koweit. As for Wakfs, the King had discussed the subject with Sir G. Clayton in 1927 and had formulated desiderata. They had been carefully considered, and later in the year a reply had been returned, based on the constant policy of His Majesty's Government of not interfering in so purely religious a matter. I remarked that I myself, though I sometimes made representations about Wakfs in the Hejaz at the instance of British Moslem interested parties, a thing rather different from interfering in Wakfs in a country which we administered or controlled in any way, always did so with hesitation and within as narrow limits as possible. There were, I observed in passing, many Wakfs for the benefit of pilgrims at Mecca, and the Hejazi Government would do well to see that they were well cared for.

8. I turned to finance. It was true that in the past His Majesty's Government had assisted King Hussein and Ibn Saud. That was part of a policy arising out of the war, when money was spent on many things—we had, for instance, spent millions on buying fish in Norway merely to prevent its going to our enemies. Economy was now the order of the day. It was a plank in every political platform in England. It was practised by His Majesty's Government. Every Government must now stand on its own feet. That was a hard saying, but true. I knew of the difficulties of this country. I realised that it was too dependent on the pilgrimage. I saw salvation only in the development of the fresh economic resources to which the Government had been turning their attention. I had heard of press statements about an application to Sweden for a geological mission. I

had nothing against that. I would not encourage any hope of direct financial assistance from Great Britain, if that was what was in Fuad Bey's mind. British interest might possibly be enlisted in connexion with economic schemes. If I could help with any advice in regard to such schemes I would be happy to do so.

9. Time was running out and I could not follow up the one remaining point in Fuad Bey's statement of the 13th June; fortunately, perhaps, as Fuad Bey might have harped on an idea, which emerged in the course of our conversations, that Ibn Saud's assistance, negative or even positive, would be useful to His Majesty's Government if ever they had trouble in Iraq or Transjordan. I wound up the conversation by saying that I had given him an exposition of my own ideas. If they were in some ways discouraging, he would not take it amiss. It would be easy enough, but not honest, to intimate agreement with him; to say when he suggested our working together on some particular line: "Yes, that's splendid; I'll put it up to my Government," and say two or three months later that my Government had turned it down.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

(C) Record of Audiences with Ibn Saud on June 14 and 17, 1931.

THE King arrived in Jedda early on the 14th June. In accordance with his custom he received the foreign representatives in succession that morning. As my audience on this occasion was formal I did not touch on current business, but I said that I had been awaiting an opportunity of conveying to His Majesty the congratulations of His Majesty's Government on the successful negotiations with Iraq (see Foreign Office telegram No. 86 of the 21st May). I said that I had previously offered my own congratulations and those of Sir F. Humphrys, but that His Majesty's Government had waited until ratification was assured. I explained that I had received my instructions some little time ago when His Majesty was expected in Jedda, but that, having told Sheikh Yussuf Yasin the nature of the message, I had deferred the communication until I could see the King in person. The King paid a renewed tribute to the part played by His Majesty's Government and myself, and spoke with great appreciation of Sir F. Humphrys, when at a later stage I said that Sir Francis had asked me to thank him for his gracious reply to a personal letter sent at the time of Nuri Pasha's visit. I observed that we had, indeed, worked hard for a successful result, but that its attainment was due to the attitude observed by the parties directly concerned in the final negotiations.

2. I had discussed outstanding business so thoroughly with Fuad Bey that I had really little to say to the King himself during this visit to Jedda. I therefore told Fuad Bey on the 15th June that I was not applying for a business audience, but that it might be useful if I saw the King, as His Majesty was going to Riyadh and I to London; that he himself might have matters to discuss with me; and that, in any case, I hoped the King would give me a few minutes before he left for Mecca, so that I might pay my respects on the eve of our separation for a long period.

3. The King received me on the 17th June and kept me for two hours. Fuad Bey interpreted, and Sheikh Yussuf Yasin was present nearly the whole time. I began by saying very much what I had said to Fuad Bey, as stated in the previous paragraph. It was clear that His Majesty did not wish any more than I did myself to discuss the details of any particular question, but he engaged me in a conversation of a general kind, in which on his position *vis-à-vis* of His Majesty's Government. The following is an account of what passed, necessarily abridged and not based on notes. I have omitted one or two digressions:—

4. The King spoke of his old friendship with Great Britain. He said that in reverting to this theme, he did not mean to imply that the friendship was in peril, but it was well to remind himself and His Majesty's Government of it. The capital question for him was that of his personal position as sovereign of the dominions over which he now ruled. He had, he said, had three intermediaries with His Majesty's Government—Sir Percy Cox, Sir Gilbert Clayton and myself. He said that he had been led to expect much by Sir P. Cox, but

that Sir Percy had not fulfilled his promises or justified his (the King's) expectations. Later he had disclosed his mind to Sir Gilbert Clayton and had charged him to report all that was in it to His Majesty's Government. He did not know what Sir Gilbert had reported, but there had been no response, as Sir Gilbert had gone to Iraq and had died soon after. He was now going to go over the same ground with me, not having been able to do so last year when our discussions related to particular matters. He mentioned that he had given Sheikh Hafiz Wahba a very general idea of what he was aiming at, but that the sheikh had reported that he had not found a suitable opportunity of speaking to His Majesty's Government.

5. I said that I was at the entire disposal of the King to convey anything he might wish to communicate to His Majesty's Government.

6. The King said that there was nothing in the general situation in Arabia to cause anxiety. The situation might, however, change. He was the friend of Great Britain, whatever might befall. If any change occurred, if, for instance, His Majesty's Government had difficulties in neighbouring countries (I do not recollect very clearly the words used, but this was implied if not stated), he would like to know where he stood. What acts would His Majesty's Government wish him to avoid? In what positive way could he assist them in case of need? These were the questions which he had sought to elucidate in the past through Sir P. Cox and Sir G. Clayton. He was asking me now to obtain answers to them. How did he stand? He did not mean that his friendship depended on the answer. He would be Great Britain's friend as he had always been, if they needed his friendship. He was not making it a matter of bargaining.

7. I undertook to convey His Majesty's statement to His Majesty's Government. I added that I could hardly venture to say much myself, but that I should like to offer a few observations. On this the King said that he was not only giving me a message, but seeking my personal advice. He did not wish to say anything that might produce a bad effect or breed suspicion.

8. Thus encouraged, I said rather more than I at first intended. I reminded the King that he had sent Sheikh Yussuf Yasin to speak to me on the 1st April about his perturbation over the apparent tension between Great Britain and himself. I had told the sheikh that His Majesty's Government's fundamental attitude of friendship towards the King had not changed, and had stressed the fact that His Majesty's Government dealt with particular questions on their merits. I had not disguised the danger of general relations being affected by such a question as that of the Transjordan frontier, but the danger had now been averted. The language I had used to Sheikh Yussuf and similar language on other occasions had been approved.

9. I spoke of the bases of our friendship with Ibn Saud. Old association was a factor in it; that always counted for something. The impression which he created personally was another factor; those of my countrymen who had had intercourse with him had always, in my experience, been attracted by his personality. The greatest factor of all was, however, the fact that His Majesty's Government saw in him an element of stability in a country where they desired stability. We were a nation of shopkeepers and wanted stability everywhere. We had a more special interest in stability in Arabia for reasons into which I would not enter, as I did not wish to be too lengthy.

10. The King, I said, had sought my advice about his message to His Majesty's Government. I did not dissuade him from sending it; I could not encourage him to hope for a definite reply. I knew little of what Sir P. Cox had done in Arabia, but I had known him otherwise. Whatever turn he might give to a matter, neither he nor Sir G. Clayton were men who would fail to report fully anything the King had said. If he had elicited no answer, I thought it was because his questions related to a hypothetical case. It was a fixed principle with His Majesty's Government to deal with questions as they arose, and they had a horror of defining an attitude in regard to hypothetical cases. I enlarged on this.

11. On this the King admitted that he could not expect a definite answer to his questions. What he wanted was to expound his views to His Majesty's Government and (this was implied rather than stated) to enlist my assistance.

12. I took the opportunity of begging the King to believe that I was sincerely well-disposed towards him and his country. I would, and did, represent his views to my Government. As I had told Fuad Bey, final instructions might differ

from original instructions as a result of my suggestions, but final instructions must be carried out. The representative of a Government was like a chisel in the hands of a carpenter, an essential tool, but worked by the carpenter.

13. The King appreciated this. He suggested, however, that before carrying out instructions I should ascertain his Government's side of the case, in order that it might be taken into account. I did not analyse this obviously impossible suggestion. I assured the King of my good dispositions, and said that I had used the analogy of the chisel advisedly. It was a necessary tool and it must be sharp, so that it could be used in the carpenter's hand to produce things of beauty; it might also make rude cuts. I said I was sure that if we could get the Transjordan problem out of the way, there was nothing to trouble relations. I reminded the King of his promise to receive the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and said I hoped the visit could be arranged if the King was staying some months in Nejd. I added that I could not suggest anything definite at the moment, as Colonel Biscoe had been ill, and had, I believed, left for England.

14. I was about to leave, but the King detained me. He said he did not want to do anything behind my back. He had not consulted his advisers about what he was going to say, but he had made up his mind to say it, whatever they might think. It was a question of the financial position. This had two aspects. The first was the exchange situation, which turned on two factors—riyals and nickel. Steps had been taken to gather in nickel, and it had been rehabilitated. As for riyals, His Majesty intended to bring them into legal circulation throughout all his dominions, and this would produce relief, as the quantity of silver money was not excessive and an extended use would suffice to revalorise it. The other question was that of banking arrangements. There had been an arrangement with the Dutch Bank, which had broken down on questions between its representatives here and their principals. The King said he would like to find another bank, which under suitable arrangements would serve the purposes of a State bank. He would prefer a British institution. He sought my advice and that of His Majesty's Government.

15. I said that my personal opinion would have no value, as I knew too little of the machinery of banking. I would willingly consult His Majesty's Government. I hinted that I thought it would be difficult to find a British bank, but did not exclude the possibility of interesting firms like Barclays, who were in the Red Sea, or Lloyds, who were in Egypt.

16. The King said what he wanted to know was whether he might or might not hope for a British bank, and whether any firm who was interested would send a representative. The matter was of some urgency, as he had received offers from other quarters. I said I had heard various reports. I had heard, for instance, of a plan to authorise an Indian Moslem bank to establish itself here, although it had been represented to me as an idea conceived with a view to the convenience of pilgrims rather than with the more general purpose the King had indicated. This was a feeler, in case His Majesty should feel inclined to say something about the other advances made to him. He did not, however, respond.

[E 3568/387/25]

No. 8.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 182.)

(Telegraphic.) R

Jedda, July 8, 1931.

TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 62 to Colonial Office.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has written officially pressing for reply to allegations regarding Glubb. He suggests that such activities prior to meeting with Ibn Zeid will breed trouble unless matter is cleared up. He affirms that Glubb persists in "idea of retaliatory confiscation."

I told Fuad in conversation on 7th July that I understood you would receive report rebutting allegations. He said at preliminary meeting with Ibn Zeid, of which he had received full report, Glubb has admitted having confiscated certain camels.

I reminded Fuad that, whatever action might have been taken in regard to raids since 1st August, they would all come into review at main meeting.

[6707]

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I pointed out that, even if any loot had been sequestered in Transjordan, similar action on considerable scale had been taken by Ibn Saud, who had, *e.g.*, refused to restore camels belonging to Howeitat pending satisfaction of counter-claims.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 217.)

[E 3559/2064/25]

No. 9.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 14, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 170 of 19th June: Financial situation in the Hejaz. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate and sympathise with financial difficulties of Hejazi Government, but regret that they are unable to depart from their long-established practice of non-intervention in transactions between foreign Governments and British banks, whose decisions they could not, in any case, influence. His Majesty's Government can only suggest, therefore, that Ibn Saud should appoint representative in London to explore matter with banks direct.

Please explain the above to King or Hejazi Government, bearing in mind that, in view of risks emphasised in your reports (ending with your despatch No. 233 of 20th June), no British bank is likely to be interested. If Hejazi Government see difficulty over choice of representative, you may, if you see no objection, suggest that they consult Gellatly Hankey.

[E 3449/1098/25]

No. 10.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 892.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 17, 1931.

I HAVE considered the note from the Italian Government regarding the question of the recognition of the new status of Asir, a translation of which was enclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 485 of the 29th June.

2. It appears that the Italian Government are under some misapprehension as to the contents of the note of the 11th March addressed by the Hejazi Government to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, which has necessitated consideration of this matter. The Italian Government's note was evidently written under the impression that the Hejazi Government's communication was a direct request for the formal recognition by His Majesty's Government of the incorporation of Asir in the dominions of King Ibn Saud. You will be aware from the summary of that note contained in the telegram from Sir A. Ryan, a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 554 of the 11th May, that this was not the case, and that the note, in fact, merely requested His Majesty's Government to enter into arrangements for the establishment of communications between certain places under British administration and the Asiri port of Jizan.

3. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are glad to be able to meet the views of the Italian Government expressed in their note referred to above, by deferring any formal and direct expression of their recognition of the sovereignty of King Ibn Saud over Asir, although they remain of the opinion that in consequence of the recent agreement between King Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, Asir has, *de facto* and *de jure*, become an integral part of King Ibn Saud's dominions.

4. On the other hand, it is clear that, as was explained in my despatch No. 554, His Majesty's Government cannot refuse to reply to the Hejazi Government's note of the 11th March, and cannot abstain from corresponding, when necessary, with the Hejazi Government in future regarding matters connected with Asir. Indeed, their delay in replying to the Hejazi Government's

communication has already placed His Majesty's Government in a position of some embarrassment. Instructions for a reply are therefore being despatched to Sir Andrew Ryan.

5. I shall be glad if you will address to the Italian Government a communication in the general sense of the preceding paragraphs.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 3713/1098/25]

No. 11.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope Gill (Jedda).

(Nos. 115 and 116.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 22, 1931.

SIR A. RYAN'S telegram No. 171 of 19th June: Recognition of new status of Asir.

Italian official reply is on lines of their semi-official views recorded in Rome despatch No. 375. His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome has been instructed to inform Italian Government that, in deference to their representations, His Majesty's Government will defer formal expression to Hejazi Government of His Majesty's Government's recognition of new status of Asir, but that they cannot abstain from corresponding with Hejazi Government regarding matters connected with Asir.

(R.) You should now as soon as possible inform Hejazi Government, in reply to their note of 11th March, that His Majesty's Government agree to establishment of wireless communication between Aden and Jizan. Acting Resident at Aden is being instructed that detailed arrangements regarding wave length, initiation of communication, &c., should be made direct through you.

You may also inform Hejazi Government that no objection is seen to establishment of postal communication between Jizan and Kamaran. Further instructions on this point will be sent by despatch. (End of R.)

Fact of replying to Hejazi note will involve what is known as *de facto* recognition, but I do not consider it desirable in circumstances to mention question of recognition (whether *de facto* or *de jure*) of new status of Asir at all to Hejazi Government.

[E 3735/387/25]

No. 12.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope Gill (Jedda).

(No. 117.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 23, 1931.

SIR A. RYAN'S telegrams Nos. 160, 161 and 182 of 5th June and 8th July: Situation on Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier.

Please convey to the Hejazi Government a reasoned reply to their complaints, basing it on the information contained in Captain Glubb's report of 14th June enclosed in Transjordan despatch No. T 220 of 4th July to you, and using your discretion as to which parts of the report to utilise.

2. At the same time you should make it clear to the Hejazi Government that His Majesty's Government strongly resent such baseless accusations levelled against this British officer, whose reply shows the patient loyalty with which he has worked and justifies the confidence which His Majesty's Government and the Transjordan Government originally placed and continue to have in him.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 98.)

[E 3887/1098/25]

No. 13.

Sir R. Graham to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 561.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a *note verbale* to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Rome, dated the 24th July, 1931, respecting the administration of Asir.

Rome, July 24, 1931.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Note verbale.

HIS Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs and have the honour to inform them that the contents of the Royal Ministry's *note verbale* of the 25th ultimo, regarding the status of Asir, has received the most careful consideration of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, who fear that there may have been some misapprehension as to the contents of the note of the 11th March, addressed by the Hejazi Government to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, to which reference was made in paragraph 3 of the Embassy's aide-mémoire of the 30th May last. This communication from the Hejazi Government was not, in fact, a direct request for the formal recognition by His Majesty's Government of the incorporation of Asir in the dominions of King Ibn Saud, but merely a request to His Majesty's Government to enter into arrangements for the establishment of communications between certain places under British administration and the Asiri port of Jizan.

2. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are glad to be able to meet the views of the Italian Government, as expressed in the latter's *note verbale* referred to above, by deferring any formal and direct expression of their recognition of the sovereignty of King Ibn Saud over Asir, although they remain of the opinion that, in consequence of the recent agreement between King Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, Asir has *de facto* and *de jure* become an integral part of King Ibn Saud's dominions.

3. In making the above communication, His Majesty's Embassy have been instructed to add that His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to refuse to reply to the Hejazi Government's note of the 11th March. The delay in replying to this communication has already placed them in a position of some embarrassment, and instructions for a reply are therefore being despatched to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

Rome, July 24, 1931.

[E 3889/2064/25]

No. 14.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 253.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 1, 1931.

IN my despatch No. 177 of the 15th May, I attempted to bring up to date the information in my earlier despatch No. 108 of the 23rd March, regarding the financial situation in this country, with special reference to the problem of exchange. I have had occasion in other reports to advert to the growing hopelessness of Ibn Saud's financial position, and to the way in which it has come to be a dominant factor in the political situation in the Hejaz.

2. There has been no improvement in the financial outlook since the middle of May. It seems more than probable, though it cannot be taken as certain, that any gold reserve which the Director-General of Finance may have had up his sleeve has been practically exhausted. This is the view of the manager of the Dutch Bank, who was in close touch with the Government during March and

April. He told me recently that at the end of that period the Government were in fact good for the £60,000 in gold required to bolster up the exchange. I could not ascertain whether he actually made a new arrangement with them then, but, if he did, little or nothing came of it, and Mr. Jacob's principals in Holland have settled down to an attitude of abstention from further transactions. Before the departure on leave of M. Adriaanse, the future Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires, who arrived here some months ago to be initiated into his duties in accordance with the Dutch system, he was strongly pressed to use his influence at home to get the Dutch Government to get the Dutch Bank to be more accommodating. There is very little chance, however, of their altering their attitude.

3. I have reported elsewhere on the King's experiment of convoking a National Conference of urban representatives, which sat from the 2nd to the 11th June, to review in an advisory capacity the problems confronting the Hejazi Government. Finance was naturally a prominent feature in the proceedings. As might have been expected, the members of the conference had no comfort to offer, and such advice as some of them were bold enough to tender was most unpalatable to Ibn Saud. All that the conference effected was to help to give a certain coherence to grievances which have gradually been growing articulate and which may be summed up as follows: (a) The Hejaz is the victim of a double drain on its meagre resources, owing to the amount of money expended abroad on extravagant requirements, of which motor cars are the favourite example, and the amount which is devoted to expenditure proper to Nejd, notably subsidies to the tribes there; (b) the country has no budget in any true sense, and almost unlimited power in the financial domain is exerted by the Director-General, Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman, whose unpopularity increases by leaps and bounds, but whose position with the King seems to be unimpaired. Certain members of the conference had the courage to criticise Abdullah Suleiman and to proclaim the necessity for a budget. The King's reply is said to have been in effect, "le budget, c'est moi."

4. The trouble has become concrete in two forms, viz., (a) the failure of all efforts to maintain the riyal exchange, and (b) the necessity for finding new money to carry Ibn Saud over a very lean period. Unless assistance can be obtained, it may be confidently anticipated that this period will be one of complete indigence for some months, that the next pilgrimage season will bring some temporary relief, and that, if the pilgrimage is again small, the position a year hence will be at least as bad as it is now.

5. The silver currency has entered on a new phase of depreciation during the last few weeks. The riyal stands now at about 14½ to the pound. The wonder is that it has not gone lower. The King has his own cure, which I described when reporting on my audience of the 17th June. I may repeat myself in order to make this despatch self-contained. All that is necessary, says Ibn Saud, is to bring the Hejazi silver and nickel currency into use throughout his dominions, and he has taken measures with that object. He may succeed, but I doubt whether he realises how difficult it may be to secure acceptance in countries like Nejd and Asir, of a currency which has been so blown upon in its country of origin. He has, however, discovered one practical device. He left Mecca for Nejd on the 28th June, intending to make a long stay. I understand that this time he is going to meet the tribal demands on his generosity by presents in riyals.

6. But the need for new money has now become the major problem. I have reported elsewhere Fuad Bey Hamza's broad hint to me on the 12th June, that His Majesty's Government might come to Ibn Saud's help financially as well as in other ways. The King himself was more guarded on the 17th June, but he broached a definite request, which I submitted for your consideration in my telegram No. 170 of the 19th June, namely, that His Majesty's Government might help him to enlist the services of a British bank. I mentioned in my telegram the King's statement that he had other offers. I have not been able to find out much on the subject and nothing with certainty. I understand that the Amir Lutfullah, that Syrian in Egypt who has had a financial past in this country, has made approaches. The Banque Misr is also said to be interested. I have heard also of Lloyds and an unnamed fourth, possibly the Eastern Bank, but I doubt very much whether either of them has come forward, although it is possible that Mr. Philby may have been taking soundings. In the enclosure to my despatch No. 235 of the 20th June, I dealt with another project to bring an Indian Moslem bank here.

[6707]

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7. I owe a good deal of the above information, such as it is, to the manager of the Dutch Bank here. According to Mr. Jacobs, what the Government are aiming at is to get a foreign bank to produce something like £200,000, in return for certain privileges like a monopoly of banking operations and privileges of note issue. He thought there might be something in the story about Amir Lutfullah, as that gentleman runs a one-man show, and has on his hands a quantity of very fine notes, all ready printed, which he had made in connexion with his financial ventures here in the last days of the Hashimite régime. Ibn Saud, however, would prefer to interest more regular bankers (and would also, I think, hate to have to borrow in Egypt); but Mr. Jacobs did not see what the Hejazi Government could offer that would be sufficient to attract a serious concern with responsibilities to its shareholders. He emphasised the difficulty of enforcing a monopoly of banking in a place where every merchant of importance does a bit of banking as a side-line.

8. I am more than ever conscious of being (like Ibn Saud) out of my depth in this subject. Nevertheless, the situation is so serious and has so great a bearing on the political situation in Hejaz-Nejd, that I have thought it well to devote a further separate despatch to it before going on leave. I am sending a copy to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3877/3/25] No. 15.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope Gill (Jedda).

(No. 118.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1931.

MY immediately following telegram contains text of identic announcement which His Majesty's Government have decided to make simultaneously to Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan Governments on the result of the MacDonnell enquiry. Please telegraph whether you have any comments, repeating to Transjordan.

Substance of announcement cannot be reconsidered, but if you think it important minor alterations of form or wording could still be made, though this would involve further delay.

Announcement should not be communicated to Hejaz-Nejd Government pending further instructions.

A similar telegram is being sent to Transjordan.

[E 3877/3/25] No. 16.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope Gill (Jedda).

(No. 119.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 30, 1931.

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have considered the report submitted to them by Mr. MacDonnell on the results of his investigation into the claims arising from raids from the Hejaz-Nejd into Transjordan and from Transjordan into the Hejaz-Nejd, which took place before 1st August, 1930. Owing to the insufficient and often contradictory nature of the information and evidence furnished to Mr. MacDonnell; to the length of time which has elapsed since the dates of many of the raids involved; and owing, moreover, to the fact that the conditions under which Mr. MacDonnell was obliged to carry out his investigation did not permit of his conducting his enquiries on the actual sites of the raids, or of his having the opportunity of examining all available witnesses, the information is not such as to enable His Majesty's Government to make an exact award on each claim submitted. For this reason His Majesty's Government are not in a position to make a detailed estimate as to the amount of loot taken from the nationals of either Government by the nationals of the other.

"The information furnished to His Majesty's Government is, however, sufficient to enable them to judge that it would be fair and reasonable that all the claims referred to them by both the Governments concerned should be held to cancel each other out. His Majesty's Government conclude, therefore, that all claims arising from raids between the two countries which took place before the 1st August, 1930, should, on the basis of such cancellation, be held to be settled and finally disposed of."

[E 3990/3/25]

No. 17.

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 187.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, July 31, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 119 of 30th July.

I suggest addition of following paragraph:—

"This is His Majesty's Government's final arbitral award."

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 229.)

[E 3931/2064/25]

No. 18.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope Gill (Jedda).

(No. 308.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 7, 1931.

WITH reference to my telegram to Sir A. Ryan, No. 113 of the 14th July, relative to the request of King Ibn Saud for the assistance of His Majesty's Government in connexion with his desire to employ a British bank as a State bank in the Hejaz, I have to inform you that the Minister of the Hejaz and Nejd called at the Foreign Office on the 21st July and raised this question. He explained that King Ibn Saud was anxious to stabilise his currency and to set the finances of his country on a firm basis. His Majesty therefore desired to establish a State bank, and was most anxious to secure the services of a British bank for this purpose. He had accordingly decided to send a representative to England to interview suitable banking firms, and the representative selected, M. Abdur Rahman Qusaibi, was arriving in London that morning.

2. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba was informed that Sir Andrew Ryan had already reported King Ibn Saud's request for the assistance of His Majesty's Government in this matter, and that the necessary instructions had already been telegraphed to Sir A. Ryan with regard to the reply to be returned to His Majesty's enquiry. In that telegram Sir A. Ryan had been instructed to explain that, whilst His Majesty's Government fully appreciated and sympathised with the financial difficulties of the Hejazi Government, it was impossible for them to depart from their long-established practice of non-intervention in transactions between foreign Governments and British banks. In any case, in England, unlike certain other countries, the banks were wholly independent bodies, whose decisions His Majesty's Government were not in a position to influence. The banks would therefore reach a decision on any proposition which might be put before them on its commercial merits and not on political grounds. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government had suggested that King Ibn Saud should appoint a representative in London to explore the matter with the banks direct. It appeared, from what Sheikh Hafiz Wahba had said, that the King had already anticipated this advice.

3. The sheikh stated that he recognised the inability of His Majesty's Government to intervene with British banks, as explained above, but hinted that King Ibn Saud would be prepared to offer very substantial commercial concessions to any bank willing to consider the business. He also explained that, while the King personally, and he himself, were eager to put any business in British hands, the Russians were making efforts to establish themselves commercially in the Hejaz and interested persons were trying to persuade the King to deal with them.

4. The Minister was informed in reply that His Majesty's Government were aware that the Russians had been selling goods in parts of Arabia at a very low

price. If they attempted to do this in the Hejaz it would not be possible for this country to compete with them, as British trade was in private hands and was run on a commercial basis. It was, of course, entirely for King Ibn Saud to decide whether or not he should encourage Russian activities in his dominions.

5. As a result of this conversation, it was arranged that M. Zade, of the Hejazi Legation, and M. Abdur Rahman Qusaibi should discuss the position at the Department of Overseas Trade on the 23rd July with members of that Department. They then stated to the representatives of that Department that they were already in touch with the Eastern Bank, with which M. Abdur Rahman Qusaibi had had commercial dealings at Bahrein, and had also had a preliminary discussion with the Ottoman Bank. They would be glad if the Ottoman Bank could be informed that the Department of Overseas Trade were fully cognisant of the project.

6. M. Zade was informed that the Department of Overseas Trade had been in touch with Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas), who had large resources, and were already represented by branches in Egypt and the Sudan, and he was given a letter of introduction to this bank. It was, however, explained to the Hejazi representatives that there were relatively few banks with experience of their part of the world, and that it was probably undesirable from their point of view to discuss the matter with more than, at the outside, two or three banks, as otherwise there might be a danger that none would be inclined to give their proposals serious consideration.

7. The Department of Overseas Trade have since approached the Ottoman Bank, as requested by M. Zade, and have been informed that the Hejazi Government's proposals are under consideration.

8. The Hejazi Minister has expressed his appreciation of the assistance rendered to him in this connexion.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 3990/3/25]

No. 19.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope Gill (Jedda).

(No. 124.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 11, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 187 of 31st July: Mr. MacDonnell's investigation of Hejaz-Nejd-Transjordan raid claims—announcement to be made to Hejazi and Transjordan Governments.

You should now communicate announcement to Hejazi Government, adding following paragraph:—

"This is His Majesty's Government's final finding,"

and at end of preceding paragraph substituting "conclusively" for "finally."

Similar instructions are being sent to Transjordan.

[E 4166/1600/25]

No. 20.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 279.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 12, 1931.

I REGRET that I have been unable hitherto to follow up my despatch No. 217 of the 9th June with a further report on the Hejazi "National Conference." I will now attempt to sum up as briefly as possible the main points in the accounts given in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 5th, 12th and 19th June. That newspaper has of late become so garrulous that a severe sifting is necessary.

2. As I stated in my previous despatch, the conference assembled at Muna on the 2nd June, but moved next day to Mecca. It sat until the 11th June, when the King gave another banquet to mark the close of the proceedings and received, after dinner, the report.

3. I have still seen no organic statute of any kind defining the constitutional character and electoral basis of the conference. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 5th June published, however, a regulation determining its internal organisation and the scope of its labours. The most interesting clauses in this are those relative to the three committees mentioned in my previous despatch.

4. The report published in the "Umm-al-Qura" does not describe very precisely the conclusions of the Committee on Public Morals, which also dealt with pilgrimage matters. It merely indicates in general terms that recommendations were made as to the means of promoting Islamic morality and that regulations were proposed in connexion with the pilgrimage, notably with reference to complaints made against mutawwifs and their agents. The paper states that these recommendations were to be submitted by the King to the ulema and the Legislative Council respectively.

5. The Committee on Judicial Affairs dealt with two main subjects, one apparently having to do with the general functioning of the courts, the other with the rapid and final disposal of all cases now pending in them. The conference adopted a regulation in forty-two articles prepared by the committee under the first of these heads. This also is to be submitted to the ulema. It was suggested that the review of all pending cases should be entrusted to four ulema, whose names were submitted to the King.

6. The Committee on Economic and General Affairs is described as having been much the largest of the three committees. The "Umm-al-Qura" gives a long, though apparently not complete, list of the subjects which it discussed with a view to their further consideration by the Government. The list is impressive, but the headings are very general. The subjects include the question whether it is a good thing to have few or many motor cars; the granting of concessions; the employment of experts in finance and agriculture; financial reform generally; banking arrangements, including the possibility of a national bank; the introduction into general use throughout Ibn Saud's dominions of the Hejazi currency and the gradual elimination of the Maria Theresa dollar; agricultural development and mining; the despatch of a mission abroad to be trained in economic questions; the creation of an agricultural company and another for dealing in hides and making yarns; road improvements and railway communications; electric lighting; payment of salaries and inspection of public departments; wakfs, including efforts to secure the revenue of wakfs created abroad for the benefit of the holy places.

7. An impressive list, as I have said, even though I have condemned it and omitted some of the items. The "Umm-al-Qura" suggests the picture of a hive of happy and intelligent bees engaged in living up to what they themselves said in their address to the King, when commending his goodness in convoking a freely-elected Assembly: "The nation is made to face a smiling future full of the dreams of the great ancient Arabs, in this, the time of the greatest crowned Arab who has appeared in Arabia."

8. Accounts from private sources show the conference in a less happy light. It undoubtedly focussed attention on a great many matters of public interest and, if certain of the suggestions put forward were acted on, good would result. The questions of mutawwifs, for instance, would appear to have given rise to considerable discussion, and at least one useful proposal seems to have emerged, namely, that they should cease to be used for the purpose of collecting Government taxation (see paragraph 57 of the pilgrimage report for 1930). On the other hand, some of the suggestions made in this connexion might, if adopted, tend to strengthen the hold of the mutawwifs on pilgrims.

9. The most crucial subject of discussion was, however, the financial situation. Some of the delegates were apparently bold enough to criticise present methods and to suggest means, including the establishment of a regular budget, whereby extravagance might be curtailed and the power of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, the Director-General of Finance, might be curbed. The critics seemed to have quarrelled violently with the sheikh and to have incurred the displeasure of the King. It is, indeed, said that this controversy decided His Majesty to make an end of the conference sooner than he might otherwise have done.

10. Broadly speaking, it may be said that the conference did more to make discontent articulate than to solve problems. It emphasised the polarisation between Nejd's arrogance and the sense of grievance with which Hejazis see themselves ridden over roughshod while their money is drained out of the country.

to pay for extravagant purchases abroad and to supply the needs of Nejd. From the point of view of a foreign observer, perhaps the most interesting feature of the proceedings was the tendency, due more, perhaps, to subservience than to conviction in the case of persons other than officials and ulema, to assert Islamic exclusiveness. I am told that some of the pilgrimage questions were approached in the spirit that foreign pilgrims should be discouraged from invoking the assistance of their consular authorities. The view seems to have prevailed that any foreign experts employed should be Moslems and that any concessions granted should also be granted to Moslems.

11. In some ways, indeed, the conference seems to have taken on the character of a Moslem religious gathering rather than that of a Hejazi national assembly. It is even suggested that it was intended partly as a counter-move to the efforts of the Indian, Shaukat Ali, who is notoriously hostile to Ibn Saud, to bring about a general Moslem conference. In this connexion, it is interesting to note that the Mecca representatives at the National Conference included two Indian notables resident there, Messrs. Abdullah and Obeidullah Dehlavi. According to my principal informant, a proposal was actually mooted that Indians should be given a share in the administration of the country, but was rejected by the King, in accord with his Syrian advisers, owing to the danger of Indians becoming consular tools.

12. I should be sorry to vouch for everything in this hurriedly-written and imperfectly-informed report, but I think that, in the main, it gives a fairly accurate account of an interesting, though incomprehensive, experiment; interesting as a reflex of the state of affairs in this country; inconclusive because Ibn Saud will gang his ain gait, so far as religious, financial and tribal considerations do not restrict his freedom of motion.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, the Acting High Commissioner at Bagdad and the Acting Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 4167/1600/25]

No. 21.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 280.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 12, 1931.

IN my despatch No. 200 of the 28th May I attempted to review the general situation in this country with special reference to the Hejaz as distinct from Nejd and its dependencies. Now that Ibn Saud has gone to Riyadh and I myself am about to go on leave, I should like to bring the review up to date.

2. It is generally felt that the King, having concentrated his attention on the affairs of the Hejaz for over a year, his first prolonged stay in this part of his dominions since he completed his conquest of it, has left those affairs in a hopeless mess. It is even suggested by some that he has run away from them. I understand that the situation has given rise to extravagant rumours abroad, one of them being that His Majesty had decided to abdicate in favour of his son Feisal, presumably in the Hejaz, of which that Prince is Viceroy, or in favour of both his elder sons, Saud and Feisal. A report in the latter sense, published in a Cairo newspaper, was formally contradicted in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 10th July.

3. The feeling one has at present is a sense, not of greater apparent trouble than in May, but of a lack of central direction. The Hejaz has been left like a waterlogged and half-dismantled ship without any particular signs of a wind to blow it either into port or to destruction. It is hard to say who is governing the country. The King is too far away and probably too fed up not to be glad of a rest from the Hejaz. The young Viceroy has been too much in the background of late to make it possible to judge of his capacity for affairs. Among the "statesmen" the two most important factors are Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, who is strong, and Fuad Bey Hamza, who is active and industrious. It remains to be seen whether this not very happily assorted triumvirate can carry on until next pilgrimage.

4. I can add nothing to what I said in paragraph 3 of my despatch under reference regarding the situation in the interior. There is the same anxiety about it in the towns. The same rumours float about, occasionally perhaps a little more precise, but usually fantastic. In the imagination of the quidnuncs of Mecca and Jedda, Jauf "falls" periodically, no one knows into whose hands. A recent rumour has filled the lacuna in the case of Tebuk, which was said to have fallen "to the rebels."

5. In paragraph 4 of my previous despatch I referred to the King's religious position. There has been an interesting development in this connexion. It became known towards the end of June that he had made concessions to his extremists. He allowed to be published in the *"Umm-al-Qura"* of the 26th June a long remonstrance addressed to him by the Ulema of Nejd regarding the repetition this year of the Accession Day celebrations instituted in January 1930. The writers claimed politely but firmly that it was their right and duty to call the King's attention to the irreligiousness of celebrations, which they had condoned in 1930 as there might be political reasons for them, but the perpetuation of which could not be tolerated. The King's reply, which was also published, expressed his delight at being thus counselled. He deferred to the judgment of the ulema, and asked the forgiveness of God for his offence.

6. About the same time steps were taken to tighten up the regulations against vicious practices, like abstention from prayer, the public use or sale of tobacco (the importation of which is nevertheless still tolerated) and the use of gramophones, &c. These regulations had been considerably relaxed and the special courts or committees for the enforcement of them had disappeared. These have now been reconstituted, and the task of enforcing the restrictions has been divided between them and the civil authorities. Stocks of gramophone needles were seized, and it is said that they can now only be bought from the police; but I will not vouch for this libel on the public service of a friendly Power. It is too soon to say whether the recent measures mark a definite change of policy towards Wahhabi extremism and a stronger imposition of Nejd on the Hejaz, or whether they were merely adopted to create a good atmosphere for the King's stay at Riyadh. His Majesty made some very pious speeches before he left Mecca on the 28th June, but there is nothing unusual in that.

7. I have dealt in separate despatches with the financial situation and the proceedings of the Nationalist Conference. I need not dwell on them further here, except to mention one side effect of the financial and economic difficulties which may have some political importance. The King was casting about in many directions before he left with a view to raising the wind in foreign quarters. The Soviet representative seems to have taken a hand in the game, and is reported to have sold 50,000 cans of benzine to the Government on easy terms. More than this cannot be affirmed, but M. Turakulov's deal has naturally given rise to rumours that the Hejazi Government have come to terms with the Bolsheviks on a more extensive basis. I am asking Mr. Hope-Gill to watch for any developments in this direction, though at present I see no evidence of more than a commercial transaction, and doubt whether there is much to come of it.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, the Acting High Commissioner at Bagdad and the Acting Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 4169/584/25]

No. 22.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 282.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 13, 1931.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 137 of the 8th April, I have the honour to state that Fuad Bey Hamza did not revert to the question of the possible entry of Hejaz-Nejd into the League of Nations until the 8th July. He was on the point of returning to Mecca and was doubtful whether he could

come back to Jedda before I went on leave on the 20th July. He seemed very anxious in any case to get me to put something in writing. I was most reluctant to commit myself to this. I said that the question he put to me last year had been very carefully considered at home, and that I had material for further conversation but not, I thought, for a written communication. I promised to refresh my memory of a despatch I had received from you (*i.e.*, your despatch under reference) and see what I could do. I mentioned in general terms slavery and the complicated legal questions involved.

2. A reperusal of your despatch after Fuad Bey left confirmed my reluctance to give him a written statement. The matters dealt with in paragraphs 2 to 4 of your despatch are such that I could touch lightly on most of them in conversation, but could not deal with them in a letter without danger of indiscretion on my side and controversial rejoinder on the part of Fuad Bey. As regards paragraph 5 of your despatch, I dare say nothing at all at the present time, as you are reviewing the position in regard to Asir, and Fuad Bey has recently reminded me that Ibn Saud's claim to Aqaba and Maan remains juridically intact. I should, therefore, be limited in a written statement to the subject-matter of paragraphs 6 to 11 of your despatch, and here again I am confronted by the difficulty that, if I proceeded definitely on the conclusions stated by you, I might find that Fuad Bey had quite different conceptions regarding the constitutional position in this country.

3. After careful consideration I have addressed a personal letter to Fuad Bey, a copy of which I enclose. For many reasons I should prefer to postpone any further discussion with him until the end of the year, but my letter will enable him to judge whether it is worth his while to come to Jedda before I leave. If he does, I will try to ascertain whether Ibn Saud has any serious intention of seeking membership of the League, so that I may consider whether the Hejazi Government can be considered to have expressed a wish to join, within the meaning of the last sentence of your despatch under reference. At present I see no evidence of more than a wish to explore the subject, and even that wish may be merely a wish on the part of Fuad Bey personally.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 22

Sir A. Ryan to Fuad Bey Hamza.

(Private.)

My dear Fuad Bey,

Jedda, July 13, 1931.

I GATHERED from our telephone conversation yesterday afternoon that you might not find it possible to visit Jedda before I leave on the 20th July. I have, therefore, written you letters on two of the questions you reopened on the 8th July, *viz.*, the International Sanitary Convention and connected matters, and the Arms Traffic Convention. As regards the League of Nations, I find it difficult to follow the same course, because the apparently simple question that you put in the letter you wrote to me last September turns largely on complicated legal questions, which we could only elucidate in discussion.

If you could find time to come to Jedda, it would give me great pleasure to discuss the matter further. At the same time, I cannot well press you to come here specially for that purpose at any great inconvenience to yourself, as our discussion could hardly be conclusive, though it would serve the very useful purpose of providing each of us with material for further consideration.

It may help you to decide whether to pursue the matter further or to postpone it until after I return, if I say that the legal question turns greatly on the constitutional relations between the Hejaz and Nejd, &c., and the effect thereof on their international status. That is not the only subject I should mention in a conversation, but it has a very important bearing on the whole matter.

[E 4172/2064/25]

No. 23.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 286.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 14, 1931.

I HAVE dealt in previous reports, ending with my despatch No. 253 of the 1st July, with the deplorable financial situation of the Hejazi Government and the various exchange crises of the last four or five months. I mentioned in my despatch No. 253 and have had occasion to refer elsewhere to the plan for improving the internal exchange by generalising the use of the Hejazi currency throughout Ibn Saud's dominions, a plan which the National Conference seems to have recommended, with the rider that the Maria Theresa dollar should be eliminated *gradually* and about which the King himself spoke to me in my audience of the 17th June.

2. This matter was the subject of a Government notice published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 19th June. After a pious exordium, the notice explains in a rather involved manner the reasons for which, while postponing any decision to enforce the exclusive use of the Hejazi currency, the Government have been impelled to lay down certain rules with a view to facilitating transactions and obviating usurious practices. I enclose a translation of the portion of the notice containing those rules, which are to operate as from the end of Safar, *i.e.*, mid-July 1931.

3. The effect of the rules is not altogether clear to me, but it would appear to be that the silver and nickel currency of the Hejaz is made legal tender throughout the King's dominions, under unspecified penalties for refusing it; but that the use of other currencies is allowed subject to certain conditions, including the fixation of internal rates of exchange. I doubt whether the exact effect matters much as the events of the last few months have shown that the Government cannot enforce for long any regulations aiming at an artificial stabilisation of the exchange. At the time of writing this despatch the quotation for riyals in Jedda is about 14 = £1.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Acting High Commissioner at Bagdad, and the High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 23.

Extract from the "Umm-al-Qura" of June 19, 1931, No. 340.

GENERAL NOTIFICATION.

(Translation.)

ALL commercial transactions must be (based) on the common (Saudi) piastre ($\frac{1}{2}$ piastre Miri) so as to enable every person to pay in the kind of coin which he possesses, whether it be dollars, Marie Theresa dollars, Indian rupees, pounds sterling, or Turkish pounds; except in the two following cases:—

If the buyer possesses any kind of coin and is prepared to pay in cash immediately at the time of purchase, he must pay in the kind of coin he has and upon which both parties have agreed at the time of sale, but if the payment is not made in cash passing from hand to hand at the time and place of purchase, then the payment shall be in piastres, to prevent usury.

The sale and purchase of houses and other immovable property sold or purchased for fixed periods, payment must be in the kind of coin agreed upon in the contract. Whoever pays in any other kind of coin than that mentioned in the agreement will render the two parties liable to heavy punishment.

Anybody who refuses Government coin will be liable to heavy punishment.

Rates of exchange—

Arabian dollar (riyal)	= 22 piastres (Saudi).
Pound sterling	= 220 piastres (Saudi).
Turkish pound	= 190 piastres (Saudi).
Marie Theresa dollar	= 11 piastres (Saudi).
Indian rupee	= 15 piastres (Saudi).

[E 4175/584/25]

No. 24.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 289.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 16, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 282 of the 13th July, I have the honour to state that Fuad Bey Hamza came to Jedda on the 15th July for the inside of the day only, and that we discussed the question of the possible entry of Hejaz-Nejd into the League of Nations.

2. I reminded Fuad Bey that, in his personal letter to me of the 7th October last, he had limited himself to an enquiry as to the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the legal position. I said that, although it was not for one Government to pronounce on a question which might concern the League as a whole, you had examined the matter carefully, with a view to giving the Hejaz-Nejd Government what friendly assistance you could.

3. I then gave Fuad Bey the gist of paragraphs 6 to 11 of your despatch No. 137 of the 8th April, explaining that you had drawn certain conclusions from the available data as to the character of the union between the Hejaz and Nejd and its dependencies, and had deduced therefrom the further conclusions, stated in the second half of paragraph 10 of your despatch, as to the position of Hejaz-Nejd in regard to possible membership of the League.

4. Fuad Bey stated that the situation as between the Hejaz on the one hand and Nejd, &c., on the other was undefined. He admitted that, although a personal union might have been contemplated in 1926, the position had evolved, and was still evolving, on such lines that the two countries could only be regarded as forming a single State. He inferred this from indications similar to those considered in your despatch and certain others which we discussed, *e.g.*, the increasing tendency to treat the whole country as a unit for administrative purposes. He emphasised, however, the fact that the Constitution of the Hejaz still applied only to that country, and that there had been no new definition of the legal situation.

5. For the reasons given in paragraph 2 of my despatch under reference, I said nothing to Fuad Bey about the requirements of the League that States applying for membership must have established frontiers; nor did I revert to the question of slavery, as Fuad Bey is well aware from previous conversations of the views of His Majesty's Government on that subject.

6. In the course of the conversation I asked Fuad Bey point-blank whether his Government had made up their minds to seek admission to the League or were merely exploring the possibility of their doing so. As I expected, he intimated that no decision had been taken; they were merely looking into the matter. Having elicited this information, I refrained from making the statement foreshadowed in the last sentence of your despatch No. 137 of the 8th April.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 4177/2064/25]

No. 25.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 291.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 16, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to state that I received your telegram No. 113 of the 14th July, relative to the possibility of a British bank establishing itself in the Hejaz, just before an interview with Fuad Bey Hamza, who came down from Mecca for the inside of the day on the 15th July. I seized the opportunity of reading the first paragraph of your telegram to Fuad Bey, who manifested no surprise or disappointment.

2. In view of the first sentence of the second paragraph of your telegram, I told Fuad Bey as from myself that, while I did not exclude the possibility of the Hejazi Government enlisting the interest of a British bank, I could not honestly encourage them to hope for much in that direction. I let fall the various names I had heard mentioned in connexion with possible arrangements with bankers (see paragraphs 6 and 7 of my despatch No. 253 of the 1st July); but Fuad Bey was not to be drawn.

3. I thought it inadvisable to suggest consultation with Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., (Limited), as regards the choice of a person to act for the Hejazi Government in the city. That firm have extensive and peculiar relations with the Hejazi Government and are themselves engaged in banking here on a fairly important scale. Their position *vis-à-vis* of the Government is so variable that any reference I might make to them in this connexion would almost certainly be misunderstood either as an encouragement to hope that the firm might themselves come to the help of the Government, which they are not prepared to do except on the most moderate scale, or as an attempt on my part to ram them down the throats of the Government.

4. As an illustration of the singular way in which all such matters are approached here, I may mention that on the 8th July, Fuad Bey asked me, at the instance of the Director-General of Finance, to use my influence with Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. in favour of an arrangement whereby they would provide money for the specific purpose of maintaining the Hejazi representative missions abroad. The Director-General was prepared to give security—apparently by depositing local silver currency—and to promise that the business would be perfectly safe. I asked why Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman did not go to Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. himself, adding that I understood they were on the best of terms. Fuad Bey said that he thought they were no longer on such good terms as formerly. Anyhow, he had been asked to pass on the message and was doing so; but he was careful to add in fairly clear language that he would prefer not to back his colleague's word.

5. I was naturally not very eager to intervene, least of all with a view to urging Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. to involve themselves in unsound business. I promised, however, to speak to the manager, Mr. A. J. Warner. When I did so three days later, I found that he had an appointment with Abdullah Suleiman himself for that afternoon and was expecting the Director-General to talk biggish business, *e.g.*, to see what Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. would do in return for a monopoly of the importation of benzine and petroleum. The upshot of the whole thing, as I learnt later from Mr. Warner, was that Abdullah Suleiman asked for £1,500 to cover one month's expenditure on the missions abroad and promised to pay interest on the sums already due by the Government to the firm, a matter of £6,000 to £7,000. Mr. Warner is quite happy about these outstandings and thought his firm would run to the extra £1,500. I was able to telephone to Fuad Bey that I understood the Director-General had had a satisfactory interview with Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co.'s manager, and I left it at that.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 4180/81/25]

No. 26.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 298.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 19, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jedda report for May and June 1931.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, New Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloops, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 26.

Jedda Report for May and June 1931.

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I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Ibn Saud.

THE King projected a further visit to Jedda on the 23rd May. Owing to his many preoccupations in Mecca, he did not actually come to Jedda until the 14th June. He went back on the 17th June to prepare for his long-projected visit to Nejd. He left for Riyadh on the 28th June, and is expected to stay there for several months, possibly until the approach of the next pilgrimage. This will be his first long stay in Nejd since he arrived in Mecca on the 30th April last year, as his visit to Riyadh last December-January was greatly curtailed.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. We have got back to the bad position of last year. The Amir Feisal remains Minister, but performs none of the duties of his office as such. Fuad Bey Hamza continues to be the working Minister, but spends little time in Jedda. He

was there from the 9th to the 11th May, the 27th to the 30th May and the 11th to the 18th June. He went to Taif immediately after the King's departure for Riyadh on the 28th June. So far as the British Legation is concerned the infrequency and shortness of Fuad Bey's visits have not caused as much inconvenience as formerly, the slate having been pretty clean as regards current business during the period under review.

Finance.

3. After the pilgrimage the financial situation became more or less desperate. Money is still found somehow for urgent requirements, e.g., the King's visit to Nejd, but whatever gold reserve there was is believed to be practically exhausted and it has become more and more a matter of hand-to-mouth expedients. The relations between the Government and the Dutch Bank were still obscure early in May, but it later became evident that the bank would do no more to help the Government either by bolstering up the exchange or by lending money. The National Conference, which sat in June (see paragraph 19), had no solution to offer. It helped to give coherence to the growing volume of discontent which has become more or less articulate on two points, viz., the excessive amount of money spent abroad, much of it on luxury articles like motor-cars, and the extent to which the Hejaz is mulcted for the support of Nejd. The King had no ear for suggestions that the country should have a proper budget and that Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, his Director-General of Finance, was the source of all evil. His Majesty's mind has turned more and more on the possibility of getting an outside bank to come to his help.

4. It is suggested that a bank might be found to provide £200,000 in return for certain privileges like a position resembling that of a State bank, a monopoly of banking operations and the right to issue notes. It is said that offers have been made by the Amir Lutfullah, a rich Syrian in Egypt, who played a rôle in Hejazi financial affairs during the last agony of the Hashimite régime. He has maintained some sort of an agency in Jedda and an underling of his visited Jedda early in June, ostensibly to clear up a difficulty about the lease of a house. The Banque Misr is also said to be disposed to do business. The King would probably hate to get money from Egypt, if it could be got elsewhere. In his statement to Sir A. Ryan on the 13th June (see paragraph 41), Fuad Bey harked back to the time when His Majesty's Government had subsidised Ibn Saud as well as King Hussein. When the King received Sir A. Ryan on the 17th June he did not refer to this, but asked whether His Majesty's Government could help him to bring in a British concern to undertake the duties of a State bank. He named no names, but may have had in mind the Eastern Bank, or possibly Lloyds. He spoke of having had other offers and asked for an early answer to his request to His Majesty's Government. Sir A. Ryan telegraphed the request to London on the 19th June, but no reply was received up to the 30th June. Before Sir A. Ryan was approached, a strong appeal had been made to the Acting Dutch Chargé d'Affaires, on the eve of his departure for Holland, to induce the Netherlands Government to persuade the principals of the Dutch Bank to be more accommodating.

5. Fresh efforts were made early in May (see March-April report, paragraph 5) to rehabilitate the exchange. One expedient was to raise a sort of forced loan in nickel with a view to reducing the volume of it in the market. The money changers' shops were closed down about the same time. Little has since been heard about nickel, but the silver riyal, after vicissitudes, settled into a steady decline in June and at the end of the month stood at about 14 riyals to the £, as against the official rate of 10. One of the remedies contemplated for restoring the value of the silver and nickel currency is to generalise its use throughout the whole of Ibn Saud's dominions. The King spoke hopefully about this scheme to Sir A. Ryan on the 17th June. He is said to have hit on the plan of giving his largess to the Nejd tribes in riyals and to have taken a large quantity of them to Riyadh for the purpose.

6. Meanwhile the authorities themselves have recognised the depreciation to the extent of requiring a 25 per cent. surcharge on telegrams paid for in silver. This measure is not unreasonable in itself, as the rates are fixed on a gold franc basis. Nevertheless it is an admission that silver is at a discount, despite official proclamations to the contrary.

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7. These troubles have not reacted seriously on any British interest. The monthly payments to the Eastern Telegraph Company have, however, again fallen into arrear since the end of February. The Government of India claim remains in the same position as that described in paragraph 4 of the last report. Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., doing a varied business on cautious lines, have continued to get on nicely, but found things very slack by the end of June. The Iraqi representative of a Bombay house, with connexions in the United Kingdom, who came to Jedda some time ago to collect outstandings from the Government said to amount to from £3,000 to £4,000, actually got £1,000 down in June and what he considered an acceptable arrangement for a later settlement of the balance.

Economic

8. The second tour of Mr. Twitchell (March-April report, paragraphs 6 and 66) enabled him to visit a considerable coastal area north of Jedda. He is said to have travelled 3,500 kilom. in all. On his return early in May, a pleasant flutter was created by the announcement that he had located a rich petroleum field near Al Muwaila (? the place of that name not far from the southern end of the Gulf of Aqaba), a thoroughly good gold mine and traces of lead near Wejh, and lots and lots of water. The petroleum and gold are believed to have been known before. Little has been heard of them since Mr. Twitchell, having completed his report, went back to the Yemen. His report on water has been published *in extenso* in the "Umm-al-Qura." It is of considerable interest, not so much as revealing the existence of previously unknown sources, but as giving a fairly precise account of the water available in the region round about Jedda and Wadi Fatima. Mr. Twitchell makes various suggestions as to how the water might be raised, dammed underground, &c., and as to how it might be utilised for increased cultivation, and to supply Jedda more cheaply and plentifully than it is at present. He writes, perhaps, with some eye to American business, *e.g.*, in windmills, and suggests that the competent department in Washington might be asked for advice as to crops, seeds, &c.

9. Economic development is in the air, but it is doubtful how far Ibn Saud and his advisers will face up to the spade-work and the need for foreign experts, not merely to make surveys but to direct exploitation. Meanwhile, according to Mr. Philby, the Hejazi Government have got into touch with Messrs. Madian (Limited), and it was announced in the Stockholm press in May, apparently with truth, that they (the Hejazi Government) had invited the Swedish Government to send a geological mission to prospect for minerals, especially oil and coal. It was further announced in the "Dagens Nyheter" of the 28th May that the Swedish Government had acceded subject to certain conditions, and that if these were accepted an expedition of four persons, headed by a M. E. Nordström, would leave for the Hejaz in August. His Majesty's Minister at Stockholm obtained confirmation of this report at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. When Sir A. Ryan mentioned the matter to Fuad Bey Hamza in June, the latter was coy but not denying.

Marconi Wireless Installation.

10. The bulk of the material to be supplied under the contract of last October (September-November report, section I, 5) was delivered in Jedda in April and May. M. Boucicault, a technical expert employed by the Marconi Company, arrived on the 21st May, together with an Egyptian Moslem subordinate named Ibrahim-al-Kurdi. A start was made with the mobile sets, one of which was mounted just outside Jedda. Communication was successfully established with the existing station at Jedda and with another mobile set at Mecca. There was some difficulty at first in communicating with Medina. This was clearly due to defective equipment or handling at the old station there, but the King was angry and girded at Mr. Philby. The latter went off himself to Medina in June with a third mobile set and the Egyptian expert. Communication was then established, and it is understood that the party were able to communicate successfully from as far north as Al Ula.

11. It had been intended that M. Boucicault should erect the central station at Riyadh, and that the Egyptian expert, having seen him do it, should then erect

the station at Mecca. This rational plan broke down on a decision of the King not to have M. Boucicault at Riyadh. His theory is that, if the Egyptian can do Mecca he can do Riyadh. Meanwhile, the King's principal desire appears to be to get the station at Qariyat started as soon as possible, doubtless for reasons connected with the Transjordan frontier situation.

12. On the whole all went well, though slowly, up to the end of June. There is perhaps some reason to apprehend that Ibn Saud will be disappointed in the range of the smaller stations, especially if he is counting on an extensive use of the wireless for telephony, to which it is admirably suited, but for shorter distances than can be telegraphed over.

Anti-Locust Measures.

13. Following on the failure of the steps taken last year (July-August report, section I, 3 (b)) to induce Ibn Saud to let the International Bureau at Damascus send a mission to Nejd, the Committee of the Bureau adopted in February a suggestion that the way for future action might be prepared by inviting the Hejaz-Nejd Government to adhere to the convention of the 20th May, 1926, in pursuance of which the bureau was created. The French Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda conveyed this proposal to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 30th April. His Majesty's Minister, having been instructed to act in conjunction with his French colleague, wrote a suitable note on similar lines on the 10th June. No reply was received up to the end of June.

Legislation.

14. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 12th June published a report on the activities of the Legislative Council, since its recognition last year up to the end of A.H. 1349 (about mid-May 1931). The council furnishes a list of thirty-two regulations issued and thirty important decisions taken, out of a total number of about 700. Perhaps the most interesting item in the report is a list of fifteen budgets, including those of certain administrations at Mecca and Jedda and a number of provincial governorates. This affords an indication that, although there is no published general budget, some attempt is made at budgeting *in petto* for particular purposes. According to Mr. Philby there was in the spring something of a struggle between the Legislative Council and the Director-General of Finance, and the Council had the courage to resist a pretension of Abdullah Suleiman to throw off all control save that of the King.

15. The number of regulations, &c., issued in the Hejaz is becoming considerable. It is very difficult to keep track of them because, while many are published in the "Umm-al-Qura," there is no regular or coherent system of promulgation. Fuad Bey Hamza told Sir A. Ryan in June that a volume of existing regulations was in preparation. This would be a great boon.

16. Among the regulations published in the "Umm-al-Qura" during May-June was one on the trade in fire-arms and carrying of fire-arms by private persons. The regulation introduces a licensing system for both purposes.

General.

17. Economic depression, financial stress, and possibly obscurer political or tribal political causes, promoted during the period under review the growth of an uncertain and potentially dangerous internal situation. Discontent and nervousness were widespread in Mecca and Jedda, and made them more than ever sounding boards for rumours of trouble elsewhere. Anxious eyes without telescopes are fixed on the Transjordan frontier and on the country south-east of it, even as far as Medina. Anxious ears are open to every sort of report, however fantastic. "Jauf has fallen," people hear, but no one can tell who knocked it down or who picked it up. "An-Neshmi has gone over from the King to the enemy"; a portent, but to what enemy is not stated. "Pamphlets are being scattered from aeroplanes; so-and-so's slave is said to have said that he saw them with his own eyes at Medina"; but what aeroplanes or whose pamphlets must remain a mystery.

18. The importance of the rumours lies, not in their individual value, for those that are easiest to check are the most palpably absurd, but in their prevalence and persistency. Whether or no there is real trouble around places like Jaufr and Hail, or in Asir, there is an uneasy general situation, which a strong push from any quarter might make critical. Up to the end of June, however, there was nothing to point to the possibility of such a push, or of there being anyone to administer it. Rumours of Shereefian activity were put about in some quarters, but there was no reason to suppose that they had any substance.

19. The King himself became increasingly conscious after the pilgrimage that things were in a bad way. Towards the end of May he decided to convoke an assembly of representatives of the principal Hejazi towns to advise on a wide range of current affairs. It was announced that he was in personal touch with the Bedouin, and that he now wished, in accordance with the best Islamic traditions of consultation with wise and thoughtful men, to enable the people of the towns to give expression to their views. An assembly of elected urban representatives would be held annually in the month following the pilgrimage. This apparently important constitutional innovation was not introduced by any published organic regulation, nor was it clear who were to be the electors. Elections, however, took place, and a "National Conference" of town notables and representatives of the ulema, with various official personages added, sat from the 2nd to the 11th June. Certain parliamentary forms were observed. The King made a speech and the conference produced a loyal address. They formed three committees to consider different sections of the agenda. A good deal was published, and it would appear that many subjects were discussed. The capital subject was naturally finance. Some delegates were bold enough to proclaim the necessity for a budget, and to attack the administration of the present Director-General (see paragraph 3 above). The King is said to have met the first suggestion with an answer amounting to "le budget, c'est moi"; and the position of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman remained unimpaired.

20. In the situation described above the lack of capable men is more than ever felt. In this connexion, mention may be made of a curious incident. An ex-Turkish officer of Syrian and remoter Yemeni origin, named Tewfik Sherif Bey, has been much in evidence in the Hejaz at various times in recent years. He is an itinerant soldier of fortune, with political aspirations and a wide radius of action. He came from India just before the 1931 pilgrimage, in the company of the well-known Indian Wahhabi, Ismail Ghuznavi, and soon after made his peace with the King, with whom he had fallen out last year. It was supposed that he would receive employment. He suddenly disappeared, however, and it was discovered that he had embarked surreptitiously in a pilgrim ship sailing for India on the 14th June. This incident, which seems to have created a little panic in high circles, is worth recording, because the man is intelligent, though restless and volatile, and it illustrates the King's difficulty in binding to him men of even moderate value, except a handful of people of the Fuad Hamza and Hafiz Wahba type, and a tail of subservient Hejazis and untrained Nejdīs.

21. Reference was made in paragraph 10 of the January-February report, and paragraph 8 of the March-April report, to the growing signs of a tendency on the part of Ibn Saud to work out the future of his country on the basis of greater toleration in the Hejaz, a relaxation of some of the stricter Wahhabi doctrines in Nejd itself, and an unification of the two. This policy encountered a set-back in June. It was announced in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 26th June that the Ulema of Nejd had remonstrated with the King on the repetition this year (see January-February report, paragraph 8) of the accession day celebrations instituted in 1930, and that the King had deferred to their view. The remonstrance of the ulema, a long letter which admitted that there might have been political reasons for the first celebration, but denounced recurring celebrations as un-Islamic, was published, as was the King's gracefully penitent reply. It became known at the same time that the regulations against vicious practices were to be enforced more vigorously, and that the former Committees of Public Virtue were to be reconstituted, though apparently with a different allocation of duties between them and the municipalities. The committees were to see to the regular saying of the five daily prayers. The public sale and smoking of tobacco were to be repressed, although it may still be imported. There was to be a round-up of gramophones and their accessories. Part at least

of this programme was brought into operation at once. It was said, at the end of June, that gramophone needles could only be bought in Jedda from the police, rather to the advantage of the members of the public taking the risk, as the police, selling a confiscated article *sub rosa*, let the needles go cheap. Virtue has come into its own again, and vice deserves the little bit of silver lining in the cloud, which may, nevertheless, weigh heavily on the Hejaz, if the new policy is persisted in. The reassertion of Nejdī principles in a Hejaz in which discontent is becoming articulate, cannot be for the ultimate good of Ibn Saud or anyone else.

22. The affair of the chauffeurs, which it was convenient to deal with in this section of the March-April report (paragraphs 9-13), was disposed of in May. Fuad Bey Hamza devised a combination whereby the British and British-protected persons involved should ask a Royal prince to intercede for them with the King. Whether by this means or not, he procured the release of the ten men, each of whom received a moderate sum of money. At least six of them have since left the country of their own accord.

II.—FRONTIER QUESTIONS.

Transjordan.

Raiding.

23. There was a fair amount of further correspondence between Mecca, Jedda and Jerusalem about particular raids, but it related to raids previous to May, including a small number to which the respective Governments had not previously drawn attention. No raids were reported up to the end of June as having occurred in May or June. The following is a statement of raids alleged up to date to have been committed from January to April inclusive, including those which first came to the notice of the Legation during the period now under review:—

From Transjordan into Hejaz-Nejd—

Six raids, including the loss of 183 camels, one man killed, four wounded, 620 rivals stolen, one rifle lost and four houses attacked. Damage not specified in one case.

From Hejaz-Nejd into Transjordan—

Three raids, involving the loss of seven camels, three policemen killed, kit, &c., stolen. Damage not specified in one case. Two other cases mentioned in which raids were attempted, but were apparently abortive.

24. The meagreness of the foregoing statement shows that, so far as actual raiding goes, there has been nothing seriously alarming in the situation during the first half of 1931. The Hejazi Government showed some zeal in connexion with the murderous attack on the Transjordan police patrol on the 30th March (March-April report, paragraph 14). They would appear to have rounded up the raiders and they informed the Legation on the 22nd June that Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeid had been ordered to hand over the effects and camels of the police party, but they did not state what punishment had been inflicted. This point is being pursued. On the same date, the 22nd June, the Minister for Foreign Affairs complained in very vague terms to the Legation of raids into Hejaz-Nejd by Syrians operating from Transjordan. This complaint was passed on to the High Commissioner.

General Frontier Situation.

25. The proposed preliminary meeting between Captain Glubb and Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeid took place on the 3rd or 4th June at Hazim Wells on the Transjordan side of the frontier. It was apparently friendly, although Ibn Zeid was unable to commit himself to anything definite without reference to Ibn Saud. It was arranged that the two representatives should continue to maintain direct communication. It is not known in Jedda whether it has been possible in this connexion to bring into operation the arrangements made in April for the use of the Jaufr wireless station. No precise particulars of what passed had reached the Legation up to the 30th June.

26. The exchange of views regarding the main meeting for the settlement of all matters connected with raids since the 1st August, 1930, proceeded voluminously to a slow tempo. Ibn Saud's attitude was affected by his internal difficulties, and from early in May onward he became somewhat more accommodating. An adequate assurance was obtained from him regarding arrangements for the mutual restoration of loot in pursuance of decisions resulting from the Glubb-Ibn Zeid meeting. It was agreed that both sides should denounce raiding, not only during the meeting, but for all time, by proclamations to be made public by local Governors. It was intended that the proclamations should be simultaneous and it was hoped that they might be identical. This was defeated by the zeal of the King, who issued on the 14th May a warning to his tribes, apparently drafted by himself, in the finest "Off with your heads!" style. Transjordan had prepared a more normally-worded announcement, which was eventually published on the 30th May. The Hejazi Government, not understanding that the delay was due to unsuccessful efforts at synchronisation, smelt rats. Sir A. Ryan administered eau de Cologne as a reagent.

27. Two other points remained, the question whether, and under what conditions, tribal sheikhs might be heard, and the question of the surrender of "raiding criminals." It was eventually agreed to treat the latter separately and only the question of witnesses remained. In May Ibn Saud relented, at first somewhat ambiguously, to the extent of agreeing that the sheikhs might be heard by the representatives jointly in cases where it was necessary, subject to safeguards against any of them who might defy his authority being allowed to seek refuge in Transjordan. To cut a long story short, agreement was finally reached on the following formula:—

"The two Governments have agreed that the sheikhs should appear before the representatives to give evidence and to make statements on matters in regard to which the two representatives consider it necessary that such evidence and statements should be taken direct, subject to the condition that, if one of these sheikhs should refuse to obey the orders of his Government and should attempt to take refuge in the country of which he is not a national, the Government of that country will do everything in its power to apprehend and hand him over to his own Government. This condition will apply equally in the case of any such sheikh taking refuge in a third country if, being a Hejaz-Nejd national, he should subsequently enter Transjordan territory, or, being a Transjordan national, he should subsequently enter Hejaz-Nejd territory."

This removed the last obstacle to the main meeting between Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid. In a note dated the 18th June, His Majesty's Minister conveyed a suggestion by His Majesty's Government that they should be left to arrange the place and date between themselves. The Minister for Foreign Affairs concurred in a reply of the 21st June and said that Ibn Zeid was being instructed to go to the meeting on receipt of an invitation from Captain Glubb, but Fuad Bey Hamza asked simultaneously that this invitation should be held back for some days, in order to enable Ibn Zeid to receive instructions which had been sent by car from Mecca.

28. The question of the surrender of "raiding criminals" had meanwhile been floated off into a separate correspondence. On the 16th May, Sir A. Ryan communicated to the Hejazi Government a draft formula which had been drafted in London and slightly modified in consultation with Sir J. Chancellor and himself. It ran as follows:—

"Hejazi or Nejd national, who have taken part in raids in Transjordan territory and have returned to Hejaz-Nejd, and who attempt to escape from penalties imposed on them for raiding by fleeing into Transjordan, will, if possible, be prevented, upon direct notification of their names and other available particulars by the Hejaz-Nejd frontier authorities to the corresponding Transjordan authorities, from crossing the frontier into Transjordan. If they enter Transjordan, the Transjordan authorities will, on receiving the necessary information from the Hejaz-Nejd authorities, use their best endeavours to prevent them from remaining in Transjordan and, if possible, to expel them into Hejaz-Nejd."

"This undertaking is given on the understanding that the authorities in Hejaz-Nejd will deal in the same manner with Transjordan raiding criminals in similar circumstances. This undertaking may be terminated either by the Hejaz-Nejd Government or by the Transjordan Government on two months' notice, and shall thereafter apply only to those raiding criminals who have crossed the frontier before its termination."

The Hejazi Government welcomed this proposal as a great contribution to improved frontier conditions, but suggested three alterations so considerable as to require prolonged consideration. *Inter alia* they objected to words so elastic as "if possible," &c. At the end of June His Majesty's Government were still considering their attitude in consultation with Sir J. Chancellor, and were contemplating the possibility of something in the nature of an extradition treaty as an alternative to a "formula," as well as the possibility of one or other being negotiated by a special delegation from Transjordan. Meanwhile, the Hejazi Government had not pressed the matter.

29. In a general way there was, during the period under review, a change in the Hejazi attitude towards more conciliation and a certain anxiety to clear the slate on the Transjordan frontier. They seemed to be positively keen on the Glubb-Ibn Zeid meeting, and they intimated a strong desire that His Majesty's Government should make their promised award on the earlier raids which Mr. MacDonnell investigated last year. This did not prevent them from indulging in one or two characteristic *boutades*. They had on the 5th April accused the Transjordan authorities of violating their frontier with cars and aeroplanes. After due investigation a reasoned and conciliatory reply, rebutting the accusations, was returned on the 13th May. The Minister for Foreign Affairs retorted on the 18th May with a petulant and still unsubstantiated reassertion of the previous accusations. On receipt of a suitable rejoinder pressing mildly for particulars he did not pursue the matter. On the 3rd June, however, he poured all the Hejazi spite against Captain Glubb into a note enumerating various misdeeds alleged against that officer. No reply had been returned up to the 30th June.

30. A pleasant note was struck in a consciously virtuous Hejazi communication of the 22nd June explaining that certain Transjordanians, who had raided Hejaz-Nejd, were moving back into Nejd with their loot, and that, although the Hejazi authorities were entitled to recover it, they preferred to wait for Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid to arrive at a settlement. They hoped that Transjordan would follow this example. This suggestion was still being considered by His Majesty's Government at the end of the month.

Administrative Arrangements on the Frontier.

31. According to information received both in Transjordan and Jedda, several changes were made during May and June in the governorates in the Hejaz-Nejd side of the frontier, but too little is known at the Legation of either the old men or the new to enable it to judge of their effect. The position of An-Neshmi remained obscure. There were rumours in Jedda (see paragraph 17) that he had rattled on Ibn Saud; in Transjordan, that he was being given a command again.

Iraq.

32. There is very little to record for the period under review except the following items:—

- (a) The treaties concluded by Nuri Pasha in April were published at the beginning of May. Laws enabling King Feisal to ratify them were passed by the Iraq Parliament on the 13th May and presumably received the Royal assent. The ratifications had not been actually exchanged up to the 30th June.
- (b) On the 14th June His Majesty's Minister conveyed to Ibn Saud in person the congratulations of His Majesty's Government on the successful result of the negotiations. He explained that although he had received instructions to do this as soon as ratification was assured (actually in

a telegram dated the 20th May) he had awaited the King's delayed visit to Jedda to deliver the message, the gist of which he had, however, conveyed orally through Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on receipt of the instructions.

- (c) About the same time Fuad Bey told Sir A. Ryan that the Iraq Government proposed to send as representative to the Hejaz, Naji Bey-al-Asil, an Iraqi formerly employed by King Hussein to represent him in London and elsewhere. Fuad Bey smiled over this, but did not suggest that the *agrément* would be refused. Sir A. Ryan did not attempt to elucidate the point. Nothing is known in Jedda as to Ibn Saud's intentions regarding a representative in Iraq. A report is understood to have reached Cairo that Sheikh Yusuf Yasin was to be appointed. It seems most unlikely that Ibn Saud would part with him, except possibly for a limited period to give the establishment of normal relations a start.
- (d) Polite messages were exchanged between Ibn Saud and King Feisal on the occasion of the death of King Hussein at Amman on the 4th June. This event was reported as a news item in the "Umm-al-Qura." It does not seem to have created any excitement in the Hejaz.
- (e) The name of Ibn Mashhur remained buried in a blessed silence.

Koweit and Bahrein.

33. There were no developments in May or June in connexion with prospective negotiations regarding Koweit and Bahrein. On the 17th June Sir A. Ryan reminded Ibn Saud in general terms of his promise to receive the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf during his stay in Nejd (March-April report, paragraph 29).

34. The Political Agent at Bahrein reported on the 9th May that, although the Bahreinis in Hasa were being gradually frozen out, they were no longer being definitely maltreated (January-February report, paragraph 27 (d)). That being so, Captain Prior concurred in Sir A. Ryan's view that it would be better not to take the matter up diplomatically with the Hejazi Government.

35. On the 13th May the Political Resident reported to the Colonial Office on the position as regards the Sheikh of Koweit's claims against Ibn Saud in respect of past raids and many other things for which the sheikh sought damages. The sheikh had at first produced claims to a grand total of 111,58,190 rupees. At the instance of Colonel Biscoe he had reduced this figure to 14,86,590 rupees for specific losses. He had, moreover, intimated readiness to waive all claims if Ibn Saud would remove the restrictions which he has for many years imposed on trade between Koweit and the interior. Colonel Biscoe recommended in principle that His Majesty's Minister at Jedda should be instructed to submit the reduced claims to the Hejaz-Nejd Government, but suggested that definite action should be postponed until the matter could be discussed with himself and Sir A. Ryan in London during the summer.

Yemen and Asir.

36. The question raised by the request of the Hejaz Government (March-April report, paragraph 32) for facilities to establish wireless communication between Asir and Aden and postal communication with Kamaran continued to engage the attention of His Majesty's Government throughout the period under review, mainly with reference to its political aspects. No decision had been taken up to the end of June.

37. There is nothing else of importance to record for the period. Reports as to the state of affairs in Asir and the extent of Ibn Saud's activities there are contradictory. Something appears to have been done this year to improve road communication with Jizan from the north. It was reported in May that the road between Birka and Jizan was being repaired. Reports at the end of June, more nebulous, suggested that the King was withdrawing troops from Asir rather than strengthening the position there owing to his preoccupation over the situation south-east of the Transjordan frontier.

37A. Nothing is definitely known in Jedda as to the position between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya. A member of the Legation staff, who is sometimes well informed, assures Sir A. Ryan (a) that there is some sort of an understanding in the nature of a provisional treaty which is renewed annually, and (b) that two persons who had been sent to Asir on Ibn Saud's business there proceeded in May to the Yemen to treat with the Imam. This information is reproduced with reserve.

38. There appears to have been some activity in the closely-connected Senussi and Idrisi circles in Mecca. The following reports came to the notice of the Legation at the end of June, but should be taken with reserve, especially the last:—

- (a) It is said that Marghani-al-Idrisi, who came from Egypt to Mecca some time ago, married in June a daughter of Sayyid Ahmed-es-Senussi.
- (b) It is said that Sayyid Ali-al-Idrisi, who formerly ruled for a short time in Asir, recently left for that country, possibly on a mission from Ibn Saud.
- (c) It is affirmed positively, though it seems most improbable, that Sayyid Hassan-al-Idrisi, the shadow-ruler of Asir, visited Mecca for three days in the latter part of June.

III.—RELATIONS WITH STATES OUTSIDE ARABIA.

British Empire.

39. The easier tone of the correspondence regarding the Transjordan frontier during the period under review produced a general feeling of *détente* all the more marked as no new questions of a seriously contentious nature arose. Ibn Saud's realisation of his internal difficulties was a contributory cause as his instinct is to turn to Great Britain in time of trouble. He had unfortunately got it well into his head that His Majesty's Minister was largely responsible for the earlier tension, and had inspired rather than merely carried out the rigorous policy of His Majesty's Government. Fuad Bey Hamza aspired to the rôle of mediator between the King and Great Britain. He was readier than His Majesty to believe that Sir A. Ryan was not ill-disposed, or, if ill-disposed, could be converted and put to good use.

40. All these factors produced a definite demonstration on the occasion of the King's visit to Jedda in June. In two long conversations on the 13th and 16th June Fuad Bey urged the strong desire of the King for a good understanding with His Majesty's Government on all points. The King himself developed the same thesis in a two hours' audience on the 17th June. The gist of all these conversations was that the King looked to his old friend Great Britain for support, and, if supported, would do anything asked of him. He requested Sir A. Ryan's assistance in arriving at a clear understanding of a fundamental kind. He referred to possible future changes in an Arabia which at present gave no cause for anxiety, hinting at a thesis which Fuad Bey had stated more plainly, viz., that Ibn Saud could offer a true and useful friendship, whereas there could be no real friendship between Great Britain and Hashimite-ruled countries, where His Majesty's Government must strive to maintain a privileged position. He spoke of his desire to use what influence he had elsewhere in a sense favourable to His Majesty's Government. He was not seeking, he said, to drive a bargain, but he did want to know where he stood with His Majesty's Government.

41. The King's desire for a good understanding with His Majesty's Government was obviously sincere, if not as disinterested as might have been inferred from his professions of pure friendship. It was equally obvious that both he and Fuad Bey were thinking much of their financial difficulties. Fuad Bey hinted openly on the 13th June at the possibility of financial assistance. The King confined himself to a request for help in enlisting the services of a British bank (see paragraph 4).

42. Sir A. Ryan undertook to convey all these ideas and suggestions faithfully to His Majesty's Government. He developed his personal views at some length, but as non-committally as possible, with the object of showing sympathetic interest and goodwill, without encouraging fantastic hopes. Full records of the conversations were sent home on the 20th June.

Money Order Agreements with India and Palestine.

43. Both these questions have continued to hang fire, although there is no point in dispute regarding either agreement. It is merely a matter of getting the texts into final shape and properly signed and exchanged. The Legation has received no answer to its last communication regarding the agreement with India (March-April report, paragraph 38). At the end of June it addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the agreement with Palestine in order to correct a verbal error in the text and to expedite the conclusion of the matter.

France.

44. Progress appears to have been made with the treaty negotiations (March-April report, paragraph 39), but neither side disclose much about them.

Italy.

45. The Italian consul seemed hopeful at the end of June of completing the proposed treaty (March-April report, paragraph 40) in the near future. He told Sir A. Ryan about that time that he was delaying his departure on leave for the purpose and was awaiting a final text from Rome. This does not necessarily mean a final text to which the Hejazi Government have already agreed.

The Netherlands.

46. The Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires, M. Van der Moulen, remained absent during the whole of May and June in connexion with his tour in Yemen and the Hadhramaut. It is stated in the "Oriente Moderne" for May that he concluded a treaty of friendship with the Imam about the middle of April. At the end of June he was understood to have reached Aden on his way back to Jedda to join his wife, who, ignorant of the scope of his travels, arrived several weeks ago to give him a surprise. The surprise was Mme. van der Moulen's, who remained stranded in grass-widowhood in Jedda up to end of June.

47. M. Adriannse (March-April report, paragraph 42), went on leave on the 10th June. For some days before his departure he was bombarded with appeals to use his influence with the Netherlands Government to make the Dutch Bank nice and kind to the Hejazi Government (see paragraph 4).

Egypt.

48. The new Egyptian consul, Hafiz Amer Bey, appears to be a person of some character and enterprise, but rather a *farceur*. At various times during May and June he dropped hints to Sir A. Ryan that he was engaged in negotiations, and he has visited Mecca more than once. There is, however, no visible sign of any material progress in the establishment of normal relations between Egypt and the Hejaz. Hafiz Bey displays a critical and contemptuous attitude in his language regarding Ibn Saud. He goes out of his way to be friendly in his relations with the British Legation and overdoes the compliments.

49. It is worth noting that in their remonstrance to the King on accession celebrations (paragraph 21) the ulema of Nejd referred with approval to Ibn Saud's action in preventing the Sacred Caravan from coming to Mecca.

Persia.

50. The Persian Chargé d'Affaires (March-April report, paragraph 45) went on leave again on the 20th June. He left his vice-consul in charge of the Legation and his sister in charge of the vice-consul, but they propose to go to Taif for a change of air. It is interesting that any foreign representative should be allowed to reside at Taif, but apparently it is well understood that M. and Mme. Behjet are going thither in an entirely private way.

Soviet Russia.

51. The Russian Minister has been little in evidence. He went to Mecca towards the end of June. According to one report he is interesting himself in working up the sale of petroleum products. His vice-consul, M. Touymetov, who

has been many years in Jedda and at one time had the name of being an ardent Communist with influence in the Legation, left apparently for good in May. Professor Moshkowsky, who acted as Legation doctor and is a skilled bacteriologist, also left with his wife early in June.

United States of America.

52. The "Umm-al-Qura" announced early in May that the United States Government had intimated their recognition of Ibn Saud through their Ambassador and the King's Minister in London. This was confirmed by a Foreign Office despatch stating that on the 7th May a member of the United States Embassy had called at the Department to say that the Embassy had notified their recognition to Sheikh Hafiz Wahba on the 2nd May. The bearer of the message did not know the intentions of the United States Government as to appointing a representative in Hejaz-Nejd, but thought them unlikely to do so in the near future.

Afghanistan.

53. The tea-cup storm over Amanullah Khan's visit to the Hejaz (March-April report, paragraphs 46-8) was allayed by his departure for Italy on the 9th May in a Khedivial Line steamer proceeding to Suez. He visited Medina early in May and on the 6th May returned to Jedda, where he was accommodated in the King's Palace. His own desire was to get away as soon as possible, but he found himself blocked by difficulties in regard to shipping and quarantine. He abandoned a project of going via the Sudan in order to avoid five days' quarantine at Suakin, but had to resign himself to the regulation three days at Tor. The various other notable Afghans, who had congregated in the Hejaz, gradually dispersed in different directions, including Nadir Khan's mission which sailed for India on the 7th May.

54. There was nothing in the final phase of King Amanullah's adventure to alter the appreciation in the first sentences of paragraph 48 of the report for March-April. If, as is more than possible, he contemplates an attempt to regain his throne, his demonstration of piety and his conversations in Mecca will have been a useful prelude to an effort which must start from some different base. His contacts here with persons other than Afghans and sympathetic Indians presented no appearance of political importance. Ibn Saud honoured him, but is unlikely to take a hand in Afghan affairs. The ex-King saw the Italian, Turkish and Persian representatives in Jedda, and the Egyptian consul, who had gone to Mecca on pilgrimage, saw him there. This intercourse with foreign diplomats seems to have been confined to courtesies. It is not known whether the Soviet Minister visited Amanullah Khan, but it seems probable that he did not.

IV.—AIR MATTERS.

Hejaz Air Force.

55. After long pondering over the resignations of Messrs. Morris and North, the Hejazi Government arranged, though without ever expressly accepting them, that the aeroplanes, &c., should be taken over by a commission of military officers and experts, the chief of whom was Mr. Lowe. The transfer was effected in the latter part of May. Mr. Lowe flew at least twice in the following days, and on the King's birthday saluted, from the air, the flag of the British Legation. Shortly after he called for the first time on Sir Andrew and Lady Ryan and has since visited the Legation several times. After the transfer he had to assist him a German named Krakowsky, who had had flying experience in the past and has eked out a hand-to-mouth existence in Jedda for some years; and also apparently another German as mechanic. The latter left after a very short time. M. Krakowsky remains, but is at loggerheads with Mr. Lowe, who has no faith in him and says that the only real assistance he has is that of a Syrian.

56. The Hejazi Government had been informed early in May that His Majesty's Government were willing to help them to recruit new personnel for the force (March-April report, paragraph 49), but considered the previous rates of salary to be a minimum which might have to be exceeded, and that the removal of

Mr. Lowe must be an essential condition of assistance. When the Hejazis were making their temporary arrangements described in the preceding paragraph, they renewed more insistently their request for assistance, but would not believe that men could not be obtained at lower rates. After full consideration they were informed on the 6th June that His Majesty's Government could only help them, if assured (a) that the new personnel would receive satisfactory treatment as regards pay, &c., and (b) that a complete break would be made with the past. His Majesty's Government reaffirmed their previous view as regards the necessity for salaries at least as high as those previously paid. They did not insist on the immediate removal of Mr. Lowe, but asked for an undertaking that his connexion with the force would be severed before the new personnel reached the Hejaz. On the 17th June the Hejazi Government intimated acquiescence in the two conditions, but propounded a new scheme. They said that they proposed to recruit only four men, viz., an aviator instructor specially qualified for training, a pilot with special knowledge of aeronautical engineering and two mechanics. They proposed, at the same time, to send a mission abroad to be trained in aviation, and asked whether His Majesty's Government would give facilities for such a mission to be trained in the United Kingdom. These proposals were referred to His Majesty's Government, who had not replied up to the end of June.

57. Meanwhile, Messrs. Morris and North remained in Jedda awaiting a settlement of accounts. This was held up by a demand of the Hejazi Government that Mr. Morris should account in detail for all the material originally delivered at Darin Island. In the absence of the original specifications and of any regular storekeeping arrangements this demand could not be complied with. Sir A. Ryan, who had been asked by Fuad Bey to advise, intervened unofficially to remove this difficulty and was, at the end of June, hopeful of adjusting it. He had, in the meantime, however, obtained instructions authorising him to intervene officially on behalf of the two ex-pilots, if efforts at mediation should fail.

Air Force Material.

58. On the 18th May the Legation at last communicated to the Hejazi Government the reply of His Majesty's Government to their request for assistance in procuring instructional aeroplanes, &c. (March-April report, paragraph 50). The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied on the 17th June that, owing to lack of technical experts, they preferred to postpone consideration of the matter.

59. Early in June the Hejazi Government requested facilities for shipment to Jedda via Bahrein and India of 500 bombs, being half the stock which had been originally supplied for the Air Force, but had been left behind at Darin Island. It was agreed that the shipment might be made subject to compliance with Board of Trade regulations and to the detonators being removed from the bombs and stored in a separate magazine at the opposite end of the ship.

Arabian Air Route.

60. The *détente* in the Transjordan frontier negotiations enabled the Legation to reopen this question (March-April report, paragraph 51). On the 28th May Sir A. Ryan handed to Fuad Bey Hamza a memorandum for the King's consideration, referring to the discussions last summer and developing the present desiderata of His Majesty's Government on the lines laid down in the instructions summarised in paragraph 45 of the report for January-February. The memorandum omitted any reference to a number of landing grounds at stated intervals or to possible consultation with the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq. Fuad Bey stated that the Hejaz Government were preparing regulations, which, he continued, would mark a more liberal attitude towards foreign aircraft, although there would be a highly centralised control. The Minister delayed further action on the chance of the regulations being published. Eventually, the Hejazi Government produced on the 18th June a not very satisfactory official reply in which they again referred to the proposed regulations, but in language suggesting that they were much less advanced than Fuad Bey had led Sir A. Ryan to think. The Hejazi memorandum ended by saying that pending the completion of the arrangements for the new regulations they wished "to inquire of the British Government as to the terms on which a mutual agreement can be come to on this subject with a view to their studying such terms also." When reporting

this reply to the Foreign Office on the 28th June (after an accidental delay due to staff changes) Sir A. Ryan surmised that Ibn Saud might have in mind a financial deal and inquired what the attitude of His Majesty's Government would be, if that proved to be the case.

Alleged Violation of Nejd Territory by British Aircraft.

61. On the 21st May the Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote a note protesting against an alleged violation of Nejd territory by British aircraft, which were said to have hovered over Jinna Island and Jubail between the 15th and 18th May. His language suggested that such violations were persistent. It was important to dispose quickly of this complaint as the Legation was just about to reopen the question of landing grounds (paragraph 60). Fortunately, the competent British authorities had no difficulty in refuting the specific accusation. They gave particulars of two specific flights at about the time of the alleged violation, neither of which could have given rise to the complaint, although there was a possibility in one of them of a flying boat having approached to within 2½ miles of the coast at Abu Ali Island owing to an accident. When informing the Hejazi Government of the fact on the 2nd June, the Legation suggested that, in order to facilitate the investigation of such complaints, local authorities should be directed to supply full particulars and took exception in polite terms to the allegation that British aircraft persistently violated Nejd territory. The Minister for Foreign Affairs did not revert to the matter up to the end of June.

V.—MILITARY MATTERS.

General.

62. There have been many rumours of troop movements, especially movements into the Northern area, with a view to strengthening Ibn Saud's position there, even at the cost of reducing the forces in Asir (see paragraph 36). These reports cannot be verified. It is also stated that, before the King left Mecca, all the military supplies there were removed to Riyadh.

Regular Army.

63. Faudhi Bey Kawokji (January-February report, paragraph 47), the Director-General of Military Organisation, resigned, or was dismissed—it is not clear which—about the middle of May. Conflicting stories were current. He had resigned because of inability to get his proposals adopted and because of undue interference—the Director-General of Finance had shifted half his little army without consulting him. He had been dismissed because he had been promised a cool million (pounds, not *riyals*) by the Soviets to promote a Shereefian restoration; or because he had suspect correspondence with Syria; or because he had written to a Turkish lady, to whose hand he aspired, that he had become a Minister of War at 35, and would end up as a King. Anyhow, he went, and was replaced by a certain Hamdi Bey, previously commander of the Jedda garrison. This person has a known capacity for intrigue and some unexplained pull in high quarters. He is a Kurd of sorts, and is understood to have risen from the ranks to the post of lieutenant in the Turkish army. He would probably be a stout fellow in a scrap, but has obviously neither the knowledge nor the experience for organisation. There has been less drilling within the sight of the Legation since he took over. It may be doubted whether the regular army will survive this change and financial stress—especially if the *ulema* of Nejd disapprove of it (see paragraph 21).

VI.—NAVAL MATTERS.

64. H.M.S. "Dahlia" (March-April report, paragraph 53) remained in Jedda until the 1st May. There were no naval visits, British or other, during the remainder of the period under review.

VII.—PILGRIMAGE.

65. The dispersal of the pilgrimage took place without any special difficulty, and was practically complete by the end of June. The Hejazi Government issued a series of bulletins recording excellent health conditions, and formally declared the pilgrimage clean on the 15th May. There was a slight scare in May, when it was rumoured that, as happened last year, a suspicion of cholera had arisen at Tor. If there was any difficulty there, it was quickly overcome. Some time after, the Government of India communicated to Sir A. Ryan information from the Health Bureau at Singapore to the effect that the Alexandria Board had declared the pilgrimage suspect of cholera on the 25th May. A direct enquiry, addressed to Alexandria, elicited a flat denial that the board had made any such declaration.

66. This contradiction had not been explained up to the end of June. The matter is of great importance to the Legation, which has to decide whether south-bound ships should be required to call at Kamaran, and has to decide the question at short notice, either on the Minister's responsibility, according as he is advised that there are or are not grounds of suspicion; or in consultation with India or Singapore in a doubtful case. Any declaration by the Quarantine Board would obviously affect the judgment of the British authorities concerned. Sir A. Ryan suggested, in June, in more general correspondence regarding the question of calls at Kamaran, that he should in future be advised direct from Alexandria of all decisions of the Quarantine Board regarding the sanitary state of the pilgrimage.

67. Some inconvenience was caused by the inability of a number of Indian pilgrims to pay their mutawwifs' fees, and consequently to recover passes held by the mutawwifs under the regulations of last April (March-April report, paragraph 59). Although those regulations are open to great objection, the right of the mutawwifs to their fees cannot be questioned, and Sir A. Ryan felt that he could not intervene strongly on behalf of the pilgrims in question. As a result of unofficial action by the Legation, however, a number of them were let off their fees.

68. These were pilgrims with return tickets, but without cash. The Legation was again confronted in June with the more normal problem of destitute pilgrims without return tickets, of whom there were at least 100 awaiting repatriation by the middle of the month, and many more by the end. None of these were embarked in June, as the Turner, Morrison Line quoted a very high rate compared with the highest charge for destitutes in recent years. The Legation was still in correspondence with the Government of India at the end of June regarding the disposal of this year's destitutes and the major question of (a) measures to reduce the number in future by more restrictive measures in India, and (b) the adoption of regular arrangements for dealing with such destitutes as must continue to come on its hands annually, however strict the control in India may be.

69. Other pilgrimage matters will be dealt with in the annual report on the 1931 season. Owing to an unfortunate chapter of accidents, the annual report for 1930 was not circulated until the 1st June, 1931. It is hoped to avoid a recurrence of this delay and to issue the report for 1931 not later than the end of September.

VIII.—MISCELLANEOUS.

King's Birthday.

70. A general reception, held at the Legation on the 3rd June, was attended by between ninety and 100 persons, of whom about two-thirds were Europeans and members of foreign missions, the remainder being local officials and notables and certain Indian merchants. The number of the former category illustrates the growth of the European and foreign official element in Jedda, if a net be cast wide enough to include all the motley elements of which the quasi-European community is made up.

Visitors.

71. Such of the visitors mentioned in paragraphs 66 and 67 of the report for March-April as were still in the Hejaz on the 30th April left in May. The Twitchells returned to Aden. Prince Ahmed Tevhid left for India on the

20th May, accompanied by a certain Jemil Pasha, a former Turkish officer of some distinction, who has served Ibn Saud in recent years. Sir Abdul Kerim Ghuznavi went to Egypt via the Sudan, and was much outraged at having to do five days' quarantine at Suakin.

72. The only notable non-Moslem visitors in May-June were M. Boucicault, the Marconi expert (paragraph 10), and Ameen Rihani, the author of books on Arabia. The latter arrived on the 5th June and stayed over the King's visit. He is said (but all such stories should be taken with a grain of salt) to have been given a present of £1,000. He called at the Legation and later dined there. His attitude in conversation towards the Administration of this country was highly critical. If he still entertains the anti-British feeling shown in his books, he discreetly concealed it.

73. Amir Adil Arslan, who is understood to be a brother of the notorious Shekib Arslan, but of a political complexion less repugnant to the French, paid a very short visit to the Hejaz towards the end of June. Nothing is known as to its object.

Legation Staff.

74. Treasury having sanctioned the appointment of a second career vice-consul at Jedda, Mr. G. W. Furlonge arrived from Casablanca on the 22nd May to take up the duties of acting vice-consul.

Mr. Wikeley went on leave on the 10th June.

Mr. C. G. Hope Gill returned from leave on the 21st June and resumed his duties as head of the Chancery.

Sir A. Ryan expects to go on leave on the 20th July, after which date Mr. Hope Gill will become Chargé d'Affaires.

Haji Abdul Majid, the pilgrimage officer sent annually from Malaya for the pilgrimage season, left for Singapore on the 13th June.

Book of Hejaz-Nejd Stamps.

75. The King intimated through Fuad Bey in June his readiness to accept the dedication of the book contemplated by Captain Lewis (January-February report, paragraph 65). Facilities were promised for obtaining information from the local postal authorities.

Meteorological.

76. Readings taken within doors at the Legation show the following averages of office temperature and atmospheric humidity for the six months ended the 30th June:—

Month 1931.	Average Humidity. Percentage.	Highest.	Temperature.		
			Average Maximum by day.	Average Minimum at night.	Lowest.
January ...	72	83	80	72	68
February ...	63	81	78	71	65
March ...	66	92	79	74	66
April ...	65	90	83	74	68
May ...	68	99	88	79	72
June ...	63	99	92	79	74

(Saturation = 100 per cent.)

Wind was 90 per cent. constant and 90 per cent. N.W., i.e., from the Red Sea. The "simoom" wind blew from the desert on only three days, twice in March and once in April, when it dried the atmosphere to between 40 and 30 per cent. of saturation.

A few drops of rain fell once during each of the first four months.

[E 4266/2064/25]

No. 27.

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 315.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 30, 1931.

THE more critical of Ibn Saud Mr. Philby has felt, the more communicative he has become. Recent despatches of Sir A. Ryan's have traced the development of this tendency. A few evenings ago I learned its origin from Mr. Philby.

2. He had been stung, I think, into unwonted frankness by trouble over the Marconi contract. Trouble over the effective range of the wireless telephony is still to come; the present friction centring round the refusal of the Hejazi Government to take over the four mobile sets and their failure to pay three of the monthly instalments of £1,000 each. Mr. Philby was contemplating drastic measures, such as sending Mr. Boucicault out of the country. He was only deterred by the fact that all the material has arrived and is in Hejazi hands, and by the fear that they would begin monkeying with it themselves.

3. He led the conversation on to financial matters in general and Ibn Saud's incompetence in particular. While the pilgrim hosts were stoning the devil at Muna, the King held meeting after meeting to discuss the problem of the nickel exchange. Mr. Philby attended them, silent but increasingly indignant. After much talk one day, it must have been the 30th April, the King ordained that the Saudi piastre should henceforth stand at 44 to the rial; its par value was 22, but it had dropped into the 50's; everyone applauded the King's wisdom and his fiat went forth. On the next day, after much further talk, the King decided that the piastre should stand at 22 and accepted equal applause from the same advisers. Mr. Philby was furious, but waited until the King had left to tell the sycophants what he thought of them. On the following day the King, whose ears are long, chaffed him beyond endurance. After a heated discussion, Mr. Philby was sent out into the streets with a gold sovereign and a silver rial in his hand and told to prove his assertion that, whatever His Majesty might ordain, not one of his subjects would sell a silver rial for 22 pieces of nickel. In vain he pointed out to the King that what he wanted for this purpose was only a handful of nickel. Ibn Saud, he maintains, simply could not understand so simple a monetary point. He left in disgust at the ignorance of Ibn Saud and the suppleness of his advisers, and has but rarely seen the King since then. The incident may well have been distorted by Mr. Philby, but there is probably enough truth in it to make it interesting. Its relation is certainly illuminating.

4. Mr. Philby was not less cynical about the impossibility of obtaining banking facilities for this country, though rather more guarded. It had been understood that he was interested in Lutfullah's Bank to the extent of urging its advantages on Ibn Saud (see paragraph 7 of Sir A. Ryan's despatch No. 177 of the 15th May). He now holds Lutfullah up to ridicule as that inordinately vain individual who, in King Hussein's day, had himself named his Ambassador at Rome and paid for the privilege not only his own salary, but those of an imposing suite. Mr. Philby has even stated that the banker is now bankrupt. His attitude seems to be one of general disillusionment. The King has feet of mud. The country, in National Conference, has ruled out anything in the nature of a State Bank. So much the worse for Lutfullah.

5. Mr. Philby also spoke of the benzine contract, to which Sir A. Ryan referred in paragraph 7 of his despatch No. 280 of the 12th July. He affirmed that, after threatening to close down his Legation and to have himself withdrawn, the Russian Minister had at length succeeded in securing the contract but nothing more, that is nothing in the nature of more favourable terms for the entry of Russian goods. The Hejazi Government had agreed to buy 50,000 cases of benzine at 1.50 dollars a case, to be paid for in three instalments at three-month intervals beginning three months after delivery. This agreement will enable the Hejazi Government to ensure something over a half-year's supply of their fuel needs. It is almost certain that no business house could afford to supply on these terms, unless at a deliberate loss.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 4260/1098/25]

No. 28.

Mr. Murray to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 622.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 13th August, respecting the status of Asir.

Rome, August 14, 1931.

Enclosure in No. 28.

Note verbale.

(Translation.)

THE Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the *note verbale* of the 24th ultimo regarding the question of the recognition by the British Government of the incorporation of Asir in the Hejaz, and thank His Britannic Majesty's Embassy for their courteous communication.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, whilst they observe that no request for formal recognition of the above-mentioned incorporation has been addressed by the Government of Jedda to the Government of London, are glad to note that, from the exchange of notes, it is clear that the points of view of His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Royal Government coincide in regard to the determination to postpone any formal and direct act of recognition of the sovereignty of King Ibn Saud over Asir.

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs,**Rome, August 13, 1931 (Year IX).*

[E 4295/1881/91]

No. 29.

Enclosure in Despatch No. 761 of July 23, 1931, from the Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Colonial Office.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, August 19.)

Report by Taha Pasha Al Hashimi on the Work of the Iraqi Mission to the Yemen.

AFTER I and the Director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had taken part with his Excellency the Prime Minister in the discussions which he conducted in Amman and in Mecca, and after his Excellency had departed with the secretary to the Ministry of Defence for Egypt, we remained in the Hejaz until the time of the arrival of the Italian ship sailing from Jedda to Hodeida via Massowa. The date fixed for our departure was the 13th April, 1931. Before departing we telegraphed to His Majesty the Imam, King of the Yemen, informing him thereof.

We went on board the ship on the appointed day and we reached Massowa on the evening of the 14th/15th April, 1931. There we learnt that the boat generally waits a week in Massowa before sailing on to Hodeida. Consequently, we were compelled to pass this week at Massowa, which is the port of the Italian colony of Eritrea. On the morning of the 15th April the interpreter of the Governor of Massowa came to the ship and informed us that we were the guests of the Italian Government. We thanked him for this courtesy. We passed five days at Asmara, the capital of the Italian colony, and two days at Massowa. During this time we received many courtesies and kindnesses from the officials of this colony, who showed us every possible consideration and politeness, of which details will be given in a separate report. Their conduct towards us was a convincing evidence of the goodwill of the Italian Government towards the Iraqi State. The ship took us from Massowa on the 23rd April, 1931, and arrived at Hodeida on the afternoon of the following day. There the officials of the

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Yemeni Government were already awaiting our arrival in accordance with the orders which they had received from His Majesty the Imam to welcome us on our arrival at Hodeida. A detachment of the Yemeni troops and a military band and representatives of the Government received us on the quay. We were accommodated at the residence of his Highness Saif-ul-Islam, the Amir Mohammad, the military commander of Hodeida. His Highness himself was absent, having gone to Sanaa to pass the Id with his father the Imam. The Qadhi Ali-al-Umari, the Deputy-Governor of Hodeida, welcomed us on behalf of his Highness and showed us every possible kindness. That evening we telegraphed to His Majesty the Imam at Sanaa informing him of our arrival. To this His Majesty replied welcoming us, and saying that he awaited our early arrival at Sanaa.

We set out by motor-car on the 25th April and travelled to Hagaila, which is the first stage into the mountains of the Yemen. We arrived there in the evening, and were received by the chief local official, who provided accommodation for us in the post office building. On the 26th April we mounted mules which were provided for us and travelled to Al Manakhah, where we arrived in the evening. That night we passed at the guest house. On the evening of the 27th April, we reached Suq-al-Khamis, and on the afternoon of the following day we reached Boaan, where we found motor cars waiting to take us on to Sanaa, which we reached in the afternoon. There we were made the guests of His Majesty the Imam and given quarters in one of his houses. On behalf of the Imam we were welcomed by the Qadhi Abdullah-al-Umari, the Acting Prime Minister, and the Qadhi Mohammad Raghieb, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. We asked the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs for an audience with His Majesty the Imam. We received a reply that an audience would be granted to us in the morning of the 30th April, 1931. On the 29th April (that is to say, one day after our arrival in Sanaa) we telegraphed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Bagdad via Eritrea, reporting our arrival at Sanaa.

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informed us in his letter that the audience would be official. We were taken in a motor car in the company of the Court Chamberlain to the palace of the Imam, which is called "Dar-al-Saadat," where a brigade of infantry with a band was paraded in our honour on both sides of the entrance. They saluted us on our arrival, and we were received at the entrance by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. From there we were conducted to the throne-room, at the entrance of which we were received by the Acting Prime Minister, the Qadhi Abdullah-al-Umari. A few moments later His Majesty the Imam entered and welcomed us with cordial greetings. When His Majesty was seated, I presented to him the letter of our King and delivered a short speech touching on the mission for which I had been appointed. A copy of the speech is attached as the first appendix to this report.⁽¹⁾ His Majesty the Imam listened most attentively to my remarks, and afterwards carefully read His Majesty's letter. Following this he expressed his pleasure at the idea of Arab unity, wishing us success and expressing his readiness to assist us. His Majesty then put to me several questions concerning the Arab world, and the audience continued for over half an hour, during which time the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were both present. On our departure after this audience we were accorded the same military honours as on our arrival.

Our arrival in Sanaa had coincided with the first day of the Id, and it is the custom of the people of the Yemen to continue their celebrations of this festival for ten days, commemorating on the tenth day the anniversary which is known as Yom-al-Nashur, which is the day on which the Prophet (on whom be peace!) spoke at Ghadir Kham.

We considered it fitting that we should visit the Crown Prince Saif-ul-Islam-al-Amir Mohammad and his brother Saif-ul-Islam-al-Amir Ahmad, and that after this we should return calls on the Prime Minister and the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and on those of the officials and notables and members of the foreign colonies who had called on us. These visits occupied several days. On the 3rd May, 1931, the Prime Minister gave an official luncheon for us, which we attended and to which the principal members of the foreign colonies were also invited.

It became apparent to us during these days that intrigue had preceded our arrival in the Yemen, and that the newspapers of Egypt and Syria, which had

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

criticised the project of an Arab alliance, had created an unfavourable atmosphere in Sanaa. It is also likely that the Russian Commercial Mission utilised these newspaper reports to give a pro-English complexion to our mission. We quickly realised that the people of the Yemen are suspicious regarding all who come from outside, especially if they should come from a country having special relations with England. It was apparent to us, therefore, that the stories which had preceded our arrival had influenced unfavourably the Imam and his entourage. We accordingly considered that it was necessary to endeavour to remove these doubts from the mind of the Imam by frank discussions, and we asked for another audience. We were received in His Majesty's presence on the morning of the 5th May, on which occasion the Prime Minister was also present.

His Majesty the Imam spoke openly of what had been said concerning our mission and of his own doubts in this connexion. I discussed all that had been said concerning us and explained to him that the purpose which had inspired His Majesty the King of Iraq, and the object for which the Iraqi Government were working was to bring about a rapprochement between all the Arab kingdoms and to remove causes of dispute between them. The Iraqi Government had, in working for this end, already concluded treaties of friendship and "bon-voisinage" between the Kingdoms of Iraq and Transjordan and between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Kingdom of Nejd and the Hejaz and its Dependencies, and although there were happily no differences existing between the Kingdoms of Iraq and the Yemen, the Iraqi Government nevertheless desired to conclude a treaty of friendship with the Government of Yemen, considering that these two Arab and Mahometan kingdoms were already bound by ties of religion, language and tradition. I explained further that it was hoped to find a solution of the outstanding differences between the Yemen and Nejd and the Hejaz in a manner satisfactory to both sides, and to bring about the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and "bon-voisinage" between these neighbouring States. If this could be done, there would remain no obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty on the lines desired to which all the Arab kingdoms could become signatories. In this manner could be laid the second stone in the desired Arab alliance. The treaties which had already been concluded between Iraq and Transjordan and between Iraq and Nejd and the Hejaz and that which was about to be concluded between Iraq and the Yemen had already, I submitted, laid the first stone of this alliance. The Imam then spoke asking me what would be the benefit to be derived from the conclusion of a treaty of friendship between Iraq and the Yemen, and I replied that it would bring great moral advantages, since it would proclaim to the world that a friendly *entente* had been concluded between these two Arab countries.

In order to dispel all further doubts from the mind of the Imam, I left it entirely to His Majesty to decide whether he would conclude a treaty or rest satisfied with the despatch of an answer to His Majesty the King of Iraq, or to send a Yemeni mission to visit Iraq to study the conditions there. His Majesty said that he would require a short time to think over the matter.

On the morning of the 9th May, the Prime Minister, Abdullah-al-Umari, visited us and informed us that His Majesty the Imam had agreed to conclude a treaty, and had appointed him as his representative for the negotiations. He asked us to prepare a draft.

We prepared a draft treaty in the form which is given in the second appendix to this report.⁽²⁾ We intentionally made it short and simple, and did not include in it any article concerning the unification of culture or the removal of customs barriers, since we did not wish that the draft should include anything likely to be an obstacle to its signature and ratification.

On the morning of the 10th May, the Prime Minister visited us and read the draft with satisfaction, raising only one small objection to the phrase "as a preparatory measure to uniting the voice of the Arab nation and consolidating its efforts," which occurs in the preamble. He found this phrase inappropriate, as there were still outstanding differences between the Yemen and Nejd and the Hejaz, and he thought that it would be difficult to obtain the approval of His Majesty the Imam to the treaty if this phrase were retained.

We explained to him the necessity for giving expression in the preamble of the treaty to the desire for uniting the voice of the Arab nation and for consolidating its efforts, since the purpose of the desired rapprochement between

⁽²⁾ Not translated or printed.

the Arab kingdoms was to prepare the way for the whole nation to act and speak in unity and harmony, so that, in the future an Arabian alliance might become possible. We suggested that this sentence could be altered to express the desire of the two high contracting parties to facilitate Arabian unity. His Excellency promised to do what he could in this matter, and took the draft to submit it to His Majesty the Imam.

On the 11th May, we met again in the house of the Prime Minister, where we were informed that His Majesty the Imam had accepted the draft treaty subject only to very slight amendment of the preamble. This was only the addition of the following phrase:—

“as a preliminary to the efforts of the Islamic leaders to unite the voice of the Arab nation.”

It was explained that His Majesty, as a religious leader, desired to see all leaders of the Islamic faith working together to unify the voice of the Arab nation, and he was convinced that these leaders would work for that end. Seeing that the way was now clear for the conclusion of the treaty, we accepted this amendment, and we prepared two fair copies of the treaty, which we signed, one copy remaining with the Yemeni representative, while we retained the other. After this we telegraphed, via Eritrea, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, reporting our signature of the treaty and our intention to sail from Hodeida on the 23rd May, which was the date on which the ship which was to take us to Egypt was due to arrive.

We visited His Majesty the Imam on the 12th May, and thanked him for his agreement to the conclusion of the treaty, and His Majesty, in his turn, expressed his pleasure and gratification with the treaty which had been signed. He explained that the amendment which he had proposed to the original draft in no way altered the spirit in which the treaty had been drafted. After this His Majesty entertained us to luncheon, on which occasion the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Majesty's nine sons, and the notabilities of the foreign colonies were also present.

On the morning of the 18th May, we paid our farewell visit to His Majesty the Imam. On this occasion we were again received with full military honours and received from His Majesty a private letter to His Majesty our King. His Majesty expressed to us his sincere and good wishes for the happiness of Iraq and the prosperity of the Iraqi people. We returned thanks to His Majesty for his great kindness to us, for his good wishes for the happiness of the Iraqi nation and for the most generous kindness and hospitality which we had received in His Majesty's territory from all His Majesty's officials.

On the morning of the 19th May we set out in motor cars from Sanaa, being accompanied to the outskirts of the town by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chamberlain. We passed the night of the 19th–20th at Mafhaq, and the night of the 20th–21st at Al Manakhah. On the evening of the 21st May we reached Hodeida, where we were again accommodated in the residence of his Highness Saif-ul-Islam, the Amir Mohammad, the Governor of Hodeida. The Assistant Governor, Qadhi Ali-al-Umari, informed us that His Majesty the Imam had made a present to His Majesty King Feisal of 1,000 kilogs. of the best Yemeni coffee.

On the morning of the 24th May we set sail from Hodeida, receiving a most kindly farewell from the Qadhi-al-Umari and the local officials. We travelled from Hodeida to Port Sudan, telegraphing at the moment of our departure from the Yemen our thanks to His Majesty the Imam and Amir of Hodeida for the great kindness and hospitality which we had received at their hands while in the Yemen.

We arrived at Port Sudan on the morning of the 25th May, and, after staying there for two days, we left by an English steamer, on which we arrived at Suez on the afternoon of the 31st May. On the 4th June we left Cairo by train and arrived at Beirut on the afternoon of the 5th June, where we waited for the departure of the motor car convoy on the 8th June. We arrived in Bagdad by this convoy on the evening of the 11th June, 1931.

Part of the mission which was entrusted to us by His Majesty the King was that we should endeavour to act as an intermediary for the removal of outstanding differences between His Majesty Abdul Aziz-al-Saud and His Majesty the Imam. His Excellency Nuri Pasha Al Said opened this question

with His Majesty King Abdul Aziz, and we understood that His Majesty did not desire to discuss this subject, as he regarded the question as having been already closed.

From my conversations with the Imam I gathered that he still regards the territory previously under the rule of the Idrisi, which is now included in Asir, as belonging to the Yemen. I considered it better not to discuss this question at any length, having ascertained that, in this matter, both the Kings held firmly to their own views. Nevertheless, the relations between the Kingdom of Nejd and the Hejaz and the Kingdom of the Yemen are outwardly friendly, since the two Kings correspond with each other and are solving questions concerning extradition with goodwill.

[E 4368/16/91]

No. 30.

The Marquess of Reading to Mr. Hope Gill (Jedda).

(No. 345. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, September 2, 1931.

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 199 of the 23rd June, 1930, I transmit to you the accompanying copy of the new instructions, drawn up in consultation with the competent Departments of His Majesty's Government, concerning the search of dhows by His Majesty's ships in the Red Sea for slaves and arms.

2. These instructions have been communicated by the Admiralty to the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, and to the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I am, &c.

READING.

Enclosure in No. 30.

Instructions concerning the Search of Dhows by His Majesty's Ships in the Red Sea for Slaves and Arms.

Suppression of Slave Trade.

THERE is no longer any general convention in force according the right of search for slaves, but the convention of the 10th September, 1919, revising the General Acts of Berlin (1885) and of Brussels (1890), states that the signatories (United States of America, Belgium, British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal) will endeavour to secure the complete suppression of slavery in all its forms and of the slave trade by land and sea. It can also be argued that the obligations of the General Act of 1890 still apply to countries who were parties to it but not to the 1919 convention, and therefore to Turkey and the States who have succeeded her. The latter would, however, probably refuse to admit this. A further legal basis of a similar kind could possibly be found in the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1881 for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade. A more definite legal basis in respect of Hejazi, Asiri and Nejd vessels is provided by article 7 of the Treaty of Jedda of 1927, in which Ibn Saud undertook “to co-operate by all the means at his disposal with His Britannic Majesty in the suppression of the slave trade.”

2. Treaties are still in force under which His Majesty's ships can search vessels of the following countries for slaves, viz., Borneo, Egypt (vessels under 500 tons), Italy, Liberia, Muscat, Persia, Spain (vessels under 500 tons) and Bahrein and the Trucial Sheikdoms (Abu Dhabi, Dabai, Shargah, Ajman, Umm-al-Qaiwain and Ras-al-Khaima).

3. By custom, however, native vessels within the Red Sea may be searched for slaves outside the territorial waters of French and Italian colonies whatever

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flag they may be flying. Searches in the territorial waters of the Hejaz proper (as distinct from Asir), *i.e.*, north of Dahban, should, however, be conducted with great discretion and should not take place at all in the vicinity of important ports.

4. Care must also be taken to avoid giving offence to the French or Italian authorities by undue restraint on dhows legitimately sailing under their colours. The authority to fly the flag should be carried by the dhow.

5. Search must always be carried out in the manner laid down in the "Slave Trade Instructions," Vol. 1.

6. The main traffic in slaves is believed to cross from the African to the Arabian shore in the narrower waters at the southern end of the Red Sea, proceeding thence up the Arabian coast, inside the islands and reefs as far as possible, to the trading ports.

7. *Runaway Slaves.*—The Arabs regard slaves as recognised servants, and to give refuge to runaways is liable to cause great irritation. On the other hand, it is against British principles to refuse these people refuge. Commanding officers are, therefore, to consult British consular or political representatives in Arabia as soon as possible as to action to be taken.

Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Arms and Ammunition.

The Arms Traffic Convention of the 17th June, 1925, is not in force. Nevertheless, in taking steps for the prevention of the illicit traffic in arms by native vessels, the procedure laid down in this convention should be followed. By this convention, His Majesty's ships have the right only to "verify the flag" in native vessels under 500 tons which fly the flag of one of the parties to the convention. Under this convention, if no authority to fly the flag is forthcoming, or if, in spite of such authority, strong suspicion still exists that the vessel is carrying on illicit traffic in arms and ammunition, she may be conducted to the nearest port of the Power whose flag she has flown. No right of search is given by the convention.

2. By custom native vessels within the Red Sea may be searched for arms outside the territorial waters of French and Italian colonies, whatever flag they may be flying. In view, however, of the absence of specific legal sanction for carrying out searches for arms in the Red Sea, it is of importance that all searches should be ostensibly for slaves and not for arms. Searches in the territorial waters of the Hejaz proper as distinct from Asir, *i.e.*, north of Dahban, should be conducted with great discretion and should not take place at all in the vicinity of important ports. If a native vessel is found to be carrying a greater number of arms than is necessary for the normal crew, it may be assumed that, in the absence of a special licence, they are doing so illegally, and any rifles or pistols (but not swords or daggers) in excess of this number should be confiscated, but in the case of a dhow which could prove Hejazi or Asiri origin, no action should be taken in the territorial waters of the Hejaz proper (as distinct from Asir), *i.e.*, north of Dahban.

3. If any considerable quantity of arms is found on board, or if there is a strong suspicion that the vessel is engaged in illegal traffic in arms or ammunition, the procedure laid down in Annex II, Section, II, of the Arms Traffic Convention is to be carried out in the case of vessels flying the flag of one of the signatories to that convention or flying no flag. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above, native vessels flying the flag of a country that is not a signatory should be taken to Aden.

4. Special agreements regarding the right of search for arms remain in force with Italy and Muscat.

5. It is the custom of the Governments of the various divisions of Arabia which border on the Red Sea to arm small vessels from time to time, for the protection of their respective shipping, and the repression of smuggling. Such vessels should, of course, not be interfered with.

[E 4561/487/25]

No. 31.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 194.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, September 4, 1931.

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs informed me on 1st September that the Imam of Yemen had advanced troops over Asir frontier at Jebel Razih; that Nejdi outpost had been ordered to withdraw and avoid contact; that several telegrams of remonstrance to Sanaa were unanswered; and that final ultimatum was being sent. He added that Hejaz Minister in London had been instructed to inform His Majesty's Government, whose attitude he supposed would be neutral.

He approached local agent of Khedivial Line yesterday for charter of steamer to transport 200 men to "somewhere near Qunfida," but has so far failed to arrange terms.

(Repeated to Aden, No. 234.)

[E 4571/487/25]

No. 32.

The Marquess of Reading to Mr. Murray (Rome).

(No. 233.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 5, 1931.

ACCORDING to Hejaz-Nejd Minister, Imam has been advancing his posts against Asir and may be contemplating attack on Ibn Saud (see also Jedda telegram No. 194 of 4th September).

Please communicate as much of this information as you think suitable to Italian Government, and say that His Majesty's Government, while not guaranteeing its authenticity, cannot disregard it in view of precarious character of situation long existing in this area. They trust, therefore, that Italian Government will urge counsels of moderation on Imam in accordance with conclusions 1 and 2 of Rome conversations of 1927. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government are impressing on Hejazi Government extreme importance of doing everything possible to avoid risk of outbreak of hostilities.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 128.)

[E 4571/487/25]

No. 33.

The Marquess of Reading to Mr. Hope Gill.

(No. 129.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 5, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 194 of 4th September, and my telegram No. 233 of 5th September to Rome Embassy: Relations between Ibn Saud and Imam.

Counsels of moderation have been already urged on Hejaz-Nejd Minister here. You should act similarly, emphasising disastrous results which might follow to Hejaz from any outbreak of hostilities.

Please telegraph action taken and any further information, and repeat to Rome.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 234.)

[E 4573/487/25]

No. 34.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 196.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jedda, September 5, 1931.

I AM informed by the captain of steamship "Jehangir" that, as a result of agreement between his agents and Hejaz authorities, he will on 7th September take 200 men to Jizan for 4,000 rupees.

It is also reported to me from a fairly good source that several thousand men from tribes round Taif have been collected by Khalid-bin-Lowai, who has led them southward on camels.
(Repeated to Aden, No. 235.)

[E 4574/487/25]

No. 35.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 197.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, September 6, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 129 of 5th September.

I have read to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs over the telephone the text of a short note which I have addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs urging moderation and stressing the present conditions and the danger to the pilgrim [? age]. He replied that an unsatisfactory reply had been received from Sanaa, but that Ibn Saud was fully alive to the risks and would do his utmost to avoid them.

He promised to keep me informed.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 236 [sic].)

[E 4575/487/25]

No. 36.

Mr. Murray to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 212.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Rome, September 6, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 233 of 5th September.

I took action in the sense of your instructions this morning.

Acting head of department, in the absence of Signor Guariglia at Geneva, assured me that the Italian Government had received no news of these developments; acting consul at Jedda would be asked to report immediately, and Signor Grandi would be informed by telegraph. Counsels of moderation would be urged on the Imam, as the Italian Government were no less anxious than His Majesty's Government to prevent outbreak of hostilities.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 1.)

[E 4627/487/25]

No. 37.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 198.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, September 8, 1931.

ROME telegram No. 212 of 6th September.

Acting Italian consul has now received telegram and is reporting. He seems inclined to attribute despatch of 600 (according to him) Nejdi irregulars by sea solely to internal trouble in Asir.

My telegram No. 197 of 5th September.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that my message urging moderation was forwarded to Riyadh by wireless and that very forbearing reply was telegraphed yesterday to Imam over two routes.

See my immediately following telegram.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 239.)

[E 4597/1600/25]

No. 38.

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 340.)

Sir,

Jedda, August 19, 1931.

IN paragraph 6 of his despatch No. 280 of the 12th July Sir A. Ryan reported the reconstitution in the Hejaz of the former Committees of Virtue, designed to enforce Wahhabi regulations against such vicious practices as abstention from prayer, the public use or sale of tobacco, and the enjoyment of music.

2. I now have the honour to transmit to you herewith a picturesque account by the Indian vice-consul attached to this Legation of the activities of the committee in Mecca, which he visited during the first week in August.⁽¹⁾ Although I suspect that the picture is somewhat overdrawn, what I learn from other sources confirms the main fact that the Hejaz is being made to feel the Nejdi yoke more heavily than before, probably as a counterpoise to Ibn Saud's long absence in Nejd. The Hejazis are becoming more and more embittered, and their talk is increasingly of revolution, but they are not the stuff of which revolutionaries are made. In Munshi Ihsanullah's words, with great restraint they have checked themselves, as they have none at their back.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan, the Acting High Commissioners for Egypt and Iraq, and the Acting Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 4664/487/25]

No. 39.

Mr. Murray to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 214.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Rome, September 11, 1931.

MINISTRY for Foreign Affairs state that telegram has been received from Italian representative at Jedda stating that tribe of Mezarrah in the vicinity of Jizan in Asir had refused to pay tax called Zikat, had revolted against and were besieging Hejazi troops of occupation, and that there had been many casualties. Imam had replied to the telegram sent him by King Ibn Saud to the effect that it was the population of Asir who wished to free themselves from troops of occupation. Acting head of department added that the Governor of Eritrea had sent message to Imam urging moderation.

In informing me of the above, acting head of department pointed out that there had been no aggression by Imam, and that information received by His Majesty's Government would not appear to be quite accurate.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

[E 4665/487/25]

No. 40.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 200.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, September 13, 1931.

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs tells me that Imam has made no reply to Hejazi telegram of 7th September, but has again advanced troops. Also that the King has acknowledged my message and promised to do his best, being fully aware of the unfavourable situation.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 241.)

[E 4677/2064/25]

No. 41.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 346.)

My Lord,

Jedda, August 29, 1931.

WITH reference to Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 308 of the 7th August, regarding a State Bank in the Hejaz, I have the honour to report that I learn confidentially from the local manager of the Netherlands Trading Society, more commonly known here as the Dutch Bank, that his principals in Amsterdam seem to be seriously contemplating a loan of £500,000 to Ibn Saud, to be secured on customs receipts and conditioned by suitable concessions in matters of handling and control of all public moneys.

2. Mr. Jacobs himself regards the purely economic and financial bases of some such contract as sufficiently sound. He supplied me in confidence with the following figures of recent Hejazi revenue from customs, which he believes to be fairly accurate:—

A.H. 1347.	A.H. 1348.	A.H. 1349.
£1,174,362	£998,263	£880,320

(The Moslem year 1349 ended last mid-May.) The details of these sums, shown by ports of entry, is attached.

3. The political future, however, worried Mr. Jacobs profoundly, the more so as there has recently been a further heavy spate of bazaar gossip about latent revolution in the towns of Hejaz and open revolt in the deserts of Nejd. If the Netherlands Trading Society decide against the venture, the decision will, I think, be almost entirely due to their lack of belief in Ibn Saud's ability to maintain peace and his own position for a sufficient further period of time.

4. If the loan is made, I gather that £200,000 of it will be required either to peg the silver rial at its present fictitious value of 10 to the £ or to cover its drop to its silver-content value of 10*d*. A further £200,000 would, I am told, be earmarked for economic development of a paying kind, the opening up of mines, for example, a subject on which I hope to be in a position to report more fully by next bag. The remaining £100,000, they say, would be required to free Ibn Saud and his Government from all debt and set the machinery of State once more in working order. It is at present so rusted up that the pay even of the police has for some time ceased to trickle through. Forty members of the Jedda force resigned yesterday, and there is apparently foundation for the prospect of a police raid on the bakers.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Customs Revenues of the Hejaz.

(Confidential.)

	A.H. 1347.	A.H. 1348.	A.H. 1349.
	£	£	£
Jedda	625,449	560,427	475,032
Yanbu'	477,890	373,890	300,720
Râbigh	20,970	18,908	15,560
Wejh	19,580	17,391	14,090
Al Lith	14,750	14,375	12,948
Dhaba	15,723	13,272	11,970
Total	1,174,362	998,263	880,320

(The Moslem year A.H. 1349 ended in mid-May 1931.)

[E 4682/1600/25]

No. 42.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 201.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, September 14, 1931.

SITUATION is deteriorating.

1. Dutch loan (my despatch No. 346), on which hopes of financial recovery have increasingly centred, was refused on 12th September. Government can now obtain no foreign credit, have drained private wealth practically dry, and appear to have no other resources.

2. They lack motor fuel to transport ammunition and supplies to Asir. Soviet benzine cannot arrive before 20th September. They did the utmost to obtain fuel from Suez by Italian steamer, but failed. They consequently completed during the night of 12th September theft of £13,000 worth of benzine from Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Limited), comprising the firm's whole stock in Government warehouse. Theft has probably been proceeding for some weeks, but authorities have apparently been falsifying accounts and denying firm access to store on pleas of absence of store-keeper and key at Taif, so that discovery was only made yesterday morning after last big haul. I have made representations by telegraph.

3. Financial and moral depression are deepened by news (not yet officially confirmed) of still further advances by Imam and general expectation of open hostilities this week.

4. Situation is not improved by spectacular collapse of Hejaz air force just when needed. Lowe is ill and was dismissed last week as useless, but police have orders not to allow him to leave Jedda to-morrow (I may have to telegraph separately on this subject). Syrian adventurer recently engaged as pilot yesterday refused to fly and has been flogged and jailed. French Chargé d'Affaires now intervening. Turkish pseudo-mechanic has escaped into his Legation after mauling by Nejdî garrison. German pilot (Sir A. Ryan's despatch No. 213) was dragged from sick bed yesterday by fifty troops under General Officer Commanding and forced to fly to Asir. He returned after a few minutes, apparently fainted, and crashed Wapiti in the lagoon, but survived: German consul now intervening.

(See my immediately following telegram.)

[E 4683/1600/25]

No. 43.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 202.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jedda, September 14, 1931.

REFERENCE is to my telegram No. 201 of the 14th September.

The refusal of the Dutch loan is serious, the rial having dropped suddenly two points. It now stands at 17. It may be anticipated that there will be renewed and intensive negotiations between the Soviet Minister and the Director of Finance regarding commercial concessions and financial assistance on long credit.

The lack of motor fuel is aggravating, but the local situation will be relieved if benzine from Russia arrives. I hope to obtain satisfactory terms for full reimbursement by means of Government sales to Gellatly, Hankey.

The situation *vis-à-vis* the Imam is disquieting for local officials. I have, however, no indication that the King considers the situation such as to call for his return.

A sensation has been created locally by the collapse of the Air Force, and the belief is naturally being fostered that foreign intervention is behind the collapse. My colleagues have suggested joint diplomatic action to me, but I have declined to participate, and have urged that it is more necessary to bolster up the confidence of the local Government than to appear to mob it.

[E 4715/3/25]

No. 44.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 205.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, September 15, 1931.

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs informed me on 3rd September that in acknowledging His Majesty's Government's arbitral award his Government would have to criticise method of investigation. I tried to persuade him how impolitic it was to rake up the past, and urged his Government to notify straightforward acceptance of award and concentrate on future co-operation.

I have nevertheless received long note dated 10th September, gist of which is:—

1. King has seen award issued by His Majesty's Government after weakness shown by MacDonnell in his investigation and his failure to investigate circumstances of raids. He notes cancellation of claims.
2. Regarding denial of Hejaz-Nejd territory to investigator, MacDonnell, although free to circulate in Transjordan, did not do so. This proves that it was also unnecessary to visit Hejaz-Nejd territory.
3. As regards witnesses, they brought all they had, and MacDonnell asked for no more.
4. In spite of bad effect of award on his robbed subjects; of difficulties which confronted his determined endeavours to pacify tribes, who will receive news with agitation; of encouragement which he considers award will give offenders, since they will find themselves obtaining loot without opposition—of these and other difficulties too numerous to mention, and because he has already authorised His Majesty's Government to deliver such award as they consider equitable and just, the King will stand by his undertaking, whatever the difficulties and hardships.
5. In the King's view it is now important to know what procedure will in fact be followed regarding raids since 1st August, 1930, when definite decision on them will be made, and what measures will be taken to prevent future raids. If no definite plan exists he fears that scope of reaction produced by feeling of hopelessness caused by award will be much widened. There is therefore need to expedite answer to these two [*sic*](¹) points.
6. He believes that unless settlement is effected between Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan like that effected with Iraq, and unless "those elements are expelled from Transjordan which were cause of dispute and hostilities on frontier of Iraq, it will be very difficult to guarantee peace" on this troublesome frontier, while offenders, encouraged by final award, are left in peaceful immunity.
7. He wishes His Majesty's Government to understand that his concession of his subjects' rights forfeited under award will avail nothing to ease frontier situation. Nothing can be of use but (a) compensation for the past violations, (b) drawing up of agreements with Transjordan like that with Iraq and (c) "removal of those causes of friction on Transjordan frontier which were causes of friction on Iraq frontier."

I have not replied.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 244.)

(¹) This word was encoded.

[E 4721/387/25]

No. 45.

Captain Glubb to Mr. Kirkbridge, Acting British Resident, Amman.—
(Communicated by Colonial Office, September 17.)

(Secret.)

Dear Kirkbridge,

August 19, 1931.

I HAVE to report that at the end of July, on receipt of instructions to that effect from the Transjordan Government, I wrote to Abdel Aziz-bin-Zeid

suggesting an interview. He replied stating that he had not as yet received any instructions from Ibn Saud, and consequently that he was unable to meet me.

On the 10th August, however, when in Amman, I received a letter from him suggesting a meeting on the 12th August. As this did not allow quite sufficient time, I suggested the 15th August, a date to which he agreed. The point fixed was the frontier, 16 miles west of Kaf.

We met at the rendezvous at 8 A.M. on the 15th August, each of us bringing two tents, ten men and two cars, by previous arrangement. We held conversations of about one and a half hours each in the morning and afternoon, and on the morning of the 16th August; I lunched with Ibn Zeid, while he dined with me. The two parties separated at 9 A.M. on the 16th August.

Return of Loot.—You will recollect that the raids which have occurred since the 1st August, the last date considered by the MacDonnell tribunal, have previously been divided into two categories:—

- (a) Raids which occurred between the 1st August, 1930, and the 1st Ramadan (the 19th January, 1931) were fairly numerous from August to November, when a pause ensued which lasted till the beginning of February.
- (b) After this pause, two or three small raids by both sides took place during February. As action was immediately taken against the raiders, these attempts were not repeated. The looted animals taken by both sides were collected by their respective Governments at the time.

The question of the restitution of loot taken since the 1st August, 1930, and thus including these two periods, was on the agenda for my meeting with Ibn Zeid. He also admitted that he had received instructions to discuss this question. Asked what claims he had to put forward, however, he admitted that he had not as yet prepared a list. This rendered the discussion of the question at the present meeting impossible, and it was agreed that such lists should be prepared and brought to the next meeting. Ibn Zeid showed manifest signs of relief at this postponement of the evil day.

As regards the raids since the 17th January, however, I pointed out that these were few and simple, and that I believed both sides had already collected the loot for their subjects. I accordingly suggested the immediate restitution of loot taken since the 19th January, 1931. To this Ibn Zeid agreed, although he admitted that some of the camels taken by Nejd tribes had not yet been recovered from the thieves, but he promised to take action as soon as possible.

Transjordan claims about twelve camels outstanding for this period, and has twenty-three ready for return to Nejd.

Future Arrangement.—As the arrangement of procedure for the settlement of future claims was also on the agenda, I asked Ibn Zeid whether he had received authority from Ibn Saud to discuss these matters. I reminded him that the question of blood money for persons killed, and the taking of commission on looted property returned, had been discussed at our previous interview, and that he had promised to write to Ibn Saud for instructions on these points.

He admitted that this was the case, and stated that he had written to Ibn Saud on the subject, but had still received no reply. He was, therefore, still unable to discuss future procedure.

Taxation of Transjordanians in Nejd.—I referred to the recent crossing of the frontier by some tents of the Howeitat, which had camped for a short period in the Wadi Sirhan, and had been visited by Nejd armed forces, who demanded immediate payment of taxes or evacuation of Nejd territory. I informed Ibn Zeid that the Transjordan Government could not admit the right of the Nejd Government to take such action. The Wadi Sirhan was, tribally, an integral part of the grazing grounds of the Transjordan tribes. No Nejd tribe had ever grazed there. Accordingly, when, in the Hadda Agreement, His Majesty's Government made a present of the Wadi Sirhan to Ibn Saud, a special clause had been inserted guaranteeing to the Transjordan tribes their rights of free grazing in this area.

Ibn Zeid replied to the effect that he had written orders from Ibn Saud immediately to tax every Transjordan subject who crossed the frontier, and that he was, and would be, compelled to obey these orders.

Protests from Jedda.—I informed Ibn Zeid that, since our last meeting, numerous protests had been received from Jedda, directed mostly against myself in person. In some of them the Nejd Government had gone so far as to accuse me of working contrary to the interests of peace on the frontier. While, I added, these protests resulted in nothing but much writing and telegraphing, they could not but perplex those working for a better understanding, and inspire me with doubts as to the genuine nature of the friendly and peaceful intentions expressed by Ibn Saud's Government.

On the one hand, I was informed that he, Ibn Zeid, was in charge of frontier relations, and when I met him, he assured me of the thanks and gratitude of the Nejd Government at the efficiency with which the Government of Transjordan and myself had established peace and order on the frontier. Caravans of Nejd tribes and merchants, now constantly passing through the Transjordan deserts from Kaf, Jaufr and the Hejaz to Syria or the Transjordan towns, frequently called at our police posts or on myself in person to express their gratitude for the public security which enabled them to carry on their lawful avocations without fear or risk.

At exactly the same time, however, Yusif Yassin or Fuad Hamza, also speaking in the name of the Nejd Government as much as Ibn Zeid claimed to do, handed frequent protests to the British Minister in Jedda, openly accusing me of disturbing the peace of the frontier. This state of affairs revealed an apparent inconsistency, and, I was obliged to admit, as a confidence imparted to him as a friend, could not but awake in me deep misgivings as to the genuineness of the Nejd Government, and might almost be said to justify suspicions of some ulterior motive which I was unable to fathom.

Ibn Zeid replied professing the greatest astonishment at the continued despatch of such protests, in view of the fact that, he alleged, after our first meeting, he had written at length to Ibn Saud, explaining that the Nejd Government had been under a misapprehension, and that, as the responsible official on the site, he was convinced that both the British authorities and myself in person were labouring only in the interests of peace, although possibly that the establishment of law and order was still not entirely in the interests of "certain persons." To this I replied that, while grateful for his conscientious action in this direction, I regretted that it had produced so little effect. Regarding his reference to "certain persons," there appeared to be no need for us, in a *tête-à-tête*, to talk to one another by hints and signs. If, however, he referred to the Shereefian family, I could assure him that I had seen no signs of their desire to prevent the establishment of law and order, quite the reverse, and that I was equally certain that a continuation of disorder was absolutely opposed to their interests, a fact of which they were, I believed, fully aware.

Comments.

Return of Loot.—Ibn Zeid showed manifest signs of relief at this success in postponing the discussion of rival claims from the 1st August, 1930, to the 19th January, 1931. To a fellow-townsmen of Hail, who reported the conversation to me and in whose veracity I have considerable confidence, he confided that he had strict and detailed instructions on this subject from Ibn Saud, which he would be obliged to follow. His relief at not having to do so on the present occasion would appear to indicate that he foresaw that the carrying out of his instructions would, in his opinion, have led to difficulties with me. He is, of course, fully aware that His Majesty's Government and that of Transjordan have, in the past, pressed strongly for the return of the loot taken by Nejd in August and September 1930. Knowing this to be our attitude, it appears fairly certain that the instructions, which he obviously feared would lead to a conflict, must have been to the effect that Ibn Saud would not return the loot in question. This conjecture is strengthened by many other considerations:—

- (a) There can, in my opinion, be no doubt whatever that the Nejd raids of the autumn of 1930 were ordered by Ibn Saud. This renders it almost impossible for Ibn Saud now to turn on the persons who raided on instructions from him, and order them to give back their loot, especially as a portion of the loot was taken by Ibn Saud's officials as the "Government share."

- (b) There is much dissatisfaction in Nejd and the Hejaz at the present, and Ibn Saud is in constant apprehension that his subjects will desert him or his tribes cross over to Transjordan or elsewhere. Knowing Ibn Saud and his extreme jealousy, it is almost impossible to believe that he would now agree to take action against his tribes and compel them to produce several hundred camels, in the interests of his bitterest rival, the Government of the Amir Abdullah.

When, last November, I submitted a report recommending that Ibn Saud be pressed immediately to return the camels raided by his followers during the MacDonnell arbitration the process was still possible. The camels, which had been raided a month before, were still collected together in Jaufr. Even then, however, there was no possibility of these camels being returned unless His Majesty's Government were to exert pressure to that end. If, however, His Majesty's Government propose to stand aside, and urge Ibn Saud and Transjordan to arrange matters between them, I do not consider that there is the least chance of Ibn Saud returning a single animal.

The MacDonnell arbitration, which cost the Transjordan Government £2,000, has failed to produce any result, although in it Mr. MacDonnell had powers of arbitration and both sides had undertaken to abide by his award. How much more hopeless, then, is it to expect any result from a meeting, in which it is laid down that myself and Ibn Zeid must meet on equal terms, myself representing the Transjordan Government alone, and in which, even if we were to reach any solution, the respective Governments are not pledged to enforce it?

Another very significant indication is provided by all the prevarications of the Nejd Government during the last six months regarding the production of witnesses, and the cross-examination of sheikhs, prevarications which appear, to me at least, to prove that the Nejd Government are anxious only to prevent the matter coming to a head and the truth being revealed.

A further significant fact lies in the arrival of Ibn Zeid at our last meeting, the principal item in the agenda for which was the consideration of these claims for past loot, and then candidly confessing that he had not yet prepared any list of claims, nor had he any facts available regarding the loot taken by Nejd raids.

I cannot, therefore, avoid the conclusion that, if we insist on the matter being pressed home at our next meeting, the only outcome will be an open rupture between myself and Ibn Zeid at a, this time, public meeting, in the presence of the rival sheikhs summoned to give evidence. The only alternative is for Transjordan once more, as in the case of the MacDonnell arbitration, to forgo its right to a return of loot greatly in its favour, in the interests of public peace. This, however, appears most unfair on the Transjordan tribes, who, as I have frequently pointed out, are in many cases actually starving as a result of Nejd raids.

Incidentally, a full meeting with Ibn Zeid attended by sheikhs, though possibly not as expensive as the MacDonnell Commission, will probably cost several hundred pounds in entertainment, probably once more with no result. Were this sum to be (and much more so had the £2,000 spent on the MacDonnell Commission been) expended on urgent relief of the starving victims of Nejd raids, the position would now be considerably less critical than it actually is.

Conditions in Kaf.—Neither Abdel Aziz-bin-Zeid himself, nor any of the officials, soldiers, motor drivers or other employees in the Sarayat-el-Milh, have received any pay for eight months. Their situation is trying in the extreme, and they are practically reduced to living on charity or requisitions from the local inhabitants in order to obtain food.

Ibn Zeid's nephew, Abdul Karim-bin-Zeid, was sent to Jaufr early in August to place himself in wireless communication with Ibn Saud, and entreat the latter to send some money. He was instructed not to return to Kaf without a definite reply.

Meanwhile, however, more motor cars continue to arrive in Jaufr with consignments, amongst other things, of arms and ammunition. A good deal of the latter has been sent on to Kaf. At the recent meeting it was noticed that all Ibn Zeid's men had been equipped with apparently brand-new German short cavalry rifles from one of the recent consignments received from Medina.

Nobody can understand the significance of these constant arrivals of more forces, officials, cars, arms and ammunition in the Jaufr-Kaf area, where

conditions are perfectly peaceful and there seems to be nothing for them to do, while none of the personnel has been paid for many months.

Abdel Aziz bin-Zeid.—As a result of this second interview with Ibn Zeid, I am further strengthened in the opinion that he himself is harmless and quite possibly even honest, when he has not received definite instructions to lie. He is, however, a man of no birth (being of a family of artisans of Hail) and no private means, and essentially a coward. He is terrified of losing his job and frightened out of his wits of Ibn Saud. This renders him entirely without initiative, and he dare not discuss any subject or undertake to return a single stolen camel without referring to Ibn Saud.

It will be recollected that Ibn Saud displayed the greatest reluctance to the delegation of powers to a subordinate on the frontier, with authority to deal with Transjordan direct. Eventually, as the arrangement was specifically provided for in the Hadda Agreement, he was compelled to yield. In actual practice, however, he has conceded nothing, as Ibn Zeid is obliged to refer every case, even affecting only a single camel, to Ibn Saud himself. In reply to me, therefore, he merely repeats verbatim what he has been told to say, and in every case where a matter is raised on which he has not received precise orders he expresses himself unable to reply. Ibn Zeid is, therefore, merely a post office, or, rather, an animated "His Master's Voice."

This state of affairs is the result of the fact that Ibn Saud's Government has now degenerated to an oriental despotism of the bad old type. He trusts nobody, least of all the other members of his family, who are viewed as possible rival claimants to the throne. The worst crime which can be committed in Nejd is to be distinguished, popular or noble. As a result, nearly all Ibn Saud's Governors are men of low birth, no private means and no initiative, who depend solely on him personally for a livelihood, and have no personal or hereditary qualifications which could by any possibility enable them to become popular or gain influence or prestige.

This actually results in his being very badly served. In a country of such vast distances and naturally lawless populations, local Governors in remote areas must enjoy a certain amount of prestige and authority. It is to overcome this difficulty that Ibn Saud is pressing forward his wireless scheme. Even, however, if wireless be erected for the use of the Governor in every important town and out-district, it will be scarcely possible for Ibn Saud himself to give effective orders, even by wireless, in the case of every camel stolen or murder committed all up and down Arabia. Moreover, his puppet Governors are probably too afraid of him to venture to make recommendations or give him a true picture of local conditions.

Another outstanding feature of the present system is the reduplication of officials, set to spy upon one another. It is almost certain that the new Governor of Kaf, Salih bin-Abdul Wahid, has been appointed principally to keep an eye on Ibn Zeid. The latter's immediate entourage consists largely of his own cousins and nephews (there is, I fear, a distinct tendency to nepotism amongst Nejd officials), but, wherever he goes, one of two natives of Riyadh are always to be found at his heels, posted to observe the activities of the men of Hail.

Altogether, I fear, matters are not at the moment too happy in the Kingdom of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies. To foresee the outcome, or its probable date, in so fickle a country as Central Arabia is, however, difficult. Perhaps something may turn up. For example, an American prospector is said to have recently discovered a gold-mine in the Northern Hejaz. To get something for nothing is the optimistic and unquenchable ambition of every Arab. Perhaps Ibn Saud is buoyed up by these hopes of discovering glittering and unlimited wealth in his apparently almost unnecessarily rapid descent towards the abysses of bankruptcy.

Yours sincerely,
J. S. GLUBB.

[E 4780/1600/25]

No. 46.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 208.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, September 19, 1931.

I SAW Emir Faisal to-day. He had absolutely nothing to say, but in answer to question stated that Ibn Saud is still at Riyadh. Philby's firm, however, have recent news that Philby was accompanying him yesterday into Hasa with Marconi's Egyptian and mobile set, leaving one at Riyadh, while Indian vice-consul back from Mecca reports general belief here that the Rashids have escaped from Riyadh and that Ibn Saud has hastened to Hail to forestall Shammar rising.

He also affirms that Mecca is now held by only 300 Nejdīs and that population is impoverished and even hungry. Here they are indignant, for unpaid troops have been helping themselves to food in shops and have even raided the Emir's palace kitchens. Efforts are being made to open military canteen. Failing adequate arrangements by the Emir to feed them, the garrison may be expected to give trouble when he leaves to-morrow.

[E 4783/487/25]

No. 47.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 211.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, September 20, 1931.

MY telegram No. 200 of 13th September.

I have received from Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs long private letter dated 14th September (which took five days to come from Taif by donkey, there being no more benzine). It encloses copies of correspondence exchanged between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya between November 1930 and 7th September.

Fuad states that he has received urgent order from the King to inform his friend the British Government that he esteems their friendly advice at its true value and expresses his gratitude. He wishes to assure His Majesty's Government that he is one of the most devoted upholders of peace, &c., and has repeatedly urged Imam to avoid bloodshed, but correspondence shows latter's evident intentions. The King therefore considers it necessary to "call whole civilised world to witness" that he hates war but is bound to defend his own and territories entrusted to him.

Enclosures comprise eight letters and telegrams, six from Ibn Saud and Viceroy and two from Imam. Three from Ibn Saud of last year call for brotherly understanding over Asir. Of the three recent telegrams, No. 1 protests against Yemeni advance; No. 2 demands withdrawal, apology, punishment of culprits, return of thirty hostages taken and blood-money and compensation; and last complains of Imam's attitude and calls God to judge between them. Imam's replies are short and flippant. The one direct promises "very beautiful" reply by post; the other via Jizan says there is nothing to make a row about. Translation by to-morrow's bag.

See my immediately following telegram.

[E 4848/487/25]

No. 48.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 217.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, September 24, 1931.

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that agreement has been come to with Imam to appoint delegates.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 255.)

The Marquess of Reading to Mr. Murray (Rome).

(No. 1150.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 25, 1931.

MY predecessor transmitted to you, in his despatch No. 973 of the 6th August, a copy of a letter from the Colonial Office in regard to the establishment of Italian armed posts on Great Hanish and Jebel Zukur Islands, in the Red Sea. The enclosure in that letter showed that, according to the Italian consul at Aden, these posts had been established by the Government of Eritrea, at the request of an Italian fishing company, for the particular purpose of protecting the personnel and vessels of the Italian concessionaire, whose concession appears to be for fishing in "the territorial waters of that colony." Not only is the implication contained in this statement one which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are unable to accept, but, in view of the strategic value of the islands, they feel that it would be dangerous, by affecting to ignore the existence of these posts, tacitly to accept the gradual establishment of an Italian claim to sovereignty over the islands.

2. While a strong case appears to exist for contending that Great Hanish and Jebel Zukur Islands were before 1914 within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sultan of Turkey, and that as such they fall within the scope of article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne, under which the future of the territories and islands renounced by Turkey is left to be settled "by the parties concerned" (in the official French text, "les intéressés"), His Majesty's Government do not at present wish to base any representations to the Italian Government on that article. It seems possible from the note of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs enclosed in Sir Ronald Graham's despatch No. 273 of the 17th April, 1930, that the Italian Government would welcome an opportunity to attempt to settle the sovereignty of these islands on the basis of that article, and such a suggestion is one which His Majesty's Government consider it desirable to avoid in present circumstances.

3. Great Hanish and Jebel Zukur Islands do, however, clearly fall within the category of "islands of the Red Sea" covered by paragraph 5 of the conclusions reached by Sir Ronald Graham and the late Sir G. Clayton with Signor Gasparini and Signor Guariglia on the 7th February, 1927, and I am of opinion that representations to the Italian Government can most advantageously be based on that paragraph of the Rome conversations.

4. I shall accordingly be glad if you will broach the matter with the Italian Government, in whatever manner you consider suitable, and endeavour to obtain from them a clear assurance to the effect that the Italian Government regard Great Hanish and Jebel Zukur Islands as coming within the scope of paragraph 5 of the conclusions of the 7th February, 1927, and, in particular, that the establishment of Italian posts is not to be regarded as involving or constituting any claim to Italian sovereignty over these islands.

I am, &c.
READING.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading:—(Received September 29.)

(No. 361.)

My Lord,

Jedda, September 9, 1931.

I TOOK occasion of the recent visit of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Jedda to ask him what he could tell me about the benzine contract, which his finance colleague was supposed to have signed with the Soviet Legation. His face fell, his manner lost its habitual assurance, and he retired into 1928 to gain time. He reminded me that in that year Ibn Saud had instructed him to broach with Mr. Bird the subject of fostering British trade with the Hejaz as an offset to the Soviet attempts to break into the closed Hejazi market. Yes, I said, a favourable commercial treaty was sought as a *quid pro quo*. No, he said, he had been misunderstood, more than that had been hoped for; but he did not specify what. Instead, he passed on to expatiate on the brave show that the

King had put up against Soviet pressure, unaided and alone, until circumstances had at last become too strong for him. (Here I reminded him that the show was made not so much for our bright eyes as for the black looks of the Nejd brethren and the Hejazi tradesmen at the mere mention of bolshevism and Soviet goods. He gave me right—up to a point.)

2. At last, however, His Majesty had been forced to yield in one particular to the Soviet pressure. Unable to make a satisfactory contract on the one side for State fuel needs, and threatened on the other by the withdrawal of the Soviet Legation from Jedda, his Ministers had made the best of a bad job and contracted to buy £30,000 worth of Russian benzine, and on very favourable terms too. I suggested that they had been both bluffed and led into the way of further concession. He admitted the first as a possibility, but denied hotly that any further concession was possible. When I reminded him that in spite of the total denial of entry to Russian goods, Russian matches were sold openly everywhere and Russian cement was not unknown, he made the curious statement that it was quite true that the prohibition was enforced and that at the same time there was a four-fold duty on all Russian goods—a position easily understood in Jedda. He then said frankly that the financial situation was rotten, but he did not think it was hopeless. He himself had received no salary since March.

3. I have since received sidelights on the benzine contract from Herr de Haas, the German trading consul. He has recently returned from leave, having spent a month of it in Moscow haggling with the Soviet authorities for the right to run their contract on a commission basis. Under pressure of his threat to undercut them with still cheaper Roumanian oil, they played him with long negotiations up to the point of agreement, which they then refused; having in the meantime succeeded in securing their contract in Jedda by negotiation with the Hejazi Government through their Minister. So keen were they to have it signed before Herr de Haas could return to Jedda to seduce Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman with his yet cheaper Roumanian oil, that two commercial plenipotentiaries arrived here with the same object. Comrade Jurgieff, representing Wosgostveg (Eastern Trading Society), came up from the south from Hodeida, and shortly afterwards Comrade Hertig (or Gertig), of Sojusneftiexport (Soviet Naphtha Export, a branch of Sojusneftsyndikat), arrived hot-foot from Europe. I understand that the exact terms of the contract are the purchase by the Hejazi Government of 60,000 8-gallon cases of benzine at 6s. 6d. a case c.i.f., and 40,000 8-gallon cases of kerosene at 5s. 3d. a case c.i.f., their total cost of £30,000 to be paid in four equal instalments at two-month intervals, the first quarter to be paid on delivery. This is now expected shortly.

4. I learn that in anticipation of the delivery, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman has already concluded an advance sale in Mecca of 2,000 cases of benzine at £1 apiece. This is the normal market price in the Hejaz, and shows a clear profit to the sheikh's treasury of 200 per cent., with the added benefit of cash down against an unmatured debt. It is surprising that the Hejazis have not fallen sooner to such a lure. Their inherent aversion to bolshevism, their interested stand against Soviet trade, and M. Turakulov's persistent efforts to obtain further concessions have probably been the main factors of delay.

5. In Jedda a humbler method obtains for raising the wind. The merchants having now been relieved, on loan, of nearly all their cash, are required to lend their stock-in-trade to the local treasury official. He thereupon knocks it down at auction for what it will fetch, spot cash. I am assured that this means was resorted to in order to pay for the official dinner with which the Finance Minister was greeted on his recent return from Medina. Little wonder that the local tradesmen feel sore, so sore that even the venerable Governor of Jedda, himself a merchant who has been heavily dunned for loans, hailed the Indian vice-consul in full market the other day and asked him how he could evade further extortion. As the Governor is very deaf, the Munshi was much embarrassed for reply.

6. With regard to expenditure, I hear through a credible channel that Ibn Saud is no whit less extravagant than before, and that observers at Riyadh are shocked at his lavish hunting parties. His Minister in London, on the other hand, has recently been telegraphing for funds. The arrangement with Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. for the supply of credit to cover the needs of missions abroad (Sir A. Ryan's despatch No. 291 of the 16th July) was not concluded after all, but I learn confidentially from the manager of the local Dutch bank that the

Finance Minister succeeded during the last week of August in collecting £300, which the bank remitted to Sheikh Hafiz Wahba. Fortunately the season is over.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 5141/1600/25]

No. 51.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 375.)

My Lord,

Jedda, September 30, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to report that Mr. Philby, or rather Hajji Abdullah St. John Philby, has returned unexpectedly from Riyadh, and in the course of several conversations has given me some interesting sidelights on the internal situation in this country.

2. There seems little doubt but that Ibn Saud and he get badly on each other's nerves. He left with all his baggage and instruments in two cars running on a three-quarter paraffin mixture. In full desert they ran out of even this modest admixture of benzine, and Mr. Philby subsisted on dates and insufficient water until relief came from Taif. Arrived there, he learned of the misappropriation of the whole of the Standard Oil Company's benzine stock at Jedda, for which he is agent. Although he pretended on his arrival here that the seizure was the result of previous arrangement by him with the Director-General of Finance, he confessed to me last night that he had been faced with a *fait accompli* and that all he could do was to write it up with the other debts owing to him by the Hejazi Government. These, he said, now amount to some £50,000, £12,000 of which represent the value of this and previous consignments from Standard Oil. He holds no drafts on customs nor even promissory notes. If the Government swims he hopes eventually to be paid. If it sinks, he fears that he must sink with it. He has staked his all on Ibn Saud.

3. This makes it all the more striking that he should criticise him so unfavourably to a third person. He describes the King as disheartened in spirit, disillusioned in mind, and approaching impotence in body. This last discomfort seems to poison his whole outlook, so that he has become morose and reticent, withdrawing himself for the greater part of the day into the quarters outside Riyadh, where he keeps his slaves and concubines, spending long nights with one or other of his wives, and only finding relaxation between whiles in the company of a few Bedouin cronies where the talk is of women and camels. Although he used even in Riyadh to devote anything up to ten hours a day to current affairs, he seems now to have lost all interest in them and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin moons about with nothing to do. These activities and this indolence indicate to Mr. Philby that Ibn Saud, in the fifty-first year of a strenuous sexual career, has reached a stage of conflict between desire and its fulfilment. The male climacteric, maybe.

4. He also has discovered, to his intense disappointment, that the King lies to him, not out of malice, he thinks, but because his moral fibre has weakened and he no longer holds a strict regard for truth. He instances the misappropriation of his benzine, with which he is convinced Ibn Saud was fully conversant. As another instance, he states that Ibn Saud told him that M. Boucicault had completed one wireless station north of Medina and was moving on to the next. Mr. Philby now learns that M. Boucicault has, until quite recently, again been held up by lack of benzine for his convoy, this time at Al Ula, whence he had been insistently telegraphing for supplies, and that he was only now able to move on to Tabuk to begin work on the first station. The Marconi payments, incidentally, are four months in arrear.

5. Mr. Philby's sidelights on the Yemen trouble are illuminating. He was with the King and Yusuf Yasin when the news of Imamic encroachment was received. They pored over large-scale maps and Mr. Philby pointed out that Arwa, the village reported as occupied, apparently lay on the Yemen side of the Jebel Razih watershed. Ibn Saud would have none of it and for some days while waiting for further news he pondered plans for a sweeping desert attack on Sana from the north-east. Mr. Philby was doing his best to show that there was no *casus belli*, but he gained the firm impression that Ibn Saud was intending

to attack the Imam at all costs—a providential means, he added, of employing a host of hungry Bedouin who hung round Riyadh and complained of taxation—when he suddenly changed his attitude and became conciliatory. I asked Mr. Philby later on whether, if such a juncture were to occur again, a friendly word from us would have any value; he replied that it would undoubtedly be deeply resented. He is evidently less than ever in the King's confidence. I must report, in this connexion, that at the end of our conversation of the 19th September Fuad Hamza made a point of telling me how grateful Ibn Saud had been for His Majesty's Government's friendly gesture of advice.

6. Mr. Philby has spoken much of the King, but what I have written summarises his views sufficiently for the purpose of this report. He also spoke of Fuad Bey as having now lost such influence as he had. He pictures him at Taif as withdrawn from contact with current affairs of State and spending his time in writing a handbook on the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies. My own impression is that he knows much less than formerly of what is passing and that his office has largely become a letter-box for receiving and despatching to the "competent authorities" the correspondence of the foreign representatives. The French vice-consul, who had to transact all the current business for his hermit Chargé d'Affaires on the occasion of the Amir Feisal's recent visit to Jedda, found Fuad Bey ready to discuss the attractions of the post of Minister at Paris. I think that M. Durmarçay initiated this subject, a point which may have significance of another kind.

7. Mr. Philby confirmed my growing conviction that the Director-General of Finance is now for all practical purposes "the Hejazi Government." He still has the King's blind confidence. He moves about the central Hejaz, the only moving point and the sole motive force in an area of complete stagnation, collecting means from the merchants in cash or kind and disposing of it none knows how. Holding the purse-strings, he controls everything except the "Umm-al-Qura," which he has tried to capture but failed in face of the "Syrian party," which still has enough means to produce the paper. An essential department which Abdullah Suleiman is said to be deliberately starving is the Post and Telegraphs. In spite of the Finance Department's hauls of benzine, the Jedda-Mecca-Taif mails have now for a fortnight been carried by donkeys. The Eastern Telegraph Company's account is mounting up and nothing has been paid since the end of May. It is Mr. Philby's opinion that, for all his secretive activity, Abdullah Suleiman is near the end of his tether and cannot reach the beginning of the pilgrimage season. I learn that he is shortly going to Riyadh.

8. If he goes, the Hejaz will lapse into a state of anarchic torpor under the figure-headship of the Viceroy. The urban populations will sit with fatalistic eyes turned towards a pilgrimage which they know will be minimum. The only movement which may be expected is from soldiery and police who, lacking pay wherewith to buy food, have the power to take it.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 5135/3053/91]

No. 52.

Mr. Murray to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 764.)

My Lord,

Rome, October 7, 1931.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 1150 of the 25th September last, I have the honour to report that an early opportunity was taken to broach the question of the Italian occupation of Great Hanish and Jebel Zukur islands with the head of the African Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. Signor Guarnaschelli said that, of course, he must consult the Colonial Office before expressing any opinion officially, but, speaking personally, he fully agreed that the establishment of these posts could not involve any claim to Italian sovereignty over these islands, since this was a question which both sides had agreed to leave in suspense for the present. In order that there should be no misunderstanding, an aide-mémoire, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, was left with Signor Guarnaschelli. He read it without further comment, merely remarking that he hoped to be in a position shortly to address a written reply to

[6707]

the Embassy which would be satisfactory to His Majesty's Government. This exchange of memoranda might be useful in later years as affording further evidence, if this were needed, of the desire of both parties to leave the question of sovereignty in abeyance.

I have, &c.
J. MURRAY.

Enclosure in No. 52.

Aide-memoire.

IN reply to an enquiry by the Resident of Aden, the Italian consul at Aden stated that the Government of Eritrea had granted a fishing concession to an Italian firm, and at the request of the latter had established small armed posts on the islands of Great Hanish and Jebel Zukur for the particular purpose of protecting the personnel and vessels of the concessionnaire.

His Majesty's Government consider that these two islands come within the scope of paragraph 5 of the conclusions of the Rome conversations of 1927, which reads as follows:—

"That there should be economic and commercial freedom on the Arabian coast and the islands of the Red Sea for citizens and subjects of the two countries and that the protection which such citizens and subjects may legitimately expect from their respective Governments should not assume a political character or complexion."

His Majesty's Embassy have been asked to obtain an assurance that the Italian Government concur and that, in particular, the establishment of Italian posts is not to be regarded as involving or constituting any claim to Italian sovereignty over these islands.

Rome, October 5, 1931.

[E 5234/387/25]

No. 53.

The Marquess of Reading to Mr. Hope-Gill (Jedda).

(No. 428.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 22, 1931.

I HAVE had under consideration, in consultation with the other Departments of His Majesty's Government concerned, your telegram No. 205 of the 15th September, summarising a note from the Hejaz-Nejd Government on the subject of the raiding situation on the frontier between Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd.

2. I consider that no useful purpose would be served by replying to the criticisms which the Hejaz-Nejd Government make of His Majesty's Government's finding in the matter of the claims arising from raids up to the 1st August, 1930. In your reply you should therefore merely take note of the acceptance of the finding by the Hejaz-Nejd Government.

3. His Majesty's Government have learnt with some surprise of King Ibn Saud's enquiry regarding the procedure to be followed in respect of claims arising from raids which have taken place since the 1st August, 1930. It was agreed with the Hejaz-Nejd Government—after a protracted correspondence on certain points of detail—that these claims should be examined jointly by Captain Glubb and the Hejaz-Nejd Government's representative on the Transjordan frontier, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Zeid. A meeting between these two officials took place on the 15th August for this purpose. It appears from Captain Glubb's report of the 19th August, a copy of which has been sent to you direct, that Sheikh Abdul Aziz, while admitting that he had instructions to discuss the claims in question, stated that he had not yet prepared a list of Hejaz-Nejd claims. In these circumstances, it was impossible to proceed to an examination of the comparatively important and complicated claims relating to raids between the 1st August, 1930, and the 19th January, 1931 (1st Ramazan). The few and simple claims for the period subsequent to the latter date were, however, discussed, settlements are understood to have been reached and the restitution of the loot involved is believed to have taken place or to be proceeding. It was

agreed that the necessary lists of claims relating to the earlier period should be produced by both parties at their next meeting. The preceding information has been confirmed orally by Captain Glubb while on leave in this country.

4. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government see no reason to contemplate a change of procedure for dealing with these claims. It appears, however, desirable that the Hejaz-Nejd Government should ensure that Ibn Zeid, at his next meeting with Captain Glubb, shall be in all respects prepared to proceed to the joint examination of the claims referring to the period prior to the 19th January last, with a view to arrive at a provisional settlement. You will recollect that, at the wish of the Hejaz-Nejd Government, it was agreed that any such settlement must be referred to the two Governments for approval. Captain Glubb has now returned to Transjordan from leave and should therefore be available for a further meeting when required.

5. You should base your reply to the relevant part of the Hejaz-Nejd Government's note on the preceding two paragraphs of this despatch.

6. A further point is raised in that note, namely, what measures will be taken to prevent future raids; and this point is expanded by references to the desirability of reaching a settlement between the Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan, such as that effected between Iraq and the Hejaz-Nejd, and also to the desirability, in the cause of peaceful relations on the frontier, of securing the expulsion of "those elements . . . which were the cause of dispute and hostilities on the frontier of Iraq." The purport of the words quoted is obscure, but it appears likely that they are a covert reference to Captain Glubb. They should be ignored in your reply.

7. The suggestion that a settlement should be effected between Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd, similar to that reached by the latter State with Iraq, is not altogether clear. I assume that King Ibn Saud has in mind the negotiation of agreements on the lines of the Iraq-Hejaz-Nejd Treaty of "Bon-Voisinage" and Extradition Agreement. As you are aware from the telegraphic correspondence between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan, ending with Mr. Young's telegram No. 73 of the 21st August, repeated to you as No. 70, His Majesty's Government have for some time past been considering the possibility of bringing about a direct agreement between Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd relating to fugitive raiding criminals. You will have observed, however, that the Amir of Transjordan objects to this proposal, as involving a step forward in the direction of his recognition of King Ibn Saud—a course to which he is still opposed. His Majesty's Government are not disposed at the present time to press the Amir Abdullah to reconsider his attitude on this point, nor are they inclined to adopt the alternative suggested by the Acting High Commissioner, namely, that His Majesty's Government should themselves, as mandatory for Transjordan, conclude an agreement with the Hejaz-Nejd Government on this subject.

8. There exists also the further objection to King Ibn Saud's proposal that any agreement on the subject of the refusal of asylum to tribal offenders is likely to be difficult to carry out in practice and, in the absence of goodwill between the Arab authorities of Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd, would probably give rise to dispute and difficulty in its working.

9. In all the circumstances, His Majesty's Government prefer to rely, for the present, at any rate, on the recently initiated policy of co-operation between the local officials on the frontier (together with the increased control now exercised by the Transjordan authorities over their tribes and the recent measures for the better protection of the Transjordan frontier) to maintain the much improved state of affairs in regard to raiding which has obtained since the beginning of the present year.

10. Your reply to the final part of the Hejaz-Nejd Government's note summarised in your telegram should therefore be on the following lines: His Majesty's Government have many times made known to the Hejaz-Nejd Government their view that the prevention or limitation of raiding and more peaceful conditions on the frontier between the Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan can best be achieved by ensuring the close and wholehearted co-operation of the local authorities of the two countries on the frontier. The great diminution both of the number and of the scale of raids since such co-operation began and the ease with which settlements appear to have been reached by Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid regarding the minor claims arising from raids since the 19th January

confirm His Majesty's Government in their opinion. They consider, therefore, that every effort should be made to increase the scope and usefulness of this co-operation, so that by constant and prompt intercommunication all necessary steps may be taken in collaboration by the officials on the spot (who alone are in a position to take action urgently and with a detailed knowledge of the facts), both for the prevention of raids that may be contemplated by the tribesmen of either side, and for the expeditious settlement of questions concerning loot, &c., which may arise. Instructions in this sense are being given to Captain Glubb, and His Majesty's Government trust that King Ibn Saud will give similar orders to Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Zeid.

I am, &c.
READING.

[E 5343/81/25]

No. 54.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 387 Confidential.)

My Lord,

Jedda, October 9, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jedda report for last July and August. I regret that shorthandedness and more urgent matters delayed its preparation last month.

2. I am sending copies to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, Simla, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloops and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 54.

Jedda Report for July-August, 1931.

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I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Ibn Saud.

HAVING left the Mu'abda Palace at Mecca on Sunday, the 28th June, Ibn Saud arrived at Riyadh on Saturday, the 4th July. It seems to have been a right royal removal and, incidentally, that's the way the money goes. An advance party in 114 box-cars and lorries carried the heavy baggage. More than sixty such cars are said to have been required for the silver dollars which the King is to popularise in Nejd, but this item of news need not be taken whole. Whatever the exact figures, they were enough vastly to impress the populace of Hejaz. Seven hundred motor vehicles in all is the estimate of the Indian vice-consul, who was in Mecca shortly before the start, and they must have been needed; for with His Majesty went his brothers the Amir Muhammad, the Amir Abdullah, the Amir Ahmad, and the Amir Musa'id, together with all their households; his sons the Amirs Sa'd, Fahad, Mansur, Abdullah, Bandar, Musa'id, Abdul Muhsin, Sultan, Mash'al, Abdurrahman, Mutiyib, and Talal; his nephew Khalid ibn Muhammad; and all the little Rashidis. His second son and Viceroy of the Hejaz, the Amir Feisal, accompanied him to Al Moya, a two days' journey, whence he returned to Mecca. His eldest son and Viceroy of Nejd, the Amir Saud, with two more sons, the Amirs Muhammad and Khalid, not to mention his cousins, came a two days' journey to meet him at Marat and escorted him into Riyadh. His reception there "our pen fails to describe," concludes the editor of the "Umm-al-Qura," who is generally a ready writer.

2. It should be added that Ibn Saud did not simply travel *en famille*. He was accompanied by his secrétaire and chief of his political diwan, Sheikh Yussuf Yasin, all the officials of his royal diwan, two doctors, and the Tripolitan refugee Khalid Bey-al-Qarqani. He was followed by Mr. Philby and two mobile Marconi wireless sets.

3. The stay in Nejd is to last about six months. In the middle of August the "Umm-al-Qura" announced that the King was just then leaving Riyadh for a few weeks in the Hasa, but it appears that the troubles to North and South, referred to later, have kept him at Riyadh, where he is in direct wireless communication with Taif. If rumour is to be believed, he has already made heavy demands on his Director-General of Finance for cash, amounting on one occasion to £20,000, of which £5,000 were collected from one still wealthy sheikh and the money-changers at Mecca.

4. In the Hejaz it is generally felt that the King, having concentrated his attention on Hejazi affairs for over a year (his first prolonged stay in this part of his dominions since his conquest of it in 1925), has left them in a hopeless mess. It has even been suggested that he has run away from them. Undoubtedly he was tired, in all probability discouraged, and as likely as not looking for relief in his native Nejd, where there was also possibly some need to consolidate his position in person. His absence has left the Hejaz half of this kingdom like a waterlogged and half-dismantled ship, lacking any particular signs of a wind to blow it either into port or further on the rocks. It is hard to say who has been governing the country for the last two months. Probably the Director of Finance, since Government seems to have reduced itself to the withholding of all pay and salaries and a succession of attempts to raise the wind.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

5. The Amir Feisal moved the seat of "Government" from Mecca to Taif on the 6th July for the summer. He has continued to be a nonentity in both features of his double rôle as Viceroy and Minister for Foreign Affairs. His impartial love of women and boys is, from all accounts, undiminished. The Bedonin falls to these luxuries of town life as an African to gin.

6. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs visited Jedda on the 6th July for two days, on the 15th July for the inside of the day, on the 26th July for a day, and not again until the 31st August. On the 7th, 8th and 15th July, His Majesty's Minister had the opportunity of discussing current affairs before his departure on leave. On the 27th July Fuad Bey contented himself with ringing up His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, and having nothing special to say he returned to Taif. His visit of the 31st August was unannounced, but productive of a certain amount of discussion which falls to be dealt with in a later Report.

Finance.

7. The silver dollar (riyal) sank another point in July to 15 to the £ sterling, although still quoted officially as standing at 10. Some £20,000 worth of the nickel coinage (halalas) has been locked up in a room in Mecca and its withdrawal from circulation, in the form of a forced loan from the merchants, has served to maintain the value of the current remainder.

8. To Ibn Saud's request of the 17th June for help from His Majesty's Government to bring a British bank into the country as a State bank (May-June report, paragraph 4), His Majesty's Minister was instructed on the 14th July to reply that His Majesty's Government regretted that they were unable to depart from their long-established practice of non-intervention in transactions between foreign Governments and British banks. Meantime, however, the King had empowered Sheikh Abdurrahman Qusaibi, who was visiting England, to interview banking firms in London, thus anticipating the advice with which His Majesty's Government had amplified their reply. As a result of the Hejazi Minister's conversation at the Foreign Office, it was arranged that his secretary should accompany the sheikh to the Department of Overseas Trade to discuss matters. They there stated that they were already in touch with the Eastern Bank and the Ottoman Bank. They were given an introduction to Barclay's Bank. No success is known to have attended their efforts to present the matter as a business proposition.

9. Sheikh Abdurrahman seems, however, not to have been idle in Holland. Following up the appeal made in Jedda to the acting Dutch Chargé d'Affaires (May-June report, paragraph 4), he appears to have made some headway in Amsterdam, for the manager of the "Dutch Bank" in Jedda—a branch of the *Nederlandische Handel Maatschappij*—informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at the end of August that his principals seemed to be seriously contemplating a loan of half a million sterling to Ibn Saud, to be secured on customs receipts and conditioned by suitable concessions in matters of the handling and control of all public moneys in the Hejaz. Mr. Jacobs regarded the purely economic and financial bases of such an arrangement as sufficiently sound, and cited customs figures for the Hejaz which ranged round the million mark (sterling) during the past three years. But the political future worried him profoundly, and he was inclined to advise his principals that Ibn Saud could not be relied upon to maintain peace and his own position for a further period sufficient to secure such a loan.

10. Meanwhile the Hejazi Government were unable to get credit anywhere. The Dutch Bank would give none pending the negotiations, nor would Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Limited), with whom the Government had been unwilling to renew their former contract for Shell benzine. The Director-General of Finance had, therefore, to look elsewhere for the fuel needed by Ibn Saud and his Government. He entered into negotiations in July with the Soviet Legation for the supply of benzine on deferred terms of payment. The negotiations were long and tiresome, the Russians seeking to use the Government's need of motor fuel as a lever wherewith to remove the existing embargo on all Russian goods (in spite of which a few goods do enter and are dutied fourfold). They failed in this endeavour, but they, nevertheless, signed a benzine contract, probably in order to keep a foot in the part-open door to further negotiations. The terms of the contract are understood to be purchase by the Hejazi Government from Sojusneftiexport (Soviet Naphtha Export) of 60,000 8-gallon cases of benzine at 6s. 6d. a case c.i.f., and 40,000 8-gallon cases of kerosene at 5s. 3d. a case c.i.f., the total cost of £30,000 to be paid in four equal instalments at two-month intervals, the first on delivery. As an immediate result, and before there was even any definite news of the arrival of this fuel, the Director-General of Finance was able to make advance sales of benzine in Mecca for cash to the tune of £2,000 at £1 a case, a transaction which paid him handsomely.

11. Neither this nor money collected periodically from Hejazi merchants "on loan" was used to reduce the Government's indebtedness, nor was much, if any, of it used to pay Government officials' salaries, which fell still further into arrear. The debt to Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Limited) of some £8,000 remains outstanding, and will probably so remain until they can distrain on the receipts of the next pilgrimage season. The Post Office Department's debt to the Eastern Telegraph Company continued to mount steadily since the last settlement up to the end of April, and was something over £2,000 at the end of

August. As for the £30,000 owed to the Government of India for arms supplied to Ibn Saud to crush the Nejd rebellion of 1929, the Hejazi Government's appeal *ad misericordiam* was perforce allowed, and they were informed in July that the Government of India had no alternative but to agree to still further postponed payment. The hope was expressed that Ibn Saud would honour his pledge not later than the 5th March, 1932. A reply expressing the King's thanks, but nothing more, was received in August.

Economic.

12. Mr. Twitchell's report on the minerals of the Hejaz coastal area appeared in the "Umm-al-Qura" during July and August, whence it was retranslated back into English and sent home for such expert study as it might merit. To the layman it was disappointing. Some ancient gold workings at Al Qaryat and some surface asphalt up and down the coast near Wejh appeared to be the only indications of mineral wealth of any possible value. More will be known when Mr. Twitchell returns, as is expected, in October with six American prospectors. This factor at least would seem to show that there was more in his report or his further discoveries than was published. The Swedish geological mission mentioned in the May-June report (paragraph 9) appears to have been side-tracked.

13. As a result of Mr. Twitchell's report and supposed high optimism, the exploitation of minerals began to assume attractive features in the eyes of the local inhabitants as a rich alternative to the exploitation of pilgrims.

Marconi Wireless Installation.

14. The Hejazi Government failed to pay the July and August instalments. There was also a series of delays in getting on with the work of installation. Two mobile sets followed Ibn Saud to Riyadh at the end of July, accompanied by Mr. Philby and the Egyptian engineer, and there they were used to maintain communication with the Hejaz, but no serious attempt was made to prepare the groundwork for the big Riyadh station and all the material continued to lie in Jedda. As for the stations-to-be in Northern Hejaz and at Jāuf, the Marconi expert, Mr. Boucicault, was unable to leave Jedda for Wejh until the 2nd August, and at the end of the month he was still at Wejh, unable to proceed to Tabūk, the site of the first station, for lack of benzine for his convoy.

Legislation.

15. The texts of measures governing the Shari'a courts, the Hejazi Civil Service, and commerce and commercial litigation were published during July and August.

Religious Intolerance.

16. July saw the reconstitution in Mecca of the dreaded Wahhabi Committee of Virtue. The easy-going Hejazis were beaten up to their five-a-day prayers by Nejd soldiery placed at the committee's disposal. In the words of an eye-witness, the Indian vice-consul, "these incarnations of the devil wildly run through the public thoroughfares and enter the lanes and by-lanes in pursuit of the defaulters who might have taken shelter there, and on discovery fall upon them with all their might and beat them mercilessly. There is no distinction between good and bad, rich or poor, young or old. They lay them down on the public road and flog them indiscriminately." There appears to be no escape for the Meccawis from these indignities, for whereas in the past offenders against the puritan Wahhabi code of prayerfulness and abstinence from tobacco were given a chance to appear before a body of notables, among whom were citizens who had a natural inclination to leniency towards their fellow-citizens in crime, all are now dealt with summarily by the Nejdīs, who are distributed in gangs of twenty throughout the thirteen quarters of Mecca. It is expected that this treatment will ease off before pilgrims from other lands begin to arrive.

17. The Legation received a long complaint in July from a prominent Shi'a recounting the indignities heaped upon his sectaries in the Holy Places. Another complaint in August concerned the closing of a school in Medina, of which the Nizam of Hyderabad is one of the patrons, for refusal to employ a Wahhabi teacher and to inculcate the Wahhabi concept of the Unity of Allah. Neither complaint could of course be attended to without departing from His Majesty's Government's settled policy of neutrality in religious matters.

II.—FRONTIER QUESTIONS.

Transjordan.

Raiding.

18. One Hejazi raid was reported in July by the Transjordan authorities as having taken place on the 5th May, when a party of Hejazi Aniza raided the Transjordan Howeytat, killed one man, and made off with some sixty camels. The usual protest was lodged.

19. In August a desert patrol of the Transjordan Arab Legion recovered two camels and two rifles taken by the Transjordan Tagatga from the Hejazi Billi. These were held ready for collection at Mudawwara, and the Hejazi Government were notified. There was no other raiding during July and August, thanks chiefly to the efficiency of the Transjordan Desert Police.

Glubb-Ibn Zeyd Meetings.

(a) Meeting of June 3.

20. Not until the 25th July did the Legation receive from the Transjordan authorities the particulars of the preliminary meeting held on the 3rd June between Captain Glubb and Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeyd (see May-June report, paragraph 25). The meeting was cordial and friendly, each side entertaining the other to a meal. The following subjects were discussed:—

- (a) The need for close co-operation between the two parties.
- (b) The immediate restitution of any loot taken, by the sending of victims with a letter to the representative of the other Government.
- (c) The method by which victims should substantiate their claims by the production of two witnesses, who, if possible, would be the sheikhs.
- (d) Compensations for persons killed:—
 - (1) If the person killed was the aggressor, the compensation should be seven young camels.
 - (2) If the person killed was not the aggressor, the compensation should be twenty-eight young camels.

These fines could be compounded for 15 liras in the first case, or, in the second case, for 60 liras. Relatives of the killed would not have to identify the actual murderer, but simply prove that the victim was killed by a certain party.

(e) The question of taking commission on loot returned:—

It was suggested by the Transjordan representative that this be done away with; the Nejd representative, however, doubted whether his Government would agree to forgo it, and was informed that if the Nejd Government did not abolish the practice the Transjordan Government could also not do so. If the practice continued the compensation should be in terms of cash per camel.

Sheikh Abdul Aziz, up to this point, agreed to all suggestions, but suddenly torpedoed all the proceedings by saying that he had no authority to make any agreement without reference to Ibn Saud, and he absolutely refused to allow any paper embodying the terms to be drawn up for mutual signature.

He stated, however, that he had received a letter from Ibn Saud saying that he hoped that powers to treat with the Transjordan Government representative would shortly be given.

21. This meeting, however, was only a preliminary one, designed to establish contact between the two frontier representatives. Their main meetings for the settlement of all matters connected with raids since the 1st August, 1930, were to follow. Meanwhile, on the 1st August, the Hejazi Under-Secretary offered to come to Jedda to discuss the preliminary meeting, but His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires replied that he thought that they could not advance matters by discussing what was merely an exchange of views at the preliminary meeting; and as the terms of reference of the main meeting had already been settled after full discussion (see May-June report, paragraphs 26-27), he considered that it should be left to the two frontier representatives to carry on. Although not strictly within the scope of this report, it is convenient to mention here that Fuad Bey, in a series of conversations held at Jedda on the 1st to the 3rd September, made another and more determined attempt to start a discussion of additional principles, by which the Glubb-Ibn Zeyd meetings for the settlement of past raids should, in his view, be controlled. He was ridden off.

22. The Legation has been somewhat hampered by lack of concise and up-to-date information from Transjordan about the passage of events which interest it closely. News of the preliminary meeting having taken place on the 3rd June was first received through the Hejazi Government. Information as to its outcome was not received from Transjordan until nearly two months later. The first main meeting was held on the 15th August, but the Legation was only apprised of the fact on the 1st September, and through Hejazi channels. Information from Transjordan came to hand on the 15th September, in the form of a report by Captain Glubb, dated the 19th August.

(b) Meeting of August 15.

23. There were apparently two items on the agenda of the main meeting of the 15th August: (1) The return of loot taken since the 1st August, 1930, an era which divided at the 1st Ramadan (the 19th January) into two looting periods, the greater and the less; and (2) the settlement of future procedure. In regard to the first item, Ibn Zeyd stated that he had not prepared a list, which rendered examination of the claims impossible, but Captain Glubb succeeded in securing his agreement to attempt an immediate restitution of the little loot taken since the 19th January. In regard to the second item, Ibn Zeyd was equally unprepared, having, he said, received no instructions to discuss future procedure. Captain Glubb raised two further matters: (3) The taxation of Transjordan tribesmen in Nejd territory, on which point Ibn Zeyd replied that he had implicit orders to tax; and (4) the "numerous protests" by the Hejazi Government against his, Captain Glubb's, activities since his last meeting with Ibn Zeyd. There seems to have been some misconception of the real position here, for only one protest was made, under three main heads, and it was made from Mecca on the same day as the meeting at Hazim Wells, the 3rd June (see May-June report, paragraph 29). So that, when Ibn Zeyd expressed to Captain Glubb his astonishment at "the continued despatch of such protests, in view of the fact that after their first meeting he had written at length to Ibn Saud" to persuade him of Captain Glubb's real merit, it seems that their feelings were being unnecessarily harrowed.

24. With regard to this first main meeting of the 15th August, it may be added, for purposes of record, that, whereas Fuad Bey informed His Majesty's Minister on the 21st June that instructions for the meeting had been sent to Ibn Zeyd, adding that it would be better if Captain Glubb were to wait a few days before arranging the meeting so as to allow time for the instructions to arrive, it was not until the end of July that Captain Glubb received instructions to suggest to Ibn Zeyd a date and place for the meeting. He did so, but received a reply from Ibn Zeyd that he had not yet received his instructions. About the 10th August, however, the latter sent to say that he was ready, and they met, only to find that Ibn Zeyd, as already mentioned, had neither lists of past raids nor instructions as to future procedure. Yet the Hejazi Under-Secretary has since categorically informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda (the 19th September) that Ibn Zeyd was supplied in good time with a full list of claims.

25. The meeting of the 15th August was the first fruit of His Majesty's Government's strong representations of the 28th February to Ibn Saud, that

Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeyd should meet to examine and settle past raids. Captain Glubb's opinion at the end of the meeting, however, was to the effect that, if His Majesty's Government proposed to stand aside and urge Ibn Saud and Transjordan to arrange matters between them, there was not the least chance of Ibn Saud returning a single animal. Captain Glubb also feared that if the matter of claims were pressed home at their next meeting, the only outcome would be an open rupture between himself and Ibn Zeyd. There were no more meetings.

Preventive Measures against Raiding.

26. In a letter dated the 5th July Fuad Bey Hamza drew Sir A. Ryan's attention to the supposed fact that the measures taken to prevent raiding were only designed to last over the period of the Glubb-Ibn Zeyd meeting for the settlement of claims. He therefore asked for His Majesty's Government's views as to how to prevent raids after the meeting. While submitting the request to His Majesty's Government, Sir A. Ryan gave his personal views in conversation with Fuad Bey on the 7th July. He reminded him that it had been agreed after a definite exchange of views that the proclamations of Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah should apply to all raiding at all times and not merely during the Glubb-Ibn Zeyd meeting. He recognised of course that proclamations alone would not stop raiding. That must be effected by the measures taken on both sides of the frontier and their co-ordination by co-operation between local authorities, as contemplated in article 3 of the Hadda Agreement. As regards measures, the position was that last October His Majesty's Government had fully informed the Hejazi Government of what was being done on the Transjordan side. They had, however, received no similar statement from the Hejazi Government. The best means of preventing future trouble were (1) mutual knowledge of the measures taken on each side, and (2) collaboration in accordance with the Hadda Agreement. These views were endorsed by His Majesty's Government and confirmed to Fuad Bey by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 10th August. There was no reaction in the direction of either (1) or (2) above.

Raiding Criminals.

27. In conversation on the 7th July Fuad Bey Hamza enquired of Sir A. Ryan as to the position regarding raiding criminals. He was told that the further points raised by the Hejazi Government had presented great difficulty and were still being examined. Now at the end of June the High Commissioner for Transjordan had expressed the view that the raiding-criminals formula (see May-June report, paragraph 28) should be dropped and a formal extradition agreement negotiated in its stead. He had therefore proposed that the Transjordan delegation to Jeddah be fully empowered to negotiate a suitable formula only if Hejazi opposition to a formal extradition agreement could not be overcome. The delegation would consist of Mr. Kirkbride only, as the Amir Abdullah was not disposed to send a Transjordan official. If an extradition agreement proved feasible, however, it would presumably be negotiated by His Majesty's Minister, co-operating with Mr. Kirkbride, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, since the Amir Abdullah would almost certainly object to direct negotiations between Transjordan and Ibn Saud. On the 8th August His Majesty's Government expressed their general concurrence, provided the Hejazi Government were willing, but suggested that the agreement should be similar in form to the Bahra Agreement of 1925, *i.e.*, signed by the Hejazi Government and a British plenipotentiary on behalf of the Transjordan Government. In that case Sir A. Ryan should negotiate and sign as plenipotentiary, Mr. Kirkbride acting merely as his expert adviser. The High Commissioner for Transjordan replied on the 21st August that the Amir Abdullah would not agree, but that he insisted on requesting that the agreement should be made by His Majesty's Government as mandatory and subsequently applied to Transjordan by local legislation. There the matter has rested.

Mutual Recovery of Loot.

28. The Hejazi Government's statement that, although many Transjordan raiders were entering the Hejaz-Nejd with the loot they had previously taken from Hejaz-Nejd tribesmen, the Government were prepared to forgo its recovery

until Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeyd had met and agreed thereon, provided that Transjordan should do likewise (see May-June report, paragraph 30), was but coldly received in Transjordan. The latter preferred to keep a free hand, suspecting the proposal as designed to seduce Transjordan tribes from their allegiance. The matter was accordingly allowed to drop in the hope that it would soon be superseded by the happy results of the Glubb-Ibn Zeyd meetings.

Allegations against Captain Glubb.

29. On the 5th July the Hejazi Government reminded His Majesty's Minister that they had not received any reply to their note of the 3rd June, in which were enumerated various misdeeds alleged against Captain Glubb (see May-June report, paragraph 29). At the end of July His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires received from the High Commissioner for Transjordan a copy of Captain Glubb's remarks on the allegations, dated the 14th June and running into a dozen close-typed sheets. A few days previously he had received instructions from His Majesty's Government to base on this report a reasoned reply to the Hejazi allegations of the 3rd June, and at the same time to make it clear that His Majesty's Government strongly resented such baseless accusations levelled against a British officer, whose reply showed the patience and loyalty with which he had worked and justified the confidence which His Majesty's and the Transjordan Governments originally placed in him and continued to hold.

30. Before the drafting of a reasoned reply, there were two points of detail on which His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had to seek enlightenment from Transjordan (in a telegram dated the 1st August), and also a point of principle concerning one case of "retaliatory confiscation," to use the Hejazi term, which he referred to His Majesty's Government at the same time for further instructions. The latter replied that they preferred for reasons of policy not to have conveyed to the Hejazi Government any endorsement of Captain Glubb's action in this case, even though the confiscation was made in exceptional circumstances, but rather to let the gist of his report on the incident speak for itself. No reply having been received from Transjordan, further telegraphic enquiry was made on the 13th August, but no reply was forthcoming by the end of the month. Mr. Hope Gill's reply to the Hejazi note of the 3rd June was therefore held up.

MacDonnell Investigation.

31. His Majesty's Government's arbitral finding on raid claims prior to the 1st August, 1930, was communicated to the Hejazi Government on the 12th August. It was worded as follows:—

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have considered the report submitted to them by Mr. MacDonnell on the results of his investigation into the claims arising from raids from the Hejaz-Nejd into Transjordan and from Transjordan into the Hejaz-Nejd, which took place before the 1st August, 1930. Owing to the insufficient and often contradictory nature of the information and evidence furnished to Mr. MacDonnell; to the length of time which has elapsed since the dates of many of the raids involved; and owing, moreover, to the fact that the conditions under which Mr. MacDonnell was obliged to carry out his investigation did not permit of his conducting his enquiries on the actual sites of raids, or of his having the opportunity of examining all available witnesses, the information is not such as to enable His Majesty's Government to make an exact award on each claim submitted. For this reason His Majesty's Government are not in a position to make a detailed estimate as to the amount of loot taken from the nationals of either Government by nationals of the other.

"The information furnished to His Majesty's Government is, however, sufficient to enable them to judge that it would be fair and reasonable that all claims referred to them by both Governments concerned should be held to cancel each other out. His Majesty's Government conclude, therefore, that all claims arising from raids between the two countries which took place before the 1st August, 1930, should, on the basis of such cancellation, be held to be settled and conclusively disposed of."

This is His Majesty's Government's final finding.

A month elapsed before a reply was received conveying Ibn Saud's reaction from Riyadh. It falls to be recorded in the next report.

Frontier Line.

32. Survey operations in connexion with the Haifa-Bagdad Railway discovered a small error near Jebel Tubaik in the boundary traced on the southern desert maps of Transjordan to define His Majesty's Government's unilateral declaration of the 19th May, 1927. Brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government in July, its rectification was called for.

Iraq.

33. Relations were undisturbed.

34. Although by the beginning of July both representatives-elect had been named, neither had proceeded by the end of August. The Hejaz-Nejd consul-general-elect, Rushaid Pasha, was apparently awaiting the arrival of his Iraqi opposite number before leaving himself. An enemy of long standing of both Ibn Saud and the Hashimites, Rushaid Pasha is now to represent Ibn Saud in the Hashimite capital.

Koweit and Bahrein.

35. Colonel Biscoe and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba had a friendly meeting at the Foreign Office on the 21st July, when mention was made of the possibility of Ibn Saud being near the Hasa coast in September and of a visit from Colonels Biscoe and Dickson being arranged (see May-June report, paragraph 33).

36. Two cases of intrusion by officials of Ibn Saud into Koweit territory were reported in August.

37. An uncertain figure passed through Jedda in July, apparently returning to Koweit after some ten months' stay in the Hejaz as a guest of Ibn Saud. His name was Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif-bin-Abdul Jalil, one time Director of Koweit Customs, decorated at the New Year 1930, convicted for forgery in June, given a letter of recommendation by the political agent in August, and kept hanging about for nearly a year in the Hejaz for a job which never materialised.

Yemen and Asir

Asir Communications.

38. As a result of an exchange of views with the Italian Government on the question of *de facto* as opposed to *de jure* recognition of the Saudi status of Asir, raised by the Hejazi Government's request for the establishment of wireless communications between Jizan and Aden and of postal communication between Jizan and Kamaran (see May-June report, paragraph 36), His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was instructed on the 22nd June to reply to the Hejazi note of the 11th March, merely stating that His Majesty's Government agreed to the establishment of wireless communication between Aden and Jizan, detailed arrangements for which would be made by Aden through the Legation, and that they saw no objection to the establishment of postal communication between Kamaran and Jizan. On receipt of further instructions in the latter connexion His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires informed the Hejazi Government on the 8th August that it was assumed that the proposed exchange of mails would be made in accordance with the principles of the Universal Postal Convention and subsidiary agreements, so far as these applied.

Status of Asir.

39. The political issue of the recognition of the actual status of Asir was met by informing the Italian Government that, in deference to their views (which were strongly anti-recognition of any kind), no formal recognition of Asir's new status would be conveyed by His Majesty's Government to the Hejazi Government, but that it was not practical politics to refuse to correspond with them on

matters of practical interest to the country. No mention of the question of recognition, whether *de jure* or *de facto*, was, of course, to be made to the Hejazi Government.

Military Affairs.

40. Intelligence reports from Aden during August combined to give warning of a certain degree of activity in the northern Yemen, possibly directed against Asir. Thus, on the 8th August, the report was recorded that the Imam Yahya had raised the pay of all his regular forces by 20 per cent., and authorised a special allowance of 20 per cent. for service in the Tihama, *i.e.*, the coastal belt; on the 15th August that the Imam was organising an expedition against the Dakam Confederation, who were supposed to be giving him trouble in his northern territories; and that on the 25th August an expedition of six companies of regulars was being fitted out at Sana under the Imam's son, Sword-of-Islam Ahmad, for service in the north.

41. Although the boundary between Asir and the Yemen has never been defined, the Hejazi Government decided in mid-August that it had been violated by the Imam's troops. As Viceroy of the Hejaz in his father's absence, the Amir Feisal telegraphed instructions on the 18th August to the Amir of Jizan to protest to the Governor of Midi, the Imam's son, against this very evil act, and to demand the punishment of the violators, an apology, withdrawal of the Yemeni advanced posts, the return of thirty hostages (pessimistically described by the Legation's translator as mortgages), and the payment of compensation and blood-money. Apparently, on the 23rd August, although the true date was probably earlier and the transmission via Massawa delayed, Ibn Saud himself telegraphed to the Imam to say that he was told that the latter's troops had reached Jabal Arwa in Asir, occupied it and taken thirty hostages—but he could not believe it. If, however, it were a fact and ordered by the Imam, then there was neither might nor power save in Allah. The sequel falls to be told in the next report.

III.—RELATIONS WITH STATES OUTSIDE ARABIA.

British Empire.

42. Sir A. Ryan sailed from Jedda on the 19th July in H.M.S. "Lupin" for five months leave of absence. Mr. Hope Gill became Chargé d'Affaires.

43. Hejazi relations with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were not strained at any point. Exchanges over Transjordan were rather tiresome, as already recounted in paragraphs 18 to 31, but His Majesty's Government's other fosterling, Iraq, gave not a moment's anxiety.

44. The signed Money Order Agreement with Palestine was received from the Hejazi Government in July and transmitted to Jerusalem together with two notes from the Mecca Postmaster-General concerning a typing error in the English version and the settlement of "interest" on outstanding accounts.

45. The Hejazi Government were reminded in July that the Government of India were still awaiting the revised versions of a similar agreement. The Hejazi debt to the Government of India for arms has already been referred to in paragraph 10.

46. The question of British banking for this country has been dealt with in paragraph 8; matters concerning British personnel in the Hejaz Air Force in paragraphs 66 to 68; and the proposed Arabian air route in paragraphs 69 to 72.

47. The Hejazi Government's co-operation with the Legation for the manumission of slaves is reported in paragraphs 85 to 86.

International.

48. Before Sir A. Ryan's departure Fuad Bey Hamza took him for another ride on his hobby-horse. He trotted out Hejaz-Nejd and the League of Nations, Hejaz-Nejd and the International Sanitary System, Hejaz-Nejd and the Arms

Traffic Convention, and a newcomer, Hejaz-Nejd and the Disarmament Conference. But this time he found Sir Andrew booted and spurred with instructions.

League of Nations.

49. Fuad Bey was reminded that, in his enquiries of last year, he had limited himself to seeking the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the legal position. He was now told that, although it was not for one Government to pronounce on a question which might concern the League as a whole, the matter had been examined in London with a view to giving the Hejaz-Nejd such friendly assistance as was possible. Fuad Bey was given certain conclusions which were to be drawn from the data available as to the character of the union between the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies, and the further conclusions to be deduced therefrom as to the position of Hejaz-Nejd in regard to possible membership of the League. Asked as to whether his Government had made up their minds to seek admission to the League or were merely exploring the possibility, Fuad Bey intimated that no decision had been taken; they were merely looking into the matter.

International Sanitary System.

50. Three definite points emerged: (a) If the Hejaz-Nejd Government wished to attach reservations to their ratification of the International Sanitary Convention of 1926 they could only do so with the previous consent of all States signatory or accessory to the convention. For this purpose, it would be necessary for them to communicate the proposed reservations to the French Government for transmission to those States. (b) The question of obtaining a seat on the Alexandria Quarantine Board was one, the decision of which rested with the Egyptian Government. (c) The Hejaz-Nejd Government might find it advantageous to accede to the Rome Convention of 1907 and thereby acquire the right to representation on the Committee of the International Office of Public Health at Paris. The official action necessary would be to notify the Italian Government in accordance with article 6 of the convention.

51. Fuad Bey was warned in friendly fashion that it was really most desirable to work up a good sanitary administration in this country. At the same time, he was reminded that other countries would continue to protect themselves, within the limits of international arrangements, against the special dangers arising from the dispersal of the large numbers of possible disease carriers brought together by the pilgrimage.

Arms Traffic Convention.

52. Fuad Bey was told that the purely technical difficulties in the way of the accession of a non-signatory State before the convention came into force were probably not insuperable, but that, regarded as a practical proposition, it seemed doubtful whether the accession of any particular non-signatory State, which saw advantage in making itself a party to the convention and thereby undertaking the onerous obligations which it would impose when it came into force, would at present amount to more than a demonstration of sympathy with the objects of the convention. So many signatory States had delayed ratification that it could only be regarded as doubtful whether the convention would come into force in the near future, if indeed it ever did come into force without amendment. These views were given as personal to Sir A. Ryan and were balanced with the object of avoiding any appearance of seeking to influence the Hejaz-Nejd Government's decision. They, of course, are chiefly concerned with removing the supposed stigma attaching to the inclusion of Arabia in one of the "special zones."

Disarmament Conference.

53. Fuad Bey complained that the Hejaz-Nejd had not been invited, although all sorts of Powers non-members of the League had received invitations. He mentioned pointedly Egypt and Iraq. This matter Sir A. Ryan referred home, and Mr. Hope Gill was instructed in August, should Fuad Bey again raise

the matter, to tell him that His Majesty's Government had not been consulted as to whether the Hejaz-Nejd should be invited or not, the matter of invitations having been left entirely to the Secretariat of the League. Fuad Bey did raise the question and received his answer. He made no further attempt to enlist the interest of His Majesty's Government.

Orientalists and Municipalities.

54. The Hejaz-Nejd were, nevertheless, invited by the Dutch Government in July to send a representative to the International Conference of Orientalists at Leiden, and by His Majesty's Government in August to appoint official delegates to the 1932 Fifth International Congress of Local Authorities, in London; they were also requested to tell their local authorities about this congress. There is no one really clever enough, and no one rich enough was found, to go to Leiden. As for the Congress of 1932, the meantime is no doubt being spent in pondering the European entanglements and spiritual dangers to be faced, if municipal pilgrims from the Holy Places of Islam are to seek the electric light in the West.

France.

55. The treaty negotiations have not yet produced the treaty (see May-June report, paragraph 44).

Italy.

56. Nor have the Italian consul's treaty hopes been fulfilled (see May-June report, paragraph 56). He went on leave on the 19th July having failed, for the second year in succession, to take the treaty with him.

57. A little, but very virulent, anti-Italian propaganda has been circulating in the Hejaz in the form of pamphlets introduced from Syria. They are inspired by the Kufra incident of the early summer.

The Netherlands.

58. The Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, M. Van der Meulen, returned to Jedda from the Hadhramaut (see May-June report, paragraph 46) on about 10th July, and left finally on the 17th July.

59. The following Hejazi appointments abroad were announced in July:—

Sheikh Hafiz Wahba to be Ibn Saud's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at The Hague;

Sheikh Abdullah Ibrahim-al-Fadhl to be First Secretary in charge of the Hejaz-Nejd Legation at The Hague;

Sayyid Hamza-al-Ghouth to be Hejaz-Nejd consul in Batavia.

60. Hejazi negotiations for a Dutch loan have been reported in paragraph 9.

Egypt.

61. Hafiz Amer Bey made several visits during July and August to Mecca and Taif, presumably to continue discussion of matters affecting the Mahmal (see May-June report, paragraph 48).

62. Sidky Pasha made a statement in the Cairo Chamber of Deputies on the 13th July in regard to the practice of sending the Mahmal, accompanied with large consignments of cash and corn, annually to the Hejaz. He traced the reasons why it was discontinued and averred that the Egyptian Government would be glad to be in a position to distribute these alms to the poor of Mecca and Medina, as in the past, as soon as the causes of disagreement with the Hejazi Government disappeared.

Soviet Russia.

63. The Soviet Minister's efforts in working up the sale of petroleum products (see May-June report, paragraph 51) resulted in the signature in August of a £30,000 contract for benzine from Batum. Details of the deal have been given in paragraph 10.

United States of America.

64. As already mentioned in paragraph 12, Mr. Twitchell is expected to return in October with six American prospectors. It is understood that the Hejazi Government have managed to remit £300 for their passages. When they arrive and begin work they will no doubt expect something in the way of salary. It is a pity that there is no American representative here to help them to get it.

Turkey.

65. The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, Abdul Ghani Seni Bey, left finally on the 30th July for Angora, where he was to be made head of the Arabian section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No successor had arrived by the end of August.

IV.—AIR MATTERS.

Hejaz Air Force.

66. Messrs. Morris and North finally got away on the 18th July (see May-June report, paragraph 57). Orders to pay them their arrears and passage money had apparently been given from Mecca on about the 20th June, but no trace of them could be discovered in Jedda until the end of the month. A further fortnight was required to find the £500 in golden sovereigns and bankers' credits, without which Messrs. Morris and North declined to leave the country.

67. There only remained Mr. Lowe. He was shocked to find one morning in July that the aerodrome guard had orders to refuse him admittance. This he attributed to base intrigue by the German Krakowsky (see May-June report, paragraph 55), and came to pour out his woes to the Legation. He was told that having taken service under a foreign Government and played his own game, he must make the best of its ways and the rules, but that if on a straight issue he was being unjustly treated as regards contractual conditions such as pay, he would be given a reasonable measure of assistance as a British subject. He returned at the end of the month to ask for a loan of £10, but as it was found that he had made no real effort to obtain arrears amounting to some £150 due to him, he was advised to take all possible steps himself, before throwing himself on the Legation's assistance. The Hejazi Government informed him on the 8th August that they did not wish to renew his contract and that he could take the terminal leave due to him on the 15th August. The miserable specimen at once yearned to re-enter their service, and at the end of the month signed a clandestine contract with the Turkish corporal who acts as Hejazi Director-General of Military Affairs, binding himself to impossible terms for a further twelvemonth. He was eventually got rid of in September—a matter for the next report.

68. The Hejazi proposals for the reorganisation of their air force personnel having received His Majesty's Government's consideration (see May-June report, paragraph 56) His Majesty's Minister conveyed to them the Air Ministry's views in a memorandum dated the 7th July. No reply was received by the end of August.

Arabian Air Route.

69. In the House of Lords debate of the 23rd June on air communications with the East, the Under-Secretary of State for Air said: "Meanwhile, we are pushing on with the examination of an alternative route along the southern coast of the Persian Gulf, that is, along the Arabian coast. This is being actively explored. Both land and marine aircraft of the Royal Air Force have been making flights of increasing frequency from Basra to Muscat, thus acting as pioneers for ultimate civil development."

70. On the 7th July His Majesty's Minister tackled Fuad Bey Hamza in regard to the exact meaning of the last sentence of the Hejazi memorandum of the 18th June (see May-June report, paragraph 60). His reply showed clearly that what they had in mind was a contract of some kind similar to the one believed to have been made with the Persian Government by Imperial Airways. Sir A. Ryan's impression was that the Hejazi Government were trying to discover what could be got out of His Majesty's Government and/or Imperial Airways before committing themselves. He thought that Ibn Saud's recent tendency to

conciliate extreme Wahhâbi opinion was probably not without effect on the position, however, for the Nejdi ulema might well dislike any truck with foreign aeroplanes in Nejd.

71. At the end of August His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was posted with information as to the latest developments connected with the proposed Arabian air route, in case the matter were pursued with the Hejazi Government. The position had been somewhat altered since the beginning of the year (see January-February report, paragraph 45) by the proposal of Imperial Airways to use flying-boats instead of land-planes in the event of their transferring the Persian Gulf section of their air service to India to the Arabian coast of the Gulf. The acquisition of facilities for land-planes on the Hasa coast was, therefore, no longer of immediate importance, in so far as Imperial Airways were concerned. No question of a contract between them and the Hejazi Government was thus likely to arise.

72. British aircraft using the Hasa coast would, therefore, for the present be likely to be almost exclusively military. The facilities which His Majesty's Government desired to secure for such aircraft remained as before, namely, the provision of emergency landing grounds on the Hasa coast and an assurance that, if British aircraft were compelled in emergency to enter and alight on Nejdi territory or in Nejdi territorial waters, they would be treated in accordance with the usual rules of international courtesy and their occupants with ordinary humanity.

V.—MILITARY MATTERS.

Northern Hejaz.

73. There was unrest and movement in the north throughout July and in August. The Beni Atiya, who lay northernmost of the Hejazi tribes, were apparently given *carte blanche* by Ibn Saud to prevent defections to Transjordan of dissatisfied elements among the Hejazi tribes further south. Even officials were reported as having deserted, the Amir of Al 'Ula, Sheikh Ismail Qazaz, and a Nejdi officer of regulars, named Hammami, amongst them. The Beni Atiya seem to have interpreted their rôle in a liberal sense, and to have raided the Aniza, Billi and Harb to some purpose, while the Amirs of Dhaba and Tabuk looked on. In early July Mr. Philby tried to make his way as far as Tabuk, with a pair of the new Marconi mobile sets, for testing purposes, and to spy out the land, but he was not allowed further north than Al 'Ula. By August Captain Glubb of the Transjordan frontier police considered that there was a possibility of Ibn Saud ordering Ibn Musa'id, his Amir of Hail, into the Northern Hejaz with his Shammar to restore order, with probable complications in the shape of a mass Beni Atiya withdrawal into Transjordan for refuge.

74. In the middle of July, however, Ibn Saud sent his kinsman, Abdullah-as-Sudairi, as Amir to Tabuk with a dozen cars, Nejdi troops, and four lorries full of arms and ammunition, as well as a camel-gun, probably the 47-mm. Pocisk presented to Ibn Saud by Poland in August last year. On arrival he seems to have concerted action with the Amir of Dhaba, who had a force of 100 camelmen at his disposal, to overawe the northern tribes. Having apparently succeeded in restoring internal order, he turned his attention to the frontier and carried out motor-patrols near Mudawwara. Captain Glubb has since reported that the Transjordan police posts are being answered post for post on the other side of the frontier by the northern Amirs of Tabuk and Jauf. The latter, Turki-as-Sudairi, cousin to him of Tabuk and successor of the notorious an-Nashmi, was said in August to have five machine guns, some 600 rifles, and about 160,000 rounds of s.a.a. Young Ibn Abdul Wahid has been appointed Amir of Qaryat-al-Milh, *vice* Abdullah-al-Hawasi, an old man and peaceful. Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeyd, Ibn Saud's Controller of Beduin and frontier representative at Qaryat, was reported in August to have fifty men and rifles and four lorries.

East (Nejd).

75. There were vague reports of "trouble in Nejd" throughout July and August, but nothing resulted. There seemed no doubt, however, that the tribes were being more strictly taxed than usual, probably thanks to Ibn Saud's presence, which would account for a certain feeling of unrest. Bedouin, anxious for largesse, camped in considerable numbers round Riyadh.

South (Asir).

76. The trouble simmering on the Asiri frontier with the Yemen has been described in paragraphs 40 and 41.

VII.—NAVAL MATTERS.

77. H.M.S. "Lupin" (Captain E. B. C. Dicken) visited Jedda for a few hours on the 19th July to embark His Majesty's Minister on his departure on leave. There were no other naval visits, British or other.

78. On the 11th July His Majesty's Minister submitted to His Majesty's Government his views on the advisability of the more frequent visits by His Majesty's ships to ports in the Hejaz and Asir desired by the Admiralty. No final decision was communicated before the end of August.

VII.—PILGRIMAGE.

79. The débris of the 1931 pilgrimage from India was cleared away on the 13th July, when 318 destitutes were repatriated at Government of India's expense (see May-June report, paragraph 68). This figure, out of a total of only 7,000 Indian pilgrims, compared badly with the figures for 1930, namely, 387 destitutes among 11,000 pilgrims.

80. British West African pilgrims seeking to return to Africa by the customary desert route to Lith and sanbuq voyage to Massowa met with great difficulties and hardship, which in August began to cause a reflux and destitution. The necessity for their repatriation was being studied locally at the end of August.

81. A vast amount of head- and paper-work was done by His Majesty's Minister between the end of the pilgrimage and his departure on leave, covering the thousand and one points raised by the Indian Haj Inquiry Committee's report. Detailed memoranda and despatches on all current issues were submitted to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India by the beginning of August, in good time for consideration before the 1932 pilgrimage begins.

VIII.—SLAVERY.

82. The last report omitted to record the number of slaves manumitted by the Legation. Two males were freed in May, two males and one female in June, one male and two females in July, and three males and two females in August. All were repatriated via Port Sudan, except the last two females, whom it was found possible to have manumitted locally by a willing owner, and two of the males freed in August; these were sent via Jibuti to Addis Ababa (see paragraphs 84 and 85).

83. The increasing difficulties of shipping manumitted Abyssinian slaves to Massowa for repatriation (see March-April report, paragraph 64) came to a head in July, when the Eritrean authorities communicated impossible terms through the Italian consul in Jedda. These terms effectively closed the Massowa route.

84. Luckily the Abyssinian Government were induced by His Majesty's Legation at Addis Ababa to interest themselves in the liberation and repatriation of two Ethiopian boys sold while on pilgrimage, one of whom succeeded in escaping to this Legation. They were repatriated in August direct to Jibuti and may serve to mark this route for regular use for this purpose in future.

85. For the first time in its life the Hejazi Government co-operated with His Majesty's Government and implemented article 7 of the Jedda Treaty of 1927. They sought out the other boy in Mecca, held courts of enquiry, sent him to the Legation for repatriation, and followed him up with a full report plus a request that the Abyssinian Government be invited to force their slave-trading subject to refund £80, the proceed of his sale to his Hejazi client.

86. There was less inclination shown in investigating a case that had a similar complexion and concerned one of the Sanusi family, who came on pilgrimage from the Sudan and was remarked to have returned there without

two of his black attendants. Pressed, however, by His Majesty's Minister, Fuad Bey Hamza made enquiries and reported in July that the two had left Mecca for Lith and Massowa, which tallied with the Legation's independent information.

IX.—MISCELLANEOUS.

Visitors.

87. His Highness the Nawab of Bahawalpur paid a rapid visit to the Holy Places of Islam in July.

Mr. Twitchell visited Jedda again at the end of July. His work has already been referred to in paragraph 12.

Marconi's expert, Mr. Boucicault, left Jedda at the beginning of August to rig wireless at Tabūk, but at the end of August he still lay half-way, at Wejh, kicking his heels and calling for petrol.

Staff.

88. Sir A. Ryan went on leave on the 19th July. Mr. Hope Gill became Chargé d'Affaires.

Mr. Furlonge was given a fortnight's sick-leave on the 26th August to recuperate at Erkowit in the Sudan.

The second archivist, Captain Lewis, left on the 23rd July for two months' special leave in England.

89. Before leaving His Majesty's Minister drafted his detailed recommendations to the Government of India for the complete reorganisation of the Indian and medical sections of the Legations, with a view to its taking effect as from the 1st January, 1932.

[E 5799/2064/25]

No. 55.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 419.)

My Lord,

Jedda, November 2, 1931.

THE last ten days have seen the final development of a serious split in the Hejazi Government. The Director-General of Finance, who has for some months been the virtual dictator of the Hejaz, has been denounced in unison by the remainder of the "Government," and has been summoned by the King to Riadh.

2. I think it was Mr. Philby's return from Riadh in the middle of October which brought matters to a head. He was infuriated by the Finance Department's theft of his benzine stocks and found his own financial position worse than he had thought. He at once wrote to tell Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman just what he thought of him and his financial policy, reminding him, amongst other things, that the price of theft in this country was the loss of a hand, and stating that on this basis he deserved to be chopped into little pieces. He also sent to Ibn Saud a formal and detailed denunciation of Abdullah Suleiman and all his ways. He then returned to Taif.

3. There he found the Amir Feisal, Fuad Bey Hamza, and the two brothers Fadhl, already putting their heads together in search of a way to break down Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's position. They were all victims of his power, in that they were not only completely overshadowed by him in all branches of government, but were also starved by him of funds. The Viceroy had had to postpone the summer removal of his diwan and household to Taif for lack of cash. Fuad Bey has received no salary for eight months, and has since told me that he has long been ashamed to demand work from his personnel in the Foreign Affairs department, who have also received no pay for months.

4. Under the stimulus, no doubt, of Mr. Philby's openly declared hostility to Abdullah Suleiman, these four drew up a lengthy memorandum to the King. Mr. Philby tells me that it was an ultimatum, tendering the resignation of Viceroy and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Chief of the Viceregal Diwan (Ibrahim-al-Fadhl), and Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly (his half-brother Abdullah-al-Fadhl), unless the Director-General of Finance were removed from his post. Abdullah-al-Fadhl left with

this document for Riādh on the 23rd October, together with Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman. It was mooted that Fuad Bey should follow them on the 24th, but he declined to go without the Amir Feisal, who also preferred to remain. The King's reaction is still anxiously awaited.

5. Fuad Bey came to Jedda on the 29th October, after having been recalled to Taif to answer some point of detail on which Ibn Saud sought information. I had a long informal talk with him on the evening of the 31st. It proved a little difficult at first to draw him, but he eventually gave me the whole story. The memorandum is apparently not an ultimatum, but a series of constructive proposals, designed to achieve the two objects which Fuad Bey states he has pressed upon the King ever since his return in the spring, namely, the drawing up and publication of a budget and the establishment of a Government on the basis of "the collective and individual responsibility of Ministers." Abdullah Suleiman, he said, had been invited to subscribe to this document, but had refused.

6. Fuad Bey seemed very doubtful as to whether any useful result would flow from the King's deliberations. He spoke with bitterness of Abdullah Suleiman's hold over Ibn Saud, and wished that the King would return to Mecca and thresh the matter out. He feared that he would not, but that things would drift on from bad to worse. They had lost all confidence in themselves, he said, and I think he was on the point of saying that they had lost all confidence in the King, when he changed the subject.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

[W 13269/47/98]

No. 56.

Mr. Hope Gill to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 424.)

My Lord,

Jedda, November 4, 1931.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 404 of the 8th October, I have the honour to report that the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 30th October published the news that the Hejazi Government has received an invitation from the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to send a representative to the General Disarmament Conference next year.

2. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs informed me on the 31st October that it had not yet been decided whether to accept the invitation. I enquired on what grounds it might be declined, and Fuad Bey confided how extremely difficult it would be to render a true return of the armed forces of the Hejaz-Nejd and the expenditure thereon. Every Amir, big and little, had an armed retinue—and there was no budget.

3. He has unbosomed himself of a further difficulty to-day. Most of the documents which he has received from Geneva are in French, a language of which he knows little. He intends, I believe, to bring me the dossier from Mecca in order to have it explained.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 5807/2064/25]

No. 57.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 432.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 9, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 419 of the 2nd November, in which I reported on the split which has occurred in the Hejaz-Nejd Government, I have the honour to inform you that Ibn Saud does not appear to have taken any decision in the matter. The Director-General of Finance is still at Riādh. Orders emanating from there have recently been circulated to all finance officials in the Hejaz instructing them to lock up their tills and to make no payments of any kind, but these orders were neither issued through, nor even communicated

to, the Viceroy and the rest of the "Government" here. As a result of the King's long silence and this evidence of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's continued disregard of his colleagues, the first feelings of nervous optimism entertained by Fuad Bey Hamza and his party are now giving way to a sense of futility and despair.

2. The Governor of Jedda and Director of Customs have protested telegraphically against the suspension of payments, but without result. Suspension of work will no doubt follow.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 5797/3053/91]

No. 53.

Sir R. Graham to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 860.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Rome, dated the 16th November, 1931, respecting the Italian occupation of Great Hanish and Jebel Zukur Islands.

Rome, November 18, 1931.

Enclosure in No. 58.

Note verbale.

(Translation.)

THE Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the pro-memoria of the 5th October, in which His Britannic Majesty's Embassy desired to obtain an assurance that the Royal Government were in agreement with the British Government in considering that the islands Great Hanish and Jebel Zukur came within the scope of paragraph 5 of the conclusions of the Rome conversations of 1927; and that, in particular, the establishment of Italian posts in those islands did not involve or constitute any claim to sovereignty over the islands themselves.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have no difficulty in assuring His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that, in confirmation of what was previously stated in the pro-memoria of the 11th April, 1930, the question of sovereignty in the Hanish group of islands remains in abeyance, notwithstanding the establishment there of Italian posts for the protection of Italian private interests, an establishment which dates from December 1929.

The international juridical status of the Hanish group of islands is thus considered by the Royal Italian Government to be in the same category as that of the islands Farsan and Cameran, mentioned in the conclusions of the Rome conversations of 1927, or of the Islands of Abu Ail (which incidentally form part of the Hanish group), Zebair and Jebel Tair, the status of which formed the subject of consideration by the British and Italian Governments in 1928, during the negotiations for the Convention regarding Lighthouses in the Red Sea, to the effect that as regards those islands also the question of sovereignty was to remain in abeyance.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have, moreover, no difficulty in assuring His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that the Hanish group of islands, as, in fact, all the Red Sea islands mentioned above, come within the scope of paragraph 5 of the conclusions of the conversations of Rome, both as regards economic and commercial freedom in the Red Sea Islands for the citizens and subjects of the two countries, and as regards the character and extent of the protection which those citizens and subjects may legitimately expect from their respective Governments.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Rome, November 16, 1931—Year X.

[E 5793/104/91]

No. 59.

M. de Fleuriau to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 24.)

L'ADMINISTRATION générale des Phares de l'ancien Empire ottoman a signalé au Gouvernement français qu'elle se trouverait, par suite de la dépréciation de la livre sterling, dans l'impossibilité d'assurer l'exécution de la Convention de Londres du 16 décembre 1930 si le Gouvernement britannique ne reconnaissait pas que la rémunération stipulée à l'article 3 du contrat annexé à l'article 4 de ladite convention doit être réadaptée en prenant pour base la valeur or de cette rémunération au moment de la signature du contrat.

Les stipulations de paiement n'intervenant que dans ce contrat, dont les seuls signataires sont le Board of Trade et l'Administration des Phares, il y aurait lieu, selon M. Briand, de préciser, par une disposition additionnelle, que toutes les sommes qui s'y trouvent énoncées s'entendent à la parité or de la livre sterling à la date de la signature. L'Administration intéressée compte poursuivre avec le Board of Trade l'inscription de cette garantie dans le texte du contrat.

D'autre part, les Puissances signataires de la convention ont déclaré, dans son article 1^{er}, "accepter le contrat passé le 29 novembre 1930 entre le Président du Board of Trade à Londres et la Société des Phares ottomans . . ." Elles ont donc accepté ce contrat tel qu'il est dans son texte sans stipulation de garantie or. Il est, par suite, nécessaire qu'elles donnent aussi leur accord sur cette garantie. Il suffirait pour cela, après introduction au contrat de la précision envisagée, d'apporter au texte de l'article 1^{er} de la convention un léger changement ou une addition. Il serait facile ensuite de centraliser à Londres, par une procédure simplifiée, les approbations de cette modification par les diverses Puissances signataires.

L'Ambassadeur de France serait reconnaissant à son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté britannique aux Affaires étrangères de bien vouloir entretenir le Board of Trade de cette question et de lui faire savoir qu'une modification de l'article 1^{er} dans le sens indiqué ci-dessus aurait l'approbation du Gouvernement français.

M. de Fleuriau saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 20 novembre 1931.*

[E 5793/104/91]

No. 60.

Sir John Simon to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, November 26, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 20th November, in which you were so good as to inform me that the Ottoman Lighthouse Company had indicated to the French Government their inability to guarantee the execution of the Red Sea Lights Convention, of the 16th December, 1930, unless the remuneration, stipulated in article 3 of the agreement annexed to article 4 of the convention, were reassessed, by taking as a basis its gold value at the moment of the signature of the agreement.

2. It is suggested in paragraphs 2 and 3 of your note that the views of the company should be met by the insertion, by agreement with the other Powers concerned, of a small amendment in article 1 of the convention, while the consent of those Powers will also have to be obtained to the proposed modification of clause 3 of the agreement annexed to article 4.

3. His Majesty's Government have given urgent consideration to this proposal, which seems to them, however, open to serious objections. As the French Government are aware, the negotiation of the convention has taken many years

and has already met with numerous difficulties. It was only after protracted negotiations that the various Powers concerned finally agreed to sign the convention, in its present form, on the 16th December, 1930. Since then, largely owing to the continued representations of His Majesty's Government, these Powers have taken many of the preliminary steps necessary for its ratification, and His Majesty's Government had entertained the hope that the convention might thus be brought into force in the very near future. In view of the difficulties which have already arisen, His Majesty's Government are convinced that any attempt at this stage to introduce a further modification, of however slight a character, in the text of the convention as signed, would not only cause the postponement of the ratification of the convention by most of the signatory Powers for an indefinite period, but might even endanger the whole instrument. As the French Government know, His Majesty's Government have now maintained these lights at their sole charge out of British funds for a very long period, which has been protracted far more than they ever anticipated, owing to the constant difficulties which have arisen in connexion with the negotiation of the convention. In these circumstances, the further postponement of the entry into force of the convention is a contingency which His Majesty's Government could not contemplate with equanimity, since they regard it as a matter of the utmost importance that the convention in its present form should be brought into force with the least possible delay. They regret, therefore, that it is not possible for them to embark on any further negotiations with the company before the convention is ratified by at least four Powers and thus brought formally into force.

4. If, however, the French Government, in view of the considerations advanced above, are willing to co-operate in accelerating the entry into force of the convention, His Majesty's Government will be ready, as soon as the convention shall have come into force, to open negotiations with the company, with a view to meeting in as sympathetic a spirit as possible their reasonable demands, and to use their good offices, in co-operation with the French Government, in order to obtain the necessary agreement of the other signatory Powers, either by means of a supplementary protocol or by exchanges of notes, to any settlement which may be reached with the company in regard to the point which has now been raised.

5. On the other hand, the French Government will realise that, more especially in view of the present financial situation, it is not possible for His Majesty's Government to continue indefinitely to maintain these lights at their sole charge. If, therefore, the company should be unable to agree to this proposal, with the consequent risk of further serious delay in the entry into force of the convention, His Majesty's Government would have no alternative but to give immediate consideration to the possibility of allowing the lights to be extinguished and of abandoning any further attempt to provide for the continuance by the means which have hitherto been in contemplation.

I have, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 5862/100/25]

No. 61.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 26, 1931.

IN accordance with arrangements made with your Department, I have the honour to submit herewith a general report on the pilgrimage to the Holy Places of the Hejaz in 1931. I have compiled this report at home from the series of special reports drawn up by the various pilgrimage officers attached to His Majesty's Legation at Jedda, which Mr. Hope Gill, who had not himself been in Jedda during the pilgrimage season, thought it better to send home as they stood, with annotations only, in his despatch to your predecessor, No. 373, of the

29th September. Although I have confined myself in the main to editing the separate reports freely condensing them where necessary, I have included certain additions and comments suggested by my own study of pilgrimage matters during the past twelve months.

2. I have preserved, as far as possible the form of the Pilgrimage Report for 1930. I propose to consider in due course the best means of standardising to some extent the form of these annual reports which, though always full of useful matter in the past, have not perhaps been drawn up in the most convenient manner for comparison from year to year.

3. In his above-mentioned despatch, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires paid well-merited tributes to the work done in 1931 by the various pilgrimage officers and by Dr. Abdul Hamid, the head of the medical section. In endorsing these tributes, I need add nothing to what has on this and previous occasions been said of the constant devotion to the interests of Indian pilgrims shown by the British Indian vice-consul and Dr. Abdul Hamid, who sustain the heaviest burden. The Malay pilgrimage officer, Haji Abdul Mejid, brings to his task great knowledge of his countrymen and their special requirements and continues to render very valuable services. I would draw your special attention to the work of Captain B. W. Seager, who deals with the less highly organised sections of the pilgrimage and has to handle a great variety of pilgrims of different races, more especially those from British dependencies in Africa. I have been greatly impressed by the ability and sympathy with which he watches over the interests of pilgrims of this poorer and sometimes very helpless class. He was, moreover, of the greatest assistance to me in 1931 in discussing with the authorities concerned particular questions affecting African pilgrims and those from the Aden Protectorate, during the visits paid to Jedda in the spring by the Commissioner at Port Sudan and the Protectorate Secretary at Aden.

4. I would suggest that copies of the enclosed report should be circulated through the proper channels to India, Bagdad, Jerusalem and the usual other posts under the Colonial Office.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 61.

REPORT ON THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1931 (A.H. 1349).

Prefatory Note.—Short explanations of a certain number of terms which occur frequently in connexion with the pilgrimage are given in Appendix A to the report. This list will be revised and amplified on a convenient future occasion.

(1) *Introductory and General.*

THE political situation in the Hejaz and Nejd underwent a marked deterioration during the first nine months of 1931. This did not manifest itself early enough to affect of itself the pilgrimage. The great decline in the number of overseas pilgrims was the result of depression in the countries of origin, not of conditions in the Hejaz. Owing to its serious effect on the finances of the country, however, the decrease in the pilgrimage was itself one of the principal causes of the deterioration in internal Hejazi conditions, which became patent in the summer and autumn. It had become evident towards the end of 1930 that the number of overseas pilgrims in 1931 would fall far short of the number for the previous season. As will presently be seen the event more than justified gloomy anticipations. The consequences to the finance and trade of the Hejaz, a country with practically no resources other than those derived, directly or indirectly, from the pilgrimage, were disastrous. They extended far beyond the actual pilgrimage area owing to the large measure in which the other parts of Ibn Saud's dominions have become financially dependent on the Hejaz. There is thus a close connexion between the pilgrimage and the general state of Hejaz-Nejd; so

much so that immediately after the 1931 pilgrimage the means of improving pilgrimage conditions became one of the principal preoccupations of Ibn Saud and his advisers. When, in the course of his efforts to cope with the general situation, he decided, in June 1931, to convene a "National Conference" of representatives of the Hejazi towns, pilgrimage questions formed an important part of the agenda. The conference, however, produced few concrete results in any direction, and, up to the time of writing, little or nothing has been done to improve the basic conditions of the pilgrimage.

2. Pilgrimage Day, on which all pilgrims congregate at Arafat, fell this year on Tuesday, the 28th April. The usual uncertainty as to the exact date prevailed up to the last moment, but, as there was no question of a Friday Haj (see paragraph 2 of the Report for 1930), the uncertainty was of little consequence, except as a cause of local inconvenience.

3. The climatic conditions were again favourable, a feature which may be expected to recur for many years to come now that the lunar dates of Pilgrimage Day and the ensuing festival are working back towards spring and winter. Thanks to this and the small dimensions of the 1931 pilgrimage, health conditions were unusually good. There was no epidemic disease and the mortality from ordinary causes (see section (4) below) was small.

4. It cannot be said that there was any marked improvement in 1931 in the sanitary equipment provided by the Hejazi Government. This subject will be dealt with more fully in section (4) below.

5. The total number of overseas pilgrims was less than half that for 1930, the number arriving by sea being estimated at 39,346, as compared with 84,821 in the previous year. Every important element showed a heavy decrease, as will be seen by the detailed statistics in section (2) below.

6. The number of inland pilgrims from the Hejaz itself and other parts of Arabia was also much less than in 1930. Even the residents of Mecca, who normally perform the Haj in great numbers, abstained to a large extent this year owing to financial stringency. The numbers from Nejd were also small. On the other hand, an unusually large number of pilgrims totalling several thousands came overland from the Yemen. Reckoning these various elements together with the pilgrims from overseas, the number of those assembled at Arafat on Pilgrimage Day may be put approximately at something in the neighbourhood of 50,000 persons.

7. The average means and purchasing power of the foreign pilgrims was less than in previous years, even in the case of those, e.g., from the Dutch East Indies, who normally constitute the wealthier elements. This must be attributed to economic depression in the countries of origin. The general purchasing power of pilgrims was still further diminished by increases in Government charges and other necessary expenditure, so that the margin left for extras including the souvenirs, &c., which pilgrims like to take home from the Holy Land, was greatly reduced. The Hejazi market, already depressed during the previous season (see paragraph 4 of the Report for 1930) was again overstocked and the local merchants suffered severely from trade depression, a fact which tended to aggravate the effect on the financial resources of the Government produced by the diminution in revenue derived direct from pilgrims.

8. The financial crisis, which was foreshadowed in the latter part of 1930 and became acute in the spring of 1931 reacted on pilgrims in various ways. It brought in its train a monetary crisis, manifested in a heavy depreciation of the local silver and nickel currency. The silver riyal, legally fixed at the rate of 10 to the English gold pound, which is the basis of the currency system, broke away, and nickel "halalas," much used in retail transactions, suffered a serious devaluation accompanied by violent exchange fluctuations just about the time of the pilgrimage. The shifting policy of the Government in their efforts to cope with the situation, the manœuvres of money-changers and other speculators, and the lack of confidence among merchants all contributed to the prevalence of uncertain conditions with the result that the prices charged to pilgrims for the necessities of life were apt to be inflated. According to the Indian vice-consul the inflation of prices was greater than was justified by fall in exchange and imposed hardship on pilgrims as well as local inhabitants. The Malay pilgrimage officer takes a more moderate view (*cf.* paragraph 172 below). Pilgrims also suffered from the efforts of the Government to offset the diminution of revenue by a considerable increase in customs charges at the beginning of the year and

greater stringency in the surveillance of their luggage and personal effects. *Inter alia*, a limit of 50 kilog. was set on the amount of rice allowed to be imported free of duty for personal consumption, a departure from the previous practice of exempting all such rice from duty. Steps were also taken to manage the utilisation of means of transport by pilgrims in such a way as to increase the revenue from koshan or road-tax, which constitutes a heavy charge on those using motor-transport for personal conveyance, as the majority of moderately well-to-do pilgrims do, and those using camels, which are normally employed for the transport of luggage. Complaints were made of the operation of a system, revived this year, whereby an official organisation, known as Naqaba, allots clients to the various motor companies in such a way as to eliminate competition and place pilgrims at the mercy of the motor-owners. It is also stated that instructions were issued to load camels as lightly as possible, in order to increase the revenue from koshan and the responsible officials were accused of manipulating the regulations so as to charge for camels in excess of the numbers actually used. This will be further explained in paragraph 81 below.

9. There was no improvement in the general condition of the roads between the main centres. A new road was opened to facilitate the journey to Arafat by motor car. The use of cars for transport to and from that place via Muna was restricted more severely than in 1930, when the novel experiment of allowing cars to be used on a considerable scale on this road (see paragraph 5 of the report for 1930) caused great confusion. In 1931 the privilege was confined to members of the Royal Family with their suites and a limited number of officials and notable personages. Among those on whom it was conferred was the British Indian vice-consul. One reform introduced by the authorities this year proved a great blessing to pilgrims. Many of them had in the past suffered hardship during the three days' halt at Muna on the return from Mecca to Arafat owing to the commandeering of houses there from the owners or from pilgrims who had rented them in advance and had had them provided with drinking water, &c., in advance. This year the Government equipped for their own use a well-found building, specially constructed and supplied with electricity and other conveniences. This relieved the strain on the limited house accommodation available at Muna for pilgrims of the better class. Thanks to the measures taken by the Government and the small dimensions of the pilgrimage, these were able to rent houses at relatively reasonable rents, instead of relying on tents as the poorer pilgrims do. Although the Government requisitioned several houses at Mecca, no serious inconvenience was caused there, owing to the smallness of the pilgrimage.

10. Security was again well maintained in the pilgrim area, notwithstanding the presence in and about the towns of numerous half-starved Bedouin, driven thither by penury in the interior. The British Indian vice-consul draws a pitiful picture of these famished and often naked unfortunates. The continued maintenance of security is the greatest advantage conferred on pilgrims by the régime of Ibn Saud and reflects much credit on the King, even though it be affected partly by the enforcement of punishments which would be considered inhuman in less primitive conditions, e.g., the amputation of limbs or even the death penalty for robbery. It is a punishable offence even to touch unclaimed articles on the roads. Notwithstanding this rigour and the safety which has been assured on the pilgrim roads, there were many complaints in 1931 of petty thefts and pilferage in Mecca and even in the sacred precincts there. An unusual number of such thefts took place at Muzdalafa, where pilgrims halt for the night on the return journey from Arafat to Muna. In some cases the culprits were believed to be Nejdî soldiers, whose pay was much in arrear.

11. There was again no Moslem Conference at Mecca in 1931. Ibn Saud gave the now usual annual banquet to leading pilgrims of all nationalities. The guests included many Indians. Egyptians came second in number. The number of Javanese was again noticeably small. The King spoke at length on the paramount necessity for unity of thought and action in the Moslem world, the importance of the Haj as an institution having for its primary purpose the assemblage of Moslems from different countries, the fallacy of reliance in the aping of Western civilisation, and his own indifference to all ambition or any object other than the glory of God and Islam. A tribute paid to the Indian leader Shaukat Ali by an Egyptian speaker elicited from His Majesty an angry denunciation of that personage, whom he criticised more particularly for having

spoken of "our brethren the Jews." He disclaimed all friendship with Jews and Christians alike.

12. The dispersal of the pilgrimage took place in good conditions and was effected without undue delay. The homeward shipping arrangements for British pilgrims may be described as generally satisfactory, subject to one or two observations on points of detail which will be dealt with in section 9 below.

13. The arrangements for recovering the effects of deceased pilgrims were again unsatisfactory. The tendency of certain mutawwifs to misappropriate such effects gives rise to complaint, and the attitude of the Hejazi Government in specific cases brought to their notice by His Majesty's Legation has not been sufficiently helpful to discourage abuse.

14. Despite the decrease in the total number of Indian pilgrims, the number of destitutes who had to be repatriated at Government expense was not far short of the figure for 1930. The majority were persons who had reached the Hejaz overland from Nejd, but there were also a considerable number of persons who had come by sea after being allowed to take single tickets at Indian ports. Financial stringency in the Hejaz had the effect this year of greatly increasing the number of pilgrims of various nationalities seeking the assistance of public authorities to get themselves repatriated after long or short sojourns in the Hejaz. The British Legation was compelled to apply for an increase in the small annual grant made by the Government of the Straits Settlements for this purpose. The disposal of African pilgrims of the poorer class, who can normally support themselves in the Hejaz until they have the means to return, also presented difficulty; and money had to be advanced on the security of a chieftain from the Aden Protectorate for the return of a party of his tribesmen. Numerous cases of destitution occurred even among the Javanese, usually the wealthiest class of pilgrims. The Netherlands Government had no arrangements for repatriating these, and the Hejazi Government undertook to finance the return of about 100 of them. They were less generous to the Afghans and Bokharans, many of whom were left at the end of the pilgrimage without means of making the homeward journey.

15. The number of notable personages who made the pilgrimage in 1931 was considerable, notwithstanding the falling off in the total number of pilgrims. They included Sir Abdul-Kerim Ghuznavi, a member of the Bengal Legislative Council, who had made an earlier visit in 1913, and is keenly interested in all pilgrimage questions; M. M. A. Momen, Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, Bengal; Prince Ahmed Teyhid of Turkey, a grandson of Sultan Abdul Aziz and nephew to the last Caliph of Constantinople; two stipendiary chiefs from the Aden Protectorate; and last, but not least, ex-King Amanullah of Afghanistan. The visit of the last named attracted great attention, and was the occasion of a considerable influx of his supporters into the Holy Land. It may have inspired, also, the despatch of an official mission from Kabul and the visit of the Afghan Minister at Cairo. The notables included Moulana Soofi Ghulam Muhiuddin, an influential religious leader in Kathiawar, who is by origin an Afghan and is related to the Mujaddidi family. He is stated to have done much to counteract the political activities of Abdullah Khan. A number of Indian political agitators also made the Haj. Some of these established or renewed contact with King Amanullah. One person in this category, however, Ismail Ghuznavi of Amritsar, proved to have modified his former attitude of antagonism to the British authorities in regard to pilgrimage matters. He enjoys influence in Wahhabi circles, and rendered considerable assistance this year to the British Indian vice-consul.

16. Mr. H. B. St. John Philby, now Sheikh Abdullah, made his first pilgrimage after embracing Islam in August 1930. Visits were paid to the Hejaz before and after the actual pilgrimage respectively by Nawab Mar Jung Bahadur, Foreign Minister to the Nizam of Hyderabad, and His Highness the Nawab of Bahawalpur.

17. By arrangement between His Majesty's Minister and Commander Jackson of H.M.S. "Dahlia," Red Sea Sloops, about twenty naval ratings from that ship and another which happened to be at Port Sudan were enabled to make the pilgrimage. They arrived at Jedda in H.M.S. "Dahlia," which made the usual visit to Jedda at pilgrimage time.

18. There was no trouble this year in connexion with forged rupee notes, the circulation of which gave rise to anxiety in 1930. It is probable that this

traffic was discouraged by the success which finally crowned the efforts of the British Indian vice-consul (see paragraph 12 of the report for 1930) to locate the distributing agency in Syria, after which it was left to the French authorities there to pursue the matter. Shortly after the end of the 1931 pilgrimage the Hejazi Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Minister in great confidence of an alleged plot to introduce forged notes on a large scale into the Hejaz, and stated that his Government were taking active measures. Indian pilgrims, although spared the uncertainty caused last year by the suspicion cast on their paper money, suffered another form of inconvenience. One of the results of the depression in Hejazi merchant circles was that in many cases difficulty was experienced in cashing "hundis," or drafts on local commercial houses, purchased from their correspondents in India, an old-world form of exchange, the use of which still prevails widely in the absence of adequate modern banking facilities in the Holy Places.

19. His Majesty's Minister devoted much attention during the 1931 season, in close consultation with the British Indian vice-consul and the medical officer, to the reports of the Indian Haj Enquiry Committee. His observations and conclusions on all portions of these reports which concern the Legation in Jedda, and more especially the Indian and medical sections of it, were embodied in a series of despatches addressed to the Government of India and the Foreign Office. While the unavoidable delay in furnishing these reports is regretted, it enabled Sir A. Ryan to review the various questions in the light of a year's experience, and to bring many of them up to date. It is hoped that his conclusions, taken in conjunction with those arrived at in India by the Haj Enquiry Committee, will provide a basis for considered decisions on numerous matters affecting the welfare of Indian pilgrims, including the reorganisation of the Indian section of the Legation and of the arrangements for supplying medical assistance to pilgrims.

20. There is nothing to record, in connexion with the other British sections of the pilgrimage, of sufficiently general interest to merit mention in this introductory portion of the present report.

21. There was again no sacred caravan or mahmal from Egypt in 1931, all efforts at a settlement of this and other questions outstanding between the Egyptian Government and Ibn Saud having failed. A new Egyptian consul, appointed to Jedda just before the pilgrimage, continued to discuss these matters without result, and the stage of formal negotiations had not been reached up to the time of writing. The difficulty of arriving at a settlement is understood to lie largely between the two Kings. Welcome as the arrival of a mahmal and the gifts it brings would be to the Hejazis as such, the objections due to Wahhabi puritanism are in any case hard to overcome. It is worth mentioning that, in the remonstrance addressed to Ibn Saud by the ulema of Nejd in the summer of 1931 (see paragraph 94 below), they commended him for his stand against the Egyptian mahmal. The Egyptian medical mission was again, however, treated with consideration during the 1931 season.

(2) Statistics.

22. As already stated, the estimated total number of overseas pilgrims fell from 84,821 in 1930 to 39,346 in 1931. The decrease in the numbers coming from the most important countries of origin was variable. It was particularly marked in the case of Egypt, which showed a reduction of 70 per cent., and the Dutch East Indies, which, though they furnished the largest single element as usual, showed a reduction of 50 per cent. In two cases the action of the authorities of the countries of origin reduced the numbers to negligible proportions. The French discouraged pilgrims from Algeria and Tunis on the ostensible ground of the existence of plague in those countries. The Persian Government would also appear to have boycotted the pilgrimage this year.

23. The following tables show, (A), the number of pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by sea, arranged by nationality; (B), the number of pilgrims arriving by sea, arranged by countries of embarkation; and (C), the number of ships transporting pilgrims, and the number of pilgrims carried under each flag. For convenience of comparison, the figures are given for the whole of the six years since Ibn Saud completed his conquest of the Hejaz. Those for the years

1926 to 1930 are reproduced from the report for 1930. Although every effort has been made to secure accurate information from the various sources available, certain discrepancies will be observed in the tables. These are due to differences in the method of computation, as explained in paragraph 21 of the report for 1930, to which it may be added that no records showing nationality are available for the port of Yambo:—

TABLE (A).

NUMBER of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Nationality.

Nationality.	1926.	1927.	1928.	1929.	1930.	1931.
India and Far East—						
Indian	18,937	26,514 ^(b)	14,022 ^(c)	15,146	11,061	7,276
Malayan	5,500	29,706 ^(c)	4,499 ^(f)	1,455	2,590	506
Dutch East Indian ..	5,110	39,704	42,730	31,119	32,000	16,803
Chinese and other ..	66	..	2,246	1,115	1,367 ^(g)	926 ^(p)
Africa^(*)—						
North African	115	2,735	2,335 ^(e)	4,528 ^(j)	1,353 ⁽ⁿ⁾	256 ^(s)
Egyptian	16,094	15,547	14,099	18,522	17,127	4,967
Sudanese	957	2,014	1,371	1,065	588
West African	1,377 ^(k)	589	2,051 ^(h)	2,338	3,525	1,558
Senegali	14	124	91	73	38	19
Eritrean	76	33
Somali	215	180	266	263 ^(l)	342 ^(o)	508 ^(r)
Zanzibari and East African ..	7	104	34	42	69	33
South African	1	100	112	85	85	51
Unclassified	490
Arab countries—						
Syrian	499	1,511	1,109	962	1,209	1,050
Iraqi	129	750 ^(d)	528 ⁽ⁱ⁾	207	278	117
Palestinian	168	333	471	558	383	447
Yemeni	565	1,334	1,242	1,867	2,055	584
Hadhrami	360	669	732	772	659	445
Muscati	213	117	341	229	99	50
Hejazi	1,729	335	1,169	968	1,279	905
Nejdi	9	39	74	62	..	48
Unclassified	187	851
Miscellaneous—						
Afghans	2,445	3,838	3,022	1,705	1,218	973
Bukharans	1,470	3,469	1,987	207	1,603	214
Persians	475	2,248	3,403	3,808	3,337	88
Russian	315	749
Turkish	157	684	875	214	125	83
Unclassified	889	1,954	..
Total	55,725	132,109	100,767	88,538⁽¹⁾	84,821	39,346

Notes on Table (A).

- (*) Classification sometimes doubtful in the case of the remoter parts of Africa.
 (b) Including 18 Cingalese shown separately.
 (c) Including 102 Sarawakis shown separately.
 (d) Including 73 Kurds shown separately.
 (e) Including 68 Cingalese shown separately.
 (f) Including 81 Sarawakis shown separately.
 (g) Made up of 183 Tripolitans and Cyrenaicans, 1,401 Algerians, 151 Moroccans, 600 Tunisians.
 (h) British and French.
 (i) Including Kurds.
 (j) Made up of 132 Tripolitans and Cyrenaicans, 2,200 Algerians, 700 Moroccans, 1,496 Tunisians.
 (k) Shown as 249 British and 14 Italian Somalis.
 (l) Corrected from total in 1929 report.
 (m) Including 4 shown as from French Indies.
 (n) Made up of 685 Algerians, 163 Moroccans, 470 Tunisians, 35 North Africans living in France.
 (o) Made up of 84 French Sudanese, 17 French Somalis, 240 Jirat and Somalis.
 (p) Includes 22 Siamese.
 (q) Made up of 60 Algerians, 189 Moroccans and 7 Tunisians.
 (r) Made up of 350 French Sudanese, 55 French Somalis and 103 Somalis.

TABLE (B).

NUMBER of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Countries of Embarkation.

Country of Embarkation.	1926.	1927.	1928.	1929.	1930.	1931.
India and the Far East—						
India	24,331	36,089	22,063	19,656	16,697	9,508
Malaya	9,600	29,604	15,279	4,297	6,893	1,867
Dutch East Indies ..	2,097	39,157	32,565	28,277	30,587	15,931
Africa—						
North Africa	1,855	2,390	4,396	1,246	93
Egypt	16,750	18,876	11,577	20,409	17,923	7,253
Sudan	1,530	1,613	1,874	2,334	5,042	2,420
Eritrea	(*)	650	652	635	278
French Somaliland
East Africa	484	104	123	305	75	..
South Africa	81	113
Arab Countries—						
Syria	458	1,977	100	962	2,631	1,005
Iraq	232	8
Yemen	1,429	428
Aden	326	1,945(*)	786	401
Hadhranaut	556	772	177	..
Miscellaneous—						
Persia	380	2
Russia	315	749	207	6	..
Turkey	574	..	317
Europe	39(3)
Total	55,584	131,109	87,729	82,584	84,810	39,346

(*) Massowah included in the Yemen.

(3) Made up of 27 from Trieste, 9 from Venice, 2 from Le Havre and 1 from Antwerp.

TABLE (C).

NUMBER of Ships transporting Pilgrims to the Hejaz and Number of Pilgrims carried under each Flag.

(N.B.—This includes the number of voyages made by each ship.)

Flag.	1926.		1927.		1928.	
	Number of Ships.	Number of Pilgrims.	Number of Ships.	Number of Pilgrims.	Number of Ships.	Number of Pilgrims.
British	29	51,343	102	79,272	104	51,427
Dutch	12	2,087	27	31,353	29	32,568
French	1	987
Italian	4	487	30	18,812	21	1,006
Soviet	1	315	2	749
Egyptian	2	1,089	1	977	1	31
Turkish	1	574
Greek	2	578	1	111	2	961
German
	49	55,584	163	131,414	160	87,729

Flag.	1929.		1930.		1931.	
	Number of Ships.	Number of Pilgrims.	Number of Ships.	Number of Pilgrims.	Number of Ships.	Number of Pilgrims.
British	109	56,388	116	53,661	63	22,223
Dutch	32	20,199	38	26,356	24	11,400
French	2	3,805	2	1,346	7	5,178(*)
Italian	22	652	32	2,264	17	535
Soviet	1	524	6	594	2	7
Egyptian	2	815
Turkish
Greek
German	2	3
	168	82,583	194	84,821	115	39,346

(*) The bulk of the Egyptian pilgrims were carried in French ships in 1931, the Khedivial Company having failed to secure the contract for carrying them as in previous years.

(3) Quarantine.

24. The usual sanitary arrangements were instituted at Kamaran, Tor and Suakin for the 1931 pilgrimage.

Kamaran.

25. As in 1930, no Malayan pilgrims were landed in Kamaran, all having been vaccinated and inoculated against cholera in accordance with the legislation of their country of origin, in the same way as the Javanese (see paragraph 23 of the report for 1930).

26. Although effect has not yet been given in India to the recommendation of the Haj Enquiry Committee in favour of compulsory inoculation against cholera, the influence used by local authorities and ships' officers induced the great majority of pilgrims to undergo voluntary inoculation. This produced the gratifying result that only two steamers from India were compelled to land their passengers at Kamaran, all the rest being allowed to proceed, after medical examination only, in the same way as ships carrying the compulsorily inoculated Malayan and Javanese pilgrims. There was a corresponding reduction in the number of representations made to the Legation in Jedda, which in the past has been bombarded with complaints by pilgrims of the inconvenience and hardship entailed by landing at Kamaran to undergo quarantine.

27. Certain Pathans stubbornly refused inoculation, but one party of them, travelling in the steamship "Sarvistan," yielded to the persuasion of the health officer at Kamaran when confronted with the alternative of being landed. The general experience of 1931 shows the great advantage which would accrue to pilgrims themselves from the legal enforcement of inoculation in all cases, and the unimportance of the opposition that need be apprehended. Sir Abdul Kerim Ghuznavi informed His Majesty's Minister that he had been able, by administrative action in Bengal, to ensure the inoculation of all pilgrims sailing from Calcutta, and it was due to his efforts that all those in the ship from Bombay, in which he himself made the voyage to Jedda, were inoculated. The results of encouragement and judicious pressure in inducing the bulk of the Indian pilgrims to undergo inoculation in 1931 were satisfactory, but these methods cannot be regarded as an adequate substitute for legal compulsion, now that all intelligent Moslem opinion in India appears to be ripe for it.

28. All ships proceeding from Kamaran to Jedda were found free from infectious disease, except for the occurrence of one case of chicken-pox in the steamship "Jehangir." This case was isolated and sent to the local hospital for treatment. No restrictions were imposed on the other pilgrims on board.

29. In view of the official information supplied by the Hejazi Government, and evidence from other sources that the pilgrimage should be regarded as clean, ships returning to India and Malaya were not required to call at Kamaran. As a result of the correspondence initiated by Sir A. Ryan last year (see paragraph 23 of the report for 1930), an understanding has been arrived at

between the various British authorities concerned as to the circumstances in which His Majesty's Minister may definitely dispense pilgrim ships bound for destinations south of the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb from proceeding via Kamaran. As one or two minor points are still outstanding at the time of writing in connexion with this understanding, an account of it is deferred until next year's report.

Tor.

30. Ships carrying homeward-bound pilgrims northward were submitted to the regulation quarantine of 72 hours at Tor. Although the Alexandria Quarantine Board pronounced the pilgrimage clean after the first two shiploads of pilgrims had been subjected to the necessary medical and bacteriological tests, some suspicion arose later owing to the discovery of four healthy carriers of non-agglutinating vibrios and one carrier of agglutinating vibrios among the Egyptian pilgrims on board the steamship "Ville de Damas" on her arrival at Tor on the 22nd May. This ship was detained for six days, but it was not considered necessary formally to declare the pilgrimage suspect, and the imposition of the normal guarantee of three days only was speedily resumed. In this connexion reference may be made to the concluding portion of paragraph 24 of the report for 1930.

31. A delegate of the Alexandria Board was employed in the Hejaz during the pilgrimage season in accordance with the usual practice.

Suakin.

32. Pilgrims returning to and via the Sudan were subjected to the regulation period of five days' quarantine at Suakin. The case of Sir Abdul Kerim Ghuznavi, who proceeded by this route from Jedda to Egypt, drew attention to the absence of first-class accommodation for pilgrims of the better class in the quarantine station there, although the difficulty was overcome in this particular case by the generosity of the medical officer in placing his own house at Sir Abdul Kerim's disposal.

Jedda.

33. No pilgrim ship was subjected to quarantine in Jedda this year. A few cases of chicken-pox and small-pox in arriving ships were isolated and sent to the hospital in the town for treatment.

34. The buildings, &c., on the quarantine islands outside Jedda are kept in a state of repair, but they lack essential equipment, *e.g.*, disinfecting apparatus. The town hospital is similarly unprovided with equipment for disinfecting the clothing, &c., of infectious patients.

35. The port medical service was in 1931, as before, maintained by two doctors. It is complained that this staff is insufficient, especially when there are several vessels in port, to enable ships to be inspected and cleared without undue delay. It is suggested that the difficulty of doing so was aggravated by ill-feeling between the doctors, and their preoccupation with private practice.

36. The senior of the two doctors, Dr. Siuti, resigned shortly after the pilgrimage. This gentleman had in 1930 submitted a report to the King on the position of the Hejaz in regard to the International Sanitary Convention of 1926, which was signed by Ibn Saud's delegate, but never ratified. There emerged from the discussion of the question a proposal that the convention should be ratified, subject to reservations designed to affirm the sovereign rights of the Hejaz. The proposal has not been pursued up to the time of writing, although the Hejazi authorities have manifested interest both in the 1926 convention, which, in its present form, they consider derogatory to their position as an independent Power, and also in a suggestion made unofficially by His Majesty's Minister under instructions from home, that it would be in their interest to adhere to the Rome Convention of 1907, and thus secure permanent representation in the Paris Health Office.

37. Dr. Siuti's proposals in 1930 contemplated the reorganisation of the quarantine islands and a grandiose scheme for the creation of a camp on the mainland capable of accommodating 10,000 pilgrims. It was suggested that the estimated expenditure on this scheme, £40,000, should be obtained by imposing fresh taxes on shipping companies. It is pretty certain that the attitude of the Hejazi Government towards international sanitary arrangements

is inspired much more by a desire to affirm their authority as a sovereign and equal Power than to collaborate with other States in preventing the dissemination of disease by pilgrims. However desirable their participation in international arrangements may be as an ultimate ideal, it is more than doubtful whether any measures they might take with their present inadequate equipment and personnel would produce useful results. They would be more likely to inflict hardship, especially if applied to outgoing pilgrims, where rapid dispersal is a matter of the first importance.

38. In this connexion it may be mentioned that after the 1931 pilgrimage blood tests were taken from the fingers of numbers of departing pilgrims by a quarantine doctor, acting in conjunction with Professor Moshkovski of the Tropical Institute in Moscow, who was for some time attached to the Soviet Legation in Jedda. Even this simple measure, taken apparently in connexion with Professor Moshkovski's studies of tropical diseases, caused, in at least one instance, delay in the departure of a ship. It may be mentioned incidentally that Professor Moshkovski was recalled from Jedda soon after the pilgrimage. He had frequently lent assistance to the Hejazi authorities, and his removal deprives the Hejaz, at least temporarily, of the only specialist in bacteriology who has recently been available. It is too soon to say whether any reliance can be placed on two students who were sent abroad some time ago to study the subject, and who returned to the Hejaz this year.

(4) *Health.*

General.

39. The excellent health conditions which characterised the 1931 pilgrimage, as stated in section (1), must be attributed rather to favourable climatic conditions and the smallness of the pilgrimage, than to any material improvement in the Hejazi sanitary service. There has been little increase in material equipment, and the number and capacity of the doctors employed has tended in recent years to diminish, a fact which may be attributed to financial stress and dissatisfaction on the part of the doctors themselves, all of whom have to be imported. At the best they are apt to be of inferior quality, in some cases "discards" from more progressive countries, and they are accused of exigency in the matter of fees. The Indian vice-consul cites the boast of one doctor, the occupant of a high official position in the Jedda Health Service, that, having been summoned on one occasion to attend an urgent case at Arafat (where the congestion and confusion on Pilgrimage Day always make it difficult to provide or obtain medical assistance), he withheld his services until he had been paid a fee of £15 in advance.

40. According to a report prepared by the Indian doctor attached to the Legation for the use of His Majesty's Minister in 1930, the extent of the then hospital and dispensary accommodation maintained by the Hejazi Government may be summed up as follows:—

Jedda.—One hospital, well but rather remotely situated at the southern end of the city. A municipal dispensary in the centre of the town. A small establishment run by the quarantine doctors at the port. A couple of rooms reserved for hospital use in the barracks outside the town. The hospital is served by two doctors, and a woman doctor is employed in addition during the pilgrimage season. The hospital doctors are responsible for all the establishments enumerated except that at the port. They are also supposed to deal with public health matters. A certain supervision is exercised over food-stuffs in the bazaars, but apart from this and some street-watering, little attention is paid to general hygiene.

Mecca.—One central hospital, not far from the sacred precincts. A small building used during the pilgrimage season for infectious diseases. A branch dispensary, some ten minutes' walk from the sacred precincts. A small building used as a lunatic asylum, little more than a lock-up for the patients.

Muna.—A temporary hospital, with twelve beds, is maintained during the festival days spent at this place on the return from Arafat.

Road from Mecca to Arafat.—Wooden shelters with water cisterns were installed at intervals on this road in 1928 and were equipped for first aid. They are apparently no longer regularly staffed owing to the reduced number of doctors available, but in 1930 four ambulance cars patrolled the road.

Road from Jedda to Mecca.—Part of a recently erected house at Bahra is reserved for dispensary purposes. There is no regular doctor and the equipment is small, but during the pilgrimage season a compounder administers first aid.

Medina.—Two small hospitals, served by two doctors and provided with medical supplies from stocks left by the Turks.

Yambo and Taif.—Small dispensaries.

41. The above summary is greatly condensed and Sir A. Ryan has not been able to check it up to date. It is given by way of indication of the general scope of the establishment maintained by the Hejazi authorities, rather than as an exact statement of the present provision. It is only fair to state that the structure and equipment of the central hospital at Mecca have been greatly improved since 1928. Sir Abdul Kerim Ghuznavi, who visited it during the 1931 pilgrimage, was most favourably impressed by its general appearance. It is also fair to add that in their reports on the 1931 pilgrimage, the Indian members of the Legation commend the arrangements this year at Muna, where the Hejazi Government provided a hospital with thirty beds and arranged for motor lorries to transport the sick to this hospital and to reserve them subsequently to the Central Hospital at Mecca. It is further stated that the twelve sheds on the road from Mecca to Arafat were duly provided with water, and were to some extent attended, although it does not appear that each shed could have been supplied with a doctor, in view of the smallness of the total number (three, not including the Director-General of Health) available in Mecca, from which place the service between Mecca and Arafat is maintained.

42. In view of these recent indications, it would be unjust to dismiss too lightly the constant professions of the Hejazi Government of their intention to increase progressively their equipment. At present, however, the service suffers greatly from paucity of personnel, lack of specialists, and, except in the case of the Central Hospital at Mecca, adequate accommodation and apparatus. Dr. Abdul Hamid further criticises, *inter alia*, the over-centralised arrangements for the supply of medical stores and the rapacity of the doctors in the matter of fees.

43. The Indian vice-consul has prepared the following statement of cases treated and deaths in Government hospitals, from official returns, for the period from the beginning of 1931 to the end of July. It may usefully be compared with the similar return for the ten months ending December 1930 in paragraph 28 of the report for that year:—

Disease.	Number of Cases.	Deaths.
Dysentery ...	262	137
Paratyphoid ...	5	5
Typhoid ...	49	12
Puerperal fever ...	48	45
Small-pox ...	621	329
Measles ...	60	38
Meningitis ...	10	9
Leprosy ...	3	2
Syphilis ...	230	10
Diphtheria ...	1	1
Malignant fever ...	24	22
Dengue ...	4	3
Consumption ...	163	80

Munshi Ihsanallah comments on the great increase in several instances in the proportion of deaths to cases in this list, compared with that which he made last year, on the high percentage of mortality in hospitals from such ordinary diseases as dysentery and paratyphoid; and in the lack of precautions to segregate infectious from other cases, even where there is an appearance of good organisation and equipment as in the Central Hospital at Mecca.

44. Not only was the 1931 pilgrimage free from epidemics, but the total number of sporadic cases of disease were comparatively small. Numerous cases of dysentery occurred. Sunstroke was rare, thanks to the relative coolness of the weather. Typhoid was also rare. Cases of sore throat, nasal catarrh, &c., were not numerous. Munshi Ihsanallah suggests that the latter phenomenon was

partly due to the small number of pilgrims landed at Kamaran on their way to the Hejaz, believing, as he does, that the exposure suffered by pilgrims landed there predisposes them to such maladies.

Infectious and Contagious Diseases.

45. Although small-pox is endemic in the Hejaz, no cases were brought to the notice of the Indian medical staff. It is suggested that this may be attributed to seasonal causes, the disease being, it is said, more apt to spread in winter than in summer. In support of this theory attention is drawn to the fact that the number of cases shown as having been treated in the local hospitals from January to July showed a marked gradual increase after January, in which month 170 cases were admitted. Attention is drawn in this connexion to the fact that the pilgrimage season is receding through spring towards winter and to the failure of the Hejazi authorities to take effective measures to stamp out the disease. There was much talk of generalising vaccination in 1930, but no progress appears to have been made in this direction. The local arrangements for preparing vaccine are, moreover, unsatisfactory, and it is stated that the imported article, introduced in a dried form, will not retain its efficacy for long, owing to the heat of the climate. These matters are the more important, as small-pox is the only endemic infectious disease.

46. As stated in section (1), the only infectious disease among incoming Indian pilgrims was one case of chicken-pox.

Mortality among Pilgrims.

47. There was a marked decrease in the proportional mortality among all classes of pilgrims this year. The Javanese, for instance, who last year showed a death-rate of 8.2 per cent., this year showed only 3 per cent., the total number of deaths being 510 out of 16,803. The percentage was the same for the Malaysians, of whom 17 died out of 506. Indian pilgrims showed a marked decrease, the proportion being less than 1 per cent. as against 3 per cent. last year. The total number of deaths during the three days at Muna was officially put at 32 out of about 50,000 pilgrims assembled there, as against 123 out of 100,000 last year. This decrease in general mortality is mainly attributable to the coolness of the season.

General Sanitary Conditions.

48. Conditions generally were similar to those recorded in paragraph 36 of the report for 1930. Reference has already been made in paragraph 40 above to the lack of serious attention to hygiene in Jedda. The same criticism applies to the other main centres. The measures for protecting food-stuffs from contamination amount to very little. Something is done in the way of street-cleaning and the sprinkling of water mixed with disinfectant. A new sprinkler, imported by the Jedda municipality was brought into use this year in the main thoroughfares of that town. No progress has been made with measures to provide public lavatories, with the result that the practice of satisfying natural needs, more or less promiscuously, in public places continues to be common. The regulations obliging mutawwifs to use phenol for the cleansing of private lavatories are little observed, nor is their condition such that this remedy would do much to abate nuisances. The practice of emptying soak-pits only at intervals of four or five years makes them prolific breeding places for mosquitoes and other disease carriers, a fact which is held accountable for the prevalence of malarial and dysenteric disorders. The delegate of the Alexandria Quarantine Board drew the special attention of Sir A. Ryan to the lack of protection at well-heads, *e.g.*, at Muna.

49. Owing, however, to the small dimensions of the pilgrimage, there was no congestion at Muna, and sanitary conditions were better than last year. The main roads were kept clean. Water was sprinkled on them two or three times a day, a measure of limited efficacy owing to the heat of the sun and the sandy nature of the surface. The arrangements for the slaughter of sacrificial animals at Muna were again satisfactory, although it still happens that, contrary to regulations, animals are killed and left to decompose in the camp area, outside the railed enclosure provided for the purpose.

50. It has been stated elsewhere that the weather at pilgrimage time was relatively cool. The maximum shade temperature recorded at Arafat was 110° F., falling to a minimum of 105° F. The temperature at Muna was steady at 95° F. or a little less.

Water Supply.

51. Conditions in this respect were again favourable. Water was obtainable without difficulty at Jedda, Mecca, Muna and Arafat. Prices were more moderate than in 1930, being from 1 to 4 piastres per 4-gallon tin. The abundance of water at Muna and Arafat is due to the efforts of the managing committee of the Zubaida aqueduct, who deserve credit for their zeal and their honesty in the administration of the funds collected from pilgrims at the authorised rate of 8 piastres *miri* = 1 rupee a head. His Majesty's Minister does not hazard an opinion as to the quality of the water, as distinct from its abundance.

Government of India Dispensaries.

52. In August 1930 a portion of the building occupied by the Chancery and other offices of the Legation at Jedda collapsed. This necessitated an overhaul and partial reconstruction of the building. The opportunity was taken of effecting much-needed alterations and improvements in the dispensary, which is housed in the ground floor of the house in question. The Government of India having sanctioned an expenditure of £145 for this purpose, considerable improvements were effected. A room adjoining the dispensary was repaired and fitted for operations and a bed provided for the use of patients operated upon. The Government of India also supplied the necessary furniture. The dispensary is now fairly well found, although it still suffers from the need for accommodating it in part of a ramshackle building mainly directed to other uses.

53. The total number of patients treated in the dispensary for the period from the 16th May, 1930, to the end of June 1931 was 26,458, as against 25,359 last year. The number during the pilgrimage season proper, *i.e.*, from the 15th February to the 19th May, 1931, including pilgrims and domiciled Indians, was 3,205, as against 4,301 last year. Eight patients were given hospital treatment.

54. A sum of £70, as against £102 last year, was realised by the sale of medicines to non-British subjects treated in the dispensary. Out of this sum, £30 was spent on contingent expenses, the balance of £40 being credited to the Government of India.

Mecca.

55. A sum of £60 was sanctioned by the Government of India for carrying out necessary repairs to the dispensary. The requisite furniture, chairs and benches, &c., were supplied by the Government before the commencement of the season. This greatly improved the general aspect of the dispensary. It is perhaps the first time in the history of the Indian pilgrimage that the dispensary was opened as early as two months before the actual season, *i.e.*, on the 15th February. It was possible to engage locally a sub-assistant surgeon, instead of importing one as usual from India. A temporary compounder was also engaged locally. The sub-assistant surgeon, a retired member of the Indian service, named Khan Sabib Mohammed Khan, showed himself to be an experienced physician. He was, moreover, peculiarly happy in his dealings with patients and attracted numerous Hejazis to the dispensary. Before the arrival of the Legation doctor at Mecca for the pilgrimage proper, the Indian vice-consul on the occasion of his visits to Mecca found Mohammed Khan and the compounder greatly pressed and hardly capable of coping with the great rush. This made it necessary to give preferential treatment to Indian patients and to relieve the compounder by detaching one of the two employed at Jedda. The dispensary was kept open from 6 A.M. to noon, also for one hour in the afternoon.

56. Unfortunately the ability and reputation of K. S. Mohammed Khan excited the jealousy of the Syrian doctors employed by the Hejazi Government to such an extent that the Director-General of Health, who had previously been willing himself to give him employment, refused to allow him to practise in the

town after the expiry of his temporary service under the Legation. This caused Mohammed Khan to leave the country.

57. The permanent Legation surgeon, Dr. Abdul Hamid, with his staff, proceeded to Mecca on the 16th April, to the great relief of the hard-pressed staff there. The total number of patients treated in the dispensary from the 15th February to the end of May was 12,125.

Arafat.

58. Before proceeding to Arafat the Director-General of Health asked the Indian doctor to accompany him thither with his staff and medicines as part of the "touring dispensary" organised by the Hejazi authorities. As this would have compelled him not only to use the Hejazi flag, but to place himself under the direction of the Director-General, to the detriment of the special interests of Indian pilgrims, Dr. Abdul Hamid, falling in with the Indian vice-consul's suggestion, did not agree to the proposal, and went to Arafat with his own staff separately by car. There he stationed himself in the quarter where Indian pilgrims usually encamp. The season, however, being favourable, no requisitions for medical assistance were received.

Muna.

59. A suitable house was again rented this year by the Indian vice-consul and the Indian doctor at their own expense. The dispensary was located in the same house. The total attendance during the three days' stay at Muna was 105. The patients treated were, with the exception of eight Malays, all Indians.

Cases Treated.

60. The following table shows the approximate percentage of cases treated in the Indian dispensaries at Jedda, Mecca and Muna:—

MEDICAL.	Percentage.
1. Malaria and its complications ...	30.0
2. Other fevers and infectious diseases ...	0.05
3. Urinary diseases, including gonorrhoea ...	19.05
4. Digestive troubles ...	16.0
5. Circulatory diseases ...	0.1
6. Respiratory diseases ...	11.5
7. Nervous diseases ...	0.2
8. Diseases of the locomotory system ...	0.5
9. Women's diseases ...	3.0
10. Children's diseases ...	3.0
11. Eye, ear, nose and throat diseases ...	6.0
SURGICAL.	
12. Sinuses, fistulas, ulcers, &c. ...	10.0
13. Wounds and other contusions ...	9.5
14. Fractures and dislocations ...	0.5
15. Hydrocele and hernia ...	0.5
16. Stone in bladder ...	0.1

100

NOTE. About twenty major operations were performed. Minor operations numbered about 230.

61. The question of reorganising the arrangements for medical assistance to Indian pilgrims is one of those raised by the reports of the Haj Enquiry Committee. His Majesty's Minister submitted comprehensive proposals on the subject, prepared in consultation with the Indian vice-consul and Dr. Abdul Hamid, in a despatch to the Government of India, No. 49 of the 31st May, 1931. While not endorsing all the suggestions of the Haj Inquiry Committee, Sir A. Ryan proposed a scheme which, he considered, would improve the present arrangements very greatly. The service would continue to be based on Jedda. A second dispensary would be provided at Mecca, as an experimental measure during the busiest portion of the pilgrimage season. The provision of accommodation at Muna, during the three days spent there, would be placed on a sounder basis.

62. In the despatch just referred to, Sir A. Ryan dealt with the question of allowing Dr. Abdul Hamid to charge for attendance on pilgrims at their residences in Mecca (see paragraph 39 of the report for 1930). The demands of private patients caused no difficulty this year, thanks to good weather and the small dimensions of the pilgrimage. The few calls which were received were attended to by both the doctor and the sub-assistant surgeon voluntarily and gratis. It, nevertheless, seems reasonable that the doctors should be allowed to make a charge for attendance outside the dispensary, except in the case of persons genuinely in need of being visited elsewhere and too poor to pay for the privilege.

Other Foreign Medical Assistance.

63. The Egyptian Government's Medical Mission arrived, as usual, a fortnight before the Haj. It functioned at Jedda, Mecca, Muna and Yambo. As before, it seemed well equipped, having many doctors, a lady doctor and three ambulances. The mission, while proceeding to Arafat, had left an ambulance with a doctor under the command of the local health authorities. The latter put the Hejazi flag on it with the words: "Relief by the General Health Department." At Muna the mission generally helped the Egyptian pilgrims only.

64. The Netherlands Government maintained their usual medical service, which is roughly similar to that of the Government of India, although it differs in detail. The Straits Settlements Government made arrangements this year for the Dutch doctor to attend to the needs of Malayan pilgrims at Mecca, instead of attaching a Malay dresser to the Government of India dispensary, as has been done in the past.

(5) Internal Transport.

Motor Transport.

65. The undoubted advantages to pilgrims in the way of convenience and celerity of movement resulting from the use of motor transport on the pilgrim routes in recent years continue to be offset by the numerous abuses practised by motor owners, mutawwifs and officials, and the failure of the Hejazi Government to repress them. Neither of the systems adopted during the last three years has given satisfactory results from the pilgrims' point of view. These systems are: (a) that of free competition among the companies; and (b) the Naqaba system, instituted in 1929, under which an official organisation known by that name allocates pilgrims to the respective transporters. Each system has the backing of powerful vested interests, with the result that the attitude of the Government has been one of vacillation.

66. After being tried in 1929, the Naqaba system was abandoned in 1930, and free play was given to competition. A price-cutting war ensued between the transporters, and fares fell so low that it was impossible for them to maintain satisfactory services, keep their cars in good condition and defray expenses. Pilgrims, on the other hand, were deprived of any material benefit from the cheapness of transport owing to the action of the mutawwifs. The latter, while themselves taking advantage of the reduced rates actually charged by the motor companies, made every endeavour to recover from pilgrims the rates sanctioned by the Government. In many cases they were successful in pocketing the whole of the difference, although, as stated in paragraph 41 of the report for 1930, Indian pilgrims were charged less than the official rates as a result of the pressure brought to bear on the mutawwifs by the British Indian vice-consul.

67. The result of this price-cutting competition in 1930 was to reduce the motor companies to a state of practical insolvency. Those interested in them and their backers induced the King to reintroduce the Naqaba system in 1931. The mutawwifs reacted by attempting to induce the pilgrims to use camels, urging that they would thereby be following the example of the Prophet. At the outset of the season some 2,000 pilgrims yielded to this persuasion. The Government and the motor companies were threatened with loss of revenue and custom, respectively, and the King took drastic action. Holding the Jedda agents of the mutawwifs responsible for the new development, he ordered their dismissal and replacement by other agents. This brought the recalcitrant agents to heel. They sought pardon, and pledged themselves to do all in their power to replenish the Treasury by recovering taxes from pilgrims, with the result

that they were reinstated within a few hours of their dismissal. The use of motor transport for personal conveyance was willy-nilly enforced on pilgrims. In the event not more than 5 to 6 per cent. of the Javanese pilgrims, for instance, were allowed to travel by camel.

68. The revival of the Naqaba system was obviously to the advantage of the motor companies. It assured them of their allotted share of pilgrims, and deprived them of any inducement to treat them with consideration or to improve the quantity and quality of their rolling-stock. They cut down heavily their expenditure, and they did nothing to keep up the supply of touring cars to meet the requirements of pilgrims of the better class. Although, according to official statistics, the number of vehicles in good condition should have sufficed for all purposes, the supply was, in fact, inadequate, and dilapidated cars were freely used. It sometimes happened that the journey between Jedda and Mecca, normally a two hours' run, occupied as long as 24 hours. It is reported that, in some cases, the journey between Jedda and Medina took as much as six days, during which pilgrims were exposed to the risk of having to alight in remote and waterless places.

69. The authorised charges, which include Government koshan, or road tax, were as follows:—

	Rs.
Jedda to Mecca by lorry in the beginning of the season, 8 rials	= 11.0.0
Ditto by car, £1	= 13.12.0
Jedda to Mecca by lorry in the season proper, £1	= 13.12.0
Ditto by car, £1 5s.	= 17.3.0
Mecca to Medina and back by lorry in the beginning of the season, £10	= 137.8.0
Ditto by car, £12	= 165.0.0
Mecca to Medina and back by lorry in the season proper, £11 10s.	= 158.12.0
Ditto by car, £13	= 178.2.0

70. The British Indian vice-consul remarks on the amount of time which the pilgrimage staff of the Legation have to devote to dealing with particular complaints, to the detriment of more important work on behalf of the whole body of pilgrims. He assigns a large proportion of them to difficulties arising in connexion with transport. He cites several concrete instances of the results in 1931 of the abuses referred to earlier in this section. These may be summed up as follows:—

- (a) A party of about 100 Indian pilgrims, including many of good standing, were to be carried from Mecca to Medina by the Alfi Motor Company. At the bidding of their mutawwifs they hurried at a moment's notice, and without luncheon, to the company's garage in Mecca, only to be kept waiting four hours for the promised cars. On arriving late in the evening at Jedda, they found no cars for the onward journey, nor had any accommodation been provided for them. Munshi Ihsanullah's intervention with the parties concerned and the public authorities elicited a medley of lies, excuses and assurances, ending in a false start in cars unprovided with the extra tyres, &c., required to be carried by Medina-bound cars. This difficulty was overcome, and the pilgrims left for Medina on the third evening, but only as a result of constant and pressing representations by the Munshi. This was typical of several cases in which he had to intervene.
- (b) In another case the transport company's employees refused to load the effects of a party of pilgrims without extra remuneration. On the refusal of the pilgrims to comply with what they considered an unjustifiable demand, the employees plotted with the koshan officials to refuse permission for the cars to proceed. The drivers took them back to the garage, where the pilgrims, including women and children, were mercilessly compelled to alight. The party was detained for 24 hours, notwithstanding the offer of certain pilgrims, shocked at the treatment of the women, to pay the money that had been demanded. This also is described as a typical case.

- (c) In several cases money was extorted from pilgrims on the pretext that cars had broken down, and that it was necessary to pay for help in repairing them, or that the money was needed to purchase benzine owing to unexpected shortage. In one case of the former kind the Indian vice-consul was able to secure redress and the imprisonment of the driver. He states that he procured the recovery of all sums extorted from Indian pilgrims for the alleged purpose of buying benzine, but that pilgrims of other nationalities suffered greatly from this exaction.
- (d) As an instance of the suffering caused by the use of dilapidated vehicles (sometimes, it is said, certified fit for service by venal officials), Munshi Ihsanullah mentions the case of six non-Indian pilgrims who had to alight for 36 hours in an inaccessible and uninhabited place, with the result that all six suffered severe sunstroke, and two died.
- (e) "Numerous complaints," says Munshi Ihsanullah, "were made by pilgrims on account of the loss of luggage, unloading of their kit outside the cities with promises to fetch it with fresh conveyances from the garages, and removing it to different places or despatching it after long delays after the departure of the pilgrims themselves. In many cases, even telegrams sent at a heavy cost could not prevail upon the companies to make the luggage, &c., reach their respective owners in time."

The policy of the Hejazi Government in all matters relative to transport would appear to have been largely dictated by a desire to compensate themselves as far as possible for the diminution of revenue caused by a small pilgrimage by rigorous insistence on charges. Obstacles were put in the way of pilgrims wishing to proceed direct to Medina after landing at Jedda, and the mutawwifs' agents had orders to collect in advance from such persons the whole of the dues payable in respect of the pilgrimage. Many pilgrims not unnaturally objected to this compulsory collection of such charges as mutawwifs' fees, house rent, tent hire at Arafat, &c., in anticipation of the services being actually rendered, and to being thus mulcted in sums for which those dying before reaching Mecca or compelled for any other reason to abandon the Haj would get no return. Numerous complaints were made, but the Government could not be induced to modify their attitude in a matter in which their own financial interest was involved. Indeed, in their anxiety to protect their revenues they ordered that Medina-bound pilgrims of the above kind should be charged a further tax of 33 piastres miri = rupees 4/2/-, to balance loss on koshan in one direction, viz., for the journey from Jedda to Mecca.

71. Under another new regulation imposed this year, pilgrims desiring to stop at Medina from eight to fifteen days were made to pay a tax of £1 5s., and a sum of £2 for any excess period up to a month. This appears to have dislocated the arrangements for returning cars, owing to the difficulty of their being kept waiting for a limited number of pilgrims. A suggestion by the Indian vice-consul that the complement of passengers might be made up by admitting other passengers without regard to their allocation to particular companies encountered the strong resistance of the Naqaba official. His Majesty's Minister must confess to inability to grasp the ins and outs of this matter without further enquiry, and includes the foregoing account of it with reserve.

72. Reference was made in paragraph 44A of the report for 1930 to the scheme for financing a Government transport company by means of a tax levied on the private transporters in consideration of their vehicles not being requisitioned from time to time for Government use as in the past. The revenue accruing from this tax was duly expended on the purchase of cars. These were put into the pilgrim traffic this year, and to the great pecuniary advantage of the Treasury had a proportion of pilgrims allotted to them by the Naqaba authorities. Persons travelling by these cars suffered great hardship owing to the arbitrary conduct of those in charge of the vehicles. The latter, being Government employees, were above restraint, no local authority daring to interfere with them. The British Indian vice-consul, though able in many cases to check the abuses practised by private transporters, could find no means of combating the misconduct of those in charge of the Government cars. He could only use his influence with mutawwifs and their agents to avoid wherever possible using them

for the transport of Indian pilgrims. Those who benefited by his efforts in this direction were subjected to some inconvenience owing to delay in departure, but were amply compensated by not having to share the unfortunate experience of pilgrims carried in the Government cars.

73. At the meeting of the National Conference soon after the pilgrimage (see paragraph 1) the private motor companies took exception to the action of the Government in itself engaging in the business of pilgrim transport in competition with them. This so angered the Director-General of Finance that he threatened to dissolve the Government concern, but to revive the old practice of requisitioning. Some composition is understood to have been arrived at, but as it was oral little reliance can be placed on it pending the actual experience of another season.

74. A further stage was reached this year in the correspondence referred to in paragraph 46A of the report for 1930, on the question whether the charge collected in advance for the return journey from Medina should be refunded in the case of pilgrims dying there. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs held that no refund could be allowed, as it would entail loss on the transporters who have to make provision for the return journey. There is little prospect of moving the Hejazi Government from this attitude. It would be sufficiently reasonable if the whole of the money charged were for transport. As it includes the Government koshan or road tax, it may be argued that part of that tax at least should be remitted, but the Government, in their present financial straits, are unlikely to admit this.

75. The practice of commandeering cars for Government use was not entirely abandoned in 1931. On one occasion seventy pilgrims failed to reach Jedda in time to sail by the steamship "Jehangir" owing to their vehicles having been requisitioned by the Government for military transport. The pilgrims were compelled to make other arrangements, entailing additional expense for their journey to Jedda. It required the intervention of the Indian vice-consul to secure a refund of the return fares paid in advance to the company which was to have brought them back to Jedda in the first instance.

76. Owing to the inability of the Naqaba to provide suitable vehicles for pilgrims wishing to secure cars for their exclusive use, certain well-to-do pilgrims were driven to hiring cars belonging to members of the Royal Family. The rates charged were exorbitant in comparison with the ordinary rates officially sanctioned.

77. In the report on which the foregoing paragraphs are based, the British Indian vice-consul draws attention to the probable aggravation of the difficulties and hardships described in them, if and when regular motor routes for pilgrims are organised between the eastern coast of Arabia and the Hejaz. There has of late been much talk of the opening up of such routes from Hasa and/or Iraq to Mecca and/or Medina. Having regard to present financial conditions in the Hejaz and elsewhere, Sir A. Ryan considers the prospect of any of these projects taking shape in the near future so doubtful that he prefers to refrain from any attempt to foreshadow their possible consequences.

Camels.

78. With the exception of a number of Javanese early arrivals, who travelled by camel in the circumstances related in paragraph 67, the great majority of pilgrims travelled by car this year. Ibn Saud turned a deaf ear to the appeal made to him by a deputation of carpenters who make it their business to manufacture camel litters or shuqdufs throughout the year and store them for use during the pilgrimage season. These men are no less affected by the substitution of motor transport for camels than the Bedouin camel-owners. Being townsmen they are in a better position than the latter to approach the King. They complained that they had invested all they had in the litter business and had to pay rent for storage as well. They suggested that pilgrims should be allocated to cars and camels respectively in the proportion of two to one. Not only did they get no satisfaction, but the koshan (road tax) for camels was raised from 35 piastres miri (rupees 4/6/-) to 70 piastres, with the result of approximately equalising the inclusive rates for camel hire and motor hire. This step is stated to have been taken to discourage the use of camels by Indian pilgrims. These are not officially denied freedom of choice, but, if they find that camel hire

is nearly as expensive as motor transport, they are apt to prefer the latter on grounds of convenience.

79. The number of pilgrims who travelled to Medina by camel was negligible. Practically all, except those of the poorest class, who go on foot, used motor transport.

80. The camel hire for two people for the various journeys was as follows:—

Jedda to Mecca, 108 piastres miri = rupees 13/4/-.

Mecca to Jedda, £2 = rupees 28.

Medina and back, £12 6 riyals = rupees 172/8/-.

Mecca to Arafat and back, £2 = rupees 28.

The double charge for the return journey from Mecca to Jedda confers no advantage on the camel-owner, who receives the same amount each way. The surplus charge goes to the Treasury.

81. In the circumstances described in paragraphs 78 and 79 camels were mainly used for the transport of luggage. The devices mentioned in paragraph 45 of the report for 1930 were again resorted to. Instructions were issued that the camels should be loaded as lightly as possible, in order to increase the amount of koshan payable to the Government, and the mutawwifs' agents were required to pay the tax in respect of a larger number of beasts than that actually used in cases where the officials considered this number too small. The Indian vice-consul cites the example of luggage sufficient for four animals being loaded on six by the camelmen in order to spare their beasts, and of this number being disallowed as insufficient by the koshan collector after it had been authorised by the Sheikh-al-Mukharijin, the official responsible for the luggage arrangements for Javanese pilgrims. He states that Indian pilgrims had difficulty in understanding why they should be charged in respect of camels not actually used and were inclined to attribute it to the dishonesty of their mutawwifs, who naturally passed on the excess charges to the pilgrims, but were not themselves responsible. He adds that, as a result of representations to the Governor of Jedda on many occasions and his own direct intervention in certain particular cases, Indian pilgrims were on the whole treated fairly in the matter.

82. There was no shortage of camels for the journey from Mecca to Arafat. Owing to the clemency of the weather and shortage of funds, many pilgrims preferred to go on foot. This was strongly discouraged by the authorities. In order to comply with Government instructions to insist on camels being used, the mutawwifs were driven to collecting a small amount at the start, in order to induce pilgrims to ride, and making them pay more on their return to Mecca. The hold on pilgrims which the regulations to be described in paragraph 102 gave to mutawwifs, made it impossible for the former to resist this extra charge. This system of not definitely fixing the camel hire to Arafat until after the journey and keeping the pilgrims in the dark meanwhile, is a revival of a practice which prevailed in Turkish times.

Arabas, i.e., Cabs.

83. As usual, motor vehicles were not allowed to enter the town of Mecca. Consequently, the only vehicles used to transport pilgrims from the outskirts of Mecca to their quarters were the cabs. There was no fixed rate for these vehicles, and on several occasions excessive charges were made. Owing, however, to the poor demand for transport of this class, the hire to Arafat, &c., went down to £5, as against £15 of last year. The mutawwifs, taking advantage of the ignorance of the pilgrims and the absence of any fixed rate, charged considerably higher rates from the pilgrims and pocketed the balance. This was the subject of many complaints to the Indian vice-consul. In a few cases he personally arranged matters with the cabmen, although it was risky to do so in presence of the regulation that no one other than the mutawwif is allowed to hire conveyances for pilgrims. The difficulties resulting from the absence of a fixed rate were increased by the fact that the charges made vary according to the quality of the animals.

84. The Government imposed another unprecedented tax of 10s. per head on pilgrims travelling to Arafat by cab.

(6) Customs.

85. One of the measures adopted by the Hejazi Government to cope with its growing financial difficulties was the imposition towards the end of 1930 of increased customs duties. The duty on articles generally was raised by 5 per cent., subject to the following variations in the case of particular articles:—

Sugar raised from 12 per cent. to 17 per cent., plus $\frac{1}{2}$ piastre miri per oke.

Tea from 12 per cent. to 17 per cent., plus 2 piastres miri per oke.

Tobacco and cigarettes from 36 piastres miri per oke to 40 piastres miri per oke.

Kerosene oil from 15 per cent. to 20 per cent., plus 5 piastres miri per tin of 4 gallons.

Matches from 15 per cent. to 20 per cent., plus $\frac{1}{2}$ piastre miri per packet of ten match boxes.

Motor accessories from 19 per cent. to 20 per cent.

86. The Government introduced in 1931 another new fiscal measure, namely, the imposition of a tax of 6 piastres miri on each tin of water from the holy well of Zemzem exported from the country. This is said to be without precedent in the history of the Hejaz.

87. Increased stringency was shown in the enforcement of customs regulations on pilgrims in 1931. When the first ship carrying Javanese pilgrims arrived, they were required to declare the contents of their luggage on a prescribed form, for which a charge of 1 piastre miri was made. This procedure caused great delay and hardship, although the number of pilgrims involved was only about 200. It was late at night before they were free to leave the custom-house. It was evident that the declaration system would break down as soon as ships began to arrive simultaneously carrying far larger numbers of pilgrims. It promised to impose so great a burden, not only on the pilgrims themselves, but on everyone else concerned, customs officials, mutawwifs' agents, porters and carters, that the Governor of Jedda and the president of the Haj Committee personally represented its impracticability to the King. He deferred to their objections and the declaration system was abandoned, other precautions being, however, taken to protect the finances of the Government. It was arranged that, in order to expedite the clearance of luggage, five exits from the custom-house should be provided instead of one, and that a customs officer should exercise strict supervision at each exit. Rigorous searches, involving in many cases several hours' delay, were instituted. Complaints were made of the venality of the officials, and the mutawwifs' agents were accused of exploiting the situation by squaring the officials on the one hand and on the other hand making pilgrims pay for facilities, to the joint advantage of the officials and the agents themselves.

88. Pilgrims were formerly allowed to import rice for their personal consumption free of charge, a privilege of great value to those, *e.g.*, the Javanese, who depend mainly on this food-stuff. This year it was decreed that duty should be charged on any rice in excess of 50 kilog. per head. This excited so much protest on the part of the Javanese pilgrims that the mutawwifs' agents were directed not to inform the pilgrims of the new requirements, but to collect instead on behalf of the Government an additional tax of 5 piastres miri (10 annas) per head, plus 1 piastre miri for the declaration sheet.

89. The position, as it affected Indian pilgrims, may best be described in the language used by the Indian vice-consul in his report to His Majesty's Minister. "The situation," he says, "became very difficult on the arrival of the Indian pilgrims, who are generally known here as 'the pilgrims with guardians at their back.' The presence of the Indian vice-consul on all occasions of the arrival of Indian ships proved a great hindrance in the illegal ways of both the agents and the customs officials. The Indian vice-consul could, and did, stop the illegal treatment and pilfering, &c., during search, whenever he or his staff could be availed of, but he obviously could not prevent the officials from the legal discharge of their duties in searching the luggage of the pilgrims or charging dues on articles which they named to be liable for customs duties. On one occasion it happened in the presence of the Indian vice-consul that the luggage

of a respectable and important Sindi pilgrim was searched, which consisted of a few pieces of clothes and cooking utensils of ordinary copper, which being tinned looked as if silver-plated. Though it was made clear to the customs officers that the utensils were of copper only, but tinned, they refused to accept the statement. Verbal protests to the Governor and other high authorities of the customs proved of no avail, and the pilgrim was charged something like £5 on the articles, which was, however, reduced at the personal protest of the Indian vice-consul. This was only one of the numerous cases which the pilgrims had to face for not taking to the easier means of satisfying the avarice of the officials. The contrast is explicable by a different incident, in which a mutawwif's agent charged a party of rich Memons under his care a sum of 12 rupees to bribe the customs officers, with a view to getting the luggage cleared from the customs. And the result was that the luggage of the party, consisting of nearly fifty bundles in number, was allowed to pass after only a nominal and showy search without any difficulty or unnecessary detention. The matter subsequently came to the notice of the Indian vice-consul, who summoned both the pilgrims and the agent. Although the pilgrims confessed that by paying such a small amount they had been spared many troubles and difficulties, which otherwise would have been immense, the Indian vice-consul could not let it pass as it was, lest one unchecked crime should encourage the defaulters to burden the over-taxed pilgrims with yet another fresh one. Accordingly he recovered the amount from the agent and delivered it to the pilgrims. It was, however, thought inadvisable to take legal action against the official, in view of the fact that the agent who had to deal day and night with these officials would not dare to incur their displeasure by giving evidence against them. And, moreover, such a course would have proved detrimental to the interests of the pilgrims, inasmuch as it would have subjected them to stricter searches and the consequent troubles and detention, while that could be easily saved on payment of a few rupees, as illustrated in the above two cases. However, the agents were seriously warned not to charge their pilgrims anything in future in this respect. This could not stop the prevailing practice, as many cases came to notice in which the agents, having expressed their inability to act as intermediaries to bribe the officials to clear the luggage of well-to-do pilgrims, these latter had to be given liberty to a certain extent to deal with the customs officers direct. This procedure deprived the agents of the mutawwifin of a certain portion of their legitimate amount, which they had actually invested from time to time in the custom's officers, from their own pockets in anticipation of earning more from the rich pilgrims under their care. This practice, however, remained prevalent throughout the pilgrimage season under review, and altogether knowing the facts full well, the vice-consul did not think it feasible, for the reasons mentioned before, to take any legal action against the officers. The pilgrims, moreover, who verbally reported the matter to him, eventually refused to record their statements for official action."

90. Although, as stated in paragraph 77, His Majesty's Minister considers it premature to deal with the possible consequences of the fixing up of organised pilgrim routes from the eastern side of Arabia, it may be noted that Ibn Saud has already devoted attention to the organisation of the customs service on the Hasa coast. He despatched thither last year a mission under Muhammad At-Tawil, a Jedda notable, who was formerly much identified with the Hashimite régime, and is reputed to be the ablest of the Hejazis, to study the economic situation, including the possibility of organising the trans-desert route, and, among other things, to reform the customs service. At-Tawil would appear to have done a good deal in the latter direction in the teeth of much local opposition.

(7) Religious Policy.

91. The 1931 pilgrimage produced no very material change in the situation described in paragraph 49 of the report for 1930. In the latter part of 1930 and the early months of 1931, there was a relaxation, very welcome to the Hejazi populations of the towns, of Wahhabi vigour. The activities of the Amar-al-Marooif, or Committee of Virtue, were so greatly curtailed that, while not actually abolished, it ceased to be an important factor. The special Nejdi police attached to it were done away with and their functions transferred to the ordinary police, who were instructed to confine themselves to notifying the public of the regular

hours for prayer. There were many signs that the King had adopted a policy of greater compromise and tolerance, one of his motives, perhaps, being not to discourage the pilgrimage at a time of economic and financial stress merely to gratify the fanaticism of the extremists among his own subjects. He is credited with a public utterance to the effect that a party of four pilgrims was of greater value to him than a clan of Bedouin. The hopes of the Hejazis were stimulated by developments between Egypt and the Hejaz, which, at the end of 1930, appeared favourable to the revival of the Egyptian Mahmal or Sacred Caravan.

92. These easier conditions were reflected in the treatment of pilgrims in 1931. The Legation received no complaints from British pilgrims of hardship or interference with their religious observances, except perhaps at the Prophet's Tomb at Medina, where it was necessary to bribe the Nejdi guards in order to be allowed to touch and kiss the railing round the grave.

93. Many pilgrims continue to be shocked by the disregard shown for other tombs, &c. This is especially true of those of the Shia denomination, who were, moreover, again disappointed in 1931 in their hope of receiving more liberal treatment as a result of the treaty concluded some time ago between Hejaz-Nejd and Persia. They were subjected to an extra tax of 10s. per head collected with the motor fare to Medina. Many Indian Shias represented their grievances to the Indian vice-consul, and one of them, a retired Government official of some standing, addressed a letter to His Majesty's Minister in which he complained of the extra taxation just mentioned and other disabilities suffered by Shia pilgrims. There appears to be good ground for all or some of these grievances, although Sir A. Ryan could only state that it would not be possible for him to intervene without departing from the settled policy of His Majesty's Government of neutrality in religious matters and non-interference in the Holy Places of Islam.

94. It is to be hoped that the Hejazi Government will continue to use in the main a wise toleration in their attitude towards pilgrims to whom extreme Wahhabi principles are repugnant. It must, however, be recorded that soon after this year's Haj, the internal policy of Ibn Saud underwent a change in the direction of greater rigidity. The Ulama of Nejd, having remonstrated with him on what they held to be the impropriety, from an Islamic point of view, of perpetuating the celebration of his succession to the throne of the Hejaz, first held in 1930, and repeated in January 1931, the King published the remonstrance in the Mecca newspaper, "Umm-al-Qura," together with a reply in which he deferred entirely to their views. At the same time the Committee of Virtue was reinstated in its powers in the various Hejazi towns and Nejdi soldiers, numbering 260 in Mecca, were employed to enforce the religious observances in a drastic manner. There was renewed stringency in various directions, e.g., the prohibition of public smoking (although the importation of tobacco is allowed and is an important source of revenue, being widely used, even by Nejdis). Some attempt was also made to enforce the law forbidding gramophones and other forms of music. It may be assumed that these measures are dictated less by a change in the King's personal sentiments than by his desire to rally the extremists to his support in a troublous time. It would be unfortunate if the new policy were extended to foreign pilgrims, who had, as has already been stated, little to complain of in 1930, subject to their renouncing visits to tombs and other shrines and concentrating on their main object, the performance of the Haj proper, as a duty enjoined on all Moslems.

95. The following passage on Wahhabi activity generally may be quoted textually from Munshi Ihsanullah's report:—

"The Wahhabi Government," he says, "do not appear to be engaged in vast activities to propagate the Wahhabi doctrines, as was reported in 1929; nevertheless, they are not totally silent on this point. The financial stringency has compelled them to limit their propaganda and confine it within the sphere of their influence. They discourage the educational institutions from imparting to the students anything other than the Wahhabi teachings, and insist on having Wahhabi treatises taught in the schools. On the revival of the Religious Committee, Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Hasan went to Medina and closed down the religious institutions of the Hanafi sect on the refusal of the latter to admit in its course books of the Wahhabi faith or appoint a teacher of the Wahhabi belief. This school was run by a leading Alim, who comes from the family of the Frangi Mahal, ulema in Lucknow. His exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad is one of its principal patrons. Besides

interfering in the curriculum of educational institutions, the Wahhabi Government further extended their spirit of intolerance to several personal liberties of the people. Recently the members of the Patani community, who are individually subjects of the British-protected Indian State of Baroda but domiciled as a mercantile community in the Hejaz for centuries, have been semi-officially ordered not to put on their national head-dress at Mecca, on the grounds that it resembles that of Christians. One of them was actually prevented from performing his 'tawwaf' in the Haram at Mecca with his turban on."

(8) Mutawwifs.

96. Paragraphs 51 to 61 of the report for 1930 gave a comprehensive description of the system whereby all overseas pilgrims are placed in the hands of the recognised guides known as mutawwifs and their agents, together with some account of the defects of the system and the abuses which accompany it. The following paragraphs bring the subject up to date, with reference to developments in 1931.

Authorised Charges.

97. This subject can best be dealt with here as the bulk of the charges annually sanctioned by the Hejazi Government pass through the hands of the mutawwifs and their agents in Jedda. The Government delayed greatly the publication of the tariff for 1931. In spite of repeated efforts on the part of the Legation to obtain it, the tariff was only made available late in January immediately after, and possibly because, His Majesty's Minister had sent an *en clair* telegram to the Government of India reporting his inability to ascertain the scale of charges and suggesting that pilgrims must take the risk of uncertain expenditure. When communicated to the Legation it was found to be practically identical with the tariff for the previous year, except in one important particular. The inclusive fee payable to the mutawwif for his personal services, accommodation in Mecca and certain other items was increased so as to allow the mutawwif a definite margin of personal remuneration. This fee varies according to the nationality of the pilgrims. The rates fixed for 1931 for the principal categories of British pilgrims were 54 rupees for Indians generally, including Bengalis, as against 33 rupees in the previous year; 20 rupees plus cost of accommodation for Malabari, Sindi and Suleimani pilgrims; and £8 for Malaysians, who are charged on the same scale as the Javanese. It was estimated that the increase for Indians would leave the mutawwifs a margin of profit of 10 rupees. This was a step in the right direction as mutawwifs, with all their defects, have had their own legitimate grievances, what with having to deal with impoverished pilgrims on the one hand and an ever more exacting Government on the other. The only hope of ever making them honest as a class lies in assuring to them a fair return for what they do.

98. The Government reversed the policy of the previous year by publishing the scale of charges for the 1932 pilgrimage unusually early, very shortly, in fact, after the end of the 1931 season. This was probably done with the object of encouraging pilgrims to come forward by diminishing uncertainty as to the cost of the pilgrimage, although it must be noted that these tariffs leave for subsequent fixation the most important items of all, namely, the authorised charges (including Government road tax) for transport. In the tariff for 1932 the mutawwif's fee for personal services, &c., was found lower than in 1931 for all pilgrims except those from the Dutch East Indies and Malaya, being reduced to 40 rupees for Indians generally and 15 rupees, plus cost of accommodation, for Malabar, &c. These reductions were presumably intended as a further attraction to pilgrims.

99. The tariff for the year 1931 is reproduced for convenience of reference in Appendix B to this report with notes showing the only alterations made in the tariff for 1932.

Charges at Medina.

100. The charges for muzawwars or local pilgrim guides at Medina (see paragraph 61 of the report for 1930) are not fixed by the Government in the same

way as those payable to the mutawwifs at Mecca and their agents in Jedda. In some cases the Mecca mutawwif takes a fee in respect of the service to be rendered by a muzawwar, e.g., Bengali pilgrims going to Medina are made to pay their mutawwifs 12 rupees each on this account. The Indian vice-consul considers this excessive and it is said that only from 2 to 3 rupees actually go to the muzawwar, the mutawwif in Mecca pocketing the balance. The attention of the Hejazi Government has been called to the desirability of fixing authorised charges for the muzawwars' services as well as for housing at Medina.

Charges for Zamzam and Zubeyda Water.

101. The question has also been raised of scheduling the charges for water from Zamzam and Zubeyda, the uncertainty of which, according to the Indian vice-consul, gave rise to many complaints this year.

New Regulations.

102. On the 3rd April, when the influx of pilgrims was in full swing, the authorities at Jedda suddenly brought into application a new regulation prepared in Mecca, but not actually published until a week later. The mutawwifs' agents in Jedda were to take possession of pilgrims' passes or passports in exchange for a printed identity card, to perform any necessary formalities at their consulates, and then to forward the passes, &c., direct to the mutawwifs at Mecca. The latter were empowered to retain them until after the pilgrimage, when they were to be returned to their owners direct or through the agents in Jedda. The immediate causes of the promulgation of this regulation were not very certain. It was, however, obvious that, notwithstanding a clause threatening mutawwifs with severe penalties in the event of their retaining passes without due cause at the end of the season, the effect of the regulation as a whole must be to place pilgrims even more than before at the mercy of mutawwifs' agents and mutawwifs. It made the pilgrim pass a pledge, as it were, for the payment of dues. It was likely, moreover, to create great confusion owing to the danger of the passes being lost or mixed up. His Majesty's Minister took strong exception to the innovation, on the double ground that pilgrims should not (as was at first intended apparently) be prevented from attending personally at their consulates for the performance of any formalities required by their national authorities, and that they should not be indefinitely deprived of their papers of identity by a foreign authority, much less by mutawwifs, &c., whom Sir A. Ryan regarded as private persons, however much their status might be officially recognised. On his threatening through the Indian vice-consul to make strenuous representations to the Central Government, the local authorities, after themselves consulting Mecca, desisted from any attempt to prevent pilgrims from attending personally at the Legation. Having established this point, Sir A. Ryan addressed a note to the Hejazi Government in which he made strict reservations, pending reference to His Majesty's Government, regarding the other point, viz., the retention of passes by mutawwifs' agents and mutawwifs. His Majesty's Government shared Sir A. Ryan's views, and he was in due course authorised to confirm his reservations by a definite protest. He was given discretion as to the time and manner of his action. Having gathered from conversations with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the new regulations, though they were enforced up to the end of the 1931 season, were likely to be rescinded, he postponed further action in the hope that this would happen before the outset of the 1932 season.

103. As a corollary to the new regulations, the authorities in Jedda required pilgrims' passes to be endorsed by the mutawwifs' agents before authorising the departure of pilgrims from the Hejaz, in order to show that all dues had been paid. This requirement placed a formidable weapon in the hands of the mutawwifs and their agents.

104. The Government contemplated levying a tax equivalent to about 10s. on pilgrims unable to produce their passes on their return from the Haj owing to their having lost them. Return tickets deposited at the Legation are returned to such pilgrims, provided there is no question of fraud, and the imposition of the proposed tax would have caused hardship at a time when pilgrims are apt to have pretty well exhausted their resources. The Indian vice-consul was able to settle the matter by getting the Governor of Jedda to issue unofficial certificates

that the passes had been lost, and the mutawwifs' agents, in their turn, affixed to the certificates the necessary endorsement to the effect that nothing was due by the holders.

Reform Proposals.

105. The question of reforming the mutawwif system was one of those debated at the Hejazi National Conference (see paragraph 1). The discussion would appear to have been heated, some accusing the mutawwifs of bringing the Government into discredit by maligning it to pilgrims, of inducing the latter to address complaints to their national representatives, and of getting money out of the tender-hearted by pretending that they were themselves squeezed, while others declared that it was the inhabitants of Mecca, not the mutawwifs, who poisoned the pilgrims' minds. One sensible suggestion emerged from the discussion, namely, that the Government should find some means of collecting taxes other than that of using the mutawwifs as middle-men. The whole subject was reserved for further consideration, and no change has been made in the system so far. The King, however, judging by his published utterances at the conference and by what is otherwise known of his attitude, would appear to be fully aware of the corruption prevailing and the need for reform. Before leaving for Riyadh in June he took the definite step of dismissing the Sheikh Al-Mutawwifin, the head sheikh of all mutawwifs in Mecca other than those responsible for Dutch East Indian pilgrims. Unfortunately the new incumbent is unfamiliar with any Indian language, and therefore ill-qualified for work which largely concerns Indian pilgrims. The British Indian vice-consul considers that there should be a separate sheikh for the Indian pilgrimage as there is for the Dutch East Indians, just as there is a separate naqib, or headman, of the mutawwifs' agents dealing with Indian pilgrims in Jedda. Munshi Ihsanullah has greatly exerted himself to promote reform on sound lines. In view of the obvious difficulties of official intervention in a matter so delicate, he has done his best to enlist the support and sympathy of distinguished foreign pilgrims and others standing well with Ibn Saud, urging the advantages which the Hejazi Government would derive from a healthy reorganisation from the point of view both of their credit with the Moslem world and their finance. He pays special tribute to the assistance rendered this year by Moulvi Ismail Ghuznavi (see paragraph 14), though the departure of the King for Riyadh and that of Ismail Ghuznavi for India supervened before anything concrete could be accomplished.

106. In this connexion it may be observed that the Hejazi Government, though so slow to put their house in order, are as sensitive as ever as regards foreign intervention, and too often present the appearance of upholding the mutawwifs, &c., whose interest it is to make themselves independent of such control as diplomatic and consular representatives can directly or indirectly exercise. His Majesty's Minister, while careful to respect religious susceptibilities, has consistently held that the British pilgrim is a British traveller, the special object of whose journey does not deprive him of the right to the protection and assistance of British officials in matters affecting his temporal interests.

Impoverished Pilgrims and Mutawwifs.

107. A good many Indian pilgrims, some 200, had difficulty in leaving Jedda after the pilgrimage owing to their inability to pay off their mutawwifs, who had the whip-hand of them owing to the operation of the new regulations described in paragraphs 102 and 103. His Majesty's Minister, feeling strongly that if on the one hand mutawwifs need to be strictly controlled, they should nevertheless get their legal dues, was loath to intervene officially, but after satisfying himself that the pilgrims in question, though provided with return passages, were without other resources, he made an unofficial appeal *ad misericordiam* through the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. This, coupled with the efforts of the Indian vice-consul, assisted again by Moulvi Ismail Ghuznavi, led to the demands of the mutawwifs being waived. It is fair to say that, though there was a good deal of official obstruction before the pilgrims were allowed to go, the King showed generosity in the matter, and a direct representation by Munshi Ihsanullah to the Director-General of Finance (a personage whom the Legation seldom has occasion to praise) contributed materially to the happy ending.

Black List.

108. The black list system, adopted by the Legation in 1930 (see paragraph 60 of the report for 1930) proved a useful instrument in inducing notoriously ill-behaved mutawwifs to mend their ways. The system is applied with elasticity, and certain mutawwifs who had been black-listed last year were allowed to go to India this year, though without being placed on the "recommended list," to be mentioned presently. Some others, who have been the subject of numerous complaints this year, have been added to the list. The further step has been taken of forwarding to the Government of India a list of "recommended mutawwifs," comprising twenty who are conversant with the Bengali language and suitable for pilgrims from Bengal, and twenty for other provinces. It is hoped that pilgrims may be judiciously advised in India to choose their mutawwifs from this list, so as to put a premium on good conduct on the part of mutawwifs generally.

Taqrir System.

109. The methods described in the preceding paragraph have had some effect in imposing better conduct on the mutawwifs competing for the custom of pilgrims who enjoy freedom of choice, but cannot be applied to those enjoying the monopoly of certain pilgrims under the Taqrir system (see paragraph 53A of the report for 1930). Fortunately there has been no extension of Taqrir. Among those subject to it are Indian Moslems of the Memon community. A leading member of the community attempted this year to contest the imposition of a mutawwif by the Hejazi Government. He appealed to the Legation, which, however, did not feel that it could interfere with the established custom. The applicant and his friends had perforce to accept the legally recognised mutawwif. In another case, a pilgrim who, though resident in the United Provinces, had taken out a passport in Bihar, the pilgrims from which district are under Taqrir, was claimed by the mutawwif for Bihar after he had placed himself in the hands of another mutawwif of his own choice. On his complaining to the Sheikh Al-Mutawwifin he had a cavalier reception. The Indian vice-consul eventually arranged for the pilgrim to revert to the mutawwif whom he wished to employ, but only after he had bought off the Bihar mutawwif by paying his dues. These cases illustrate the helplessness of pilgrims subject to the Taqrir system, the total abolition of which would be a boon.

Deceased Pilgrims' Estates.

110. The Indian vice-consul cites two specific cases this year in illustration of the danger of deceased pilgrims' property being misappropriated by mutawwifs. In one case he was informed by a respectable pilgrim from Bihar that a female companion of his had died leaving 300 rupees, £15 and jewellery. The mutawwif having taken charge of the effects, ostensibly to hand them over to the Beit-ul-Mal, the proper Hejazi authority, actually deposited only 80 rupees. In the other case, an Indian notable named Moulvi Nisar Ahmed used to come annually on Haj, bringing with him merchandise which he left with his mutawwif. He died, leaving, it is said, about 2,000 rupees in the possession of the mutawwif, who is accused of having appropriated the amount. Both cases have been taken up by the Legation.

Miscellaneous.

111. In certain cases in which mutawwifs had got possession of pilgrims' passes under the new regulations (see paragraph 102), they handed them over to impostors, who succeeded in getting hold of the corresponding return tickets deposited at the Legation. Owing to the control exercised over the issue of passes, the fraud was detected when the real owners presented themselves, and it was possible to compel the illegal recipients of tickets to make good their value. Such incidents nevertheless illustrate one of the practical disadvantages of the new regulation, as distinct from the strong objections to which it is open in principle.

112. The Indian vice-consul states that miscellaneous complaints of the familiar kind against mutawwifs, their agents and their *sabees* or apprentices were much more numerous this year than usual. His description of them is reproduced in his own words as follows: "The pilgrims in some cases were charged the mutawwif's fee over and above the scheduled rates, as was the hire

for motors and arabas—the latter for the journey from Mecca to Arafat. Extra charges were made for the necessary kit, which hitherto the pilgrims were allowed to take with them free of charge. This was, it is said, done with the co-operation of the motor owners at the time when pilgrims had seated themselves in the cars and were about to start. Those who refused to pay were detained. The free choice of pilgrims in the purchase of sacrificial animals at Mina was greatly hindered. Pilgrims from Peshawar, North-West Frontier Province, were, in respect of mutawwifin's fee, treated as pilgrims from the Punjab, whereas the former have to pay a smaller fee than the latter. In many cases the cash entrusted by certain pilgrims to their mutawwifin for safe custody, both in the Hejaz as well as in India prior to their departure were embezzled, forged accounts being presented to make up the balance. Remittances made by the relatives of pilgrims through their mutawwifin were not delivered in full till the Indian vice-consul threatened to refuse them permission for the journey to India. Instances of the mutawwifin marrying Bengali women, bringing them here, stripping them of all their belongings and then divorcing them and driving them out penniless and helpless, were again not lacking. Cases of the mutawwifin charging pilgrims for both journeys, but actually purchasing single steamer tickets, which fact the latter came to know on reaching Jedda, also came to notice."

113. Munshi Ihsanullah attaches importance to a case of a different kind, for which he knows no precedent and which may be placed on record, although the attitude of the woman concerned made it impossible for the Legation to take official cognisance of it. A respectable Indian from Sind brought on Haj the wife of one of his servants. She was missing when the party were about to leave Mecca on the return journey to India, and was traced to the house of a person of bad character, who is a favourite of the Amir Faisal and reputed to serve him as a pander. She had apparently been removed to this house from that of the mutawwif in unascertained circumstances. Ismail Ghuznavi, who assisted Munshi Ihsanullah in the matter, saw the girl and vainly endeavoured to persuade her to go back to India. In these circumstances he could do nothing further, and the woman remained in Mecca, notwithstanding the efforts of her late employer to procure her return.

(9) Indian Pilgrimage.

114. This section deals with various matters connected with the Indian pilgrimage which have not already been covered in the more general preceding sections.

115. The arrivals of ships carrying Indian pilgrims in 1931 began with that of the steamship "Rezwan," which reached Jedda on the 13th January with 865 pilgrims, and ended with that of the steamship "Rehmani" on the 22nd April. As was the case last year, only two lines, the Mogul (Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., Ltd.) and the Nemazi, were engaged in the traffic.

116. The following table shows the number of pilgrims from each province of India and Ceylon, classified according to ports of embarkation:—

BRITISH Subjects.

Province.	Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Bengal and Assam ...	940	13	323	1,276
Punjab ...	98	1,453	...	1,551
Bombay ...	1,045	27	...	1,072
United Province ...	915	167	1	1,083
Madras ...	392	392
Sind	349	...	349
Bihar and Orissa ...	103	...	5	108
Central Province ...	245	73	...	318
Baluchistan ...	17	129	...	146
N.W.F.P. ...	97	265	...	362
Hyderabad (Deccan) ...	373	11	...	384
Delhi ...	104	78	...	182
Burma ...	12	1	41	54
Ceylon ...	15	15
	4,356	2,566	370	7,292

117. The above table shows that the total number of pilgrims coming from British India and the Native States was 7,292, as against 11,061 last year. The decrease was mainly due to the falling off in the number of pilgrims from Bengal and Punjab, of whom there were 1,261 and 1,351 respectively, as against 3,706 and 2,003 last year respectively.

118. The reduced number of Indian pilgrims this year is attributed to the fall in the price of Indian products and to general trade depression throughout the country. The cultivators and other poor classes seemed to have been much affected, as it was among these that the decrease was most marked. This year's Haj was, indeed, remarkable for the unusually large proportion of well-to-do and educated pilgrims, including high Government officials, &c.

119. The following list shows the number of non-Indian pilgrims who travelled to the Hejaz via Indian ports:—

Nationality.	Bombay.	Calcutta.	Karachi.	Total.
Chinese (Turkestan) ...	55	...	734	789
Afghan ...	50	...	547	597
South African ...	40	40
Bahraini ...	26	26
Russian (Turkestan) ...	10	...	7	17
Chinese ...	17	17
Persian ...	32	...	10	42
Miscellaneous ...	124	124
Hejaz-Nejd, &c. ...	428	...	43	471
	782	...	1,341	2,123

120. Pilgrims of the above category were less by 1,970 than last year, when their number was 4,093. Of this decrease, Persians accounted for 968, Chinese (Turkestan) for 653, while other countries were responsible for the balance.

121. In addition to the pilgrims classified in the above tables, there was a small number of Indian pilgrims who came to the Hejaz via Iraq, Palestine and Suez. Also a good number of them came by overland routes via Nejd, Iraq and Yemen. The last mentioned pilgrims were almost all indigent and had to be eventually repatriated at the expense of the Government of India.

122. The following table shows the movement of return traffic. It should be noted that the Nemazi line ran only one steamer, the "Sarvistan," during the season. This vessel brought two shiploads of pilgrims to Jedda, but, after taking one complement of outgoing pilgrims back to India, did not return to Jedda for the remainder. This caused some difficulty, as the agents who represent both lines at Jedda had no authority to accommodate the outstanding balance of Nemazi Line pilgrims in the Mogul ships. An arrangement in this sense was eventually, however, arrived at between the two companies, greatly to the relief of the holders of Nemazi return tickets, who, as it was, suffered some delay and were in danger of being stranded.

RETURN Traffic to India.

Dates.	Number of Steamers in Port.	Pilgrims Awaiting Embarkation.			Pilgrims Despatched.			Name of Steamer which Sailed.
		Mogul.	Nemazi.	Total.	Mogul.	Nemazi.	Total.	
1931.								
May 6..	6	2,808	1,473	4,281	1,508	..	1,503	Steamship "Khosrou."
" 7..	5	1,532	1,495	3,027	1,501	..	1,501	" "Akbar."
" 8..	4	203	1,585	1,788	..	1,585	1,585	" "Sarvistan."
" 20..	3	1,451	59	1,510	1,451	59	1,510	" "Rizwani."
" 28..	2	822	114	936	822	114	936	" "Jehangir."
June 14..	1	472	190	662	600	62	662	" "Alavi."
July 13..	1	97	28	125	97	28	125	" "Jehangir."
Aug. 7..	1	64	12	76	64	12	76	" "Alavi."
Sept. 7..	1	54	17	71	54	17	71	" "Jehangir."

123. The following table shows the number of ships run, voyages effected and pilgrims carried by the two lines engaged in the Indian traffic:—

Line.	Outward from India.			Homeward to India.		
	Number of Ships.	Number of Voyages.	Number of Pilgrims Carried.	Number of Ships.	Number of Voyages.	Number of Pilgrims Carried.
Mogul ..	5	7	6,879	5	8	7,453 ⁽²⁾
Nemazi ..	1	2	2,380	1	1	1,585
Total ..	6	9	9,259 ⁽¹⁾	6	9	9,038

(1) The discrepancy between this figure and that given in the general statistics in section (2) is accounted for by the fact that the figure in section (2) is based on official lists received from India, whereas the figure in the print table is derived from the steamship companies' lists, which do not include children.

(2) The excess of outgoing over incoming pilgrims carried by the Mogul Line is due to the fact that they took back to India a number of holders of Nemazi return tickets (see paragraph 122) as well as the destitutes repatriated at the end of the season, many of whom had come overland to the Hejaz.

124. The following table shows the distribution of the totals given in the preceding paragraph by ports of embarkation and destination. The statement of arrivals at Bombay and Karachi cannot, however, be vouched for, owing to the fact that a certain number of pilgrims booked for Bombay prefer to land at Karachi rather than continue the sea voyage on to Bombay.

Port.	Pilgrims embarked.	Pilgrims returning.
Bombay ..	4,757	4,807
Karachi ..	4,132	4,231
Calcutta ..	370	...
Total ..	9,259	9,038

125. The Mogul Line carried, in addition to the above pilgrims embarked for the return voyage to India, 674 pilgrims, including children, for other destinations as follows:—

Aden ..	108
Mokalla ..	509
Kamaran ..	57
Total ..	674

126. The following is a statement of the number of pilgrims who purchased single and return tickets in India or deposited the amount of the return passage:—

	Single.	Return.	Deposit.	Total
Bombay ..	324	4,418	15	4,757
Karachi ..	760	3,371	1	4,132
Calcutta ..	64	292	14	370
Total ..	1,148	8,081	30	9,259

Return of Pilgrims to India: General.

127. Apart from the difficulty over certain holders of Nemazi return tickets (see paragraph 122), there was no undue detention of returning Indian pilgrims. No pilgrim was kept waiting for more than the regulation period of twenty-five days, and no fines were therefore incurred by the shipping companies. Attention may, however, be drawn to the certain matters of detail, as follows, in connexion with the arrangements for returning pilgrims:—

128. Much anxiety was caused among pilgrims booked for return in the steamship "Jehangir" owing to the reluctance of the agents and/or owners to allow her departure when as many as 900 return ticket-holders, besides a number

of purchasers of fresh tickets, were ready to sail. There was, in the opinion of the Indian vice-consul, no plausible reason for the delay, as another ship of the same line was also in harbour, and a third was on its way from India. A considerable number of the waiting pilgrims, headed by one Syed Ahmed, a brother of Dr. Syed Mahmoud, secretary to the All-India Congress Committee, threatened a demonstration. The matter was adjusted at the instance of the Legation, although His Majesty's Minister has no legal power to control shipping in such matters. In the event, the "Jehangir" sailed three days earlier than the date at first proposed. The fact that she carried her full complement of pilgrims shows that there was no reasonable ground for holding her back.

129. The growth in the number of well-to-do and educated pilgrims in proportion to the total number coming from India, has directed attention to the insufficiency of first and second class accommodation for the return voyage. Pilgrims of this class are naturally eager to get back as soon as possible after the Haj. In some cases they are reduced to travelling on deck rather than wait, although they thereby sacrifice money as well as comfort, for the shipping companies allowed no refund. In three steamers of the Mogul Line, sailing in May 1931, fifty first and thirty-two second class ticket-holders travelled on deck, and five first class passengers travelled second class. The shortage of accommodation also creates a traffic in cabins reserved for the ships' officers, who make a personal profit by letting them to pilgrims desirous of greater space and comfort. This would not be open to any grave objection, if it were practised on a moderate scale and the extra charges were controlled. When, however, officers' accommodation is thus let to pilgrims on any considerable scale, it affects the comfort of all first and second class passengers, as the officers who have vacated their own cabins are compelled to encroach on the saloon and deck accommodation intended for such passengers. It is alleged that in one case this year, every member of a ship's complement entitled to cabin room, from the master down to the clerks, let it to pilgrims at rates varying from 1,200 rupees to 400 rupees for the voyage from Jeddah to India. His Majesty's Minister has drawn the attention of the Government of India to the matter in a separate despatch, in which he dealt also with another and even more undesirable practice, whereby deck space reserved or said to be reserved for the use of members of the crew is divided off and let to deck passengers.

130. The shortage of accommodation for passengers of the better class increases the difficulty of dealing with conflicting claims on it. Pilgrims are tempted to bring various influences to bear in order to secure priority of departure, and in the past corrupt practices were common in the offices of the shipping agents. The Indian vice-consul has, in recent years, been instrumental in establishing a system of rotation, under which passages are assigned, under the direction of the local Haj Committee, in the order of arrival at Jeddah, with resort to ballot in the presence of the pilgrims themselves, in doubtful cases, e.g., to decide between the claims of pilgrims arriving simultaneously. This system has earned the commendation of pilgrims. Every effort is made to apply it strictly, without regard to the standing or influence of those seeking return accommodation, and, when it was first introduced, Munshi Ihsanullah risked Ibn Saud's displeasure by refusing to accord preferential treatment, even at the King's request. It has since been thought politic to allow some relaxation in favour of Royal guests, when the occasion arises.

131. The Indian vice-consul draws attention to a difficulty arising out of the fact that pilgrims taking return tickets at Calcutta are compelled to land at Bombay on their return, as the steamers go no further. First and second class passengers complained that they could not obtain a refund of the difference in fare from the agents in Jeddah, who make the necessary refund to deck passengers in the vice-consul's presence, but professed to have no instructions to make it locally in other cases. The agents gave way and made the refunds on Munshi Ihsanullah's intervention, but he points out that it would obviate much trouble and uneasiness if the carrying companies could be induced to charge for the return voyage to Bombay only in the first instance, unless they can guarantee shipment to Calcutta.

132. Some difficulty arose at Jeddah in 1931 in connexion with pilgrims who had come from India by way of Iraq, and had deposited money in India to cover possible quarantine charges and the like in the latter country. A good many of them, finding their resources depleted in the Hejaz, expected to be able

to draw on the deposits in question at Jedda. From correspondence between His Majesty's Minister and His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, it emerged that the deposits could not be touched, but claims falling to be met from them should be made later by the Iraq Government. In certain cases the Legation was compelled to advance money to enable the pilgrims concerned to proceed to India. In some they contrived to borrow the necessary money from other sources.

133. In a few cases pilgrims, who had come via Iraq, and had taken return tickets for the homeward journey from Jedda to Beirut by steamer, and on to Bagdad by motor-car, remained in the Hejaz, and unsuccessfully sought a refund of the return fares. The transporting companies relied on the conditions printed on the combined tickets, which protected them against any obligation to make refunds in respect of unused coupons except in the case of sickness or death. In view of their refusal, it seemed doubtful whether the matter could usefully be pursued.

Representations by Pilgrims.

134. In view of the attention which is now being given to pilgrimage matters generally in India, in connexion with the Haj Enquiry Committee's Reports, the following passages are reproduced textually from the Indian vice-consul's report on the 1931 pilgrimage:—

" Besides many who made verbal complaints, the names of K.B. Abdul Latif Haji Hayat Khan, M.L.C., Bombay, and K.B. M.J. Kader of Bombay, and one Syed Mehr Ali Shah, B.A., a respectable pilgrim from Sind, may be mentioned. These gentlemen in their memorandum, a joint one in the case of the first two, to the Legation have pointed out that:—

- " (1) Steamer fares are still high, and, if possible, should be further reduced.
- " (2) Accommodation for first and second-class pilgrims on board pilgrim steamers is inadequate to meet the demand, which is on the increase. Due to lack of the accommodation, many first- and second-class return ticket holders, of whom the detail is given hereafter, had perforce to travel as deck passengers. Many had to pay excessive amounts to get officers' cabins.
- " (3) The bath-rooms and w.c.'s provided for first- and second-class passengers, besides being inadequate to cater for requirements, were freely used by deck passengers as well as by ships' officers. The first-class lady passengers were the worst sufferers in this respect.
- " (4) The second-class cabins are located in an ill-ventilated corner on the middle deck, and their condition is much worse than that of third-class passengers.
- " (5) The heavy luggage belonging to pilgrims which may not be wanted during the voyage should be kept in a store room. At present it is allowed to be placed on deck, to the great inconvenience of other passengers.
- " (6) The supply of water, though copious, was not fit for consumption on the return journey, owing to its having been stored for over two months. It was found to have changed in colour and taste. Many of the passengers drinking this water suffered from diarrhoea and dysentery and other intestinal troubles.
- " (7) Cooking spaces reserved on the upper deck were occupied by deck passengers, who put up curtains and thus prevented their being used for the purpose intended.
- " (8) The shipping companies are not keen to observe punctually the dates fixed for the sailing of steamers, which are changed often to the great anxiety of intending pilgrims.
- " (9) First and second-class passengers should have the privilege of having their berths reserved on the return journey beforehand by intimation to the authorities concerned, and to be allowed to land at Karachi to get their food supply, &c.
- " (10) Deck passengers cooked their food near the first-class cabins, to the great inconvenience of the occupants of the cabins.

- " (11) The space on the upper deck provided for cooking purpose is not sufficient. The pilgrims, therefore, had to cook in turn.
- " (12) Lighting arrangements were inadequate and unsatisfactory.
- " (13) The shipping staff was generally careless and did not quite look to the comforts of the pilgrims. Pilgrims were packed to suffocation and no room was left for them to offer their prayers. This was due to the heavy luggage being allowed to remain on deck.
- " (14) The ship's doctors in many cases charged fees from patients suffering from small-pox or chicken-pox, and, so to speak, usually carried on practice on board.

" In this connexion it may also be worth recording that on the Khedivial Mail Line (Suez-Jedda-Suakin-Port Sudan), which has much smaller steamers than the Indian pilgrim steamers, first- and second-class cabins are much more decent and have separate saloons and decks, while there is no separate saloon or deck for second-class pilgrims on board Indian pilgrim steamers. Reports from first-class passengers to the effect that officers did not allow them to use the saloon were not infrequent. Sir A. K. Ghaznavi, who had an opportunity during his recent visit to the Hejaz on pilgrimage to visit the steamers of other lines engaged in pilgrim traffic, was surprised to see the far superior conditions of the first- and second-class cabins on those steamers. He expressed it as his desire that similar arrangements and facilities should be provided on Indian steamers.

" The other great need, which has been pointed out in previous annual reports and which was also felt by Sir A. K. Ghaznavi, is for adequate arrangements for pilgrims landing from board ship. The Khedivial Line steamers have four ladders—two on each side—for the purpose. The ladders, moreover, have strong wooden bars against the danger of falling into the sea while landing. It would be as well if similar arrangements could be provided on board Indian pilgrim steamers."

135. In another passage in his report the Indian vice-consul deals with the vexed question of catering on board ship. He states that most pilgrims who take tickets inclusive of food complain vehemently. He deprecates the present system by which the food is provided by a private concern independent of the shipping companies. He accuses the food supply company of discriminating in favour of influential pilgrims, in order to curry favour with them and enlist their support. Notwithstanding the favourable opinions expressed by certain pilgrims of this kind, e.g., Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif, Munshi Ihsanullah considers that the food supply company neglect the mass of pilgrims. He strongly advocates the introduction of a compulsory food system, and the adoption as a pendant thereto of measures to ensure the comfort and convenience of pilgrims in this respect, either by a reform of the present system or by arranging for the shipping companies to provide food for all passengers, as they at present do in the case of those travelling first and second class. In any case, he says, the arrangements should be under the supervision of the Amir-ul-Hujjaj, of each pilgrim ship, as suggested by the Haj Enquiry Committee.

136. In this connexion, Munshi Ihsanullah mentions an incident which occurred when the steamship "Jehangir" was about to leave Jedda. Two second-class pilgrims complained to him after embarking that no cabin accommodation had been provided for them. It appeared on enquiry that the manager of the food supply company had been given gratis the use of one of the cabins shown in the ship's papers as being reserved for second-class passengers, and was unwilling to give it up. He was eventually compelled to vacate the cabin, but Munshi Ihsanullah reports the matters with the suggestion that accommodation other than that reserved for pilgrims should be provided for employees of the food supply company, or that, if pilgrims' cabins are used for the purpose, the ship's papers should be amended accordingly, in order to prevent encroachment on space intended for pilgrims.

Registration.

137. The arrangements for registering Indian pilgrims at the Indian section of the Legation on arrival have now been perfected, and have given eminently satisfactory results. Out of the 7,200 odd Indian pilgrims arriving

by sea in 1931, no less than 6,838 were registered. The remainder were mostly single-ticket holders.

138. The registration system confers on pilgrims the advantage of bringing them into personal contact with the Indian vice-consul and his staff, and thereby reducing their hardships and difficulties in the Hejaz. They escape the danger of losing their return tickets during the Haj, as these are deposited with the Indian section. Strict precautions are taken to prevent impostors from obtaining possession of the tickets when these are redistributed through the mutawwifs' agents, who are required to sign for the tickets handed to them, and are held responsible for seeing that they are used only by the rightful owners.

139. During the 1931 season, sixty Indian pilgrims lost their pilgrim passes bearing the registration endorsement of the Legation. Some of these passes were in due course presented by impostors. In a few cases it was found, as soon as the rightful owners presented themselves, that tickets for which mutawwifs' agents had signed had got into wrong hands, and the agents were called upon to make good the value. After this experience they learnt caution, and spared no pains to assure themselves of the genuineness of their clients.

140. The registration system also facilitates the return to India of unclaimed return tickets; 155 such tickets, dating from 1929, were forwarded to the Government of India this year. It appears that there is some technical difficulty in India in obtaining a refund of the value of such tickets from the shipping companies, but it is at least satisfactory to know that they can no longer go astray or be misappropriated.

141. Registration not being compulsory, it still happens that return tickets are not deposited at the Legation. The large percentage of registrations now recorded shows, however, the success achieved by the Indian vice-consul in counteracting the inclination of evil-minded mutawwifs to prevent their pilgrims from coming into contact with the Legation, and to impress upon the mutawwifs' agents in Jedda the importance of ensuring the registration of all Indian pilgrims in their charge. In 1931 three out of the small number of pilgrims who had failed to deposit their return tickets, lost them. The shipping companies were duly warned, and the owners of the tickets were provided with emergency passes to enable them to return to India.

Local Haj Committee.

142. This committee was again duly constituted in 1931 and did useful work in connexion with the distribution of passages to out-going pilgrims. The nature and scope of this committee, an unofficial body with strictly limited functions, have been described minutely in one of the recent despatches from Jedda (see paragraph 18) dealing with the conclusions of the Haj Enquiry Committee. The Government of India has also been approached on the question of providing a suitable representation allowance for the Indian vice-consul, at whose house the committee meets, and who has for some years past been put to considerable expense through the necessity of extending hospitality to the committee as well as in other directions of a similar kind.

Destitutes.

143. The number of destitute Indian pilgrims who had to be repatriated at the expense of the Government of India in 1931 was 318, a figure which, having regard to the diminished size of the pilgrimage, compares unfavourably with that of 387 in 1930. Passage money at the high destitute rate of 40 rupees a head was collected from seven of the 318, and one was a State pensioner. The remaining 310 were completely destitute. The expense entailed on the Government of India was R. 13,239.3.8. The usual difficulties were experienced at the Legation, which had to deal with a mob of over 400 applicants, and to weed out persons having no claim on the Government of India, i.e., Afghans and those from beyond the borders of Baluchistan, whom it is most difficult to distinguish from British Indian subjects of frontier origin. By arrangement with the Government of India, it was decided this year (a) to transmit to the leading authorities in India by the master of the carrying ship lists showing the names and alleged addresses of the repatriated destitutes, with a view to their being traced on arrival and called upon, if possible, to refund the money expended on

their behalf; and (b) to obtain from each destitute an undertaking to repay the cost of repatriation on demand.

144. The difficulties of the Legation were increased this year by the unwillingness of Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., who now have a virtual monopoly of the return pilgrim traffic to India, to quote a moderate rate. Their agents at first stood out for 50 rupees a head, or only 20 rupees less than the ordinary single fare of 70 rupees. This made it impossible, pending consultation with India, to ship the destitutes as intended in the steamship "Alavi." The authorities in India eventually got the company to agree to a rate of 40 rupees, and the destitutes were repatriated in a later vessel. It may be noted that the agents had already conceded the rate of 40 rupees to the Hejazi Government for the repatriation of 60 Bokhari destitutes shipped in the "Alavi."

145. The problem of the destitute Indian pilgrim was discussed at length in paragraphs 25 ff. of the report for 1930. Its growing importance appears from the following table showing the number of pilgrims repatriated at Government expense during the last five years and the rates charged:—

Year.	Total Indian pilgrims.	Destitutes repatriated.	Rate per head. Rupees.
1927	26,500	188	15.8.0
1928	14,000	179	13.8.0
1929	15,000	139	25.0.0
1930	11,000	387	35.0.0
1931	7,276	318	40.0.0

146. The following table shows, for the 310 completely destitute pilgrims repatriated in 1931, (a) the provinces of origin and (b) the routes by which the pilgrims reached the Hejaz:—

(a) Province of Origin—

Sind	91
Bengal	75
Punjab	62
Malabar	32
Baluchistan	31
North-West Frontier	10
Hyderabad (Deccan)	3
Other provinces	6

310

(b) Routes of Access—

Overland—

Viâ Muscat, Bahrein, Goadar, Basra, Koweit, Nejd	120
Viâ Mokalla, Aden, Yemen	68
Viâ Bagdad and Syria	28

216

By Sea—

Single ticket holders from Bombay and Karachi	84
Return ticket holders from Bombay and Karachi who obtained refunds	10

94

310

147. Several passes showed that the authorities at Goadar had either issued a certificate of identity or endorsed passes to enable pilgrims to land at different ports of the Arabian coast. Ten of those who came viâ Bagdad and Syria had obtained permanent passports at Bagdad and then travelled overland on foot. The figures as a whole show how greatly the increase in the number of destitutes is due (a) to the large number of pilgrims who find their way to the Hejaz by overland routes and (b) to abuse of the facilities given in India for travelling by

sea with single tickets, taken in the off-season or, during the season, on a declaration of non-intention to return to India.

148. The Legation in Jedda does its utmost to reduce the annual expense to the Government of India under this head, by assuring itself that applicants are really destitute and are, in fact, British Indian subjects. It cannot be too often repeated, however, that the key to the situation lies with the authorities in India and that a serious reduction in the growing number of destitutes can only be effected by the exercise of strict control at all seasons on the land frontier and at minor ports of embarkation and by a considerable tightening up of the arrangements under which pilgrims are allowed to take single tickets for the sea voyage from the regular pilgrim ports. The Indian vice-consul makes the following specific suggestions, which are reproduced textually at the risk of labouring the points made in last year's report:—

"(a) The authorities in Karachi and Calcutta should be instructed to put a stop to the menacing increase of single ticket holders, who hail particularly from these two ports, merely making a declaration of non-return to India within three years. Pending modifications in existing rules by the Government of India, they should strictly follow the policy of the Bombay authorities and observe a more restrictive attitude in the matter of allowing pilgrims to come to the Hejaz with single tickets only.

"(b) The existing system of obtaining pilgrim passes from the Protector of Pilgrims at Karachi and Bombay should be discontinued, and the intending pilgrims should apply for their passes to their respective district officers. It would put a stop to the evil machinations of the pilgrim brokers in fetching pilgrims to ports other than their own, deceiving them in many ways which ultimately give rise to various complaints in the Hejaz.

"(c) The shipping companies engaged in pilgrimage traffic should be made to repatriate free of charge a certain proportion of the total pilgrims carried. The companies would suffer no financial loss if they adopted this scheme, in view of the fact that their ships have to go back to India, whether there is any sufficient number of pilgrims on board or not.

"(d) The last, though not the least, is to amend the existing regulations, which enable pilgrims to claim refunds of their return passage money on the expiry of one year, and to extend this period to two years, with reservations for the Indian vice-consul to use his discretion in cases where he deems it proper to prolong it for a further two years, thereby making the ticket valid for four years."

149. His Majesty's Minister is in general agreement with Munshi Ihsanullah's suggestions, subject to a doubt under head (c), as to whether shipping companies can be expected, especially in the present depressed conditions, to repatriate any important number of destitutes free of charge. Sir A. Ryan considers that a reasonable rate for eventual destitutes up to a suitable number or percentage should be agreed in India early in the season. He trusts that, in the course of the present examination of the conclusions of the Haj Enquiry Committee, special attention may be given to the connected problems of (a) reducing the number of potential destitutes by restrictive action in India and (b) facilitating the task of the Legation in disposing of such destitutes as may have to be repatriated at the end of the season despite all precautions which can be taken to reduce their number.

Forged Indian Currency Notes.

150. See paragraph 18 of section (I).

Publicity.

151. Attention is directed to the points enumerated in paragraph 86 of the report for 1930 regarding matters which might usefully be brought to the notice of intending pilgrims in pamphlets, &c., published in India for their guidance. During the period now under review His Majesty's Minister suggested to the Government of India definite arrangements for affixing sign boards to the various offices, &c., in the Hejaz when the Indian vice-consul and doctor attest to the requirements of pilgrims, in accordance with the recommendations made in the Haj Enquiry Committee's confidential report.

Banking Facilities.

152. The lack of adequate banking facilities in the Holy Places is increasingly felt. Owing to their absence, pilgrims still make considerable use of hundis or drafts issued by commercial houses in India on their correspondents in Jedda and Mecca. The difficulty of cashing these hundis was greatly aggravated in 1931 owing to the precarious position in which many local merchants found themselves as a result of the general economic stress and instability. In many cases it required the intervention of the Indian vice-consul to ensure the payment of hundis, and pilgrims suffered further hardship owing to exchange fluctuations. A certain use is made by pilgrims of Cook's circular drafts, which are obtainable at the Indian ports of embarkation. These, however, can only be cashed in the regular way at Jedda, and in present circumstances they are difficult to realise at Mecca and Medina, where pilgrims encountered great difficulty this year in consequence. On several occasions the Indian vice-consul was compelled to bring drafts of this kind from Mecca to Jedda to be cashed, at the request of Indian pilgrims.

153. His Majesty's Minister has dealt with the whole subject more fully in his despatches dealing with the Haj Enquiry Committee's reports. He deprecates a suggestion made to the Hyderabad Government by the leader of the pilgrimage from that State, who had considerable difficulty in cashing hundis in 1931, that arrangements should be made to remit funds through the Legation. It appears to him undesirable that the Legation should be involved in business of this kind when so many other pilgrimage matters have to be dealt with under great pressure. The real cure would appear to lie in a development of modern banking facilities.

Pilgrimage Staff.

154. The work of the Indian Section was carried out during the 1931 season under the direction of Munshi Ihsanullah with two assistants. One of the latter, Mr. Syed Nur Hussein Shah, fell seriously ill about two months before the Haj and had to return to India. He was replaced temporarily by a third clerk, Haji Mohammed Sharif, who only arrived by the last pilgrim steamer from India, but did good work during the remainder of the season. His knowledge of trans-frontier people and things was of special value, e.g., in the handling of the destitutes. The dislocation of the arrangements caused by Nur Hussein Shah's illness imposed a considerable burden on his permanent colleague, Mr. Shah Jehan Kabir, who worked with commendable zeal and ability throughout the season.

155. In his despatches on the Haj Enquiry Committee's reports (see paragraph 19) His Majesty's Minister has submitted to the Government of India considered proposals for a reorganisation of the staff of the Indian Section on the basis of employing three permanent clerks with properly graded rates of pay in addition to the Indian vice-consul, future increases to be supplied, if possible, from established Indian services. Such a strengthening of the permanent staff would enable the increasing work of the section to be performed with greater efficiency. It would also reduce somewhat the need for temporary staff during the busy season, for which purpose the Government of India has in recent years sanctioned special expenditure not exceeding £200 each year.

Pilgrimage Tariff and Estimated Cost of the Pilgrimage.

156. The subject of the authorised tariff of charges for pilgrims is dealt with this year in the section on mutawwifs (see paragraphs 97 ff. above). A tentative estimate by the Indian vice-consul of the probable inclusive cost of the pilgrimage to an average Indian pilgrim in 1932 is given in Appendix C. This estimate was prepared before the sterling crisis of the autumn of 1931, and does not take into account the possible repercussions on the monetary situation in India and the Hejaz, as to which no precise information is available at the time of writing.

(10) Afghan Pilgrimage.

157. Five hundred and ninety-seven Afghan pilgrims came on Haj through Indian ports. The majority travelled on return tickets. Twenty-three of them

lost their tickets while in the Hejaz and were given such assistance as possible by the Indian Section of the Legation, emergency certificates being issued to enable them to secure return passages from the shipping companies concerned. The Afghan pilgrims generally were treated on the same footing as Indians in such matters as the provision of return passages, &c.

158. After the pilgrimage there were about 160 Afghan destitutes who had come to the Hejaz with single tickets by sea or overland on foot. In the past the Hejazi Government have assisted such persons to return. This assistance was withheld in 1931 owing to the impoverishment of the Government and perhaps to the fact that they had undertaken the repatriation of a considerable number of Javanese pilgrims (see paragraph 14). It is suggested that in conditions of financial stress they preferred to show their favour to pilgrims who, like the Dutch East Indians, are, in the mass, remunerative, rather than to Afghans, none of whom bring much grist to the Hejazi mill. Anyhow, despite appeals made on their behalf to the King by influential members of the local community, the Afghan destitutes remained stranded in the Hejaz in conditions of great misery and many returned from Jedda to Mecca and Medina in the hope of living on charity.

159. Reference has been made in paragraph 15 to the participation in this year's Haj of Amanullah Khan and many Afghan notables, including supporters of the ex-King and representatives of the present Afghan Government.

160. The Turkish representative in Jedda would appear to be no longer in charge of Afghan interests as the arrangement in this sense made in the time of King Amanullah has not been renewed since the accession of the present King of Afghanistan; in consequence of this the Turkish Legation again refrained from appointing a representative on the local Haj Committee this year. The question of Afghan representation in the Hejaz is stated to have been discussed with Ibn Saud by the official delegates from Kabul who came on Haj. The Kathiawar Afghan, Moulana Soofi Muhiuddin, mentioned in paragraph 15, also interested himself in the matter and appears to be responsible for a suggestion, which has not, however, got beyond the stage of indeterminate soundings, that the British Indian vice-consul should be placed in charge of Afghan interests. The question of Afghan representation is of importance in connexion with the problem of the destitutes mentioned above.

161. The following sections, dealing with other categories of pilgrims, are based on the reports submitted by the Malay pilgrimage officer, Haji Abdul Majid (paragraphs 162 to 184) and Captain B. W. Seager (paragraphs 185 to 206). It has been thought well to reproduce the reports with little more than verbal alterations, even at the risk of some slight overlapping with previous sections of the present report as a whole.

(11) Malay Pilgrimage.

Shipping.

162. The first pilgrim ship during the season under review left Singapore on the 11th November and arrived at Jedda on the 28th November. Seven other pilgrim ships followed, the last one arriving at Jedda on the 11th April. All eight ships were of the Blue Funnel Line.

Number of Pilgrims.

163. The total number of pilgrims of all nationalities, including infants, embarked at each of the two Straits Settlements ports were as follows:—

Singapore	1,489
Penang	361
Total	1,850

The figure for last year was 6,333. Port Swettenham, in the Federated Malay States, though declared in November last as a port of embarkation for pilgrims, was apparently still not utilised as such during the 1931 season.

Number of Malay Pilgrims.

164. The number of registered Malay pilgrims from each colony or State in Malaya was as follows:—

Straits Settlements—	Males.	Females.	Children under 12.
Singapore	52	12	1
Penang (including Province Wellesly and the Dindings)	18	16	9
Malacca	19	7	3
Federated Malay States—			
Perak	65	30	11
Selangor	32	9	5
Pahang	21	7	1
Negri Sembilan	16	6	1
Unfederated Malay States—			
Johore	32	8	7
Kedah	22	20	8
Kelantan	26	18	10
Trengganu	4	5	1
Brunei	3	1	...
Total	310	137	57

Grand total: 506.

This figure includes six Malay pilgrims who came on pilgrimage via India.

165. The figures for the last three seasons were as follows:—

Season 1927-28	...	4,418
Season 1928-29	...	1,455
Season 1929-30	...	2,590

The conspicuously small number of Malay pilgrims during the season was no doubt due mainly to the world-wide trade depression that perhaps hits Malaya the hardest owing to her dependence on only two principal industries, tin-mining and rubber-planting.

Pilgrim Passes.

166. Certain centres issuing pilgrim passes, viz., Kemaman, Klang, Rembau, Johore Bahru, Sarawak, Kuala Lipis, and Temerloh, still omitted to state (a) names of pilgrims, and (b) the names of "accompanying relatives" in the Jawi (Arabic) character. Other centres, on the other hand, gave other details unnecessarily written in Jawi. The main point for purposes of identification by the Hejazi authorities is to have the two above-mentioned headings filled in in Jawi (Arabic) letters as well as in English.

Vaccination and Inoculation.

167. The practice evidently adopted in the Straits Settlements of leaving these preventive measures to be attended to by private practitioners seems to my mind to be irreproachable only if the practitioners will certify that the pilgrim is *successfully* vaccinated and inoculated, instead of merely vaccinated and inoculated, as I find has been the practice in some of these certificates. The difference between the two is too apparent to need further comment.

The Feeding System.

168. Haji Abdul Majid expresses regret that in spite of his memorandum of last year urging improvement in this respect, no attempt was made to see that the food was prepared in a better way. Raja Haji Othman, the Chief Kathi of Selangor and a son-in-law of the ruler of that State, expressed to him great surprise at the unsatisfactory mode of cooking food in vogue on board the pilgrim ship by which he travelled to Jedda. He remarked that he could not understand why the Federated Malay States Malay police recruits, who paid less for their

food in the training depot, got better food in every respect than the pilgrims who paid more. He added that he could easily get contractors who would supply superior and better cooked food for the amount now collected from the pilgrims on this account. He also deplored the fact that unwanted heavy luggage of pilgrims was still strewn on the decks.

Stowaways.

169. There were several cases of stowaways who were discovered after their landing in Jedda. They were taken back to Malaya, if found before disembarkation at Jedda, but were allowed by the Hejazi Government to perform their Haj before they were surrendered to the shipping company for repatriation.

Sheikh's or Mutawwif's Fees.

170. The fees paid by pilgrims for the various items to their sheikhs during the season were as follows:—

	£	Rials
(1) Boat-hire for each pilgrim with his luggage, cartage of luggage, house-rent in Jedda and municipality dues	...	2
(2) Car-hire for each pilgrim, Jedda to Mecca. (No pilgrim was allowed to travel here by camel)	...	8-10
(3) Camel-hire for luggage to Mecca	1	
(4) "Duit Jamu," i.e., house-rent in Mecca, food and accommodation at Arafat and Muna, and Government tax	8	
(5) Car-hire, Mecca-Medina and back. (This rate advances with the season)	9-12	
(6) Camel-hire, Mecca-Medina and back	7	
(7) Car or camel-hire, Mecca-Jedda with luggage	...	17½
(8) Payment in Jedda, as per items in (1)	...	2
Total	28	31½

Its equivalent roughly in Straits dollars is 270.

171. A slight increase in the Hejazi Government taxes on pilgrims, particularly at (4) above, raised the total for these payments from the total shown in previous years. These figures should form a basis for the estimate of expenses by would-be pilgrims during the coming season.

General Conditions during the whole Pilgrimage.

172. There was no difficulty experienced by pilgrims on account of exorbitant prices of food-stuffs and water, as sometimes happened in the past, but the temporary fall in the market value of the local Government currency, i.e., the qurush and balālas, during the Haj week was a source of some anxiety to the pilgrims, as each day brought news of a fresh decline in the purchasing value of their money.

173. The peace and security to life and property, so highly spoken of in the past, remained practically the same throughout the season, though signs were not wanting that the poverty-stricken Bedouin camel-owners, through the use of the more favoured motor vehicles, would revert to their former life of stealing and robbing whenever or wherever they could. Pilgrims, therefore, would be well advised not to be implicitly trustful of these Bedouin in future.

174. During the Haj days, the Hejazi medical authorities had on the route between Mecca and Arafat more hospital tents and water-tanks provided for the use of pilgrims than in previous years. Traffic arrangements as well as climatic conditions, were also better, so that with the comparatively small number of pilgrims of all nationalities congregated, no great hardship was experienced at Arafat and at Muna as in the past.

175. The Hejazi Government's regulation under which, in order to protect local traders, pilgrims who have stayed for more than one season in the Hejaz should be guaranteed by some responsible person against possible liabilities

before they are allowed to leave the country, is considered by one and all to be unnecessary and vexatious, the more so as the procedure for effecting this "guarantee" was a long and tedious one, lasting between a week and a month. Pilgrims who used to depend on their sheikhs to stand guarantee for them are apt now to find that the sheikhs refuse to do so for the plausible reason that the traders seldom, if ever, refer to them before selling on credit to the pilgrims.⁽¹⁾

176. The use of cars for journey to Arafat and Mina which was allowed last season was stopped this season, except among a few favourites of the King.

Assistance to Pilgrims.

177. The annual allowance of £25 for the assistance of Malay destitutes was raised to £100 so as to meet the needs of the large number of applicants to this fund, due to the stringent conditions prevailing in Malaya as well as in the Hejaz. Out of forty applications received, seventeen were approved, and a sum of £100 was distributed as loans which should be in most cases recoverable. Though it could be considered a good check against the tendency among pilgrims to look upon the sheikhs or mutawwifin as their sole benefactors in the Hejaz, precautions were nevertheless taken so as not to encourage this form of assistance by the Government in future.

Suggestions by the Dato' Perdana Menteri of Kelantan.

178. Amongst many other things, the Dato' Perdana Menteri of Kelantan, Nik Mahmud, O.B.E., who came on pilgrimage during the previous season, made the suggestion that every pilgrim before leaving Malaya should deposit with the Government the necessary amount, to meet all dues and payments in the Hejaz, so as not to be a burden financially on the sheikhs or mutawwifin. In spite of all that has been said against the sheikhs, it cannot be denied that as a class, particularly those of Malay origin, they have been helpful to destitute pilgrims in the past. Indeed, the notorious rapacity of these people, so much deplored nowadays, has been due principally to the necessity of making up for losses on account of bad debts among pilgrims. Whilst agreeing with the Dato' on the main principles of his recommendation, it is felt that if the Malay Pilgrimage Officer were to be in charge of the deposited funds and pay them out as they were due according to the Dato's scheme, there would be too much Government interference in the freedom of the pilgrims in such a personal and religious affair as the pilgrimage. Haji Abdul Majid recalls a previous suggestion of his that wide circulation should be given in Malaya to the estimate of expense likely to be incurred by would-be pilgrims, and adds that the sheikhs or mutawwifin concerned have been warned unofficially that all promissory notes and such like documents should be legalised at the British Legation, so as to ensure the validity of their claims.

Provision of Passage for the Return Journey.

179. Four ships carried back the pilgrims to Malaya, the first leaving Jedda on the 8th May and the last on the 12th June. As usual, those who had no pilgrim passes for this journey, who numbered fifty-two, used emergency passes issued by the British Legation. The new arrangement that pilgrims are allowed to take the holy Zemzem water on board the pilgrim ships with them for distribution among friends at home was a satisfactory one.

The System for the Issue and Refund of Tickets.

180. This somewhat thorny question, which had been under discussion during the last three or four years, was summarily decided in effect by the Government of the Straits Settlements, with the concurrence of the Singapore agents of the Blue Funnel Line, as follows:—

- (1) Pilgrims normally shall purchase return tickets.
- (2) Single tickets may be issued to Hejazi or Arabian nationals generally on the recommendation of the Mohammedan Advisory Board or the passport officer.

⁽¹⁾ The regulations here referred to are of general application, but they specially affect Malay pilgrims, who, like the Javanese, not infrequently stay more than one season. His Majesty's Minister has drawn the attention of the Hejazi Government orally to the hardship entailed.

- (3) Malays and persons domiciled in Malaya may be given single tickets on the recommendation of the passport officer, who shall satisfy himself, first, that such persons are of sufficient financial status to guarantee that they will not become destitute in the Hejaz; and secondly, that they intend to remain for the purpose of study in the Hejaz for not less than two years after having performed the Haj.
- (4) Return ticket-holders, at the end of two seasons in the Hejaz, may be given either (a) a refund on their unused ticket at the rate of 30 per cent. of the face value of the return ticket and on the recommendation of the Malay Pilgrimage Officer or the British Legation, or (b) an extension for a further period of three years to the validity of their tickets, making five years in all.

Number of Deceased Pilgrims.

181. The total number of deceased pilgrims amongst those who came this season, as reported by the deceased's next-of-kin to the Malay Pilgrimage Officer up to the time he left Jedda on the 12th June was seventeen, made up as follows:—

Straits Settlements—				
Singapore	2
Penang (including Province Wellesly and the Dindings)	1
Malacca	1
Federated Malay States—				
Perak	2
Selangor	1
Pahang	1
Negri Sembilan	2
Unfederated Malay States—				
Johore	2
Kedah	1
Kelantan	3
Trengganu	1
Brunei
Total	17

This total works out at 3.4 per cent., which is a decidedly better death rate than in all the previous years, owing to the better climatic and other conditions mentioned above.

Effects of Deceased Pilgrims.

182. Practically all enquiries for effects of deceased pilgrims were successfully followed up with a view to the effects being distributed amongst deceased's next-of-kin through the usual channel. Effects of deceased pilgrims who died during this season without accompanying relatives should be handed over to the British Legation during the course of next season.

Recommendations.

183. Haji Abdul Majid makes the following suggestions:—

- (a) The list of tariffs in the Hejaz during the past and coming year should be posted in the offices issuing pilgrim passes throughout Malaya. A margin for possible increases should, nevertheless, be made. Pilgrims are to be warned against making these payments in advance.
- (b) The quality of food to be supplied on board pilgrim ships should be gone into by a committee.
- (c) Pilgrims should be told to keep only such luggage as contain necessary clothing during the voyage on deck; heavy and unwanted luggage to be put in ship's hold.
- (d) Medical practitioners should be asked to certify that the vaccination and inoculation are successfully done.

- (e) As students in Mecca generally cannot say definitely beforehand how long they will remain in the Hejaz, there being many factors to determine such a decision, it is felt that it would be a more satisfactory arrangement if the validity of all return tickets were extended to five years and that a refund should be made, in the event of the holders still remaining in the Hejaz, only after the expiration of this total period of validity.

Staff.

184. Haji Abdul Majid, who had been seconded from the Federated Malay States Educational Department, to act as Malay Pilgrimage Officer since 1924, was confirmed in the post of the 1st January, 1931. Haji Mohammad Jamil, as clerk to the Malay Pilgrimage Officer, was satisfactory in many ways.

(12) West African Pilgrimage.

185. Statistics issued by the local quarantine authorities show that 1,555 West African pilgrims, or "Takrunis," arrived in Jedda on pilgrimage this year via Suakin, as against the official figure of 3,525 for last year. It is, however, again evident that a considerable number—probably well over a thousand—travelled by sambuq (dhow) from Massawa in spite of the Italian undertaking to the contrary, and landed at the smaller Hejazi ports south of Jedda such as Lith and Qunfida, in order to avoid payment of the Jedda quarantine dues.

186. During the return half of the season it was reported that this class of pilgrim had had the greatest difficulty in going back over the Massawa route. The inland desert track between Mecca and Qunfida and Mecca and Lith, which perforce has to be followed before proceeding across the Red Sea in sambuqs, was said to be unsafe owing to the raging of a series of sandstorms. This caused a number of caravans, which had set out from Mecca, to return and await better weather. Those pilgrim caravans which had managed to reach the Red Sea littoral eventually took passage for Massawa in sambuqs, but were reported to have been turned back by the Eritrean authorities owing to their inability to meet the quarantine dues. On their return to the Hejaz, these unfortunates set out on foot again for Mecca and passed the word round that the Massawa route was closed to those with limited means, which effectively checked the departure of those pilgrims who had been held up owing to the inclement weather.

187. At the time of writing it is estimated that there are any number of British West African pilgrims up to a thousand in the Hejaz who are unable to get away owing to the reported impracticability of the desert-cum-sambuq route and to the lack of funds to return via Suakin. The question of their repatriation at Government expense is complicated by the congested state of the labour market in the Sudan, through which country they normally work their way homewards at their leisure.

188. A visit paid to Jedda in the spring by Major D. S. B. Thomson, Commissioner at Port Sudan, provided an opportunity of further discussion of the proposed scheme for the better organisation of the pilgrimage from Nigeria. This led to an agreement between the Sudan authorities and His Majesty's Legation on proposals which it was hoped would meet as far as possible the wishes of the Nigerian Government without creating undue difficulty in the Sudan and at Jedda. It is hoped that a working agreement between all the authorities concerned will be reached in the near future. It will take time to make the proposed arrangements fully operative, but they should eventually ensure the use of the Suakin-Jedda steamer route, with return tickets, by the bulk of the Nigerian pilgrims and kill the sambuq traffic from Massawa with its attendant inconveniences.

(13) Somali Pilgrimage.

189. The Hejaz quarantine authorities report that 103 British Somali pilgrims entered the port of Jedda by steamship and sambuq (dhow) this year. This figure in no way represents the total number of Somalis who came on pilgrimage. Apart from those pilgrims who entered the Hejaz through the port

of Jedda, there are others, and doubtless they are the most numerous, who leave British Somaliland ports for Aden and Sheikh Sa'id, or Mocha, or Mayûn, and reach the Hejaz through the Yemen.

190. The pilgrims, whose means are limited and who proceed by the Aden route, usually set out for the Holy Land on foot until they reach Hodeida in the Yemen. The following is one of the many routes followed: Aden-Lahej-Subeyhi-Mawiya-Tess-Rumeyda-Matrûba-Haiss-Jeraha-Zebi-Beyt-al-Fâgi-Hodeida overland, and thence by sambuq to the Hejazi ports of Lith or Qunfida, where they land and proceed on foot to Mecca; a few of them only being carried on as far as Jedda.

191. The pilgrims who come by Sheikh Sa'id, where they can land if they so wish and proceed on foot to Haiss in the Yemen, generally continue up the coast in sambuqs and land at Mocha (Yemen), whence they join up with the Aden and Mayûn contingents at Haiss, on the Hodeida route, in the Tihâma.

192. Those pilgrims who leave Somaliland ports for Mocha direct, if the wind be favourable, proceed thence on foot to the Holy Land and join up with the Aden, Sheikh Sa'id and Mayûn contingents at Haiss. From Haiss they proceed to Hodeida following the route described in paragraph 6 above.

193. The pilgrims, who proceed from Somaliland to Mayûn, and from thence on foot if they so wish along the coast to Haiss in the Yemen, generally continue the journey by sambuq to Mocha via Sheikh Sa'id. They, too, join up with the other pilgrim caravans at Haiss.

194. It will be seen that it is well nigh impossible to estimate the total number of Somalis who annually come on pilgrimage as, unless they are sick and destitute after their perilous and arduous journey overland, few are seen in Jedda. The hardier pilgrims with funds return home the same way and are not seen, whilst the destitutes seek out the British Legation at Jedda and apply for repatriation.

195. The disposal of Somali destitutes after the pilgrimage is a thorny problem. Most of them are without travel documents or any identity papers, and from time to time mistakes in identity are not unlikely to occur. The expenditure incurred on the repatriation of these Somali destitutes is not very considerable, but there are added complications owing to the fact that a number of them die on the return journey, which naturally increases the difficulty of obtaining refunds of moneys expended by the Legation on their behalf.

196. A special study is being made of the Somali pilgrimage, and it is hoped in due course to make certain recommendations to the Government of British Somaliland for the future welfare of their nationals.

197. A total of twenty-five destitute Somali pilgrims have been repatriated this year up to the time of writing.

(14) Sudan Pilgrimage.

198. The Hejazi quarantine authorities report that 588 Sudanese pilgrims were carried by Khedivial steamers to the Hejaz from Suakin this year, a decrease of 477 on last year's figure, which was 1,065.

199. All Sudanese pilgrims who held pilgrim passports and return tickets returned to the Sudan on the conclusion of the pilgrimage. Those who had lost their travel documents on Haj were provided with emergency certificates by the Legation, whilst Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited), the local agents of the Khedivial Mail Line, were good enough, as usual, to grant free passages to those pilgrims who were able to satisfy them that they had actually left the Sudan on pilgrimage and had possessed return tickets at the outset.

200. Three Sudani pilgrims are reported to have died on pilgrimage this year.

(15) Palestinian and Transjordanian Pilgrimage.

201. The number of Palestinian and Transjordanian pilgrims to whom pilgrim passes were issued by the authorities in Palestine and Transjordan this year is reported by them to have been 447, an increase of sixty-four on last year's figure. All these pilgrims travelled via Egypt and performed the sea journey to the Hejaz in steamers of the Khedivial Mail Line.

202. According to the quarantine authorities, no Palestinian and Transjordanian pilgrims were reported to have died on pilgrimage this year.

203. During the return half of the season advances were made to five pilgrims who declared that they had insufficient means to meet the cost of their passage home and subsistence on the journey.

(16) Iraqi Pilgrimage.

204. According to the local quarantine authorities, 117 Iraqi pilgrims entered the Hejaz on pilgrimage this year, as against 278 last year. The greater number travelled via Syria (Beirut) to Jedda direct by steamship.

205. The advantages of the compulsory deposit in Bagdad of 100 rupees in the case of each adult pilgrim was again manifested this year. During the return season one Indian and one Iraqi pilgrim were given advances to enable them to meet the cost of their return passages.

(17) Sarawak Pilgrimage.

206. Twenty-five persons from Sarawak performed the pilgrimage. The member of the staff of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited) who acts as Acting Sarawak Pilgrimage Officer reported that all had left the Hejaz safely, eleven in the steamship "Adrastus" and fourteen in the steamship "Dardenus."

Appendix A.

Short Explanation of some Terms frequently used in Connexion with the Pilgrimage.

Alim (pl. *ulama*).—A learned man. The term usually includes Imams, Muftis, Qadhis and Maulawis. (Hughes.)

Arafat.—The "Hill of Recognition," set in a wide plain 12 miles from Mecca, where pilgrims gather on the ninth day of the month of pilgrimage, Dhu l Wijja.

The Holy Hill owes its name to the following legend: When our first parents forfeited Heaven for eating wheat, which deprived them of their primeval purity, they were cast down upon earth. The serpent descended upon Ispahan, the peacock at Kabul, Satan at Bilbays, Eve upon Arafat, and Adam at Ceylon. The latter, determining to seek his wife, began a journey to which the earth owes its present mottled appearance. Wherever our first father placed his foot, which was large, a town afterwards arose, and between the strides will always be country. Wandering for many years, he came to the Mountain of Mercy, where our common mother was continually calling upon his name, and recognition of each other gave the place the name of Arafat. (Burton.)

Harum.—"That which is sacred." A name given to the precincts of Mecca and Medina, but more often and more particularly to the immediate precincts of the Holy Cube, or Kaba, at Mecca.

Haj (lit. "setting out").—The fifth pillar of Islam—Pilgrimage.

"And proclaim to the peoples a Haj. Let them come to thee on foot and on every fleet camel, arriving by every deep defile;

"That they may bear witness of its benefits to them, and may make mention of Allah's name on the appointed days, over the brute beasts with which he has supplied them for sustenance;

"Therefore eat thereof yourselves, and feed the needy, the poor;

"Then let them bring the neglect of their persons to a close, and let them pay their vows, and circuit the ancient House.

"This do. And he that respecteth the sacred ordinances of Allah, this will be best for him with his Lord." (Koran XXII, 28.)

Hanafi.—A sect of the Sunnis founded by the Imam Abu Hanifa and found in Turkey, Central Asia and Northern India (see *Sunni*).

Hundi.—An old-fashioned form of draft drawn by merchants in India on their agents or clients or correspondents elsewhere. An insignificant commission, at much less than a bank rate, is generally charged, but there is no charge on Hundis for the Holy Places.

Koshan.—A Persian word come to Arabia via Turkish, and now meaning the tax payable for the privilege of travelling by camel or car to Mecca or Medina.

Mina (lit. "a wish"). frequently transliterated Muna, which form, though apparently less correct, is retained temporarily in the body of the report for the sake of uniformity.—The sacred valley near Mecca, so called because Adam there wished for paradise. Here the pilgrims spend the 10th, 11th and 12th days of the month of pilgrimage to stone the three devils and to slaughter a sheep or a goat or a camel or a cow, according to their means. These "days of flesh-drying" terminate the pilgrimage and provide food for the return journey.

Mutawwif (pl. mutawwifin).—The obligatory pilgrim guide, so called because he leads the ceremony of "tawaf" or seven-times circumambulation of the Kaba. From the execution of this simple religious duty his scope has so increased that he now controls every movement of his clients while on pilgrimage, and gains thereby his yearly livelihood (see *Taqir*).

Naqaba (lit. "syndicate").—The official organisation which allots clients to the motor-car companies competing in the pilgrim traffic.

Shafi'i.—A sect of the Sunnis founded by the Imam Muhammad-bin-Idris-ash-Shafi'i and found in Egypt and South India (see *Sunni*).

Shia (lit. "followers").—The followers of Ali, first cousin of the Prophet and husband of his daughter, Fatima. The Sunni Moslems call them the "forsakers of the Truth," i.e., the Dissenters of Islam. The Shia, on the contrary, strenuously maintain that they are the "orthodox" Moslems and arrogate to themselves (as do also the Sunnis) the title of the "True Believers." They are chiefly found in Persia, Iraq and India (see *Sunni*).

Sunni.—"Verily it will happen to my people even as it did to the Children of Israel. The Children of Israel were divided into seventy-two sects, and my people will be divided into seventy-three. Every one of these sects will go to Hell except one sect." The Companions said: "O Prophet, which is that?" He said: "The religion which is professed by me and my Companions." (Mishkat I, VI, 2.)

The number has, however, far exceeded the Prophet's predictions, for the sects of Islam even exceed in number and variety those of the Christian religion. The Sunnis arrogate to themselves the title of "those who are being saved" (as, indeed, do the other sects), but within the limits of the Sunni section of Moslems there are four which are esteemed "orthodox"—the Hanafi, the Shafi'i, the Malaki and the Hanbali. (Hughes.)

Taqir.—The system whereby certain districts of the Moslem world are allotted by contract to the highest bidder for the sole or very select privilege of "guiding" its inhabitants on pilgrimage (see *Mutawwif*).

Ulama (pl. of Alim, q.v.)

Wahhabi.—A sect of Moslem revivalists founded in Nejd by Muhammad-bin-Abdul Wahhab (circ. 1750 A.D.). They originally branched from the Hanbali sect of Sunnis (q.v.) and are the Unitarians of Islam. Their tenets, now enforced by Wahhabi Committees of Virtue on the easy-going folk of the Hejaz, are stern and puritanical, a distinctive one being that women should not be allowed to visit the graves of the dead on account of their immoderate weeping.

Their temporal power has always been connected with the Ibn Saud dynasty in Nejd, from the days of the Saud who captured Mecca in 1803 to the present day.

Zamzam.—The sacred well within the precincts of the Mosque at Mecca, supposed to be the identical well where Hagar and Ishmael drank in the wilderness. (Hughes.)

Zeydi.—A sect of the main Shia schism which flourishes in the mountainous parts of the Yemen (Arabia Felix) and is headed by the Imam Yahya.

Zubeyda.—A spring of water rising in the hills beyond the plain of Arafat, carried by an aqueduct upon a 9-foot wall which skirts the Hill of Recognition, and conducted thence underground to Mecca.

Appendix B.

Tariff of Charges officially fixed by the Hejazi Government for the Pilgrimage of A.H. 1349 (1931), with notes showing the modifications in the tariff for A.H. 1350 (1932), under Heads 15, 16 and 17 (see paragraph 99 of the text of the report).

	Pts Egyptian.
(1) Quarantine dues and passport charges on arrival and departure, and fees of the Control Committee at Jedda	106
(2) Sambuk (dhow) hire from the outer harbour on arrival	Pts. Miri. 12
(3) Sambuk (dhow) hire from the middle harbour on arrival	9
(4) Sambuk (dhow) hire from the inner harbour on arrival	7
(5) Mutawwif's agent's "ikram" (charges) at Jedda on arrival, for all nationalities	25
(6) Portage of baggage from sambuk (dhow) to quay	1/2
(7) Housing accommodation in Jedda on arrival 3 pts. Miri per night up to three nights and 2 pts. Miri for every additional night	3
(8) Portage of baggage from quay to house	2
(9) Municipality fee per "shuqduf" (camel litter)	6
(10) To the "naqib" (chief) and "Muauin" (assistant) at Jedda, to be collected from pilgrims on arrival	2
(11) To the mutawwif's agent for his services at Jedda on the return journey	3
(12) Housing accommodation at Jedda on the return journey 3 pts. Miri per night up to three nights and 2 pts. Miri for every additional night	6
(13) Sambuk hire to the outer harbour on departure	3
(14) Sambuk hire to the middle harbour on departure	2
(15) Sambuk hire to the inner harbour on departure	12
(16) Sambuk hire to the quarantine island for the first three days 14 pts. Miri and 2 1/2 pts. Miri daily thereafter	9
(17) Portage of luggage from house to sambuk on departure	7
(18) By every Javanese pilgrim for hospitality at Mecca, housing accommodation at Mecca, housing accommodation at Muna, hospitality during the days of "Tashriq," hospitality at Arafat, tent hire at Arafat, cost of water, fuel, light and servants, fees for numbering and cleaning, and sheikh's charges	14
(19) By every Indian and Bengali pilgrim for hospitality, housing accommodation, servants, tent hire at Muna and Arafat, fees for numbering and cleaning and mutawwif's charges. Pilgrims who wish to rent houses by themselves will be entitled to a reduction of 12 rupees in the accommodation charge and those who wish to hire tents at Muna and Arafat by themselves will be entitled to a reduction of 4 1/2 rupees	2 1/2
(20) By every Malabari, Sindhi and Suleimani pilgrim for hospitality, servants, fees for numbering and cleaning and mutawwif's charges. House rent at Mecca and tent hire at Muna and Arafat will also be payable by these pilgrims	3
(21) By every Persian pilgrim for hospitality, servants, fees for numbering and cleaning, and mutawwif's charges. House rent at Mecca and tent hire at Muna and Arafat will also be payable by these pilgrims	£8 sterling
	Rs. 54 Indian ⁽¹⁾
	Rs. 20 Indian ⁽²⁾
	250 pts. Miri ⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ Reduced to 40 rupees for 1932.

⁽²⁾ Reduced to 15 rupees for 1932.

⁽³⁾ Reduced to 140 pts. Miri, with a similar exception in favour of Sudanis, &c., of the poorer class.

- (22) By every pilgrim of any other nationality, including those from Khartum, Omdurman and other places in the Sudan, Adenese and people of Hodeidah for hospitality, servants, fees for numbering and cleaning, and mutawwif's charges. House rent at Mecca and tent hire at Arafat and Muna will also be payable by these pilgrims ... 210 pts. Miri(*)

P.S.—Sudani, Yemeni, Somali, Jibuti, and Abyssinian pilgrims (with the exception of those mentioned under other nationalities) will pay their mutawwifs and for the other expenses mentioned what they like.

Camel and motor-car hire will be fixed by the Government in due course.

Appendix C.

(See text of Report, paragraph 156.)

Tentative Estimate of the Cost of Pilgrimage to an Indian Pilgrim in 1932.

	Rs.	a.	p.
1. Unloading of baggage from steamer to boat (approximately)	0	8	0
2. Boat hire: Outer harbour, fixed 1-8-0			
3. Boat hire: Middle harbour, fixed 1-2-0			
4. Boat hire: Inner harbour, fixed 0-14-0			
} average			
5. Unloading of baggage from boat to customs (fixed)	0	1	0
6. Porterage of luggage from customs to lodging (fixed)	0	12	0
7. House rent at Jedda for at least three nights at -/6/- per night (fixed)	1	2	0
8. Fee for Jedda agents of mutawwifin (fixed)	3	2	0
9. Fee for Naqib and his assistant (fixed)	0	6	0
10. Municipality dues on each shuqduf (fixed)	0	4	0
11. Miscellaneous expenses at Jedda (approximately)	10	0	0
12. Camel hire for luggage (approximately)	17	0	0
13. Motor hire to Mecca by lorries (approximately)	13	8	0
14. Motor hire to Mecca, if by cars (approximately)	17	0	0
15. Mutawwif's fee, including house rent at Mecca and tent hire at Arafat and Mina (fixed by the Government)	40	0	0
16. Zamzami fee (not fixed)	3	0	0
17. Nahar Zubeyda tax (not fixed)	1	0	0
18. Half camel and shuqduf hire to Arafat and back to Mecca (approximately)	45	0	0
19. Miscellaneous expenses at Arafat including water, &c. (approximately)	20	0	0
20. Expenses at Mina including cost of sacrificial sheep and water (approximately)	40	0	0
21. Return journey fare between Medina and either Mecca or Jedda by lorries (approximately)	182	0	0
22. Return journey fare between Medina and either Mecca or Jedda, if by cars	205	0	0
23. Muzawwir's fee at Medina (not fixed)	3	0	0
24. Other expenses at Medina in respect of visiting the Holy Places (approximately)	10	0	0
25. Municipal and other taxes at Medina (approximately)	6	0	0
26. Motor hire to Jedda from Mecca	27	0	0
27. Camel hire for baggage from Mecca (approximately)	25	0	0
28. Miscellaneous expenses at Jedda on return (approximately)	10	0	0
29. Fee for the mutawwif's agent at Jedda on return (fixed)	0	12	0
30. Accommodation charge for at least seven days—			
First three nights at -/6/- = Rs. 1-2-0			
First five nights at -/4/- = Rs. 1-4-0			
} 2 6 0			

(*) Reduced to 140 pts. Miri, with a similar exception in favour of Sudanis, &c., of the poorer class.

	Rs.	a.	p.
31. Porterage of luggage from lodging to quay (fixed)	0	12	0
32. Boat hire from quay to steamer (approximately)	1	4	0
33. Loading charges from boat to steamer (approximately)	0	8	0
34. Presents and gifts, which have to be purchased even by the poorest pilgrims (approximately)	20	0	0
35. Maintenance expense for at least two months during stay in the Hejaz at Rs. 1/8/- daily	90	0	0

Total cost of pilgrimage from the moment of the ship's arrival in harbour until the returning ship's departure ... 575 0 0

N.B.—The following may also be added, in order to get a comprehensive estimate of expenditure likely to be incurred by an intending pilgrim:—

36. Preliminary expenses in India	20	0	0
37. Railway fare from home to the port of embarkation and vice-versa, average	40	0	0
38. Expenses at port of embarkation, awaiting the ship (approximately)	40	0	0
39. Steamer fare for outward and homeward journeys	185	0	0
40. Necessary expenditure on food, &c., on board ship for both journeys (approximately)	35	0	0
	875	0	0

Thus it would appear that the minimum cost of pilgrimage is roughly 900 rupees. But if a pilgrim prefers to travel by camel the amount can be reduced to 800 rupees.

Particular attention is drawn to the fact noted in paragraph 156 of the report that this estimate was prepared prior to the monetary crisis of the autumn of 1931.

[E 6007/2064/25]

No. 62.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 444.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 17, 1931.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 241 of the 14th November regarding the financial situation, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the Royal proclamation, or letter, as it is familiarly styled, announcing budgetary reform.

2. The opening phrases are somewhat misleading. The King poses as having obeyed the call of duty. In reality he has disobeyed it for months. He states that he took the initiative in informing himself of the whole situation. In reality it was his second son, egged on by his Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, no doubt stimulated in his turn by Mr. Philby's and his own personal animosity towards his financial colleague, who spurred His Majesty into belated activity by forcing upon him a great deal of unpalatable information. Ibn Saud states that the information was submitted through the Minister, more properly Director-General, of Finance. In reality it accompanied him to Riyadh as unwelcome evidence of his guilt, which he has evidently failed to disprove. Towards the end of his letter the King informs his people that he has kept his Finance Minister at Riyadh in the interests of the finances of Nejd; his people know better, or think they do. They do not believe that Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman will be released for a long time, but Fuad Bey Hamza has told me that it is only too true that he will soon return. He, with Yusuf Yasin, is making the most of Abdullah Suleiman's absence.

3. I was asked to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs here on the 13th November to meet Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who had arrived post-haste from Riyadh overnight. The glad news of reform was broken to me, followed by the less gratifying news of a virtual moratorium on all Government debts, internal and external, and rounded off by an invitation to His Majesty's Government to

stand on a footing of equality with all other creditors in the matter of the 1929 debt to the Government of India.

4. I enquired what part of the revenue was to be devoted to funding these debts, how much it would amount to, and what period was calculated to be necessary for the liquidation of the current indebtedness. Only in the matter of proportion were any figures available. The total revenues, it appears, are to be classified under four headings to meet four main objects, as follows:—

- (1) Official salaries, 35 per cent. This was explained to me as covering all the normal costs of administration.
- (2) Indebtedness, 25 per cent. This was to cover all arrears of salaries, as well as the internal and external debt of the Hejazi Government.
- (3) Reserve, 15 per cent. This is a notable novelty, which will have all the attraction of a pot of honey.
- (4) Extraordinary expenses, 25 per cent. This is intended to ensure the comfort and health of pilgrims and to develop the country's hidden resources.

5. As regards approximate figures, I could be given no information. Much spade work remained to be done. But as regards the length of time which it would take to pay off current debts, Fuad Bey informed me—Yusuf Yasin having by then gone to say his prayers—that they calculated it at about two years. In reporting the matter to you in my telegram under reference, I therefore suggested that the concurrence of His Majesty's Government with this still further postponed repayment of the Government of India debt might be made conditional on the production of a satisfactory budget estimate.

6. I have already reported in the same telegram the Hejazi Government's attitude towards the other outstanding British credits, namely, the costs of the MacDonnell investigation, the account with the Eastern Telegraph Company, and the two classes of debts owing to Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited). I have as yet nothing more to add.

7. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Fuad Bey Hamza spent two busy days in negotiation with the Government's other creditors in Jedda. I fear that they have gone too fast. A great diversity of categories of indebtedness and conditions of security and treatment has been brought to light, but nothing has been reduced to writing, and the sheikh and the bey have now returned to Mecca with views and intentions which undoubtedly conflict with the impressions they have left behind them with the creditors here.

8. One further point of interest has emerged. It is intended to make Jedda the chief centre of financial control, and hopes are still entertained of securing the services of a Dutchman as financial adviser. My Dutch colleague seems less hopeful.

9. The reform, in short, is late, perhaps too late, in time, drastic in theory, and reducible in practice to the low levels of local diligence and integrity. Moreover, it is not obvious how Ibn Saud himself will live, unless he lives on the salaries of his officials, the funded debts, the pilgrims, or the reserve. I did not broach the delicate question which.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 62.

(Translation.)

Extract from "Umm-al-Qura" of November 13, 1931 (3/7/1350).

PROCLAMATION.

(After compliments.)

IT is known to all that the world crisis has affected every part of the globe, and every person, each in the measure of his capacity, is trying to put it right. We, for our part, must do our duty and the duty of our Government in the Hejaz-Nejd and its Dependencies, by alleviating the effects of this crisis, and by resisting them as far as is possible, and by such means as the country and the Government can bear. We therefore ordered our Viceroy to furnish us with detailed information regarding the whole situation, in general and in particular, and to

explain and to submit this to us through the Minister of Finance and the Vice-Acting President of the Legislative Council, who arrived here a few days ago and gave us details of the financial situation. God Almighty has now helped us to arrive at an organisation of income and expenditure. Expenditure has been weighed against income in the most advantageous fashion, and revenues of the Government have been divided up and classified under four headings, each according to its needs:—

1. Official Salaries.
2. Indebtedness.
3. Reserve.
4. Extraordinary Expenses (not decided upon).

Instructions have accordingly been laid down and arrangements co-ordinated for the collection and conservation of these revenues, with a view to their being disbursed under the specific headings. The quotas allocated under the regulations and instructions confirmed by us are to be adhered to in such a manner that no person will be preferred to another in the matter of drawing or disbursing any money from the Treasury. Under these regulations the principle has been laid down that salaries and debts shall be settled in equality amongst all persons. Strict orders have been issued that this principle must be observed, and that any person infringing these instructions, orders and regulations shall be severely punished. The budget will, please God, be sufficient to ensure the dues of all officials, inhabitants and claimants of the different categories, certain items of expenditure having been reduced and certain items of revenue having been increased in very reasonable proportions. It depends for this on the principal revenue of the country, which the Government are endeavouring, by all the material and intellectual means at their disposal, to foster and augment, with a view to its becoming the main source of Government income. It has been arranged that the undetermined portion of the income shall be spent on its own objects, such as securing the comfort of pilgrims, facilitating their journey and preparing sanitary measures, and all such things as may bring tranquillity and happiness to them and the people of the country. In order that the affairs and interests of the inhabitants may lie within the scope of the sacred religious law and the regulations which depend therefrom, we have ordered our Viceroy and the Council of Ministers over which he presides to be watchful in carrying out our orders, as regards the maintenance of peace and of justice and equity amongst the people without distinction between the strong and the weak; to follow our instructions as regards the improvement of finance; and to ensure that every person shall have his rights without delay or negligence. We have ordered Yusuf Yasin to convey all the instructions and orders in this respect to the Viceroy in the Hejaz, so that he will see that they are notified and complied with attentively. We have also ordered the Minister of Finance and Vice-President of the Legislative Council to remain here in order to consider certain financial affairs relating to Nejd and its Dependencies and then to return to their work.

We have left the door open, thank God, to everyone who has any complaint and wishes to report. It has already been proved to all that we do not fail to examine any claim in accordance with the religious law.

Relying upon God, we invite all Governors and officials to follow the right path and the straight way in their procedure for the interests of the people and the Government.

We pray that God may grant success to all. Amen!

ABDUL AZIZ-AL-ABDURRAHMAN-AL-FEISAL.

Ar-Riadh, Jumada-ath-Thani 28, 1350.

[E 6237/325/91]

No. 63.

Sir John Simon to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington).

(No. 1696.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 14, 1931.

IN the course of conversation to-day General Dawes briefly mentioned the matter of the application which has been made to the Sheikh of Koweit for an oil concession. He wished to emphasise that, though an American company had

secured an option from the British company concerned, the terms of the option would adequately provide for British interests. This is a highly technical matter, which neither the Ambassador nor I understood in detail, and I told him that I would communicate his remarks to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whose Department was closely concerned and had been informed already of the representations recently made by Mr. Atherton on the subject.

I am, &c.
JOHN SIMON.

[E 6209/81/25]

No. 64.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 465. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 1, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jedda report for last September and October.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, New Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloops, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 64.

Jedda Report for September-October 1931.

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I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Ibn Saud.

THE King spent September and October at Riyadh, whence he made a number of three and four-day excursions to neighbouring centres and oases for sport and the diversion of picknicking. These were no doubt mixed with a little local politics, but he seems to have avoided work of any kind as much as possible. He did not pay his projected visit to the Hasa coast, nor did he move in force to Hail, as rumour alleged, to forestall the Shammar rising which was expected to follow the circumstantially reported escape of some of the Rashidi family from Riyadh. All this and other similar and repeated news of "trouble in Nejd" proved unfounded. There was at most a certain dissatisfaction amongst the tribes at having to pay taxes instead of receiving bounty from the King.

2. Ibn Saud, during this period of retreat in Nejd, has been described as disheartened in spirit, disillusioned in mind, and approaching impotence in body. This last disability seemed to have poisoned his whole outlook, so that he had become morose and reticent, withdrawing himself for the greater part of the day into the quarters outside Riyadh, where he kept his slaves and concubines, spending long nights with one or other of his wives, and only finding relaxation between whiles in the company of a few Bedouin cronies, where the talk was of women and camels. In the past it had been his wont, even in Riyadh, to devote many hours daily to current affairs of his dual monarchy, but he seems this summer to have lost all interest in them, so that even his industrious Rais-ad-Diwan, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, mooned about with nothing to do. These activities and this indolence suggest that His Majesty, who is now 52 and has had a strenuous sexual career, has now reached a stage of conflict between desire and its fulfilment.

The Hejaz.

3. While the King was thus employed in Nejd, government of the Hejaz lapsed more and more into the Bedouin hands of his Director-General of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, having placed his numerous relatives in key positions, himself moved to and fro between Taif, Mecca, Jedda and Medina, levying contributions in cash and kind and disposing of them none knew how. His bodyguard and style came to overshadow those of the Viceroy, whom he kept short of funds. He made the Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly, Abdullah Ibrahim-al-Fadhl, his jackal. Fuad Bey Hamza, the only other important functionary in the Hejaz, he reduced to impotence by continuing to deprive him and all the Foreign Ministry personnel of their pay and completely ignoring him and his communications. Throughout September he consolidated his position as dictator in the King's absence. By the middle of October he was supreme. At the end of October he was called at last to account.

4. The period of this ignorant Nejd's rule was chaotic and critical. As foreshadowed in the last report (July-August report, paragraphs 40 and 41), September opened with a threat of war from the Yemen. There was urgent necessity to send reinforcements and ammunition to meet it, but there was neither money nor petrol available. Abdullah Suleiman raised forced loans from the merchants and 250 troops were sent by sea to Jizan, but the military transport was held up for lack of fuel. He pressed the Soviet Legation for the benzine they had contracted to supply (July-August report, paragraph 10); it had not even left Batoum. He pressed Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. for Shell benzine on credit, knowing their man they offered it on cash terms only. Messrs. Sharqieh (Limited) quoted similar terms for Standard oil. He pressed the Dutch Bank for credit; they refused it pending the outcome of the negotiations in Amsterdam (July-August report, paragraph 9). On the 12th September they informed Abdullah Suleiman that the negotiations had failed and that no more credit would be given. The same night a clean sweep was made of all the benzine held in Jedda. Government lorries plied all night at the task, and when Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. and Messrs. Sharqieh (Limited) woke next morning they found the warehouse empty and their stocks gone.

5. This *coup* made a profound local impression. Although such action by the Government is not unknown in Jedda, it had never been carried out on such a grand scale. It soon became evident, however, that, whereas some £5,000 worth

of benzine was removed that night, the theft was in reality much greater. It had been continuing for some time; the official returns of stocks bonded in the Government warehouse had been systematically falsified. It transpired, furthermore, that, in order to cloak the process, the Shell and Standard Oil Companies agents had been denied access to their stocks for purposes of verification, on the plea that the storekeeper had gone to Taif and had taken his keys with him. Having current supplies in hand they had weakly accepted the plea. They now found that they had lost £12,000 worth of Shell benzine and £4,000 of Standard oil. Sharqieh (Limited) awaited Mr. Philby's return from Riyadh—he was shortly expected. Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. at once protested to the local authorities, who in their turn protested complete innocence and ignorance of the whole affair. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires therefore used the expedient of a telegram in plain English to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Taif, an effective means in a country where there is no press and the authorities are consequently sensitive to publicity. An arrangement was forthwith negotiated by Abdullah Suleiman with the Shell agents, by which he admitted responsibility and with the financial terms of which the agents were well pleased. The Government's guilt thus established, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, registered an official protest and requested a formal assurance that such high-handed action would not be resorted to again.

6. The 13th September was also marked by the spectacular collapse of the Hejaz Air Force. Planes were required at Jizan to overawe both the Imam of Yemen and the dissidents of Asir. The only remaining British pilot, Mr. Lowe, had developed ear trouble, therefore he could not fly. A young Syrian adventurer, recently engaged as a pilot on the strength of his declared ability to fly a Moth, broke down at the prospect of flying a Wapiti; he was flogged and jailed, whereupon the French Chargé d'Affaires at once became interested. A Turkish pseudo-mechanic, who also betrayed hesitation, was mauled by the Nejd garrison, but escaped into the Turkish Legation, where he was given refuge. Finally, a German ex-war pilot, who had been keeping a myopic eye on the machines since the departure of Messrs. Morris and North, was persuaded by the General Officer Commanding the Hejaz army (accompanied by fifty troops) to leave his bed, where he lay ill with dysentery, and set out to fly to Jizan. After a few minutes he was seen to turn back. Above Jedda he shut off his engine and fainted, and the machine glided on its slots into the lagoon. The pilot survived; the German consul intervened; and the Hejaz Air Force lay *kors de combat*, a position which it has since maintained.

7. The benzine *coup* and the air force collapse shook the *moral* of Government employees and titillated the expectations of the rest. The urban populations of the Hejaz were heartily sick of the Saudi régime. At Medina there was acute distress, amounting almost to famine conditions. At Mecca people were beginning to go hungry. In Jedda the populace was in a poor way, while the landlord and merchant classes were exasperated almost beyond measure by the extortions of Abdullah Suleiman. But there was neither leader nor the courage to rebel. It was hoped that the benzine incident would make trouble for the Saudi authorities, and the belief was naturally fostered that the failure of the air force was the result of foreign intervention. The silver riyal exchange rapidly fell to 17 to the £. Traffic ceased, since there was no motor fuel; the mails had to go by donkey. Further advances by the Imam Yahya were reported and open hostilities were expected within the week. An appreciation of the general situation made on the 19th September is given in paragraph 65.

8. Certain colleagues were for making joint representations to the Hejazi Government about the air force personnel, but His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires declined to co-operate and urged rather the need of bolstering up the confidence of the local Government instead of seeming to mob it. He, nevertheless, got into touch with the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, who was lying at Port Sudan, and concerted provisional arrangements in case a naval visit were to become advisable. Communications were the chief concern, for the Jedda-Port Sudan cable is a decrepit link and the wireless station lies alongside the barracks. No trouble was anticipated from the Hejazi townfolk, at best a craven element, but the Nejd garrison had to be reckoned with. They were dissatisfied and underfed. Two days later, indeed, they began to help themselves to food in the cookshops of the town, and as soon as the Viceroy visited Jedda they raided his kitchens.

9. In the face of these events Abdullah Suleiman remained in Mecca, but it is to the credit of the Amir Feisal and Fuad Bey Hamza that they came to Jedda. They arrived on the 17th September, spent the 18th enquiring into the benzine affair, the air force position, and the complaints of the Nejd soldiery. A canteen was opened for the latter, to be supplied with goods borrowed from the local tradesmen, since the Finance Department would issue no pay, and the Viceroy left with Fuad Bey on the 19th September and returned to Taif. The visit served to lay the spectre of Abdullah Suleiman for the moment and to steady the nerves of local officials. Better news began to come through from Asir. The people relapsed into torpor again and Abdullah Suleiman resumed his acquisitive rôle. No one seemed able to withstand him. What he could not exact in cash he took in merchandise, which was at once knocked down for cash at auction. No one knew where the money went, but a great deal must have gone to Riyadh. A little went to the Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London, who had been telegraphing actively for funds. None went to other Government servants, whose pay had, for the most part, fallen eight months into arrear by the end of October. The "Government" at Taif ceased, to all practicable intent or purpose, to exist. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs became the receiving office for unanswered complaints against the Finance Department made by foreigners and delivered by donkeys. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs retired into his projected "Handbook of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies."

10. The credit for laying the first charge which eventually undermined the dictatorship of Abdullah Suleiman must be ascribed to Mr. Philby. He returned from Riyadh at the end of September and was much struck by the news of the appropriation of his benzine. It contravened his standing arrangement with the Finance Department and placed him in an awkward position *vis-à-vis* of the Standard Oil Company. On arrival at Jedda he made further discoveries in regard to the Abdullah Suleiman régime. They achieved his reconversion from Saudi idolatry to sane citizenship. He wrote to Abdullah Suleiman such a letter (all of this is confidential, as indeed is this report) as numbered with its amenities the reminder that the price of theft in this country was the loss of the thieving hand, and the opinion that Abdullah Suleiman's body, therefore, deserved to be cut into little pieces. He also wrote to Ibn Saud. Then he went to Taif, where he found the Viceroy, Fuad Bey Hamza, the Viceroy's Rais-ad-Diwan Ibrahim-al-Fadhl, and his half-brother, Abdullah Ibrahim-al-Fadhl, Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly and Abdullah Suleiman's erstwhile jackal, putting their heads together in search of a way to break down Abdullah Suleiman's ascendancy. Under the stimulus of Mr. Philby's presence they drew up a lengthy memorandum to the King. Mr. Philby has described it as an ultimatum, involving wholesale resignation unless Abdullah Suleiman were removed, but Fuad Bey Hamza rather as a report, describing the chaotic situation in detail and submitting recommendations for its reform, to which Abdullah Suleiman was invited to subscribe. He very naturally refused. So the document was entrusted to Abdullah Ibrahim-al-Fadhl for presentation to His Majesty at Riyadh. Abdullah Suleiman accompanied him there on the 23rd October. At the end of the month Ibn Saud's reaction was still anxiously awaited in the Hejaz. Fuad Bey, when he came to Jedda on the 29th October, was nervous and despondent. He confessed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that he and his colleagues had lost all confidence in themselves. He seemed to be on the point of saying that they had lost all confidence in the King, when he changed the subject.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

11. The Under-Secretary visited Jedda on the 31st August and left on the 4th September. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires discussed a number of current questions with him on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd, amongst them the Yemen situation, which is dealt with in paragraphs 43 to 47. Fuad Bey visited Jedda again on the 17th September, accompanying the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as already described in paragraph 9. Mr. Hope Gill was received by the young man, who, as usual, had nothing whatever to say beyond answering prettily that the King, his father, was well, thank God. The interview with Fuad Bey was short and unsatisfactory, marked chiefly by a clumsy denial of all Government responsibility for the benzine theft. The Amir and Fuad Bey left the same day, the 19th

September, to return to Taif. There they remained until Fuad Bey again visited Jedda on the 29th October. In a private conversation on the 31st he unburdened himself to Mr. Hope Gill of his cares and fears for the future of this country.

Finance.

12. The silver riyal fell two more points in mid-September to 17 to the gold pound. The official rate still stood at 10, however, which enabled the Government to pay at 10 whenever they did pay, which was seldom, and to take, which they often did, at 17. But for the fact that large numbers of riyals were withdrawn from currency in the Hejaz, probably for use in Nejd, the exchange must have fallen considerably lower. The export of gold, except by special Government licence, was forbidden by decree of the 16th October.

13. External credit was still nil. British banks had declined to accept Sheikh Abdurrahman Qusaibi's proposal to open a State Bank in the Hejaz (July-August report, paragraph 8). The *Nederlandische Handel-Maatschappij* also turned down his proposal that they should lend Ibn Saud half a million sterling (*ibid.*, paragraph 9). Internal loans were therefore extracted by the Director-General of Finance wherever he went in the Hejaz, and by means which have already been described in the preceding paragraphs. Very little was written down. Accounts were kept in Abdullah Suleiman's head, which his creditors hoped no longer to see upon his shoulders when the day of reckoning should come. Poverty bred barter. When their benzine was so urgently sought, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. were offered rice and raisins in exchange. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs never has had a bank balance, but is used to make its diverse payments to the Legation, in respect of small claims and minor routine adjustments, such as telegrams, in mixed currency tied up in scraps of old garments. When even this ceased, the Legation's accountant saw nothing for it but to expect payment in goods, three cakes of soap and a leg of mutton, for instance. But the Ministry maintained caste and paid nothing.

14. The anxiously awaited Soviet benzine (July-August report, paragraph 10) did not materialise until the 20th October, when a Greek five-masted schooner brought 30,000 cases. Contrary to the previous report (*ibidem*), the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires has now stated that payment is not due until six months after each consignment's delivery, when it would be due integrally. He hopes to have no difficulty.

15. No external debt was reduced during September and October, except for a surprise payment of £500 to the Eastern Telegraph Company on the 26th October. This appeared to result from certain written representations made by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires personally to Fuad Bey Hamza on the 14th October and from the absence of Abdullah Suleiman in Nejd. The balance was promised "in a few days, God willing." The Deity has much to answer for in the Hejaz. The balance at the end of October amounted to something over £2,500.

Economic Development.

16. Work continued in desultory fashion during September and October on the Waziria wells outside Jedda, and the Turkish aqueduct which connects them with the town. The present wells were built by Osman Pasha, ruler of the Ottoman Hejaz, in 1882-86, but the springs were first exploited for the benefit of Jedda in about 1640. The Turkish system was primitive, and had already lapsed into decay early in the present century. It is now to be repaired, modernised, and donated with a windmill pump from Ohio (III.).

17. Mr. Twitchell returned from America on the 19th October, bringing with him the pump, a hand-drill, and a prospecting engineer from Arizona. No serious work was begun until November.

Marconi Wireless Installation.

18. There is nothing definite to report. Even Mr. Philby, Marconi's agent, is vague as to what has been happening beyond the fact that the September and October instalments of payment fell into line of arrear with their predecessors (July-August report, paragraph 14). M. Boucicault is believed to have completed the Tabuk station and to have moved on to Qaryat-al-Milh. Riyadh

has kept in communication with Taif by means of the mobile sets. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 30th October announced that the stations at Al Hasa and Buraida had been completed, presumably by Marconi's Egyptian engineer.

Legislation.

19. No legislation of any note has been promulgated.

Religious Intolerance.

20. Copies of a further Shia protest against the desecration of tombs by the Wahhabis were received in September from India. It had already received the usual answer (July-August report, paragraph 17). The Wahhabi Committee of Virtue continued its activities at Mecca (*ibid.*, paragraph 16).

Communications.

21. The Hejazi Government received in October an enquiry from the Iraqi Government as to the possibility of opening a route for motor traffic from Najaf through Jaufr to Medina. They are believed to have replied that the deep sands of the Nafud desert, which lie to the south of Jaufr, made this route impracticable, but that they were studying an alternative route following the old pilgrim track via Hail, called the "Darb Zubaida." This track is so named after the beneficent wife of Harun-ar-Rashid, who still has the present Mecca water supply to her credit.

Locusts.

22. A reply was received in September to Sir A. Ryan's note of the 10th June (May-June report, paragraph 13). The Hejazi Government said that they would do their best to afford every assistance in the matter of advice to the International Bureau for Anti-Locust Measures, but they expressed their regret at being unable either to associate themselves with the bureau or to adhere to the convention. In effect, as in Persia, they preferred their own locusts to a foreign mission.

Security.

23. At the end of August two West African natives disappeared near Rabigh as they were returning on foot from Medina to Jedda. The authorities, having failed to trace them, surmised that they must have been devoured by wild beasts in the mountainous forests of that region. As the Tihama Plain thereabouts is open dusty desert, inhabited by gazelle and Bedouin, and the two victims were found to be French West Africans after all, the case was passed to the French consulate for further treatment. It must be added that such disappearances are surprisingly rare.

24. At the end of October the Palestine press reported the murder of a Danish Moslem, named Knud Holmboe, by a Wahhabi enthusiast, while he was on his way from Transjordan to Mecca. The Danish Government made enquiries through His Majesty's Government. As a result, the Hejazi Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that the frontier Amirs denied all knowledge of the man and the incident. He added that the press had recently reported him to be alive in Maan.

II.—FRONTIER QUESTIONS.

Transjordan.

Raiding.

25. On the 19th October the Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan reported that, on the 28th September, some Nejd Bedouin had raided the Hejazi Beni Atiya at Hazim, in Nejd, and carried off 200 camels belonging to the Transjordan Howeytat, which were grazing with the Hejazi herds. A request was accordingly addressed to the Hejazi Government for their return. It would seem that the locality of this raid, the only one of the period, was really Hazim, and not Hazim, which is 150 miles distant and in Transjordan territory. The whimsical Laurentian mode of treating Arabic names has its disadvantages.

Glubb-Ibn Zeyd Meetings.

26. In a series of conversations held on the 1st to the 3rd September, the Hejazi Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs made a determined attempt to engage His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in a discussion of "additional principles," by which he sought to bind the frontier representatives at their meetings for the liquidation of raid claims. In memory of the complete agreement on the terms of reference, &c., reached in June, as a result of the prolonged exchange of views of March, April and May (May-June report, paragraphs 26 and 27), Mr. Hope Gill refused to discuss yet another set of "principles." He contended that the frontier representatives must now be left a free hand to liquidate the claims on the agreed basis, and not be further bound by restrictions. Fuad Bey finally capitulated, and professed himself only anxious to establish more principles for the post-liquidation period of frontier co-operation. He expressed the intention of submitting them in writing for His Majesty's Government's consideration, but had failed to do so by the end of October.

27. On the 16th September he opened a new line of attack by writing to express regret at Captain Glubb's apparent departure from Transjordan, and to request that urgent steps be taken to liquidate the loot, the purpose for which Ibn Zeyd was still patiently waiting at Qaryat. This was a little difficult to answer, since the Colonial Office's telegraphic enquiry of Transjordan of the 2nd September, repeated to Jedda, and asking what was the position in regard to the Glubb-Ibn Zeyd meetings, had apparently not been answered, and there had been no news of Captain Glubb's movements for some time. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires therefore made further telegraphic enquiry of the High Commissioner on the 20th September. On the 1st October, crossing a reminder, came the reply that Captain Glubb would return from leave on the 13th October, and would be instructed to exchange lists of claims with Ibn Zeyd at an early date. Mr. Hope Gill, in informing Fuad Bey, expressed the hope that this time the Hejazi representative would be fully documented for his rôle. In reporting on the situation to His Majesty's Government, he asked for information as to whether any decision which should affect his attitude had been taken as a result of the sombre conclusions reached by Captain Glubb after his last meeting with Ibn Zeyd (July-August report, paragraph 25). Instructions were also sought as to whether the details of future frontier procedure and co-operation, under the guise of Fuad Bey's "additional principles," should be discussed at Jedda or left to the frontier representatives alone.

Preventive Measures.

28. The Hejazi Government took no steps during the period to bring to the knowledge of His Majesty's Government the measures taken to prevent raiding from their side of the frontier (July-August report, paragraph 26), and no steps beyond that narrated in paragraph 26 above to seek collaboration with the Transjordan authorities in accordance with the Hadda Agreement.

Raiding Criminals.

29. No further advance was made from the position described in the July-August report, paragraph 27. The Amir Abdullah having objected to taking any step forward in the direction of recognising Ibn Saud, His Majesty's Government did not feel disposed at present to press him to reconsider his attitude about a raiding-criminal agreement with the Hejaz-Nejd. Nor were they inclined to adopt the alternative proposal made by the Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan that they should themselves, as mandatory for Transjordan, conclude such an agreement with Ibn Saud. In any event, such an agreement would be hardly workable in the face of hostility between the Arab authorities on either side. His Majesty's Government, therefore, preferred to rely for the present on the existing policy of frontier co-operation.

Allegations against Captain Glubb.

30. Without waiting longer for the information asked for in his telegram of the 1st August to Transjordan, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires took advantage of the presence of the Hejazi Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Jedda, on the 2nd September, to reply to the June allegations against

Captain Glubb on the lines laid down by His Majesty's Government (July-August report, paragraphs 29 and 30). He read to Fuad Bey enough of Captain Glubb's reply of the 14th June to answer all the allegations and to meet his further questioning, without having to touch upon the details on which further information was awaited. Fuad Bey, as was to be expected, fastened upon the one case of "retaliatory confiscation" admitted by Captain Glubb. He asked whether His Majesty's Government condoned or supported such action, but Mr. Hope Gill remained non-committal and treated the question as hardly serious. Fuad Bey dropped it, but left the impression that he would raise it again when he got the chance. He has not yet done so, however.

MacDonnell Investigation.

31. Ibn Saud's reply to the announcement of His Majesty's Government's arbitral finding on raid claims prior to the 1st August, 1930 (July-August report, paragraph 31), was made on the 10th September. While accepting the finding as binding and noting the cancellation of claims on both sides of the line, he was unable to refrain from going over old ground, criticising the weakness of the investigation, discounting the effects of his denial of Nejd territory to the investigator, and protesting that all available witnesses had been produced. His Majesty assured the British Government that, in spite of difficulties which he enumerated and others too numerous to mention, he would abide by his undertaking to accept the award. But he wished to know what procedure would be followed regarding the raids made since the 1st August, 1930, when would a decision be made on them, and what measures would be taken to prevent future raids. He believed that the deplorable situation created by the award could only be remedied by a liquidation of the past, the making of agreements with Transjordan similar to those made with Iraq, and the "removal of those causes of friction on the Transjordan frontier which were causes of friction on the Iraq frontier"; no doubt meaning, chiefly, Captain Glubb.

32. Under instructions from His Majesty's Government of the 22nd October, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires replied taking note of Ibn Saud's acceptance of the finding, ignoring his criticisms and his insinuation against Captain Glubb, and taking him up on his wish for knowledge which he already possessed. The Hejazi Government were reminded that all claims since August 1930 were now, after long negotiations, subject to joint examination by Captain Glubb and Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin-Zeyd; that the latter had come to the main meeting hopelessly unprepared; and that His Majesty's Government saw no reason to change the procedure except to improve the Hejazi side of it. As to measures for preventing further raids, they were still waiting to learn what the Hejazi Government were doing, the Transjordan measures having been fully explained already and having secured encouraging results. They considered that every effort should be made to increase the scope and usefulness of the co-operation between the frontier representatives. Captain Glubb had his instructions in this sense. His Majesty's Government trusted that Ibn Saud would similarly instruct Ibn Zeyd.

33. As regards the costs of the MacDonnell investigation, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires informed the Hejazi Government on the 6th October that their share amounted to £1,726 7s. 8d. He invited them to pay. They have not paid as yet.

Refugees from the Hejaz.

34. At the end of August the semi-official "Umm-al-Qura" published a leading article, which alleged that disaffected elements among the Hejazi tribes were being enticed into Transjordan. The writer piously concluded that they must be either heretics, profligates, or criminals, of whom the Hejaz was well rid. They would find plenty of scope in Amman for their disgusting practices, he added, whereas in the Hejaz and Nejd the sword was nearer to the neck of such a one than his own jugular vein. The article would have been merely amusing but for its calculated disrespect of His Highness the Amir Abdullah.

35. On the 3rd September, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs conveyed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires Ibn Saud's conviction that there was truth in the allegation of enticement. He requested Mr. Hope Gill to bring the facts described in the papers quoted by the "Umm-al-Qura" to the notice

of His Majesty's Government in connexion with article 8 of the Hadda Agreement, which forbids such practices. He added an enquiry as to whether it were true that the Transjordan Legislative Assembly had recently voted a credit for the construction of posts on the Hejaz-Nejd frontier. Both points were referred to His Majesty's Government on the 9th September for instructions.

36. A second and much more virulent leading article appeared in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 23rd October. Before making representations to the Hejazi Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires established to his own satisfaction the fact, later confirmed by Mr. Philby, that both articles came from the pen of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. Mr. Philby had added that they were written with Ibn Saud's full knowledge and that repeated efforts had been made to induce himself to co-operate with messages to the "Near East" and the "Daily Herald" on the same subject. He had declined, saying that he knew nothing of the facts of the matter and that in any case he had since long decided to write nothing for the press about the Hejaz-Nejd, having only severe criticism to offer. Mr. Hope Gill was therefore not surprised when Fuad Bey Hamza, in reply to his formal representations of the 1st November, affected to view the articles with equanimity and even with some satisfaction. Feeling that he had the King and Yusuf Yasin behind him he sought to justify the articles as proper replies to the unwarranted attacks made on the Hejaz-Nejd in the Arabic press and inspired by the Amir (Abdullah). Moreover, he would not admit that they were the work of Yusuf Yasin. Mr. Hope Gill was not in a position either to divulge Mr. Philby's information or to judge of what degree of provocation had been given. He therefore maintained his view that the articles were inexcusable and should not be repeated and referred the question of further action to His Majesty's Government, with the suggestion that the return of His Majesty's Minister to Jedda might serve as the occasion for an expression of his views on the behaviour of the Hejazi Government in his absence.

37. In reply to Captain Glubb's suggestion that, should the Beni Atiya (July-August report, paragraph 73) seek refuge in Transjordan from punitive measures by Ibn Saud, they should first be ordered back and then, if they refused, be ordered to move north of Maan and well away from the frontier, His Majesty's Government stated in October that they were disposed to agree, if the case presented itself in the precise circumstances foreshadowed by Captain Glubb. In any other circumstances, however, they would need to consider the matter further in the light of the situation then prevailing. No attempt by the Beni Atiya to take refuge in Transjordan has been reported.

Frontier Line.

38. The Hejazi Government registered a formal protest on the 4th October against an alleged aerial trespass of the frontier by three British machines on the 25th September in the neighbourhood of Qaryat-al-Milh. The complaint was referred to His Majesty's Government for investigation.

Iraq.

39. On the 2nd September Fuad Bey Hamza broached with Mr. Hope Gill a question which Ibn Saud said was causing him concern. A number of remnant chiefs of the 1929 rebellion were said to be residing at Al Huwika, near the frontier, where they were being given noticeably friendly asylum by the Iraqi authorities. Ibn Saud did not wish to take the matter up with the Iraqi Government on the eve of the exchange of representatives, but he would be very grateful to His Majesty's Government if something could be done about it. The request was passed on on the 9th September.

40. Representatives, however, have not even yet been exchanged, for reasons that are obscure. An Iraqi Royal Irada of the 1st October made the headquarters of the consul-general for Iraq in the Hejaz-Nejd at Mecca instead of Jedda. This somewhat surprised and puzzled the Hejazi Government, who had not been consulted and who, while Nuri Pasha was here, had told him that Jedda was the diplomatic capital and that no exception could be made.

41. In mid-October King Feisal professed to be much perturbed by rumours of a large concentration at Jauf, which was said to be directed against the pipeline and railway surveys then proceeding in Iraq territory. In order to test Ibn Saud's attitude, he invited him to agree to the opening of a pilgrim route

through Jauf, and is believed to have suggested that Ibn Saud should meet him there to inaugurate it. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires could learn nothing in the Hejaz about the supposed concentration. As regards the pilgrim route, the test was inconclusive, since Jauf is bound on the south by the sandy Nafud desert. As mentioned in paragraph 21, the Hejazi Government are believed to have replied that this route was unsuitable for motor traffic.

Koweit and Bahrein.

42. The record of an inter-departmental meeting held at the Foreign Office on the 12th August was received at Jedda in September. Among other matters discussed were: (1) The method of negotiating the questions awaiting settlement between Koweit and Nejd; it was agreed that Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, should in the first place visit Ibn Saud on the first occasion when the latter's presence near the Persian Gulf made this possible. (2) The Nejd "blockade" of Koweit; there being little likelihood of an appeal to Ibn Saud's good nature being successful, it was agreed that the threat to raise the Bahrein transit dues on goods to Nejd, and, if necessary, the actual raising of the dues, should prove a useful weapon in the negotiations. (3) A proposed treaty for the settlement of future claims between Koweit and Nejd; it was agreed that, in the circumstances, no formal treaty was required. (4) Past Koweit claims against Ibn Saud; it was agreed that the claims amounting to some £110,000, should be held over until conversations were opened with Ibn Saud and then, if possible, used as a lever in the negotiations. (5) The effect of the Hejazi Nationality law on Koweitis and Bahreinis; it was agreed that the matter should not be discussed with the Hejazi Government unless the latter themselves forced an issue. (6) The future status of Koweit; it was agreed that the policy hitherto followed should be continued, namely, that Koweit should be maintained as a protected State entirely independent of either Iraq or Nejd.

Asir and the Yemen.

43. The threat of war between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya noted in the last report (July-August report, paragraphs 40 and 41) developed serious proportions in the beginning of September, but was almost averted by the end. The situation continued to improve in October. It was complicated in the first instance by the simultaneous and probably not unconnected rising of certain Asiri tribes, notably the Masariha, round Jizan, against the Nejd occupation. After some delay, due to lack of benzine for military transport, recounted in paragraph 4, reinforcements were sent by sea to the Amir of Jizan, and the Asiri situation was got in hand again. As a result probably of this show of resolution on the part of Ibn Saud, reinforced by his telegraphic invocations of Allah, the Imam stayed his hand. He may also have felt Italian pressure at his end. Ibn Saud, on his side, received urgent counsels of moderation from His Majesty's Government.

44. On the 1st September the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs had informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that the situation was regarded as serious. On the 4th the Hejazi Minister in London informed His Majesty's Government that the Imam had occupied a number of places on the Hejazi side of the *de facto* frontier and was adopting so aggressive an attitude that, if it were maintained, there was a serious danger of open hostilities developing. The desirability was very strongly urged upon Sheikh Hafiz Wahba of Ibn Saud adopting counsels of moderation and exercising the greatest possible patience in his dealings with the Imam. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was, at the same time, instructed to act similarly at Jedda, emphasising the disastrous results which might follow to the Hejaz from any outbreak of hostilities. The Italian Government undertook to urge similar counsels upon the Imam. Ibn Saud, in reply, expressed his gratitude to His Majesty's Government for their advice and assured them that he was doing his best to follow it. As evidence, the Hejazi Ministry for Foreign Affairs communicated to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires copies of all the messages exchanged between Ibn Saud and the Imam. The former's were pious and ponderous; the latter's short and flippant.

45. During the first days of September the redoubtable Khalid-bin-Luwey, captor of Taif from the Hashimites, was sent southwards with a force of several

thousand tribesmen on camels, with orders to collect more *en route* and enter Asir. He encountered apathy, and even resistance, on his way and took a month to reach his objective. On the 7th September the Hejazi authorities chartered deck space on the Mogul Line's steamship "Jehangir," then leaving for Aden, to transport to Jizan 250 Nejd "regulars," a mixed body containing many slaves of African origins; also fifty aeroplane bombs. Because of the reefs she had to approach from the south, and on arrival on the 11th September lay hooting for half a day off an apparently deserted town. Thinking it had already fallen, the captain prepared to leave, when a solitary dugout canoe ventured near. It held the port officer, disguised in a loin cloth; he was much relieved to find the ship held Nejd reinforcements. Her arrival from the direction of the Yemen had persuaded the local defence that she was full of enemy Yemenis. On the 17th September Aden reported that the Imam was conniving at aggression on the Asir frontier in the regions of Jabal Fifa and Jabal Razih, in the hope that Ibn Saud's inactivity would give him the chance of occupying Sabya, Abu Arish and Jizan and eventually the Farsan Islands. A contributory cause of the Imam's activity was said to be his anxiety at the grave decline of his port of Midi owing to the rivalry of Jizan. But further Saudi reinforcements, including some armed cars, reached Jizan overland as soon as benzine was available in the Hejaz, and the situation began to stabilise.

46. On the 20th September the Hejazi Government received from the Imam Yahya by post the "very beautiful" reply which had been promised in a brief telegram received in August. It proved to be quite unintelligible, written in the cryptic style which the late Sherif Husain used to baffle treaty negotiators. On the 24th, however, he clearly accepted Ibn Saud's proposal to appoint delegates to meet near Arwa, agree and delimit a frontier, and set up a *modus vivendi*. They began to meet about the middle of October.

47. An illuminating sidelight was later thrown by Mr. Philby on Ibn Saud's attitude of early September. When the news of the advance of the Imam's troops in the mountains reached Riyadh, the King and he and Yusuf Yasin pored over large-scale maps to determine the extent of the aggression, but nobody knew just where the frontier lay. Ibn Saud was, nevertheless, bent upon launching a sweeping desert attack upon San'a from the north-east, a providential means of employing the Nejd brethren who lay camped round Riyadh. No arguments appeared to deter him, when he suddenly changed his mind completely and ordered his outposts in Asir to avoid all contact with the Yemenis. His Majesty's Government's message thus seems to have been effective, though Mr. Philby was, and still is, ignorant of it and has given as his opinion that any such message would do more harm than good.

III.—RELATIONS WITH STATES OUTSIDE ARABIA.

British Empire.

48. The Hejazi Government's relations with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom remained normal. The Transjordan frontier produced its usual quota of matters in dispute (see paragraphs 25 to 38). With regard to Iraq, Ibn Saud raised one small point of concern to himself (see paragraph 39). Matters affecting Koweit and Bahrein were discussed in London and are recorded in paragraph 42.

49. On the 18th September His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires forwarded to India, for signature, two English-Arabic copies of the revised Money Order Agreement between the Indian and Hejazi Post Offices, signed by the Hejazi Postmaster-General.

50. British personnel in the Hejaz Air Force is dealt with in paragraphs 62 to 67. The Hejazi Government's theft of Shell benzine from Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. has been described in paragraph 5.

International

Disarmament Conference.

51. In consequence of a letter, dated the 14th September, from the Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London to the League of Nations, the Council of the League resolved to invite the "Government of the Hejaz" to the 1932 Disarmament

Conference. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires of the invitation with some gratification. He added that it had not yet been decided whether to accept it or not. On being asked on what grounds the Hejazi Government might decline, he confided how extremely difficult it would be to render a true return of the armed forces of the Hejaz-Nejd and the expenditure thereon. Every Amir, big and little, had an armed retinue of some sort, and there was no such thing as a budget in the country. Moreover, his French was weak, and the League had sent him masses of documents in French.

Treaties.

52. In October the Hejazi Government communicated to His Majesty's Legation a collection of treaties and agreements concluded to date by Nejd and the Hejaz-Nejd with their neighbours and foreign Powers. A list of these instruments is annexed.

France.

53. The treaty negotiations still continued.

Italy.

54. The treaty negotiations were stayed. The Italian consul returned to Jedda on the 11th October with instructions to take no further step forward so long as there existed discord and the possibility of hostilities between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya (see paragraphs 43 to 47).

The Netherlands.

55. For lack of funds, the secretary-elect to the Hejaz-Nejd Legation at The Hague has been unable to proceed to his post (July-August report, paragraph 59). The failure of the Hejaz-Nejd negotiations for a Dutch loan and its aftermath have been reported in paragraph 4.

Egypt.

56. The Egyptian consul, Hafiz Amer Bey, went on leave of absence on the 10th September. A place-man of Emin Yehia Pasha, the Alexandria shipowner and brother of the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, he was expected to spend his leave in trying to arrive, with their help, at some understanding between the Egyptian and Hejazi Governments before the next pilgrimage.

Soviet Russia.

57. The Soviet Minister and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps at Jedda, Nezir Bey Turakoulov, left on the 11th October for six months' leave of absence. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires gained the impression that his eventual return would depend upon such progress as might be made in the Soviet negotiations for the entry of their goods into this country, where they are still more or less banned.

58. Comrade Horace Salkind arrived in Jedda on the 1st September, and on the Minister's departure became Chargé d'Affaires *par intérim*.

59. The first consignment of Soviet benzine, contracted for by the Hejazi Government in August, put in a tardy appearance on the 20th October (see paragraph 14).

United States of America.

60. Mr. Crane's engineer, Mr. Twitchell, arrived for development work on the 19th October (see paragraph 17).

Turkey.

61. The new Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, Lutfullah Bey, arrived in Jedda on the 5th September, but the presentation of his credentials was held up for two months by the state of his pancreas.

IV.—AIR MATTERS.

Hejaz Air Force.

62. Mr. Lowe, the last of the four British pilots, and six mechanics selected by the Air Ministry in 1929 for Ibn Saud's new air force, was eventually got rid of in September. As already reported (July-August report, paragraph 67), he had re-engaged himself on the 24th August under a clandestine contract with the Director-General of Military Affairs. When required for work at the aerodrome at the beginning of September, however, he reported sick with ear trouble. He was treated as a malingerer and publicly insulted by the Turkish corporal, his contractor. He sought the assistance of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 6th September. Mr. Hope Gill took up the matter with Taif, and, as a result, learned on the 8th that the Hejazi Government had decided to cancel the new contract. This was both legal and acceptable, but another ten days was spent in somewhat acrimonious debate before getting the local police surveillance raised (it had been imposed by Hamdi Bey to prevent Mr. Lowe's departure from the country), and before extracting this now distraught pilot from the toils of the enquiry which followed the crash of a machine on the 13th September (see paragraph 6). He was got away, with his arrears of pay, on the 20th September, incontinently declaring, for reasons known only to himself, that he would return in three months. There was unfeigned relief in both British and Hejazi circles at this final liquidation of the unsuitable 1929 personnel.

63. Conversations continued meanwhile concerning new personnel for the air force. Referring to the memorandum which had been communicated to the Hejazi Government on the 7th July (July-August report, paragraph 68), the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the 1st September answered the three subsidiary points then raised by His Majesty's Minister. He stated that he had referred all three points to Ibn Saud, who had replied uncompromisingly that (1) matters of discipline were of purely Hejazi concern; (2) he could not permit any arrangement whereby the new personnel might procure alcoholic liquor; and (3) the question of failure to pay salaries when due did not arise, since the terms of the contract would be faithfully observed. The first and third of these answers were somewhat softened by Fuad Bey, who promised to reply shortly to the memorandum itself. Meanwhile the events described in paragraph 13 supervened.

64. Instead of making a written reply, Fuad Bey gave His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires a message on the 19th September from Ibn Saud to His Majesty's Government, to the effect that he would like to know how soon new personnel could be sent out, and that he regarded the option enjoyed by the previous personnel, to resign in the event of war, as incompatible with his present need (that of bombing the Imam Yahya, no doubt); he therefore asked for its omission from the new contracts. Fuad Bey also asked that, in view of the urgency of the matter, the new contracts, modified from the old in the above sense only, be sent to Jedda with the new personnel, for signature on arrival.

65. In transmitting this message to His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires summarised the situation which underlay it. As far as could be judged at Jedda, Ibn Saud was simultaneously faced by a state of lawlessness and disaffection in the Northern Hejaz, the possibility of a resurrection of the Rashidi power at Hail, disaffection throughout Nejd at stricter taxation in place of the customary *largesse*, insurrection in Asir, abetted and utilised by the Imam Yahya, and latent but bitter hostility in the towns of the Hejaz. If this maximum estimate were to be discounted by half, Ibn Saud was still faced with a formidable situation, to meet which he had unimpaired military prestige, much impaired political prestige, less Wahhabi fervour to back him and no money. If he could at once have two pilots with full power to use them as he wished, it would assist him, but it could hardly prove decisive, except perhaps to frighten the Imam into terms. Their effect on his subjects everywhere else could not fail to be less than the effect of his four new aeroplanes in 1929, when the Nejd rebels had been driven into a corner and the weight of His Majesty's Government, which the tribes discerned behind Ibn Saud, was concentrated in one district. Only two machines in any case were now serviceable, while a third might be made serviceable, given time, which would be grudged. A further consideration was that Ibn Saud no longer figured in the Moslem press

as the popular consolidator of Arabia. Once suspected of having his back to the wall, the press might well turn on him and feature his pilots as hired assassins, with unfortunate results in India; while if they were to fall into rebel hands, there would be far less hope of their deriving protection from their British nationality than there might have been in the 1929 operations near both the Iraq frontier and the Royal Air Force. Over against all these lay the consideration that Ibn Saud would probably regard any delay or failure on the part of His Majesty's Government to send out the new personnel, which he so badly needed, as evidence that they were no longer inclined to give him their support and assistance, just when these were most required. Fuad Bey had stated that he could not believe that the British Government, with their wide powers and great experience, could fail to devise the means of helping so loyal and useful a friend as Ibn Saud.

66. His Majesty's Government nevertheless replied to Ibn Saud's message that in no circumstances could they agree to British personnel taking part in hostilities against another Power; the option to resign in the event of war must therefore be maintained and would be exercised if necessary. As regards the contracts, these must be agreed before the personnel were engaged. Draft contracts were sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, for submission to the Hejazi Government if they still desired the early engagement of personnel under the above condition.

67. Ibn Saud professed to be much grieved by this reply, which His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires communicated to the Hejazi Government on the 30th September. He assured His Majesty's Government that his intentions were purely pacific, but he did not deny the fact that he needed his air force to meet both internal rebellion and external aggression. He complained that the 1929 personnel had not been worth the money spent on them. He now found it necessary to punish "certain subjects," and asked His Majesty's Government to choose one of two courses: either send out sufficient new personnel for four machines, to be under his orders for every purpose, or else send only instructional personnel and mechanics, and he would himself look for his pilots elsewhere; he would use the British for training and the rest for war. An interim reply was given on the 1st November, to the effect that Ibn Saud's proposals presented difficulties, but were receiving urgent consideration by His Majesty's Government. As has been described earlier in this report, the situation has meanwhile improved considerably.

V.—MILITARY MATTERS.

Northern Hejaz.

68. The poverty and misrule at the seat of Government described in the opening paragraphs of this report were severely felt in the northern Amirates. The Amir of Qaryat-al-Milh, Ibn Abdul Wahid, was reported to have received no pay since June. Ibn Saud's Controller of Bedouin, Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeyd, and his fifty men had had no pay since February. At Jauf the Amir Turki-as-Sudairi went in fear that his troops would mutiny for the same reason, and his difficulties were increased by the presence of numbers of unemployed soldiery of the recent an-Neshmi régime. His cousin at Tabuk, the Amir Abdullah-as-Sudairi, was also reported to be experiencing serious trouble with his garrison, who refused to wear uniform or to clean their barracks. In addition there was typhoid at Tabuk and no medical assistance. Furthermore there was no more benzine, so that frontier patrols could no longer be made. Nevertheless, there was no raiding into Transjordan during September and October.

East (Nejd).

69. Ibn Saud's presence attracted large numbers of tribal visitors to Riyadh, but no military movements of note were remarked. Reports from Jerusalem state that it was rumoured in October that the Harb and Shammur were to be concentrated at Jauf, which King Feisal interpreted as a threat against the pipe-line and railway surveys then working in near-by Iraqi territory, but which, if true, was more likely to indicate contemplated Nejd action against the unruly tribes of the northern Hejaz (July-August report, paragraph 73).

South (Asir).

70. The course of the threat of war on the Yemen frontier of Asir has been reported in paragraphs 43 to 47.

VI.—NAVAL MATTERS.

Naval Visits.

71. In view of the situation in the Hejaz, and after an exchange of views with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Captain Dicken, Senior Naval Officer Red Sea sloop, postponed the scheduled departure of His Majesty's sloop "Lupin" from Port Sudan from the 16th to the 21st September. A visit to Jedda was not found necessary, however. His Majesty's sloop "Dahlia" (Commander A. R. Farquhar) paid a routine visit to Jedda from the 23rd to the 26th October. The situation was then normal again, and several hundred Jeddawis, mostly uninvited, attended a cricket match between the ship and the British colony. The usual courtesy visits were exchanged between the captain and the Governor of Jedda, who received his salute of thirteen guns. Both were entertained at dinner at the Legation.

72. There were no naval visits by foreign warships.

Search for Arms.

73. As a result of further inter-departmental consultation on the subject of naval search for arms in the Red Sea (see July–August 1930 report, section 34), the following instructions were communicated by His Majesty's Government on the 2nd September:—

"Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Arms and Ammunition."

"The Arms Traffic Convention of the 17th June, 1925, is not in force. Nevertheless, in taking steps for the prevention of the illicit traffic in arms by native vessels, the procedure laid down in this convention should be followed. By this convention, His Majesty's ships have the right only to 'verify the flag' in native vessels under 500 tons which fly the flag of one of the parties to the convention. Under this convention, if no authority to fly the flag is forthcoming, or if, in spite of such authority, strong suspicion still exists that the vessel is carrying on illicit traffic in arms and ammunition, she may be conducted to the nearest port of the Power whose flag was flown. No right of search is given by the convention.

"2. By custom, native vessels in the Red Sea may be searched for arms outside the territorial waters of French and Italian colonies, whatever flag they may be flying. In view, however, of the absence of specific legal sanction for carrying out searches for arms in the Red Sea, it is of importance that all searches should be ostensibly for slaves and not for arms. Searches in the territorial waters of the Hejaz proper, as distinct from Asir, *i.e.*, north of Dahban, should be conducted with great discretion and should not take place at all in the vicinity of important ports. If a native vessel is found to be carrying a greater number of arms than is necessary for the normal crew, it may be assumed that, in the absence of a special licence, that they are doing so illegally, and any rifles or pistols (but not swords or daggers) in excess of this number should be confiscated, but in the case of a dhow which could prove Hejazi or Asiri origin no action should be taken in the territorial waters of the Hejaz proper (as distinct from Asir), *i.e.*, north of Dahban.

"3. If any considerable quantity of arms is found on board, or if there is a strong suspicion that the vessel is engaged in illegal traffic in arms or ammunition, the procedure laid down in annex II, section II of the Arms Traffic Convention is to be carried out in the case of vessels flying the flag of one of the signatories to that convention or flying no flag. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above, native vessels flying the flag of a country that is not a signatory should be taken to Aden.

"4. Special agreements regarding the right of search for arms remain in force with Italy and Muscat.

"5. It is the custom of the Governments of the various divisions of Arabia which border on the Red Sea, to arm small vessels from time to time for the protection of their respective shipping and the repression of smuggling. Such vessels should, of course, not be interfered with."

VII.—PILGRIMAGE.

1931 Pilgrimage Report.

74. A very detailed and consequently somewhat bulky pilgrimage report on the 1931 season was compiled in the Legation in September and despatched on the 29th. The local pilgrimage conditions had showed no improvement on those of the previous year. The best that could be said for Ibn Saud was that he had maintained security; the worst, that the inefficiency and corruption of his Moslem Arab régime in the Holy Places continued increasingly to contrast with the care bestowed on pilgrims by the infidel Powers.

Nigerian Pilgrim Destitutes.

75. In September it was calculated that there were some 500 Nigerians destitute in Jedda without means to return to Africa and without sufficient work to support themselves in the Hejaz (see July–August report, paragraph 80). As there was no prospect of their being able to find employment for many months to come, the Legation was faced with the necessity of arranging for their repatriation to the east coast of Africa, whence they might work their way as usual across the continent. On the 6th October His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires addressed the Sudan authorities in this sense, and enquired whether special arrangements could be made to admit these destitutes at Suakin, without payment of the usual quarantine dues, and either to absorb them in the local labour market or, alternatively, to entrain them for districts in or beyond the Sudan, where their labour could be utilised, and whence they could work their way homeward in the traditional fashion. No reply was received by the end of the month. More destitutes meanwhile began to arrive from the interior, where poverty was even more acute than in Jedda.

VIII.—SLAVERY.

Slave Trade.

76. Also as a result of the inter-departmental consultation referred to in paragraph 73, the following instructions in regard to searches for slaves in the Red Sea were issued by His Majesty's Government on the 2nd September:—

"Suppression of Slave Trade."

"There is no longer any general convention in force according the right of search for slaves, but the convention of the 10th September, 1919, revising the General Acts of Berlin (1885) and of Brussels (1890), states that the signatories (United States of America, Belgium, British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal) will endeavour to secure the complete suppression of slavery in all its forms, and of the slave trade by land and sea. It can also be argued that the obligations of the General Act of 1890 still apply to countries who were parties to it, but not of the 1919 convention, and therefore to Turkey and the States who have succeeded her. The latter would, however, probably refuse to admit this. A further legal basis of a similar kind could possibly be found in the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1881 for the suppression of the African slave trade. A more definite legal basis in respect of Hejazi, Asiri and Nejdî vessels is provided by article 7 of the Treaty of Jedda in 1927, in which Ibn Saud undertook 'to co-operate by all the means at his disposal with His Britannic Majesty in the suppression of the slave trade.'

"2. Treaties are still in force under which His Majesty's ships can search vessels of the following countries for slaves, *viz.*, Borneo, Egypt (vessels under 500 tons), Italy, Liberia, Muscat, Persia, Spain (vessels under 500 tons), and Bahrein and the Trucial sheikhdoms (Abu Dhabi, Dabai, Shargah, Ajman, Umm-al-Qaiwain and Ras-al-Khaima).

"3. By custom, however, native vessels within the Red Sea may be searched for slaves outside the territorial waters of French and Italian Colonies, whatever flag they may be flying. Searches in the territorial waters of the Hejaz proper (as distinct from Asir), *i.e.*, north of Dahban, should, however, be conducted with great discretion, and should not take place at all in the vicinity of important ports."

"4. Care must also be taken to avoid giving offence to the French and Italian authorities by undue restraint on dhows legitimately sailing under their colours. The authority to fly the flag should be carried by the dhow.

"5. Search must always be carried out in the manner laid down in the Slave Trade Instructions, Volume I.

"6. The main traffic in slaves is believed to cross from the African to the Arabian shore in the narrower waters at the southern end of the Red Sea, proceeding thence up the Arabian coast, inside the islands and reefs as far as possible, to the trading ports.

"7. *Runaway Slaves.*—The Arabs regard slaves as recognised servants, and to give refuge to runaways is liable to cause great irritation. On the other hand, it is against British principles to refuse these people refuge. Commanding officers are, therefore, to consult British consular or political representatives in Arabia as soon as possible as to action to be taken.

Manumissions.

77. One Abyssinian woman was manumitted locally in September by agreement with her owner. Two male slaves took refuge in the Legation in October; one left of his own accord to work for himself, the other, a Sudani, was repatriated to Suakin.

IX.—MISCELLANEOUS.

Staff.

78. Mr. Furlonge returned from a short sick leave on the 9th September. Captain Lewis returned from England on the 10th October.

Annex.

Treaties and Agreements.

By—	With—	Date of Signature.	Title.	Date of Ratification.	Remarks.
Nejd Iraq ..	March 5, 1922	Mohammara Treaty.		
Nejd Iraq ..	Dec. 2, 1922	Uqair Protocol No. 1.		
Nejd Iraq ..	Dec. 2, 1922	Uqair Protocol No. 2.		
Nejd Koweit ..	Dec. 3, 1922	Frontier Agreement.		
Nejd Iraq ..	Nov. 1, 1925	Bahra Agreement.		
Nejd Transjordan ..	Nov. 2, 1925	Hadda Agreement.		
Hejaz-Nejd France, for Syria ..	March 19, 1926	Mecca Agreement..		Lapsed.
Ibn Saud The Idrisi ..	Oct. 21, 1926	Mecca Agreement..		Modified Dec. 9, 1930.
Hejaz..	.. Sudan..	Dec. 18, 1926	Cable Ownership Agreement.		
Hejaz..	.. Sudan..	Dec. 18, 1926	Cable Service Agreement.		
Hejaz-Nejd British Empire ..	May 20, 1927	Treaty of Jeddah ..	Sept. 17, 1927	
Hejaz-Nejd Persia..	Aug. 25, 1929	Treaty of Friendship	Nov. 12, 1929	
Hejaz-Nejd Signatories	Postal Convention..	Nov. 12, 1929	
Hejaz-Nejd Germany ..	April 26, 1929	Treaty of Friendship	Nov. 6, 1930	
Hejaz-Nejd Turkey ..	Aug. 3, 1929	Treaty of Friendship	Dec. 10, 1930	
Ibn Saud The Idrisi ..	Dec. 9, 1930	Notification of Protectorate.		
Hejaz-Nejd Iraq ..	April 7, 1931	Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage."		
Hejaz-Nejd Iraq ..	April 7, 1931	Arbitration Protocol.		
Hejaz-Nejd Iraq ..	April 8, 1931	Extradition Treaty.		

[E 6268/487/25]

No. 65.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 251.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, December 18, 1931.

MY despatch No. 400.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sends copy of communiqué announcing that Imam asked Ibn Saud to arbitrate on Yemeni occupation of Mount Arwa after failure of delegations to agree and that the King thereupon ceded it. Delegates are to continue to discuss minor questions, including tribal allegiance.

(Copies to Rome and Aden by bag.)

[E 6358/487/25]

No. 66.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 254.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, December 24, 1931.

MY telegram No. 251 of 18th December.

Further communiqué announces conclusion of treaty of friendship, "Bon-Voisinage" and [? group omitted]. It will be published after ratification.

(Copy by bag to Rome and Aden.)

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA.

[E 3916/206/89]

No. 67.

Consul Hole to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 66. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 29, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9 of the 14th January, in which I reported on the Monarchist hopes engendered by the journey of ex-King Ali through Syria and his favourable reception by the High Commissioner, I have the honour to report that in Damascus at least these Royalist aspirations have in the last few months assumed the proportions of a certainty that, on M. Ponsot's return, King Feisal's brother will ascend the Throne of Syria and a treaty will be concluded with France. To what extent this conviction is due to subtle Monarchist propaganda I cannot at present judge, but there can be no question as to its reality.

2. Until recently I inclined to believe that the whole question of the monarchy was a device of the High Commission to divert attention from the prevailing hostility to the mandate, or conceivably an expedient of M. Lépiessier at Bagdad, designed to assist in the settlement of the pipe-line problem, and meant to be disavowed as soon as it became inconvenient. The Nationalist leaders were to my knowledge personally opposed to a monarchy, and articulate opinion in Syria sharply in favour of a republic, chiefly because a President who showed signs of subservience to France would be easier to get rid of than a dynasty. There is, however, no doubt as to the complete confidence of the Royalists in Damascus, and of certain sections of the local press.

3. During his recent short stay in Damascus, Yassin Pasha-el-Hashimi made considerable progress in negotiating on this subject with Fares-el-Khoury, if I may judge from their conversation at a private luncheon party to which I was invited.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE

[E 3988/656/89]

No. 68.

Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 78.)

Sir,

Beirut, July 23, 1931.

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 39 of the 1st April, 1930, I have the honour to report that a mild ministerial crisis has recently occurred owing to the resignation of Ahmed-el-Husseini, the Minister of Justice. He was in marked disagreement with some of his colleagues, who for certain reasons favoured the grant of a gambling monopoly at Aley, the summer capital of the Lebanon. This has necessitated a reconstruction of the Ministry, as a result of which the Prime Minister, Auguste Pasha Adib, has taken the portfolio of Justice, while Soubhi Bey Haidar has been appointed Minister of Finance and Minister of Agriculture. Soubhi Bey was Minister of Finance in the last Ministry of Habib Pasha El Saad, and has recently been Director of Public Instruction. It is possible that he will not be replaced in that capacity, as it is said that he has stipulated that the post shall be kept open in order that he may reoccupy it if the Ministry falls. The above-mentioned changes are of little or no importance from a practical point of view.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 4438/48/89]

No. 69.

Lord Tyrrell to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 928.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the Syria-Iraq and Syria-Transjordan frontiers.

Paris, August 27, 1931.

Enclosure 1 in No. 69.

Note from Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

PAR une note en date du 14 janvier dernier, qui faisait suite aux échanges de vues poursuivis depuis l'été précédent entre les Gouvernements français et anglais au sujet de la délimitation de la frontière entre la Syrie d'une part, l'Irak et la Transjordanie de l'autre, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a soumis à l'Ambassade d'Angleterre un contre-projet de requête commune à adresser au Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations en vue de l'examen par le Conseil du différend relatif à cette question.

Cette communication étant restée jusqu'à ce jour sans réponse, le Ministère croit devoir attirer la particulière attention de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté sur l'intérêt que présenterait dans les circonstances actuelles un prompt règlement de cet important problème. Aussi bien un progrès sensible paraît-il avoir été accompli dans la voie de l'entente, à la suite des entretiens que Sir Francis Humphrys a eus à Beyrouth, en mai dernier, avec M. Ponsot.

Comme le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique en a été certainement informé, ces entretiens ont abouti à l'établissement d'un texte de requête considéré comme satisfaisant par les deux Hauts-Commissaires et par le Gouvernement de Bagdad. Ce texte, dont une copie est jointe à la présente note, pose exactement et complètement le problème en laissant au Conseil de la Société des Nations la latitude de fixer la procédure qui lui paraîtra la plus apte à conduire à une solution équitable de la question. Il a l'entière approbation du Gouvernement français et le Ministère se plaît à espérer que, rédigé en complet accord avec le Haut-Commissaire britannique à Bagdad, il aura également été approuvé par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères estime, en conséquence, qu'il serait opportun de saisir l'occasion offerte par la prochaine session de Genève pour soumettre cette requête à l'examen du Conseil et, à cet effet, il propose d'adresser le plus tôt possible au Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations une demande tendant à ce que cette question soit inscrite à l'ordre du jour de ladite session.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères se permet de rappeler en même temps à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté l'accord intervenu au cours des entretiens officiels de l'été dernier sur la nécessité d'établir une carte commune de la région frontière dont il s'agit, avant même que la commission dont la désignation est envisagée et qui aura à utiliser cette carte se soit rendue sur le terrain. La disposition d'un tel document, obtenu par confrontation des travaux cartographiques déjà effectués de part et d'autre, basé sur des données scientifiques vérifiées et, par conséquent, valable pour l'une et l'autre partie, faciliterait considérablement la tâche de la commission, tout en lui permettant de conserver son entière liberté d'action et d'appréciation quant au fonds du débat.

Au cas où le Gouvernement britannique partagerait sur ce dernier point le sentiment du Gouvernement français, il suffirait que des instructions fussent adressées respectivement à Bagdad et à Beyrouth pour que les services techniques intéressés entrent dès maintenant en rapports en vue de l'établissement de la carte susvisée.

Paris, le 27 août 1931.

[6707]

Projet de Requête commune au Conseil de la Société des Nations.

AU mois de décembre 1920, les Gouvernements britannique et français, désireux de régler complètement les problèmes soulevés par l'attribution à la Grande-Bretagne des mandats sur la Palestine et la Mésopotamie, et par l'attribution à la France du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban, conférés par le Conseil suprême à San-Remo, recherchèrent d'un commun accord une solution pratique de ces problèmes.

Les négociations engagées à cet effet par les deux Gouvernements aboutirent à la signature de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920.

L'article 1^{er} de cette convention fixait les limites entre les territoires sous mandat britannique et les territoires sous mandat français.

Aux termes de l'article 2, une commission mixte devait être chargée de reporter sur le terrain les limites ainsi fixées. Ce même article stipulait que les conflits qui pourraient résulter des opérations de cette commission seraient portés devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, dont la décision serait sans appel.

Les deux Gouvernements décidèrent par la suite que la commission se conformerait aux dispositions de l'article 29 du Traité de Sèvres relatives aux lignes à déterminer sur le terrain.

La commission se réunit en juin 1921 et procéda à l'abornement de la frontière jusqu'à El-Hammé.

Au delà de ce point, elle se heurta à la difficulté d'établir un tracé qui tint compte des conditions locales, en ce qui concerne spécialement le sud du Djebel-Druze. La commission ayant constaté l'impossibilité dans laquelle elle se trouvait de résoudre cette difficulté, suspendit ses travaux, qui ne furent pas repris depuis lors.

La reprise de ces travaux supposait l'envoi à la commission de directives concertées entre les Gouvernements britannique et français, et un examen des conditions d'application de la Convention de Londres ne pouvait être utilement entrepris entre ces deux Gouvernements avant l'attribution définitive de toutes les parties des territoires auxquels s'appliquait cette convention.

Cette dernière condition s'étant trouvée réalisée du fait de la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations en date du 16 décembre 1925 et de la signature de l'Accord franco-turc du 22 juin 1929, les Gouvernements britannique et français procédèrent en commun à une étude du problème de la frontière non encore délimitée, telle qu'elle est définie par la convention du 23 décembre 1920.

Au cours de cette étude, les deux Gouvernements se trouvèrent placés, en ce qui concerne divers points de la frontière, devant des difficultés analogues à celles qui avaient arrêté les travaux de la commission en 1921. Ces difficultés étaient de deux sortes. En premier lieu, des divergences d'opinions existent au sujet de l'interprétation exacte de la définition de la frontière qui faisait l'objet de l'article 1^{er} de la convention. En second lieu, il fut constaté que, quelle que pût être l'interprétation donnée à l'article 1^{er} de la convention, une frontière tracée en stricte conformité avec cette interprétation serait vraisemblablement peu satisfaisante dans certains secteurs pour des raisons militaires, politiques, administratives, de tribus, économiques, géographiques ou autres.

Les Gouvernements français et britannique considèrent qu'il n'entre pas dans la compétence d'une commission de délimitation, telle que celle qui se trouve visée par l'article 2 de la convention, d'apporter à la frontière définie par l'article 1^{er} des modifications suffisantes pour faire disparaître les inconvénients mentionnés ci-dessus.

Les Gouvernements britannique et français, ne se trouvant pas en mesure, en raison de ces considérations, d'établir pour la commission des instructions comme appropriées et animées du désir de favoriser un règlement prompt, définitif et équitable d'une question d'importance primordiale pour les populations des territoires sur lesquels s'exercent leurs mandats respectifs, ont convenu d'inviter le Conseil de la Société des Nations à examiner tous les aspects des difficultés mentionnées ci-dessus et, après avoir établi ses conclusions en ce qui concerne les intentions que traduit l'article 1^{er} de la convention, indiquer une frontière définie sur la base de cette convention, mais modifiée pour tenir compte des considérations susvisées, la définition de la frontière ainsi établie devant être

acceptée par toutes les parties en cause comme constituant une solution définitive de la question de frontière.

Les deux Gouvernements suggèrent que la tâche du Conseil serait facilitée par la désignation d'une commission qui recueillerait sur le terrain telles informations et ferait telles recommandations qui seraient susceptibles d'aider le Conseil dans l'élaboration de sa décision.

[E 4617/48/89]

No. 70.

The Marquess of Reading to Mr. R. H. Campbell (Paris).

(No. 2253. Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 11, 1931.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 239 and 240 of the 29th August, in regard to the Syrian-Iraqi and Syrian-Transjordan frontier, I have to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have now considered the French Government's note of the 27th August, a copy of which was enclosed in your despatch No. 928 of the same date. The following explanation of the position contained in paragraphs 2 to 9 below is for your confidential information.

2. As you will have observed from the record of the conference held at the Foreign Office on the 13th July last, a copy of which was sent to you semi-officially on the 31st August, the difficulty in the way of the unqualified acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the formula provisionally agreed upon by Sir F. Humphrys and M. Ponsot at Beirut last May is connected with the application of that formula to the Transjordan sector of the frontier. As the French Government are aware, His Majesty's Government would have been prepared to accept the present formula without reservation a year ago, but the French Government rendered the adoption of a solution on these lines impossible by their failure to confirm the provisional agreement reached as a result of the Paris conversations of July 1930, and by their refusal to agree to the Council of the League being given adequate discretion in the matter. The situation in respect of the Transjordan sector of the frontier has now considerably changed. Since the autumn of 1930 the new convention between the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Iraqi Government has been signed and ratified, and agreements have been concluded between the company and the Governments of Palestine and Transjordan for the construction of a pipe-line from Bagdad to Haifa. A preliminary survey has now also been carried out for the construction both of the pipe-line and of the proposed Bagdad-Haifa Railway; and this survey has shown that both the pipe-line and the railway are likely to have to follow an alignment nearer to the Syrian frontier, as laid down by the 1920 convention, than had at first been anticipated. It is essential that the strategic security of both these lines should be adequately provided for, and that the frontier between Syria and Transjordan should not be carried so far south as either to bring it within the immediate vicinity of the railway and pipe-line or to involve any threat to the safety of the so-called Transjordan corridor. It has been ascertained that this view is fully shared by the Iraqi Government, who regard the safety of the corridor as a vital Iraqi interest.

3. These developments give additional importance to the following circumstance, to which my attention has now been drawn. When the question of the delimitation of the frontier between Syria and Transjordan was first considered in 1921, the French Government put forward extensive claims in this area, and at one moment the British representative on the Delimitation Commission even proposed to the French High Commissioner a concession to Syria extending as far south as Azrak. This proposal was immediately repudiated by His Majesty's Government, but there is reason to believe that the French Government have not lost sight of it and may well revive it before a League commission. Although a claim to so large a cession of Transjordan territory to Syria would be difficult to establish, the danger of its being revived and of a much larger area being awarded to Syria than His Majesty's Government have hitherto contemplated can no longer be ignored.

[6707]

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4. It must, moreover, be borne in mind in this connexion that the adjustments of the frontier desired by the Iraqi Government in the neighbourhood of the Jebel Sinjar are of considerable extent. Should the commission decide in favour of Iraq in this area, the consequent modification of the frontier might prove to extend for as much as 30 miles beyond the convention line. It has hitherto been assumed that a League commission would not be likely to award to Syria on the Transjordan sector an extension of more than some 10 miles south of the convention line. But there is, in fact, no guarantee that a commission which was prepared to award a 30-mile modification on the Iraq sector might not be led to award one of equal depth on the Transjordan sector, notwithstanding the narrowness of the corridor, particularly if the French Government should decide to press their original claim to the Azrak region. Even a compromise by which the concession to Syria should extend no farther south than Mafrak could only be regarded by His Majesty's Government with grave anxiety.

5. In these circumstances, and in view of the extreme importance of maintaining the strategic safety of the Transjordan corridor, more especially in connexion with the impending construction of the Bagdad-Haifa Railway and pipe-line, His Majesty's Government have now come to the conclusion, in which His Majesty King Feisal has informed Sir F. Humphrys that he concurs, that it is no longer possible for them to agree to place the revision of the frontier between Syria and Transjordan unreservedly in the hands of the Council of the League. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government are still prepared to offer the French Government considerable concessions in this sector in order to secure the establishment of a frontier more in accordance with tribal and administrative needs and geographical and strategical considerations than would be the case if the line laid down in the 1920 convention were to be literally adopted. They would therefore be prepared to negotiate a revision of this sector of the line by direct agreement with the French Government, and definite proposals for the establishment of a new line on this sector are in course of preparation.

6. The foregoing considerations do not apply to the far longer and more complicated sector of the frontier between Syria and Iraq, where, indeed, it has been proved by experience that a settlement by direct negotiation of the question either of the interpretation of the 1920 line or of its revision is likely to be unattainable. In regard to this sector, therefore, His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the Beirut formula for a reference of the matter to the League without any reservation. His Majesty's Government understand, indeed, that when the Beirut formula was drawn up by Sir Francis Humphrys and M. Ponsot, and subsequently concurred in by the Iraqi Government, only the Iraqi sector of the line was taken into consideration. His Majesty's Government realise that, by restricting the application of the Beirut formula to the Iraqi sector of the frontier, it may be more difficult to put forward any formal claim that Iraq should benefit by the concessions which His Majesty's Government are prepared to offer to Syria on the Transjordan sector of the frontier. They feel sure, however, that the French Government will not lose sight of the extent of these concessions when putting forward to the League their proposals in regard to the Iraqi sector.

7. As regards the Transjordan sector, His Majesty's Government desire to propose that the matter be dealt with by direct negotiations between the French Government and themselves, independently and, if necessary, in advance of any settlement which may be reached in regard to the sector between Syria and Iraq.

8. As you are aware, the great advance towards a settlement marked by the provisional agreement reached at Beirut last May between M. Ponsot and Sir Francis Humphrys was due in large measure to the cordial personal relations then established between the two High Commissioners. The proposals set forth in the preceding paragraphs will, if agreed to by the French Government, involve the modification of the Beirut formula in order to restrict its application to the Iraqi sector of the frontier, and will necessitate a further understanding with the French Government regarding the negotiation of the suggested modifications in the Transjordan sector. I consider that the best way of securing the agreement of the French Government to this will be by personal discussion between the negotiators of the original formula, *i.e.*, M. Ponsot and Sir F. Humphrys, in person. In these circumstances it is, in my opinion, definitely preferable that the reasons which have led His Majesty's Government to modify their attitude

should be explained fully and frankly to the French Government in the same manner, that is, orally by Sir F. Humphrys to M. Ponsot and the French Government, rather than by means of further official correspondence. I consider, therefore, that any further detailed discussion of the question with the Quai d'Orsay should be postponed until such a meeting can take place.

9. The final settlement of the frontier between Syria and Iraq and between Syria and Transjordan is, however, becoming a matter of increasing urgency and importance. I understand, moreover, that M. Ponsot is returning to Syria in the latter part of October. His Majesty's Government are therefore anxious that a meeting between Sir F. Humphrys and M. Ponsot shall take place in Paris at the earliest possible moment. It will be necessary that any provisional agreement reached between the High Commissioners shall be confirmed and completed in order that it may lead to a final settlement between the two Governments. For this purpose further discussions of a more formal nature between His Majesty's Embassy and the French Government will be required, and I desire to place the general conduct of these discussions in your hands.

10. You should therefore now inform the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs orally, with further reference to their note of the 27th August, that His Majesty's Government consider that the difficulties which have arisen in connexion with the Beirut formula are most likely to be satisfactorily overcome by personal discussion between the drafters of that formula, *i.e.*, the High Commissioners for Syria and Iraq, who are now both in Europe on leave. His Majesty's Government accordingly propose that informal conversations shall take place in Paris in the near future, in the first instance between Sir F. Humphrys and M. Ponsot, and as soon as possible thereafter between His Majesty's Embassy and the Quai d'Orsay, Sir F. Humphrys and M. Ponsot both being present, and that, in the course of these discussions, the difficulties in the way of the unqualified acceptance of the Beirut formula by His Majesty's Government shall be fully explained and an alternative solution of the question proposed.

11. His Majesty's Government also propose that Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. F. Cox, C.M.G., D.S.O., the British resident in Transjordan, shall accompany Sir F. Humphrys on his visit to Paris and take part in such portions of the discussions as concern Transjordan. For your information I may add that it is hoped that Colonel Cox's presence will enable any direct negotiations in regard to the Transjordan sector to be proceeded with immediately, as soon as the main question of the limitation of the Beirut formula to the Iraqi sector of the frontier shall have been disposed of.

12. Any agreement reached with the French Government on the lines proposed by His Majesty's Government should immediately be embodied in an exchange of notes between His Majesty's Embassy and the Quai d'Orsay. These notes should be exchanged if possible before the conversations are concluded, and in any case the drafts should be initialled before Sir F. Humphrys and M. Ponsot leave Paris, in order that all risk may be avoided of a repetition of what occurred in July 1930, when, as you will recollect, the informal conference agreed, *ad referendum* to the two Governments, upon a solution, which the French Government were subsequently unable to accept.

13. Should the French Government be prepared to agree to the above suggestion, and eventually to the application of the Beirut formula to the Iraqi sector of the frontier only, it is for consideration whether it will be necessary to await the January meeting of the Council of the League before referring the question of the Iraqi sector of the frontier to that body for settlement. On previous occasions non-contentious questions on which an agreement has already been reached between the parties have been referred to the Council when that body has not been actually in session, through the chairman of the Council, who has then consulted the members of the Council individually. The possibility of adopting such a course on the present occasion is now receiving consideration, and I shall address a further despatch to you on this point in due course.

I am, &c.

READING.

The Marquess of Reading to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 2452.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 3, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2253, Confidential, of the 11th September to Mr. Campbell on the subject of the Syrian-Iraqi and Syrian-Transjordan frontier, I have to inform you that Sir Francis Humphrys, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Cox, will arrive in Paris on the evening of the 6th October, and the former will be at the disposal of M. Ponsot on the morning of the 7th October, as arranged by your Lordship.

2. I request that you will afford all possible assistance to Sir Francis Humphrys, and I enclose, for your information, a copy of his letter of instructions. I invite your particular attention to paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the letter, in which the limits of his responsibility in relation to you for the conduct of the impending discussions are defined.

3. You will appreciate from paragraph 12 of my despatch No. 2253 of the 11th September the importance of immediately embodying in an exchange of notes any agreement which may be reached during the discussions. If then such agreement is reached in the course of informal conversations between Sir Francis Humphrys and M. Ponsot, a formal meeting will be required for the above purpose. It is possible, however, as indicated in the enclosed letter, that the conversations may merge into formal negotiations at an earlier stage.

4. At whatever moment formal negotiations begin, the responsibility for their conduct will devolve upon you, and I request that you will in that case be guided by the instructions issued to Sir Francis Humphrys, who, with Lieutenant-Colonel Cox, will then assist you in the capacity of expert adviser.

I am, &c.

READING.

Enclosure in No. 71.

Mr. Thomas to Sir F. Humphrys.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Downing Street, October 3, 1931.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have had under consideration the formula (known as the Beirut formula) which, subject to confirmation by the respective Governments, was agreed upon by yourself and M. Ponsot as a result of your conversations at Beirut in April 1931, for a joint reference to the League of Nations of the question of the frontiers between Syria and Iraq and Syria and Transjordan. For convenience of reference, copies of that formula and of the French version of it are attached as Annexures 1 and 2⁽¹⁾ of this letter.

2. The French Government in a note to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, dated the 27th August (Annexure 3⁽¹⁾), indicated their readiness to accept this formula.

3. His Majesty's Government have considered the formula with every desire to accept it, since it represents the solution which they themselves urged in the negotiations with the French Government during 1930. They have, however, been compelled to recognise that it is now impossible to accept it in regard to the Syria-Transjordan sector of the frontier for reasons which are fully set out in Foreign Office despatch No. 2253 of the 11th September to His Majesty's representative in Paris (Annexure 4⁽¹⁾).

4. In that despatch Mr. Campbell was informed—

(1) That His Majesty's Government were prepared to accept the Beirut formula as regards the Syria-Iraq sector of the frontier.

(2) That, while unable to agree to it so far as the Syria-Transjordan sector was concerned, His Majesty's Government were prepared to negotiate a revision of this sector by direct agreement with the French Government independently, and, if necessary, in advance of any settlement which might be reached regarding the Syria-Iraq sector.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

(3) That His Majesty's Government considered that the difficulties in the way of their unqualified acceptance of the Beirut formula were more likely to be satisfactorily overcome by oral discussion, in the first place, between M. Ponsot and yourself, than by a written reply to the French note of the 27th August, 1931, and that they accordingly proposed that their difficulties should be fully explained, and an alternative solution of the question proposed, in the course of informal conversations between yourself and M. Ponsot, in the first instance, and as soon as possible thereafter between His Majesty's Embassy and the Quai d'Orsay, yourself and M. Ponsot being present.

(4) That Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. F. Cox, C.M.G., D.S.O., the British Resident in Transjordan, would accompany you to Paris to take part in such portions of the discussions as might concern Transjordan.

5. It has now been ascertained that the French Government agree to the proposed conversations, and that the 7th October will be convenient to M. Ponsot as the date on which they should begin.

6. The solution which is now to be proposed to the French Government involves a reversal of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government, who themselves took the initiative in 1928 in suggesting that the frontiers between Syria and Iraq and Syria and Transjordan should be dealt with as a whole. It will therefore first be necessary to obtain the French Government's agreement to the proposal of His Majesty's Government to separate the two frontiers and to restrict the application of the Beirut formula to the Iraq sector only. In these circumstances, it is considered advisable that the initial conversations, at all events, should take place between yourself and M. Ponsot alone, as the drafters of the original Beirut Formula. Otherwise it might appear that His Majesty's Government were taking for granted the acceptance by the French Government of the present proposal to deal separately with the two sectors of the frontier and to settle the Transjordan sector by the method of direct negotiation.

7. You may, indeed, find it possible to negotiate with M. Ponsot a comprehensive settlement in a similar informal manner. I am, however, to invite your attention to paragraph 12 of the Foreign Office despatch to His Majesty's representative in Paris of the 11th September, in which it is laid down that any agreement that may be reached with the French Government on the lines now proposed should immediately be embodied in an exchange of notes between His Majesty's Embassy and the Quai d'Orsay. His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to this, as they desire to avoid all risk of the impending negotiations being rendered abortive, as occurred in the case of the conversations of July 1930, by a subsequent refusal on the part of the French Government to endorse any agreement which you may reach with M. Ponsot. A formal meeting between His Majesty's Ambassador or his representative and members of the Quai d'Orsay will, in any case, therefore, be necessary in order to elaborate, record and approve any agreement already reached. But the possibility must also be envisaged that your conversations with M. Ponsot may merge into formal negotiations before that stage is reached.

8. The responsibility for such formal negotiations with the Quai d'Orsay must, of course, lie with His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, to whom a copy of this letter is being sent; and when such formal negotiations begin you and Lieutenant-Colonel Cox will act as his Excellency's expert advisers. But so long as the conversations are of an informal character with M. Ponsot, the responsibility for their conduct will lie with you.

9. For your general guidance, I am to enclose the recommendations (Annexure 5⁽¹⁾) of a meeting on the 23rd September of the Official Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence for questions concerning the Middle East, at which you and Lieutenant-Colonel Cox were present. A sketch map, to which further reference will be made below, is attached to the recommendations.⁽²⁾ Within the limits, however, of the following observations, His Majesty's Government are prepared to leave to your own judgment the precise course to be followed, and do not wish to fetter your discretion in dealing with situations as they may arise in the course of the discussions. You will, naturally, remain throughout in close consultation with His Majesty's Ambassador, who is being instructed to afford you all possible assistance.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.⁽²⁾ Not reproduced.

10. Should the agreement of the French Government be obtained on the general preliminary question of dealing separately with the two sectors of the frontier, the Iraq sector only being referred to the Council of the League, it will remain—

- (a) To negotiate a revised version of the Beirut formula to apply only to the Syria-Iraq sector of the frontier; and
- (b) To agree on the general lines of a revised frontier on the Transjordan sector

11. As regards the Transjordan sector of the frontier, His Majesty's Government have hitherto been prepared, as you are aware, to make concessions, especially in that area which embraces the cultivated lands belonging to the Druze tribes. In view of the altered circumstances, however, the concessions which can be made in this sector are necessarily somewhat less extensive than those hitherto contemplated. The maximum concessions which can now be offered have been considered by His Majesty's Government, and are based on certain key points in Transjordan territory which have been selected to afford protection to the pipe-line and railway. These key points are all physical features, and can easily be recognised by both parties to the negotiations. The frontier must in no case approach closer than 2 miles to straight lines joining these key points to each other. You will no doubt think it best not to disclose to the French at the outset of the negotiations the maximum concessions which His Majesty's Government are prepared to make, and the area which can be conceded has accordingly been divided into two parts, (A) and (B), on the sketch map referred to in paragraph 9 above, the intention being that area (A), which is mainly Druze territory, might constitute your first offer, area (B) being kept in reserve in case your first offer should prove insufficient.

12. Attached to this letter are three maps of the Syrian-Transjordan frontier area (Annexures 6⁽¹⁾, 7⁽¹⁾ and 8⁽¹⁾), the first showing the line laid down in article 1 of the Anglo-French Convention of 1920 as interpreted by His Majesty's Government, the second showing the line if concession (A) is offered, and the third showing the line if both concessions (A) and (B) are offered; technical descriptions of these three lines are attached to the respective maps.

13. His Majesty's Government do not consider that any concessions should be either asked for or conceded in the region of the Yarmuk Valley, as any administrative difficulties in this part of the frontier should be susceptible of adjustment by means of a "Bon-Voisinage" agreement to be negotiated at a later stage.

14. It is possible that before entering into direct negotiations for the settlement of the Transjordan sector of the frontier, the French Government will insist on obtaining from the League of Nations a definition of the line laid down in the Anglo-French Convention of 1920, a copy of which is enclosed herewith (Annexure 9⁽²⁾), together with a copy of the French text (Annexure 10⁽²⁾). It is practically certain that a definition of the convention line in this sector would be greatly in favour of His Majesty's Government, whose hands might thus be strengthened in subsequent direct negotiations with the French Government. Should the French Government refuse to consider the concessions which you are authorised to offer as sufficient, it may even be advisable for you yourself in the last resort to suggest a definition of the convention line by the League as a preliminary to further progress, and you are authorised, if necessary, to adopt this course, provided that the French Government are prepared first to accept the application of the Beirut formula to the Syria-Iraq sector of the frontier. On the other hand, should the French Government take the initiative in suggesting a definition of the convention line in the Transjordan sector by the League, you should accept their proposal only in the last resort, and again provided that they are prepared first to accept the application of the Beirut formula to the Syria-Iraq sector of the frontier.

15. To assist you in devising a modified version of the Beirut formula, which shall be applicable to the Syria-Iraq sector only, two suggested redrafts of that formula are enclosed (Annexures 11 and 12): (1) for use if agreement is reached during your negotiations regarding the main lines of the revision of the Transjordan sector of the frontier, and (2) for use if the negotiations regarding

⁽¹⁾ Not reproduced.

⁽²⁾ Not printed.

the revision of that sector have to be postponed or cannot be completed before the Iraq sector is referred to the Council of the League.

16. It is hoped that the above instructions will be sufficient to enable you to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion. Should you feel, however, any doubt as to the scope of your authority in dealing with any proposal which may be raised in the course of the discussions, or wish for further guidance on any matter, you will no doubt seek further instructions from His Majesty's Government through His Majesty's Ambassador.

17. A copy of this letter with the enclosures is being sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

I am, &c.

A. C. C. PARKINSON.

Annexure 1 to Enclosure.

Humphrys-Ponsot Draft for combined reference to the Council of the League of Nations.

IN the month of December 1920 the British and the French Governments, desirous of finally settling the problems raised by the assignment to Great Britain of the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia, and by the assignment to France of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, conferred by the Supreme Council at San Remo, sought by mutual consent a practical solution of these problems.

The negotiations undertaken for this purpose by the two Governments resulted in the signature of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

The first article of this convention fixed the boundaries between the territories under the British mandate and the territories under the French mandate.

According to the terms of the article 2, a mixed commission was to be established to trace on the spot the boundaries so fixed. The same article stipulated that any dispute that should arise in connexion with the work of the commission would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision would be final.

The two Governments subsequently decided that the commission should conform to the provisions of article 29 of the Treaty of Sévres regarding the lines to be fixed on the ground.

The commission met in June 1921, and proceeded to carry out the delimitation of the frontier as far as El Hamme.

Beyond this point it was confronted with the difficulty of delimiting a line which took account⁽¹⁾ of local conditions, especially in so far as the south of the Jebel Druze was concerned. The commission being satisfied that it was impossible, in the existing circumstances, to overcome this difficulty, suspended its operations, which have not since been resumed.

The resumption of these operations presupposed the issue to the commission of directions agreed upon between the British and French Governments, and an examination of the conditions of the application of the Franco-British Convention could not usefully be undertaken between the two Governments, before a definite allotment had been carried out of all the territories to which this convention applies.

This last condition having been fulfilled by decision of the Council of the League, dated the 16th December, 1925, and by the signature of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 22nd June, 1929, the British and French Governments proceeded to carry out a combined enquiry into the problem of the section of the frontier not yet delimited, which is defined by the convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

In the course of this enquiry the two Governments found themselves faced at several points on the frontier with difficulties analogous to that which had stopped the work of the commission in 1921. The difficulties were two-fold. In

⁽¹⁾ These words appear in the English text as received from Bagdad. The French text however runs "d'établir un tracé qui tînt compte," and a more correct wording would appear to be "of establishing a line which should take account."

the first place divergencies of opinion exist as to the exact interpretation of the frontier which article 1 of the convention was intended to define. Secondly, it was found that whatever interpretation was placed upon article 1 of the convention, a frontier drawn in strict conformity therewith would be likely to be unsatisfactory in certain sectors for military, political, administrative, tribal, economic, geographical or other reasons.

The French and British Governments consider that it is not within the competence of a delimitation commission, such as that referred to in article 2 of the convention, to modify the frontier defined in article 1 to an extent sufficient to remove the unsatisfactory features above mentioned.

The British and French Governments being for these reasons unable to prepare suitable joint instructions for the commission and desirous of promoting a speedy, final and equitable settlement of a question of primary importance to the population of the territories over which they exercise their respective mandates, have agreed to invite the Council of the League to examine all aspects of the difficulties referred to above, and, having formed its conclusions as to the intention of article 1 of the convention, to indicate a frontier based thereon but modified as required by the aforementioned local considerations, the frontier so indicated to be accepted by all concerned as a definitive solution of the frontier question.

The two Governments suggest that the task of the Council would be facilitated by the appointment of a commission which would collect on the spot such information and would make such recommendations as might assist the Council to reach a decision.

Annexures 2 to 10 to Enclosure not printed.

Annexure 11 to Enclosure.

Draft for combined reference to the Council of the League of Nations.

(N.B.—Proposed amendments to the original Ponsot-Humphrys Agreement are printed in italics.)

IN the month of December 1920 the British and French Governments, desirous of finally settling the problems raised by the assignment to Great Britain of the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia, and by the assignment to France of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, conferred by the Supreme Council at San Remo, sought by mutual consent a practical solution of these problems.

The negotiations undertaken for this purpose by the two Governments resulted in the signature of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

The first article of this convention fixed the boundaries between the territories under the British mandate and the territories under the French mandate.

According to the terms of the article 2, a mixed commission was to be established to trace on the spot the boundaries so fixed. The same article stipulated that any dispute that should arise in connexion with the work of this commission would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision would be final.

The two Governments subsequently decided that the commission should conform to the provisions of article 29 of the Treaty of Sèvres regarding the lines to be fixed on the ground.

The commission met in June 1921 and proceeded to carry out the delimitation of the frontier from the Mediterranean as far as El Hamme.

Beyond this point it was confronted with the difficulty of *establishing a line which should take account of local conditions*. The commission being satisfied that it was impossible, in the existing circumstances, to overcome this difficulty suspended its operation, which have not since been resumed.

The resumption of these operations presupposed the issue to the commission of directions agreed upon between the British and French Governments, and an examination of the conditions of the application of the Franco-British Convention could not usefully be undertaken between the two Governments, before a definite allotment had been carried out of all the territories to which this convention applies.

This last condition having been fulfilled by decision of the Council of the League, dated the 16th December, 1925, and by the signature of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 22nd June, 1929, the British and French Governments proceeded to carry out a combined enquiry into the problem of the section of the frontier not yet delimited, which is defined by the convention of the 23rd December, 1920. *This section is divided into two parts (a) the Syria-Transjordan frontier and (b) the Syria-Iraq frontier.*

As regards (a) the Syria-Transjordan section, the British and French Governments have succeeded in arriving at a solution of the problems which confronted them and have agreed, subject to the approval of the Council of the League, upon a line which can be delimited on the ground by a commission such as is contemplated by article 2 of the convention.

As regards (b) the Syria-Iraq section, in the course of the enquiry the two Governments have found themselves faced at several points on the frontier with difficulties analogous to that which had stopped the work of the commission in 1921. The difficulties were two-fold. In the first place, divergence of opinion existed as to the exact interpretation of the frontier which article 1 of the convention was intended to define. Secondly, it was found that whatever interpretation was placed upon article 1 of the convention, a frontier drawn in strict conformity therewith would be likely to be unsatisfactory in certain sectors for military, political, administrative, tribal, economic, geographical or other reasons. The French and British Governments consider that it is not within the competence of a Delimitation Commission, such as that referred to in article 2 of the convention, to modify the frontier defined in article 1 to an extent sufficient in the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier to remove the unsatisfactory features above mentioned.

The British and French Governments being for these reasons unable to prepare suitable joint instructions for the commission *as regards the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier*, and desirous of promoting a speedy, final and equitable settlement of a question of primary importance to the population of the territories over which they exercise their respective mandates have agreed to invite the Council of the League to examine all aspects of the difficulties referred to above, and having formed its conclusions as to the intention of article 1 of the convention to indicate a frontier *between Syria and Iraq* based thereon, but modified as required by the aforementioned local considerations, the frontier so indicated to be accepted by all concerned as a definitive solution of the frontier question.

The two Governments suggest that the task of the Council would be facilitated by appointment of a commission, which would collect on the spot such information and would make such recommendations as might assist the Council to reach a decision.

Annexure 12 to Enclosure.

Draft for combined reference to the Council of the League of Nations.

(Amendments to the original Humphrys-Ponsot draft are printed in italics.)

IN the month of December 1920 the British and the French Governments, desirous of finally settling the problems raised by the assignment to Great Britain of the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia, and by the assignment to France of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, conferred by the Supreme Council at San Remo, sought by mutual consent a practical solution of these problems.

The negotiations undertaken for this purpose by the two Governments resulted in the signature of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

The first article of this convention fixed the boundaries between the territories under the British mandate and the territories under the French mandate.

According to the terms of the article 2, a mixed commission was to be established to trace on the spot the boundaries so fixed. The same article stipulated that any dispute that should arise in connexion with the work of this commission would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision would be final.

The two Governments subsequently decided that the commission should conform to the provisions of article 29 of the Treaty of Sèvres regarding the lines to be fixed on the ground.

The commission met in June 1921 and proceeded to carry out the delimitation of the frontier from the Mediterranean as far as El Hamme.

Beyond this point it was confronted with the difficulty of establishing a line which should take account of local conditions. The commission being satisfied that it was impossible in the existing circumstances to overcome this difficulty, suspended its operations, which have not since been resumed.

The resumption of these operations presupposed the issue to the commission of directions agreed upon between the British and French Governments, and an examination of the conditions of the application of the Franco-British Convention could not usefully be undertaken between the two Governments, before a definite allotment had been carried out of all the territories to which this convention applies.

This last condition having been fulfilled by decision of the Council of the League, dated the 16th December, 1925, and by the signature of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 22nd June, 1929, the British and French Governments proceeded to carry out a combined enquiry into the problem of the section of the frontier not yet delimited, which is defined by the convention of the 23rd December, 1920. This section is divided into two parts, (a) the Syria-Transjordan frontier and (b) the Syria-Iraq frontier.

As regards (a) the Syria-Transjordan section, the British and French Governments are engaged in direct negotiations and hope shortly to agree, subject to the approval of the Council, upon a line to be subsequently delimited on the ground by a commission such as is contemplated by article 2 of the convention.

As regards (b) the Syria-Iraq section, in the course of the enquiry the two Governments found themselves faced at several points on the frontier with difficulties analogous to that which had stopped the work of the commission in 1921. The difficulties were two-fold. In the first place, divergence of opinion existed as to the exact interpretation of the frontier which article 1 of the convention was intended to define. Secondly, it was found that whatever interpretation was placed upon article 1 of the convention, a frontier drawn in strict conformity therewith would be likely to be unsatisfactory in certain sectors for military, political, administrative, tribal, economic, geographical or other reasons. The French and British Governments consider that it is not within the competence of a Delimitation Commission, such as that referred to in article 2 of the convention, to modify the frontier defined in article 1 to an extent sufficient in the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier to remove the unsatisfactory features above mentioned.

The British and French Governments being for these reasons unable to prepare suitable joint instructions for the commission as regards the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier, and desirous of promoting a speedy, final and equitable settlement of a question of primary importance to the population of the territories over which they exercise their respective mandates, have agreed to invite the Council of the League to examine all aspects of the difficulties referred to above, and having formed its conclusions as to the intention of article 1 of the convention to indicate a frontier between Syria and Iraq based thereon, but modified as required by the aforementioned local considerations, the frontier so indicated to be accepted by all concerned as a definitive solution of the frontier question.

The two Governments suggest that the task of the Council would be facilitated by appointment of a commission which would collect on the spot such information, and would make such recommendations as might assist the Council to reach a decision.

[E 5307/48/89]

No. 72.

Report by Sir F. Humphrys on his recent Negotiations in Paris regarding the Syrian Frontier.

Sir F. Humphrys to Mr. J. H. Thomas.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 23.)

Sir,

Downing Street, October 23, 1931.

I ARRIVED in Paris on the 6th October and started my informal conversations with M. Ponsot on the following morning.

2. It became clear at once that the French Government were very suspicious of the object of my visit. They did not understand (1) why the Beirut formula, the terms of which the British Foreign Office had been attempting to negotiate with the Quai d'Orsay for the last two years, and which had been approved informally by M. Ponsot and myself last May, was now found to be unacceptable to His Majesty's Government; (2) why the official note conveying the acceptance of the Beirut formula by the French Government had not been replied to in writing; and (3) why the High Commissioner of Iraq had been selected to negotiate with M. Ponsot in regard to the frontier between Syria and Transjordan. It took me a long time to reassure M. Ponsot, and through him M. Berthelot, on these points.

3. I explained that, as the conversations at Beirut had been initiated between M. Ponsot and myself and agreement had provisionally been reached between us, it seemed to my Government to be an appropriate act of courtesy that the reasons why His Majesty's Government were unable to accept the Beirut formula in its entirety should be explained at a personal interview between the two High Commissioners who had negotiated that formula.

4. On the occasion of our first meeting at Beirut I had pointed out that the formula agreed on between us was not only *ad referendum* to our two Governments, but that its application to Transjordan would have to be subject to consideration of any comments which the High Commissioner for Transjordan might put forward. The latter had submitted to my Government reasons why the formula was now found to be inapplicable to Transjordan. My Government, after full consideration, had come to the conclusion that it would be inappropriate on the following grounds to request the League of Nations to suggest deviations from the convention line in Transjordan:—

(a) The principle of give and take which it was proposed to apply to the alteration of the convention line between Syria and Iraq could not be applied in the case of Transjordan, since the proposed concessions were all in favour of Syria. Since it would be unfair to grant concessions to Iraq at the expense of Transjordan territory ceded to Syria, it was felt that it would be embarrassing to the League to be asked to vary the convention line in Transjordan in a one-sided manner.

(b) It was only within the last few weeks that the alignment of the proposed oil pipe-line and railway from Iraq to Haifa had been traced on the ground, and it was found by the engineers that it would be necessary to construct both these lines further north than was originally anticipated. It was clearly the duty of my Government to provide for the adequate protection of the proposed railway and pipe-line, and limits had now been laid down beyond which it was considered unsafe to contract what was already the narrowest part of the corridor by the cession of territory to Syria. My Government proposed that the two High Commissioners should attempt by means of informal conversations to come to an agreement regarding the boundary from El Hamme eastwards to the Transjordan-Iraq frontier, and that this agreement should be set forth in an appropriate exchange of notes and signed by representatives of the Quai d'Orsay and the British Embassy in Paris. It would then be submitted to the League of

Nations for approval. At the same time the Beirut formula should be accepted by both Governments in regard to the Syrian-Iraq frontier. In other words, that the League of Nations should be invited to appoint a commission which would examine the ground in the Syrian-Iraq sector and report to the Council at its May session. The decision of the Council would be accepted by both parties as final.

5. M. Ponsot informed me that he now thoroughly understood the reason why my Government was reluctant to apply the Beirut formula to Transjordan and why I had been sent to Paris to continue the negotiations. He pointed out, however, that it would be extremely difficult for his Government to accept two different methods of treatment of two sectors which had hitherto been inseparably linked together. He feared that it would inevitably be considered in some quarters that French interests would suffer by the proposed differentiation of treatment, and he assured me that M. Briand would be unable to risk parliamentary interpellations on this subject. It would be even more impossible for M. Briand to face questions in the Chamber if the French Government was to agree privately with the British Government to evacuate territory to the south of the convention line which was now in their occupation. Such evacuation would only be defensible if carried out in accordance with a direction by the League of Nations.

6. I suggested that it might be possible to save the face of the French Government in the Chamber if the approval of the League to our private agreement in respect of Transjordan was communicated simultaneously with the Council's decision on the report of the commission on the Syrian-Iraq sector.

7. After prolonged discussions which lasted four days, M. Ponsot (who was throughout in the closest consultation with M. Berthelot) agreed to the principle that the settlement of the two sectors of the frontier might be treated separately as I had proposed. He strongly stressed, however, the necessity for maintaining the principle that France would be unable to evacuate as a result of private agreement between us territory in the Jebel Druze which was already occupied.

8. I explained that I was taking my stand on a strategic principle which my Government was unable to surrender, and that the proposal which I should have to make involved the evacuation by the French Government of a considerable portion of the Jebel Druze country. Unless, therefore, M. Ponsot was prepared to give way on this point, I regretted that there was no further use in continuing our conversations.

9. After a discussion lasting several hours, M. Ponsot finally agreed to whittle down his principle to a refusal to evacuate, except by direction of the League, villages which were inhabited by Druze or Syrians and within the zone of the French occupation.

10. I said that, while I could not definitely accept such a principle as invariable, it seemed to me to provide a sufficient basis for the next stage in our negotiations.

11. At our next interview I placed all my cards on the table and showed him the map of the convention line (Annexure 6⁽¹⁾), and sketched the limit of the concession that I was prepared to offer in the Imtan-Nasib sector. On comparison of our maps, it was found that the occupied Jebel Druze village of Kherbet Awad slightly overlapped the line I was prepared to offer. There was thus a conflict of my strategic principle with M. Ponsot's administrative principle.

12. I said that it would be reasonable for me to insist that my own principle should prevail, since it was of supreme importance that the protection of the railway and pipe-line should be adequately safeguarded. I should therefore be justified in asking that the village of Kherbet Awad, which contained only 158 inhabitants, should be abandoned. In order to minimise M. Ponsot's difficulties, however, I was prepared to recommend to my Government that the line should so be drawn as to include the village of Awad (but not the village lands to the south) within the Syrian boundary.

13. We next discussed the central sector in the vicinity of Deraa. It was agreed that the frontier should follow the line which divides the lands of the

⁽¹⁾ Not reproduced.

Transjordan villages Amrawa, Shejara, Turrah and Remthe, on the one hand, from the lands of the Syrian villages of Tel Shehab, Mezerib and Deraa on the other, but on condition that the people of Turrah shall continue to have access to a pool lying in the Wady Meidan. This line passes through El Beuib on the Deraa-Remthe road and then follows the crest of the western ridge of the Jebel-ez-Zumla as far as the cairn at the southern extremity of the line dividing the lands of Deraa from those of Remthe. Thence the frontier runs to the cairn 1,500 metres south of Rahaya farm, thence through the cairns at Kabar Hamdan and Kerker Sud and thence to a point on the railway between Nasib and Jabir so as to leave lands and hill of Jabir in Transjordan.

14. The cairns referred to above were those erected by local British and French officials in agreement in 1926, and the new frontier differs slightly from the line defined by these cairns in so far as the boundary now follows the line which divides the lands of four Transjordan villages from the lands of three Syrian villages. This concession, which is authorised by my instructions, is in favour of Syria, but is considered by Colonel Cox to be more appropriate and convenient than the line between the cairns.

15. The westernmost sector in the Yarmuk Valley was finally discussed.

16. M. Ponsot represented that the convention line was most inconvenient. This provides that the boundary shall be drawn as near as possible to the south and parallel to the railway line. This railway crosses the Yarmuk River no less than ten times.

M. Ponsot urged that the southern crest line of the Yarmuk gorge should be considered as the frontier.

I pointed out that this would place the whole valley within Syria and that the people of Transjordan would be unable to approach the river without entering Syrian territory. I regarded this suggestion as quite impracticable and said that I was unable to discuss it.

17. M. Ponsot then urged that the boundary should run as described in the convention, but modified to the extent that whenever the railway ran to the north of the Yarmuk River, the river itself should be regarded as the boundary.

I pointed out that this was a one-sided arrangement to which the people of Transjordan might well take exception.

18. M. Ponsot contended that since it was laid down in the convention that "the existing railway in the Yarmuk Valley is to remain entirely in the territory under the French mandate" and that "the frontier will in principle leave the Valley of the Yarmuk in the territory under the French mandate," it was reasonable to ask for a variation of the convention line on the ground that the right of the British Government to construct a railway for its own purposes in the Yarmuk Valley, which had been valid for ten years, had now lapsed.

He mentioned that it was originally provided that the British railway should enjoy complete extra-territoriality even when situated on the north side of the river.

19. I took advantage of this opening to suggest another solution. I explained to M. Ponsot that the invariable rule in eastern countries with which I was acquainted was to draw the frontier along the middle of the river. I suggested that this simple solution should be adopted in the present case with the proviso that the railway track, with its embankments, telegraph line and stations, should in all cases be considered as situated within French mandated territory. In other words, that the French railway should enjoy complete extra-territoriality to the south of the Yarmuk River.

M. Ponsot admitted that this was a fair counter-suggestion and said that he would lay it before his Government for consideration.

20. At the interview of the 15th October, M. Ponsot informed me that he thoroughly understood the British point of view and that no further explanations were required. In the Imtan-Nasib sector he would have preferred the following solution:—

21. The boundary shall run along a line drawn westwards, but which shall not approach closer than 2 miles to straight lines joining the following points: Jebel Rumah, Deir-el-Kaht, Umm-el-Kuttein, Sabha, Subhiya, Shajara, Umm-es-Surab, Summa (which points shall lie in Transjordan), with the exception that the village of Awad and any cultivated lands belonging to Jebel Druze villages

shall lie in the State of Jebel Druze, provided that the boundary shall not in any case extend south of the line joining the above-mentioned key points.

22. I told him that I could not accept the argument that the cultivated lands south of the 2-mile line should be included in Jebel Druze. This cultivation was scattered and irregular and varied from year to year, and its use by the Jebel Druze villagers could be easily regulated by a "Bon-Voisinage" agreement. On the other hand, the reason for my strategic line could be readily understood by a reference to the map, which showed that to the south of the Jebel Druze the corridor was at its narrowest.

23. M. Ponsot admitted that my case was the stronger; he produced a draft of certain principles for inclusion in a "Bon-Voisinage" agreement (Enclosure 1). He promised that in laying my draft (Enclosure 2) before his Government he would give full weight to the objections I had stressed to any concessions to Syria south of the 2-mile line as defined in the draft, and remarked that we should not break on the question of the boundary in the Yarmuk Valley. He said that it would be necessary for him to draw up a report and discuss the question with the military authorities and the Quai d'Orsay, and that, since M. Briand and General Weygand were both out of Paris for several days, he would not be able to resume our informal negotiations for at least a week.

24. At our final interview on the 16th October he suggested that we should resume our negotiations about a fortnight hence, when I would be passing through Paris on my way to Geneva. He hoped that we should be able to come to a settlement in twenty-four hours, and our agreement could be formally expressed in an exchange of notes between the Quai d'Orsay and the British Embassy. He asked that if possible maps should be exchanged with these notes.

25. At this meeting M. Ponsot expressed himself as willing to consider the advisability of presenting a Franco-British agreement on the Syria-Transjordan sector for the approval of the League without waiting for the commission's report on the Syria-Iraq sector. It was therefore agreed to insert the words "as soon as possible" in our exchange of notes.

26. On the following day we took leave of each other with every expression of mutual regard and in confident anticipation that our negotiations would shortly be brought to a successful conclusion. We exchanged notes (Enclosure 3) setting out the result of our discussions to date and our proposals for concluding them.

27. Altogether I had ten meetings with M. Ponsot, lasting in the aggregate for thirty-two hours. After each of our meetings he discussed the case with M. Berthelot at the Quai d'Orsay and occasionally with M. Briand and once with M. Laval. It was obvious that his hands were tied, and that M. Berthelot especially, who was one of the authors of the convention of 1920, was taking a great interest in the proceedings.

28. On all occasions when details had to be discussed I was accompanied by Colonel Cox, whose intimate knowledge of the frontier and power of lucid expression were of invaluable assistance in our discussions and obviously made a great impression on M. Ponsot. Throughout I was privileged to receive the helpful guidance of Lord Tyrrell and Mr. Campbell, without which it would have been extremely difficult for me to have continued the negotiations. I desire to express my grateful thanks to the Ambassador and his staff and to Colonel Cox for their unfailing advice and assistance. If I am not being too optimistic in assuming that the British and French points of views have been brought very close together with every prospect of an early settlement, there remain only the following points for decision before I return to Paris:—

- (1) *Imtan-Nasib Sector and the boundary north-east of this line as far as the Iraq-Transjordan frontier.*—I recommend that we should take our stand on the line described in the draft (Enclosure 2).
- (2) *The Derna Sector.*—Final agreement appears to have been reached, and in any case I do not recommend a deviation from the draft.
- (3) *Yarmuk Valley Sector.*—The alternatives are:—
 - (a) Convention line as described in the draft.
 - (b) M. Ponsot's second amendment, viz., that the convention line should be followed except where the railway lies to the north of the Yarmuk River, in which case the river should be the boundary.

- (c) My proposal which makes the thalweg of the main stream the boundary, with the exception that the railway with its embankments, telegraph lines, stations, &c., should be allowed complete extra-territoriality and be considered as lying within Syria.

29. I recommend that I should be instructed to attempt to obtain either (a) or (c), but authorised in the last resort to accept (b), which has been described in Mr. Kirkbride's note as unobjectionable and which Colonel Cox is ready to accept if necessary. I also recommend that a map should be prepared showing as clearly as possible the boundary described in Enclosure 2, with an extra map of the Yarmuk Valley.

30. In the event of M. Ponsot asking that his draft principles for a "Bon-Voisinage" agreement (Enclosure 1) shall be included in the settlement, I request instructions. Colonel Cox's note on this question is attached (Enclosure 4).

31. I propose to leave for Paris on the 29th October. This would allow forty-eight hours, excluding Sunday, for me to conclude my informal negotiations with M. Ponsot, and to be present at the final meeting when the representatives of the British Embassy and the Quai d'Orsay can exchange notes embodying the settlement. I am due to leave Paris for Geneva not later than Sunday night, the 1st November.

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 72.

Disposition intéressant les Rapports de Bon-Voisinage, à ajouter à la Définition de la Frontière.

UN accord séparé réglera dès que possible les rapports de bon-voisinage entre la Syrie et le Djebel Druze, d'une part, la Transjordanie, d'autre part, de façon à permettre aux habitants sédentaires, semi-sédentaires ou nomades ayant des propriétés ou des droits de pâturage, d'abreuvoir ou de culture d'un côté à l'autre de la frontière de continuer à jouir de leurs droits.

Cet accord arrêtera, d'autre part, des dispositions de nature à assurer le maintien absolu de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans les régions voisines de la frontière. Il stipulera, notamment, les mesures à prendre contre les auteurs d'agressions qui viendraient à être commises d'un territoire à l'autre et prévoira l'éloignement hors d'une zone large de . . . kilomètres de part et d'autre de la frontière des individus dont les agissements seraient susceptibles de compromettre la tranquillité des territoires placés sous l'administration de l'autre partie.

Enclosure 2 in No. 72.

Sir F. Humphrys to French High Commissioner.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

October 14, 1931.

IN accordance with my promise to your Excellency yesterday evening, I enclose a suggested draft for a definition of the revised Syria-Transjordan frontier to be agreed first informally by ourselves, then to be signed formally by representatives of the Quai d'Orsay and the British Embassy, and finally to be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval. I have explained to your Excellency that this draft proposal is valid only if it is adopted as embodying a formal settlement of the question by means of an agreement between our two Governments.

I take, &c.
F. HUMPHRYS.

Suggested draft agreed Definition of the Revised Syria-Transjordan Frontier, for the approval of the Council of the League of Nations.

FROM the railway bridge 500 yards east of El Hamme station as far as the point where the railway crosses the Wady Zeizun before the latter joins the main stream of the Yarmuk the frontier is, as described in the convention and as hitherto observed, as near the railway as possible on its southern side.

From the point above referred to where the railway crosses the Wady Zeizun the frontier follows the middle line of the Wady Zeizun and of the Wady Meidan up to the point near Tel Shehab where the railway crosses the Wady Meidan. From this last-mentioned point to the point where the railway again crosses the Wady Meidan the frontier is drawn as near the railway as possible on its southern side. The frontier then follows the line which divides the lands of the Transjordan villages of Amrawa, Shejera, Turrah and Remthe on the one hand from the lands of the Syrian villages of Tel Shehad, Mezerib and Deraa on the other, but on condition that the people of Turrah shall continue to have access to the waters of a pool lying in the Wady Meidan, east of Jisr Meidan. This line passes through El Bueib on the Deraa-Remthe road and thence follows the crest of the western ridge of the Jebel-ez-Zumla as far as the cairn at the southern extremity of the line dividing the lands of Deraa from those of Remthe.

From the cairn last mentioned the frontier runs to the cairn approximately 1,500 metres south of Rahaya farm, thence through the cairn at Kabr Hamdan and onwards to the cairn at Kerkur Sud and from there to a point on the railway between Nasib and Jabir, so as to leave the lands and hill of Jabir in Transjordan, thence along a line drawn eastwards which shall not approach closer than 2 miles to straight lines joining the following points: Semma, Umm-es-Surab, Shajara, Subhiya, Sabha, Umm-el-Kuttein, Deir-el-Kaht, Jebel Rumah (which points shall lie in Transjordan), but with the exception that the village of Khirbet Awad shall lie within the State of the Jebel Druze, and thence in a straight line in the direction of Abu Kemal village as far as the Transjordan-Iraq frontier, but leaving Jebel Tenf in Syria and Kasr Burga in Transjordan.

N.B.—The cairns referred to are those erected in agreement between officials of Transjordan and Syria in 1926.

Enclosure 3 in No. 72.

Exchange of Notes.

THE Beirut discussions on the subject of the frontier between Syria and Iraq and between Syria and Transjordan having been resumed in Paris, and views having been exchanged between the two High Commissioners with great frankness, it has been agreed, first, that endeavours should be made to reach a separate agreement between the French and British Governments on the Syria-Transjordan sector, which would be submitted for approval to the Council of the League of Nations as soon as possible; secondly, that, in the event of such an agreement being reached, the Council of the League of Nations should be invited, in the terms, *mutatis mutandis*, of the formula agreed on at Beirut, to give its decision on the Syria-Iraq sector.

The two High Commissioners feel that no further explanations of the point of view of their respective Governments are necessary to be exchanged between themselves, and have agreed to conclude their negotiations when the High Commissioner for Iraq revisits Paris on his way to Geneva in about fifteen days. While it is confidently anticipated that full agreement between the two Governments will be achieved, it is understood that, failing such agreement, the British and French proposals informally put forward by the two High Commissioners will be considered as withdrawn and cancelled.

H. PONSOT.
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

October 16, 1931.

Enclosure 4 in No. 72.

Note on M. Ponsot's Stipulation that in the Syria-Transjordan Frontier Agreement certain principles, for inclusion in a "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement, should be included.

THE principle set forth in the first paragraph of M. Ponsot's draft, that residents of one territory having certain rights in the other territory should continue to exercise those rights is entirely acceptable.

The principle contained in the second paragraph is less acceptable because it will give the authorities of one territory power to interfere with the movements of the subjects of the other.

A zone within lines drawn 10 Kilom. on either side of the proposed frontier will include some twenty-five Transjordan villages and a considerably larger number of Syrian villages.

In Transjordan, to the east of the railway line, no villages fall within the zone, whilst in the Jebel Druze a considerable number of villages will be included. The French are, therefore, making a proposal which may impose restrictions on a larger number of their own subjects than on the subjects of Transjordan. Furthermore, such a restriction as that proposed might well prove useful to us in safeguarding the pipe-line and railway, which will be so near the frontier.

It appears, therefore, that the proposal cannot well be resisted, but I urge that the zone should be between lines drawn not more than 10 kilom. away from the frontier on either side, but that preferably these lines should be drawn at a distance of 6 kilom. only so that a lesser number of villages may fall within the zone.

C. H. F. COX.

[E 5417/48/89]

No. 73.

Colonial Office to Sir F. Humphrys.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 29.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, October 29, 1931.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Thomas to thank you for your report, dated the 23rd October, on your negotiations with M. Ponsot in Paris regarding the Syria-Iraq and Syria-Transjordan frontiers. His Majesty's Government note with much satisfaction the considerable measure of provisional agreement which you have succeeded in reaching in the negotiations.

2. His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to your report and to the further proposals made by M. Ponsot in the memorandum accompanying his personal letter to you of the 24th October, and I am now directed to convey to you the following further instructions.

3. His Majesty's Government have considered your recommendation that you should take your stand on the line described in Enclosure 2 of your report in respect of the sector of the frontier east of Nasib; they have also considered the counter-proposals of M. Ponsot in respect of this sector of the frontier. The considered opinion of His Majesty's Government is that the counter-proposals of M. Ponsot cannot be agreed to. Under these proposals the French might eventually be able to establish a claim to the cultivated lands up to, and in some cases even beyond, the straight lines joining the key-points. It is considered that the strategic line running at least 2 miles to the north of the key-points must be maintained if adequate security is to be provided for the proposed railway and pipe-line. His Majesty's Government desire, therefore, that you should make it clear to M. Ponsot that it is not possible for them to agree to any proposals which involve the abandonment of this line, save in regard to the village of Awad, which may remain in territory under French mandate.

4. In regard to the Deraa sector, you are authorised to accept the frontier proposed in M. Ponsot's revised draft, which forms paragraph 2 of Enclosure 5 of M. Ponsot's memorandum of the 24th October.

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q 3

5. Consideration has been given to the three alternative proposals contained in paragraph 28 of your report in regard to the Yarmuk Valley sector. His Majesty's Government would much prefer that the frontier in this sector should be the thalweg of the River Yarmuk and, where the frontier finally leaves the valley of the Yarmuk proper, the thalweg of its tributaries, with a proviso that wherever the railway is situated on the Transjordanian side of the river the railway and its buildings, &c., should be granted complete extra-territoriality. If, however, this is impossible to obtain, His Majesty's Government will accept either the line as laid down in the Anglo-French Convention of 1920, or in the last resort, rather than allow the negotiations to break down, M. Ponsot's proposal that the line should be drawn as close as possible to the Transjordan side of the railway, save where the railway is situated on the Syrian side of the Yarmuk and its tributaries, in which case the thalweg of the river should form the boundary.

In the event of M. Ponsot's proposal being adopted, His Majesty's Government think that an endeavour should be made, as has been agreed with you orally, to obtain for Transjordan the village lands to the east of El Hamme Station. It will also be essential in that event to ensure that the water rights of Transjordan are adequately protected.

6. Consideration has also been given to M. Ponsot's draft provisions concerning frontier relations, which he suggests should be annexed to the definition of the frontier. His Majesty's Government's view is that these provisions are unobjectionable, and you are therefore authorised to agree to them. They would prefer that the zone should be limited to a width of 6 kilom. on each side of the frontier, but if necessary you may agree to a zone of 10 kilom. in width.

7. In accordance with your request a map⁽¹⁾ (two copies) of the Yarmuk Valley area is attached, together with a map⁽¹⁾ (two copies) showing the line proposed in the Deraa and Nasib-Imtan sectors, and a further map⁽¹⁾ (2 copies) showing the proposed frontier eastwards from the fixed point north of Jebel Rumah. There is also enclosed an English and French version⁽²⁾ of the revised definition of the frontier. In the sector east of Nasib the definition has been revised to make it more precise, and to bring it once more into line with the desiderata of His Majesty's Government in that sector. In the Deraa sector it describes the line provisionally agreed upon by you and M. Ponsot, but has been elaborated somewhat for the sake of clarity. In the Yarmuk sector it has been based on the assumption that you will succeed in obtaining acceptance by M. Ponsot of your own proposals for that sector, and it has also been amended somewhat in order to make the definition clearer. His Majesty's Government wish, however, to make it clear that, rather than allow the negotiations to break down, they are willing that you should accept the wording of M. Ponsot's definition, save where alterations are necessary for the purpose of safeguarding any question of principle, such as the strategic line in the Nasib-Imtan sector, and the water rights of Transjordan in the Yarmuk Valley (in the event of your having to accept M. Ponsot's proposed settlement for that sector).

8. The following further documents are also enclosed:—

- (1) An English version of the principles proposed by M. Ponsot for a "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement.⁽³⁾
- (2) A further draft definition of the frontier in the Yarmuk Valley sector for use, if you find it necessary to agree to M. Ponsot's proposals for the frontier in that area.⁽²⁾
- (3) A note as to the method of estimating the distance of the line which is to run 2 miles to the north of the key-points.⁽²⁾

I am, &c.

A. C. C. PARKINSON.

⁽¹⁾ Not reproduced.

⁽²⁾ Not printed.

[E 5495/1205/65]

No. 74.

The Marquess of Reading to Mr. R. I. Campbell (Cairo).

(No. 1064.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 5, 1931.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 26 of the 28th October to the Acting High Commissioner at Jerusalem, in regard to the projected Pan-Islamic Conference there, I have to inform you that the Egyptian Minister called at this Department on the 4th November, when he stated that he had recently had much conversation regarding the conference with Shaukat Ali and other Moslem leaders.

2. Dr. Hafez Afifi Pasha stated that Shaukat Ali's programme had appeared to him to be vague and impracticable in the highest degree. It apparently consisted of three parts: (a) The foundation of a Moslem University at Jerusalem; (b) a scheme for the establishment of a permanent Pan-Islamic Committee to deal with political questions; and (c) a scheme to revive the Caliphate by taking the ex-Caliph from Nice to reside somewhere in the Middle East. The Minister had asked for more detailed information on all these points, as, for instance, whether the university was to be religious or lay, whence its students and professors were to be recruited, the nature of the constitution and the manner of election of the proposed Moslem Committee, and had pointed out the improbability that any Moslem Power would accept the ex-Caliph as leader of Islam and the absurdity of the suggestion that he should be established in some kind of Middle East Vatican. Shaukat Ali had, however, been unable to answer any of his questions.

3. Shaukat Ali had further apparently told the Egyptian Minister that his scheme for a Moslem Congress had the support of His Majesty's Government and was "viewed with favour by the Foreign Office." The Egyptian Government were, he stated, anxious to know whether this was in fact the case, as it might affect their own attitude towards the proposed conference.

4. Dr. Hafez Afifi Pasha was informed that it was quite untrue that Shaukat Ali's schemes had the support or approval of His Majesty's Government. Shaukat Ali's activities in connexion with the proposed Pan-Islamic Conference were not regarded very seriously by His Majesty's Government, and it seemed most unlikely that they would lead to any tangible result. The fact that His Majesty's Government were not interfering with these activities did not mean that they were according them their approval. The Egyptian Minister replied that this had been his own impression. He had only wished to know whether his Government could deal with the question at their own discretion and on its merits, which would scarcely have been the case if Shaukat Ali's activities had the formal blessing of His Majesty's Government as Shaukat Ali had apparently represented.

5. I enclose for your information a copy of a letter which was addressed on the 30th October to the Turkish Ambassador,⁽¹⁾ who, on the 13th October, had raised the question of Shaukat Ali's activities in conversation with Sir Robert Vansittart.

I am, &c.

READING.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 5547/206/89]

No. 75.

Sir G. Clerk to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 366. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

Angora, November 2, 1931.

HAVING waited for an hour at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this afternoon to keep an appointment made by the Minister, I decided that I had sufficiently complied with the requirements of official courtesy and returned home.

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q 4

leaving word that I had not liked to force myself on his Excellency, as he was apparently seriously engaged, but that I was at his disposal whenever he wished to see me. Shortly after I got back, I was rung up by Tefik Rüstü Bey with profuse apologies for a staff error—his Excellency had never been told that I was waiting to see him—and an urgent request to receive him at once. I begged his Excellency not to bother, for the hour was late and there was no pressing need for an interview. However, the Minister insisted and arrived at eight o'clock.

2. I have seen Tefik Rüstü Bey excited and vehement, but I have never seen him so agitated as he was on this occasion. The cause of this agitation was, as I briefly reported to your Lordship in my telegram No. 65 of to-day, that he had just received confirmation of an offer of the throne of Syria by the French Government to King Feisal, which offer it seemed probable that His Majesty would accept. I asked the Minister if he was quite sure of all this, of which I'd seen vague reports in the press, for to me it seemed that King Feisal would be kept busy enough in Iraq without adding the problems of Syria to his burden. Tefik Rüstü replied that King Feisal in Bagdad had admitted having received the offer and had said that his acceptance depended upon a satisfactory settlement of the conditions attaching to it, while it was a fact that when the King was in Paris M. Berthelot had, at some banquet in his honour, drunk a toast to the King of Iraq and Syria, which His Majesty had accepted *sub silentio*.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then launched forth. He said that he was in despair over French policy in Syria—or rather, it was not the policy of France or even of the French Government, but of M. Berthelot, and, at the back of M. Berthelot, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, otherwise M. Finaly. It was not the first time that M. Berthelot and banks had worked together, and the precedent had not been a happy one. His Excellency had no objection, *per se*, to a union of Iraq and Syria under one head, nor indeed to an Arab union, provided that the conditions in Syria were the same as they were in Iraq, where our position caused the Turkish Government no anxiety at all. We had been perfectly straightforward in our dealings with Turkey as regards Iraq, and he recognised that, with our commitments in India and the East, Iraq must have a definite political interest for us. But we had left, or were about to leave, Iraq to full independence and the Iraq frontier would be defended by Iraq soldiers. That was far from being the case in the proposed arrangement about Syria. There, the French troops and French administration were to remain, and King Feisal would merely be a means of extending French influence into Asia. Turkey was at peace with all her other neighbours and on the best of terms with them. The best proof of how secure she felt in the good intentions of the neighbouring countries was that on the frontiers contiguous to Greece, Bulgaria, Russia and Iraq there were no soldiers, nor were there any on the coast facing the possessions of Italy, while those that were maintained on the Persian frontier were solely there, not for fear of any aggression on the part of Persia, which was out of the question, but, he was sorry to have to admit, because of the weakness of the Persian administration. Only opposite the Syrian frontier did the Turkish Government feel any nervousness, and in that region Turkey was obliged to maintain from two to three divisions. Turkey was as friendly disposed to France as to any other Power, but the Minister felt that France could not forgive Turkey for refusing to become, at least in spirit, a member of the Little Entente. Turkey for her part was determined to have no entangling alliances. She only sought to live at peace with all the world and to develop herself as a cultured and civilised European State. She had definitely cut loose from Asia. There was a time when she had thought of playing a rôle in Afghanistan, but she had been let down and his Excellency had never been more thankful than when he had safely extricated the Turkish Military Mission and his other nationals from the mess made by Amanullah. From that time Turkey's eyes were fixed on the West, and she was so good a European that he was prepared to welcome the extension of the International Straits Commission to the whole of the Black Sea, while he made no secret of his wish that Turkey should join the League of Nations, as he had just told M. Litvinoff. The Soviet Commissary had replied that while Moscow considered that Turkey was wrong, she was an independent country and was free to decide as she thought best. (This is interesting as corroborating the reasons for M. Litvinoff's dissatisfaction with his visit suggested in my despatch No. 361 of the 1st instant.) Turkey was, moreover, an upholder of Europe as it was

to-day. Theoretically, she might share some of the misgivings about the sanctity of the Treaty of Versailles, but she was above all a realist in her policy, and she would never take an active part in upsetting the treaty. But neither would Turkey consent to be the "gendarme" of Versailles. Perhaps that was why France made things so difficult. His Excellency was frankly at a loss to know what France was aiming at in the Near East. He only knew that he was filled with anxiety by this latest development. Had he got to guard against an eventual move on Cilicia, or had he to expect French political penetration through Syria and Iraq into Asia? If the invitation to Feisal had no sinister basis, why had Turkey been kept in the dark and left to find out what was happening by herself?

4. The Minister talked for over an hour with more than his usual volubility, and I have tried to give your Lordship the gist of his observations, but I cannot pretend to complete accuracy. His Excellency made no direct request, and seemed to be using me more as an outlet for the expression of his feelings than for anything else. None the less it was obvious that he hoped for some assurance from us, either that Feisal would not accept the throne of Syria except on conditions analogous to those in Iraq, or that we were confident that France had no ulterior aims when extending the invitation to the King.

5. Your Lordship will doubtless instruct me in due course as to the line you wish me to take if and when Tefik Rüstü recurs to the subject, but it is clear that it will not be easy to eradicate the intense suspicion which the Turkish Government feels towards French policy in Syria, or perhaps I should say which Tefik Rüstü feels towards M. Berthelot and the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. I have always considered that the Ottoman Bank, or rather the French Board, have underestimated not only the determination of the Turkish Government to avoid submission to French financial control in any shape or form, but also the power of Turkey to retain her independence. The attitude of the bank has been that it has only got to sit tight and sooner or later the Turkish Government will be bound to come to it on bended knees for the wherewithal to carry on. This I believe to be an entire misreading of the situation, but it seems to have inspired the policy of the bank from the start, and the feeling that this is the bank's policy lies to my mind at the root of much of the uneasiness displayed in Tefik Rüstü Bey's outburst.

6. My French colleague, who usually talks to me very openly of his relations with the Turkish Government, so far as they have an interest for us, has not said a word on this matter of the Syrian throne, and as his Excellency is in Constantinople at the moment I shall have no opportunity of any discussion with him for some little time.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK

[E 5587/48/89]

No. 76.

Foreign Office to the Secretary-General, League of Nations.

(Immediate.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 11, 1931.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir John Simon to transmit to you the accompanying text of a joint request by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government to the Council of the League, regarding the settlement of the frontier between Syria and Iraq.

2. In view of the urgency of this question, I am to request that you will be good enough to place it on the agenda of the meeting of the Council which is to be held in Paris on the 16th of this month.

I am, &c.

G. W. RENDEL.

Joint Request by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government to the Council of the League of Nations, relating to the Settlement of the Frontier between Iraq and Syria.

IN the month of December 1920 the British and French Governments, desirous of finally settling the problems raised by the assignment to Great Britain of the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia, and by the assignment to France of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, conferred by the Supreme Council at San Remo, sought by mutual consent a practical solution of these problems.

The negotiations undertaken for this purpose by the two Governments resulted in the signature of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

Article 1 of this convention fixed the boundaries between the territories for which the mandates are respectively exercised by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic.

According to the terms of article 2, a mixed commission was to be established to trace on the spot the boundaries so fixed. The same article stipulated that any dispute that should arise in connexion with the work of this commission would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision would be final.

The two Governments subsequently decided that the commission should conform to the provisions of article 29 of the Treaty of Sèvres, regarding the lines to be fixed on the ground.

The commission met in June 1921 and proceeded to carry out the delimitation of the frontier from the Mediterranean as far as El Hamme.

Beyond this point it was confronted with the difficulty of establishing a line which should take account of local conditions. The commission being satisfied that it was impossible in the existing circumstances to overcome this difficulty, suspended its operations, which have not since been resumed.

The resumption of these operations presupposed the issue to the commission of directions agreed upon between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic, and an examination of the conditions of the application of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, could not usefully be undertaken between the two Governments before a definite allotment had been carried out of all the territories to which this convention applies.

This last condition having been fulfilled by decision of the Council of the League, dated the 16th December, 1925, and by the signature of the Franco-Turkish Protocol of the 22nd June, 1929, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic proceeded to carry out a combined enquiry into the problem of the section of the frontier not yet delimited, which is defined by the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

The frontier not yet demarcated comprises two sections:—

- (a) The frontier between Syria, the Jebel Druze and Transjordan;
- (b) The frontier between Syria and Iraq.

As regards (a), the Syria-Jebel Druze-Transjordan section, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic have succeeded in arriving at a solution of the problems which confronted them, and have agreed, subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, upon a line which can be delimited on the ground by a commission such as is contemplated by article 2 of the said convention.

As regards (b), the Syria-Iraq section, the two Governments found themselves faced with difficulties analogous to those which had stopped the work of the commission in 1921. The difficulties were two-fold. In the first place divergencies of opinion existed as to the exact interpretation of the frontier, which article 1 of the convention was intended to define. Secondly, it was found that, whatever interpretation was placed upon article 1 of the said convention, a frontier drawn in strict conformity therewith would be likely to be unsatisfactory in certain sectors for military, political, administrative, tribal, economic, geographical or other reasons.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic consider that it is not within the competence of a Delimitation Commission, such as that referred to in article 2 of the convention, to modify the frontier defined in article 1 to an extent sufficient in the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier to remove the unsatisfactory features above-mentioned.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic being for these reasons unable to prepare suitable joint instructions for the commission as regards the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier, and desirous of promoting a speedy, final and equitable settlement of a question of primary importance to the populations of the territories over which they exercise their respective mandates, have agreed to invite the Council of the League of Nations to examine all aspects of the difficulties referred to above, and, having formed its conclusion as to the intentions of article 1 of the convention, to indicate a frontier between Syria and Iraq based thereon, but modified as required by the aforementioned considerations, the frontier so indicated to be accepted by all concerned as a definitive solution of the frontier question.

The two Governments suggest that the task of the Council would be facilitated by the appointment of a commission which would collect on the spot such information and would make such recommendations as might assist the Council to reach a decision.

[E 5606/48/89]

No. 77.

Mr. R. H. Campbell to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 1190.)

Sir,

Paris, November 9, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of the second part of the report addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by Sir Francis Humphrys respecting the negotiations which he recently conducted in Paris with the French High Commissioner in Syria and the Lebanon, with a view to the settlement of the question of the frontier between Syria and Iraq and Syria and Transjordan. The first part of Sir Francis's report is already in your possession.

2. According to the instructions issued by your predecessor and by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the negotiations were to be conducted in two stages, the first between the two High Commissioners alone, and the second between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Embassy, the two High Commissioners being present. In point of fact, Sir Francis Humphrys was successful in reaching complete agreement with M. Ponsot, and the intervention of the Ministry and the Embassy was only required on the last day of the proceedings, for the purpose of assisting in putting the documents into final shape and in drafting the notes to be exchanged between M. Briand and His Majesty's Ambassador recording the agreement and making it binding on the two Governments. The originals of the two French notes and certified copies of Lord Tyrrell's two notes, together with copies of the other documents referred to in Sir Francis Humphrys's report, are enclosed herein.

3. It is unnecessary for me to describe or explain these documents, or otherwise to add to Sir Francis's succinct and comprehensive account of the proceedings, beyond remarking that the negotiations were much more difficult than might have been anticipated. The reason for this was two-fold: In the first place, the Jebel Druze, being under a separate (military) Governor, largely independent of Beirut, M. Ponsot's own position was a delicate one in agreeing to any line involving a withdrawal of French military posts from the positions at present occupied. On the other hand, it was precisely on this section of the frontier that Sir Francis Humphrys's instructions compelled him to be less accommodating than elsewhere. In the second place, M. Briand's personal position is at present so weak that he dare not agree to anything which might be represented, whether correctly or incorrectly, as a sacrifice of French interests, and thus expose himself to attack in Parliament. The Ministry was consequently reluctant to agree, of its own volition, to any line involving a retirement, though it would probably have contemplated with equanimity a less favourable one imposed as a result of a reference to the League of Nations. Indeed, the most difficult part of M. Ponsot's task was probably that of

persuading M. Berthelot and the General Staff, with whom he was in constant contact, of the justice and reasonableness of Sir Francis Humphrys's contentions.

4. The above factors combined to make M. Ponsot less easy to deal with than he might otherwise have been, and I know that I am voicing Lord Tyrrell's opinion in saying that it was due to Sir Francis Humphrys's tact and skill in negotiation that a satisfactory agreement was finally reached.

I have, &c.

R. H. CAMPBELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 77.

Second Report by Sir F. Humphrys on his Negotiations in Paris regarding the Syrian Frontier.

Sir F. Humphrys to Mr. J. H. Thomas.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 9.)

Sir,

Geneva, November 5, 1931.

IN continuation of my report dated the 23rd October, 1931, I have the honour to inform you that I returned to Paris on the 29th October in order to resume my negotiations with M. Ponsot regarding the Syrian frontier. On the morning of my departure from London I received my final instructions contained in Mr. Parkinson's letter of the 29th October. Since it was necessary that I should leave Paris on the night of the 31st in order to arrive at Geneva in time for my examination before the Permanent Mandates Commission, which was due to commence on the morning of the 2nd November, there remained only two days in which to complete my negotiations in Paris.

2. The whole of the first day was occupied in a recapitulation by M. Ponsot of his arguments in favour of obtaining a more favourable line for Syria in the valley of the Yarmuk and the Nasib-Intan (or key-point) sector than I was prepared to concede, and in my replies to the observations of his Government, which he had been instructed to convey to me in regard to these two sectors. Briefly, M. Ponsot's standpoint was as follows:—

- (1) In the Yarmuk Valley the 1920 convention line should be followed, except where the railway lies to the north of the Yarmuk River, in which case the river should be the boundary, i.e., alternative B, described in paragraph 28 of my report dated the 23rd October. M. Ponsot was not even prepared to accept the thalweg of the main stream on the sections where the river was to be the boundary, but asked for the whole river to be included in Syria.
- (2) In the key-point sector he said that the French Government was unable to accept a rigid application of the 2-mile line to the north of the line joining the key-points, but demanded that the Franco-British Commission which would be entrusted with the delimitation of the boundary, should be given authority to vary this line in favour of Syria, so as to include within the Syrian boundary all cultivated lands appertaining to Syrian and Jebel Druze villages.

3. As regards (2), I reminded M. Ponsot that I had told him from the first that the 2-mile zone in front of the key-point line was the minimum demand of my Government, and that, as this claim rested on a strategic principle, which throughout our conversations I had warned him could not be surrendered, I was unable to give way on this point. I appealed to him to take a reasonable view. At an early stage in our negotiations I had insisted that no account could be taken of the cultivated lands within the 2-mile zone, except by means of a "Bon-Voisinage" agreement. Such an agreement as I had in mind would dispose of all his administrative difficulties, and at the same time provide a minimum safeguard for the protection of the oil pipe-line and railway, which was considered to be a vital interest by my Government. M. Ponsot admitted that my arguments were strong and convincingly put, but he suggested that I should put them before M. Berthelot myself on the following day. He had personally been unable to induce M. Berthelot to accept the British standpoint in this sector.

4. As regards the Yarmuk Valley, M. Ponsot said that he had been taken to task by the military authorities in Paris for not insisting that the southern crest line of the Yarmuk gorge should be considered as the frontier. He hoped, therefore, that I would accept his alternative B, beyond which he was unable to go. I said that B was too one-sided an arrangement for my Government to accept and that my own proposal C, which makes the thalweg of the main stream the boundary, giving extra-territoriality to the railway when running south of the river, was considered by my Government to be the best and simplest solution. M. Ponsot said that the French Government would never accept this proposal, as both the railway and the whole of the valley of the Yarmuk were described in the convention of 1920 as in principle lying in the territory under the French mandate. When I saw that I was unable to shake him on this point, I suggested a compromise by which the thalweg of the main stream of the Yarmuk should be the boundary up to the point where the railway crosses to the Syrian side of the river by the second bridge north-east of El Hamme station; thence the convention line should be followed except where the railway lies to the north of the river, in which case the thalweg of the Yarmuk and the Wadi Zeizun and the Wadi Meidan, should be the boundary up to the point where the railway crosses the Wadi Meidan for the last time close to the village of Tell-es-Shihab. After an argument which lasted late into the evening, M. Ponsot finally accepted my compromise, it being stipulated that the railway should be granted extra-territoriality for the westernmost section in the Yarmuk Valley in the terms of the convention of the 3rd February, 1922, which regulated the section of the railway in Palestine up to Semakh station. It was also agreed after a prolonged discussion that nothing in this agreement would have the effect of modifying the rights over the usage of the waters of the Yarmuk and its tributaries, provided by article 8 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920. It will be observed that this compromise secures a valuable concession for Transjordan by transferring the lands lying between the railway and the Yarmuk River in the loop in which the village of El-M'Khebi is situated (i.e., between the first and second railway bridges to the north-east of El Hamme station), from Syria to Transjordan. The rights in the water of the Yarmuk and its tributaries have been conserved, and the thalweg of the main stream is the boundary, except where the convention line is followed where the railway runs to the south of the river. It has, therefore, considerably more advantages to Transjordan than the limit which my instructions allowed me to accept.

5. In the Deraa sector we were in agreement and M. Ponsot's draft, embodying some of the amendments suggested in London for the purpose of clarity, was adopted.

6. Early the next morning Mr. Campbell and I paid a visit to the Quai d'Orsay. I had hoped to have the opportunity of speaking to M. Berthelot alone, but I found that M. Ponsot and M. Saint-Quentin had arranged to be present at the interview. M. Berthelot made a long speech on the subject of the key-point sector, in the course of which he urged that on a matter of such importance there must be give and take on both sides. He showed a surprising misconception of the problem on the point of principle which divided us. I recapitulated the main arguments which I had used with M. Ponsot and illustrated them from the map, and informed M. Berthelot that in placing my cards on the table and taking my stand rigidly on this line from the first I had perhaps committed an error in diplomacy. It might have been easier for M. Ponsot, for instance, to accept this line if I had originally demanded a 4-mile or even a 3-mile zone. I had, however, deliberately adopted an attitude of the utmost frankness with my friend and colleague from the start, and had told him that this was the utmost to which my Government was prepared to go. I still held to that declaration, but I felt sure that I could satisfy M. Ponsot in regard to his administrative difficulties by means of agreed principles for a "Bon-Voisinage" arrangement in this zone. I finally appealed to M. Berthelot not to disappoint the first mission sent to Paris by the new British Government in its endeavours to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement with France on a long-standing difficulty. After Mr. Campbell and M. Saint-Quentin had joined in the discussion, M. Berthelot invited us to explore the possibilities of settlement in M. Saint-Quentin's office.

The remaining period of the morning was spent in redrafting the definition of the frontier to include the amendments which had been accepted, and M. Ponsot agreed to omit the phrase "en ce qui concerne spécialement le sud du Djebel

Druze," which he had inserted in the revised Beirut formula (Annex B). He attempted to alter the phrase "modifiée pour tenir compte" in the penultimate paragraph of the formula, but finally agreed to leave the wording as it stood.

7. After lunch, while I discussed with M. Ponsot the general lines of an "accord frontalier" and "Bon-Voisinage," Mr. Campbell and M. Saint-Quentin were engaged in the drafting of an exchange of notes between Lord Tyrrell and M. Briand which would give formal sanction to the informal agreement, which it was hoped might be reached between M. Ponsot and myself that evening. The agreed draft, which was afterwards accepted by His Majesty's Ambassador and exchanged with M. Briand, is shown as Enclosure 3. The draft of the general principles for the "Accord frontalier" and "Bon-Voisinage" (Enclosure 3) was finally agreed on by M. Ponsot and myself. As the width of the "frontalier" zone and the zone for the exclusion of bad characters is left to be defined by the Transjordan and Syrian Governments in agreement, I trust that I have not in any way compromised the discretion of the High Commissioner of Transjordan in agreeing to this draft. M. Ponsot attempted to make the zone for bad characters 20 kilom. in width on either side of the frontier, and would not reduce this width below 15 kilom., and it was with the greatest difficulty that I persuaded him to leave the actual width of the zone open for discussion with the High Commissioner of Transjordan.

8. There was now little time left, and M. Ponsot, under instructions no doubt from M. Berthelot, was still unable to accept my definition of the key-point sector. In order to allay French suspicions about possible Transjordan activities in the 2-mile zone, the draft of a letter marked "Confidential" and not intended for publication was prepared, with the assistance of Mr. Campbell and M. Saint-Quentin, to be addressed by Lord Tyrrell to M. Briand. This letter contains two points: (1) A self-denying ordinance on behalf of both Governments to abstain from favouring the establishment of new villages within the 2-mile zone so long as both Governments are responsible for maintenance of order on their respective sides of the frontier; and (2) a concession providing that all taxes payable on landed property belonging to Syrian and Jebel Druze villagers within the 2-mile zone shall continue to be paid, as heretofore, to the Syrian Government. Although full credit was taken for these two concessions to French sentiment, I submit that both are equally in the interests of Transjordan and His Majesty's Government. It is obvious that the establishment of new villages in the 2-mile zone would be embarrassing to both sides. It would also be inconvenient for the Transjordan Government to collect the taxes due from Syrian and Jebel Druze nationals for the exiguous produce of the cultivated area in the 2-mile zone. This view was accepted by Lord Tyrrell, who signed the letter (Enclosure 4) to M. Briand.

9. The French objections to the British draft for the key-point sector were now overcome, after I had made a small but reasonable concession in respect of Awad village. This provides that the frontier will deviate from the 2-mile line up to a point 60 metres to the south and encircling the last group of houses actually existing to the south, and will include the land embraced by an angle of about 90 degrees (45 degrees on either side) from this point (60 metres south of the village). This concession, which, I think, requires no justification, is rendered more reasonable by the fact that two roads approaching the village of Awad from the Jebel Druze villages to the north-west and north-east are shown on the French map as forming together an angle of about 90 degrees from a point drawn slightly to the south of the village.

10. We were now able to complete the revised definition of the frontier, which is described in the exchange of notes as Annex A. Paragraph 5 of this protocol refers to the maps which were utilised during the course of the negotiations. It is stated that the lines drawn on these maps are only approximate, but the indications inscribed in ink (by myself) on the maps of the Yarmuk Valley are to be regarded as authoritative. A copy of the latter map and the indications which I left with M. Ponsot is attached under separate cover.⁽¹⁾ These indications merely show the easternmost and westernmost points of delimitation in the Yarmuk Valley, the course of the Wadi Zeizun, and the points of junction between the Wadi Zeizun and the Yarmuk River and the Wadi Meidan with the Wadi Zeizun.

(1) Not reproduced.

11. The results of our negotiations were now typed out and signed at 8.30 p.m., little more than an hour before my train was due to leave for Geneva. There was no time to type and sign the English texts of Annexes A and B and of the general principles of the "Accord frontalier et Bon-Voisinage," which will be deposited with the Quai d'Orsay later, and are to have equal validity with the French texts.

The negotiations were carried through with the greatest friendliness and cordiality, and I hope it will be found that the point of view of both parties has been met without sacrificing any of the interests of Transjordan or His Majesty's Government.

12. I received the most valuable co-operation throughout from Mr. Campbell, and desire once more to express my gratitude to Lord Tyrrell and the Embassy staff for the assistance which was so freely given me.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 77.

Lord Tyrrell to M. Briand.

M. le Président,

Paris, October 31, 1931.

IN accordance with the mission entrusted to them respectively by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic, the British High Commissioner in Iraq and the French High Commissioner in Syria and the Lebanon have considered the means of settling the question of the frontier between Iraq and Syria and between Transjordan and Syria and the Jebel Druze. As a result of their researches, Sir Francis Humphrys and M. Ponsot have in concert made certain recommendations which are known to your Excellency.

2. I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accept the recommendations of the two High Commissioners and agree with the Government of the French Republic to adopt the following procedure with a view to the final settlement of this question:—

The boundary between Transjordan and Syria and the Jebel Druze, as defined in the protocol which forms Annex A to this note, will be referred to the Council of the League of Nations for approval. When such approval has been given, the boundary will be demarcated on the spot, in accordance with the above-mentioned definition, by a commission such as is contemplated in article 2 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

The settlement of the boundary between Iraq and Syria will be entrusted to the Council of the League of Nations, in accordance with the terms of the draft reference which forms Annex B to this note.

I have, &c.

TYRRELL.

Annex A.

Protocol relative to the Settlement of the Frontier between Syria and the Jebel Druze on the one side and Transjordan on the other side.

1.—DEFINITION OF THE FRONTIER.

1. Yarmuk Sector.

(a) From the point where the railway crosses the Yarmuk above El Hamme as far as the point where the railway crosses the river above El M'Khebi, the frontier follows the thalweg of the Yarmuk, it being understood that the section of the railway situated between these two bridges, and lying to the east of the Yarmuk, shall be accorded, in favour of Syria, the same exterritorial régime as was provided for, in the case of the section of the railway already delimited as far as the station of Semakh, by the Delimitation Agreement of the 3rd February, 1922 (which fixes the last point delimited).

(b) From the above-mentioned point above El M'Khebi up to the point where the railway crosses the Wadi Meidan in the direction of Mezerib for the last time, the frontier runs on the Transjordan side of the railway at a distance fixed, where these rivers flow on the south side of the railway, by the thalweg of the Yarmuk and of its tributaries, the Wadi Zeizun and the Wadi Meidan, and where the railway runs on the Transjordan side to the south of these rivers, by the railway itself.

In the latter case the frontier shall be established to the south of the railway and parallel to it in such a way as to leave to Syria, besides the railway itself, its structures and grounds, its borrow-pits, its stations, its yards and outbuildings, and the area necessary both for the technical protection of the railway and its works and for its operation. This definition of the railway also applies to the section of the railway mentioned in paragraph (a) above.

(c) Nothing in the preceding definition of the frontier shall have the effect of modifying the water régime relative to the Yarmuk and its tributaries, as provided for in article 8 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

2. Deraa-Remthe Sector.

From the point defined above, where the railway crosses the Wadi Meidan, as far as the point where the frontier meets the railway to the south of Nasib, the frontier is defined by the following marks and cairns:—

From the bridge on the Wadi Meidan, the frontier rejoins the line which separates the lands of the Transjordan villages of Amrawa, Shejera, Turrah and Remthe, on the one hand, from the lands of the Syrian villages of Tel Shehab, Mezerib, and Deraa on the other.

This line passes through El Bueib on the road from Deraa to Remthe, and thence follows the western crest of the Jebel-ez-Zumla as far as the cairn situated at the southern extremity of the line separating the lands of Deraa from those of Remthe.

From the latter cairn the frontier runs to the cairn situated approximately 1,500 metres to the south of the farm of Rahaya; thence, it passes to the cairn of Kabr Hamdan, and continues towards the cairn situated at Kerkur Sud, and thence rejoins the railway at a point situated between the Syrian village of Nasib and the Transjordan village of Jabir, in such a way as to leave to each of these villages the lands which belong to them.

It is understood that when the frontier, in this second sector, follows a watercourse or Wadi, the thalweg is meant, and when the frontier follows a crest, the water parting is meant.

It shall be further understood that whatever the actual line of the frontier, the inhabitants of Turrah shall continue to have access as heretofore to the water points in the Wadi Meidan situated to the east of Jisr Meidan.

3. Sector to the East of Nasib and Jabir.

From the point above mentioned, between Nasib and Jabir, to the point where it meets with the frontier between Transjordan and Iraq, in the neighbourhood of Jebel Tenf, the frontier is defined as follows:—

(a) From the above-defined point on the railway, the frontier rejoins the point of intersection of the meridian of Semma with the line defined hereafter. Between the meridian of Semma and the meridian of Tell Rumah it passes to the north of a line running through the following points:—

Semma, Umm-es-Surab, Shajara (a place approximately 2 kilometres south-west of the solitary tree on the track from Umm-el-Jemal to Tissiye, Subhiya, Sabha, Umm-el-Kuttein, Deir-el-Kahf (or Deir-el-Kabt) and Tell Rumah, these points being situated in Transjordan.

The frontier shall be indicated by boundary marks placed 3,200 metres (say, 2 miles) to the north of and parallel to the lines which join the centres of the places or localities mentioned above.

It is understood that if the village of Khirbet Awad or any part of that village is found to lie to the south of the frontier line as marked out above, the frontier shall be deflected around and to a point situated 60 metres to the south

of the last group of houses at present existing, rejoining the main line to the east and to the west of the village by lines forming an angle of approximately 90 degrees at the point above mentioned (60 metres to the south of the village), in such a manner as to include in the territory of the Jebel Druze all the inhabited part of this village as well as the land situated within this salient from the main line.

(b) From the point situated 3,200 metres north and on the meridian of the highest point of Tell Rumah to the frontier of Iraq in the neighbourhood of Jebel Tenf, the frontier shall run in a straight line in the direction of Abu Kemal on the Euphrates, the geographical position of this village being calculated, for the special purpose of establishing this line, by reckoning the central point of the locality.

II.—AGREEMENT ON FRONTIER RELATIONS AND "BON-VOISINAGE."

An agreement on frontier relations and "bon-voisinage," of which the essential points are indicated hereafter, and which shall enter into force at the same time as the present agreement, shall lay down the reciprocal guarantees of security in the interests of the two States and shall assure the safeguarding of the rights of the inhabitants of the frontier zone.

III.—MAPS.

The following maps, which have been utilised in the course of the negotiations, are annexed to the present agreement for the purposes of explanation:—

On the French side:—

1. Feuille de Bosra, édition 1930 au 1/200,000.
2. Feuille du Yarmuk au 1/100,000.

On the British side:—

1. Yarmuk Valley, scale 1/50,000; contours at 50-metre intervals.
2. Marked bromide reproduction map of the area between J. Rumah à Abu Kemal, scale 1/1,000,000.
3. Syria-Jaffa-Damascus, scale 1/250,000 corrected.

The frontier lines marked on these maps having been drawn prior to the agreement, have a purely relative value for the purposes of general indication.

On the other hand, the indications shown in ink on the maps of the Yarmuk Valley are intended to support the agreed text, in particular in so far as concerns the course of the Wadi Zeizun and the Wadi Meidan.

H. PONSOT.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Paris, October 31, 1931.

Sub-Annex to Annex A.

General Lines of the Agreement on Frontier Relations and "Bon-Voisinage."

A SEPARATE agreement will be concluded as soon as possible, to regulate relations on the frontier between Syria and the Jebel Druze on the one side, and Transjordan on the other side, in such a way as to allow non-nomadic, semi-nomadic and nomadic inhabitants having properties or rights of pasture, watering or cultivation across the frontier, to continue to enjoy their rights.

Such inhabitants shall be able, within the limits of a frontier zone on either side of the frontier of a width to be defined hereafter, to convey from one side of the frontier to the other their beasts, the natural increase and produce of their flocks, agricultural implements intended for their work, their vehicles, their seeds, and the agricultural produce of their properties, without having to pay any dues in respect of customs, pasturage or watering, or any other tax leviable in respect of entry into the neighbouring territory.

The agreement contemplated will furthermore contain provisions designed to ensure the maintenance of complete order and security in the regions bordering

on the frontier. In particular the measures to be taken against persons coming from one territory and committing acts of aggression in the other will be laid down, and provision will be made for the exclusion from a zone on each side of the frontier, of a width to be fixed by agreement between the two Governments, of any individuals whose conduct might be considered as prejudicial to peace and order in the territories under the administration of the other party.

H. PONSOT,
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Paris, October 31, 1931.

Annex B.

Draft Reference to the Council of the League of Nations relating to the Settlement of the Frontier between Iraq and Syria.

In the month of December 1920 the British and French Governments, desirous of finally settling the problems raised by the assignment to Great Britain of the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia, and by the assignment to France of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, conferred by the Supreme Council at San Remo, sought by mutual consent a practical solution of these problems.

The negotiations undertaken for this purpose by the two Governments resulted in the signature of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

Article 1 of this convention fixed the boundaries between the territories for which the mandates are respectively exercised by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic.

According to the terms of article 2, a mixed commission was to be established to trace on the spot the boundaries so fixed. The same article stipulated that any dispute that should arise in connexion with the work of this commission would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision would be final.

The two Governments subsequently decided that the commission should conform to the provisions of article 29 of the Treaty of Sèvres regarding the lines to be fixed on the ground.

The commission met in June 1921 and proceeded to carry out the delimitation of the frontier from the Mediterranean as far as El Hamme.

Beyond this point it was confronted with the difficulty of establishing a line which should take account of local conditions. The commission being satisfied that it was impossible, in the existing circumstances, to overcome this difficulty, suspended its operations, which have not since been resumed.

The resumption of these operations presupposed the issue to the commission of directions agreed upon between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic, and an examination of the conditions of the application of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, could not usefully be undertaken between the two Governments before a definite allotment had been carried out of all the territories to which this convention applies.

This last condition having been fulfilled by decision of the Council of the League dated the 16th December, 1925, and by the signature of the Franco-Turkish Protocol of the 22nd June, 1929, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic proceeded to carry out a combined enquiry into the problem of the section of the frontier not yet delimited, which is defined by the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

The frontier not yet demarcated comprises two sections:—

- (a) The frontier between Syria, the Jebel Druze and Transjordan.
- (b) The frontier between Syria and Iraq.

As regards (a), the Syria-Jebel Druze-Transjordan section, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic have succeeded in arriving at a solution of the problems which confronted them, and have agreed, subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, upon a line which can be delimited on the ground by a commission such as is contemplated by article 2 of the said convention.

As regards (b), the Syria-Iraq section, the two Governments found themselves faced with difficulties analogous to those which had stopped the work of the commission in 1921. The difficulties were two-fold. In the first place, divergencies of opinion existed as to the exact interpretation of the frontier which article 1 of the convention was intended to define. Secondly, it was found that whatever interpretation was placed upon article 1 of the said convention, a frontier drawn in strict conformity therewith would be likely to be unsatisfactory in certain sectors for military, political, administrative, tribal, economic, geographical or other reasons.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic consider that it is not within the competence of a Delimitation Commission, such as that referred to in article 2 of the convention, to modify the frontier defined in article 1 to an extent sufficient in the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier to remove the unsatisfactory features above-mentioned.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic being for these reasons unable to prepare suitable joint instructions for the commission as regards the Syria-Iraq section of the frontier, and desirous of promoting a speedy, final and equitable settlement of a question of primary importance to the populations of the territories over which they exercise their respective mandates have agreed to invite the Council of the League of Nations to examine all aspects of the difficulties referred to above and having formed its conclusion as to the intentions of article 1 of the convention to indicate a frontier between Syria and Iraq based thereon but modified as required by the aforementioned considerations, the frontier so indicated to be accepted by all concerned as a definitive solution of the frontier question.

The two Governments suggest that the task of the Council would be facilitated by the appointment of a commission which would collect on the spot such information and would make such recommendations as might assist the Council to reach a decision.

(Initialled by)
SIR F. HUMPHRYS, and
M. PONSOT.

Paris, October 31, 1931.

Enclosure 3 in No. 77.

M. Briand to Lord Tyrrell.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 31 octobre 1931.

S'ACQUITTANT de la mission dont ils avaient été chargés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, le Haut-Commissaire de la République française en Syrie et au Liban et le Haut-Commissaire de Sa Majesté britannique en Irak ont recherché les moyens de résoudre le problème des frontières entre la Syrie et l'Irak d'une part, la Syrie, le Djebel Druze et la Transjordanie de l'autre. A la suite de cet examen, M. Ponsot et Sir Francis Humphrys ont présenté de concert certaines recommandations qui sont connues de votre Excellence.

J'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de la République accepte les recommandations des deux Hauts-Commissaires et qu'il est d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni pour adopter la procédure suivante en vue d'un règlement définitif de la question :

La frontière entre la Syrie, le Djebel Druze et la Transjordanie, telle qu'elle est définie dans le protocole qui forme l'Annexe A à la présente lettre sera soumise à l'approbation du Conseil de la Société des Nations. Cette approbation une fois donnée, la frontière sera délimitée sur le terrain conformément à ladite définition par une commission instituée en exécution de l'article 2 de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920.

Le règlement de la frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak sera confié au Conseil de la Société des Nations conformément aux termes du projet de requête joint en Annexe B à la présente lettre.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
A. BRIAND.

Annex A.

Protocole relatif à la Fixation de la Frontière entre la Syrie, le Djebel Druse et la Transjordanie.

I.—DÉFINITION DE LA FRONTIÈRE.

1. Secteur du Yarmouk.

(a) Depuis le point où la voie ferrée traverse le Yarmouk en amont d'El Hammé jusqu'au point où la voie ferrée traverse la rivière en amont d'El M'Khebi, la frontière suit le talweg du Yarmouk, étant entendu que la section du chemin de fer située entre ces deux ponts à l'est du Yarmouk reste placée, au bénéfice de la Syrie, sous le même régime d'exterritorialité que celui défini par la Convention de Délimitation du 3 février 1922 (qui fixe le dernier point aborné) en ce qui concerne la section de chemin de fer antérieurement délimitée jusqu'à la gare de Semakh.

(b) Du point précité en amont d'El M'Khebi, jusqu'au point où la voie ferrée traverse pour la dernière fois le Ouadi Meidan en direction de Mzerib, la frontière est tracée du côté transjordanien de la voie ferrée à une distance qui est marquée par le talweg même du Yarmouk et de ses affluents, le Ouadi Zeizun et le Ouadi Meidan, lorsque ces rivières coulent au sud de la voie ferrée et par la voie ferrée elle-même lorsque la voie passe du côté de la Transjordanie au sud de ces rivières.

Dans ce dernier cas, l'abornement sera fait au sud de la voie et parallèlement à elle de façon à laisser à la Syrie, outre la voie elle-même et ses travaux d'art, les emprises, balastières, stations, dépendances et terrains nécessaires tant à la protection technique de la voie ferrée et de ses ouvrages qu'à son exploitation. Cette même définition de la voie s'applique à la section du chemin de fer visée au paragraphe précédent (a).

(c) Rien dans la définition de la frontière qui précède n'a pour effet de modifier le régime des eaux relatif au Yarmouk et à ses affluents tel qu'il est prévu par l'article 8 de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920.

2. Secteur de Deraa-Remthé.

Du point ci-dessus défini où la voie ferrée traverse le Ouadi Meidan jusqu'au point où elle rencontre la voie ferrée au sud de Nasib, la frontière est définie par les indications et repères suivants :

Du pont sur le Ouadi Meidan, la frontière rejoint la ligne qui sépare les terrains des villages transjordanien d'Amraoua, Shejera, Turrah et Remthé d'une part, des terrains des villages syriens de Tell Chéab, Mzerib et Deraa d'autre part.

Cette ligne traverse el Bueib sur la route de Deraa à Remthé, et de là suit la crête occidentale du Djebel-ez-Zumla jusqu'au repère situé à l'extrémité sud de la ligne séparant les terrains de Deraa de ceux de Remthé.

De ce dernier repère la frontière va jusqu'au repère situé approximativement à 1,500 mètres au sud de la ferme de Rahaya, ensuite elle passe au repère de Kabr Hamdan et continue sur le repère situé à Kerkur sud, et de là rejoint un point de la voie ferrée situé entre le village syrien de Nasib et le village transjordanien de Jaber, de façon à laisser à chacun de ces villages les terres qui leur appartiennent.

Il est entendu que lorsque, dans ce second secteur, la frontière suit un cours d'eau ou Ouadi, il s'agit du talweg, et que lorsque la frontière suit une crête il s'agit de la ligne de partage des eaux.

Il est également entendu que quel que soit le tracé de la frontière, les habitants de Turrah continueront à avoir accès comme par le passé aux points d'eau du Ouadi Meidan situés à l'est de Jisr Meidan.

3. Secteur à l'Est de Nasib et Jaber.

Du point ci-dessus précisé entre Nasib et Jaber jusqu'à la rencontre de la frontière de la Transjordanie et de l'Irak au voisinage du Djebel Tenf, la frontière est ainsi définie :

(a) Du point de la voie ferrée ci-dessus précisé, la frontière rejoint le point de rencontre du méridien de Samma avec la ligne définie ci-après. Entre le

méridien de Samma et le méridien de Tell Romah, elle passe au nord d'une ligne jalonnée par les points suivants :

Samma, Oum-es-Surab, Shajara (point situé à 2 kilomètres environ au sud-ouest de l'arbre isolé sur la piste d'Oum-el-Djemel à Tissie), Subhiyé, Sabha, Oum-el-Kottein, Deir-el-Khaf et Tell Romah, ces points étant situés en Transjordanie.

La frontière sera indiquée par des bornes placées à 3 kilomètres 200 (soit 2 milles) au nord et parallèlement aux lignes qui joignent les centres des lieux ou localités mentionnés ci-dessus.

Il est entendu que si le village de Kirbet Aouad ou une partie quelconque de ce village se trouvait au sud de la ligne frontière jalonnée comme il est ci-dessus, la frontière s'infléchirait jusqu'à un point situé à 60 mètres au sud et autour du dernier groupe de maisons actuellement existant, le raccordement à la ligne générale étant fait à l'est et à l'ouest du village par des lignes formant un angle d'environ 90 degrés au point ci-dessus indiqué (60 mètres sud du village), de manière à inclure en territoire druse toute la partie habitée de ce village ainsi que les terrains situés dans cet angle de rattachement à la ligne générale.

(b) A partir du point situé à 3 kiloms. 200 au nord (méridien) du sommet le plus élevé de Tell Romah, jusqu'à la frontière d'Irak située au voisinage du Djebel Tenf, la frontière se prolonge en ligne droite en direction d'Abou Kemal sur l'Euphrate, la position géographique de ce village étant calculée aux fins spéciales de ce tracé, en tenant compte du centre même de la localité.

II.—ACCORD FRONTALIER ET DE BON-VOISINAGE.

Un accord frontalier et de bon-voisinage dont les points essentiels sont indiqués ci-après et qui entrera en vigueur en même temps que le présent accord fixera les garanties mutuelles de sécurité au profit des deux Etats et assurera la sauvegarde des droits des habitants de la zone frontalière.

III.—CARTES.

A titre d'indication, sont annexées au présent accord les cartes suivantes, qui ont été utilisées au cours de la négociation :

Du côté français :

- 1 Feuille de Bosra, édition 1930, au 1/200,000.
- 2 Feuilles du Yarmouk au 1/100,000.

Du côté britannique :

1. Yarmouk valley, scale 1/50,000⁰-contours at 50 metres intervals.
2. Tracé figuré de J. Rumah à Abu Kemal, scale 1/1,000,000⁰.
3. Syria-Jaffa-Damascus, scale 1/250,000⁰, rectifiée.

Les tracés de frontière figurés sur ces cartes ayant été inscrits avant accord n'ont qu'une valeur relative d'indication générale.

Par contre, les indications portées à la plume sur les cartes de la vallée du Yarmouk sont données à l'appui du texte convenu en particulier en ce qui concerne le cours du Ouadi Zeizoun et du Ouadi Meidan.

Paris, le 31 octobre 1931.

H. PONSOT.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Sub-Annex to Annex A.

Lignes générales de l'Accord frontalier et de Bon-Voisinage.

UN accord sera conclu dès que possible en vue de régler les rapports de bon-voisinage entre la Syrie et le Djebel Druse d'une part, la Transjordanie d'autre part, de façon à permettre aux habitants sédentaires, semi-sédentaires ou nomades ayant des propriétés ou des droits de pâturage, d'abreuvoir ou de culture d'un côté à l'autre de la frontière, de continuer à jouir de leurs droits.

Ces habitants pourront, dans les limites d'une zone frontalière de kilomètres (à définir) de part et d'autre de la frontière, faire passer d'un côté à l'autre de la frontière leur bétail, le croît et les produits de leurs troupeaux, les instruments agricoles destinés à leur exploitation, leurs voitures, leurs semences, les produits du sol de leurs propriétés, sans avoir à payer aucun droit de douane, de pâturage ou d'abreuvoir ou toute autre taxe relative à l'entrée en territoire voisin.

L'accord envisagé arrêtera, d'autre part, des dispositions de nature à assurer le maintien absolu de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans les régions voisines de la frontière. Il stipulera notamment les mesures à prendre contre les auteurs d'agressions qui viendraient à être commises d'un territoire à l'autre et prévoira l'éloignement hors d'une zone dont la largeur sera fixée de part et d'autre de la frontière, de commun accord entre les deux Gouvernements, des individus dont les agissements seraient considérés comme compromettant la tranquillité et le bon ordre dans les territoires placés sous l'administration de l'autre partie.

H. PONSOT.
F. H. HUMPHRYS

Paris, le 31 octobre 1931.

Annex B.

Projet de Requête commune au Conseil de la Société des Nations au Sujet de la Fixation de la Frontière entre la Syrie et l'Iraq.

Au mois de décembre 1920, les Gouvernements français et britannique, désireux de régler complètement les problèmes soulevés par l'attribution à la Grande-Bretagne des mandats sur la Palestine et la Mésopotamie, et par l'attribution à la France du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban, conférés par le Conseil suprême à San Remo, recherchèrent d'un commun accord une solution pratique de ces problèmes.

Les négociations engagées à cet effet par les deux Gouvernements aboutirent à la signature de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920.

L'article 1^{er} de cette convention fixait les limites entre les territoires sous mandat britannique et les territoires sous mandat français.

Aux termes de l'article 2, une commission mixte devait être chargée de reporter sur le terrain les limites ainsi fixées. Ce même article stipulait que les conflits qui pourraient résulter des opérations de cette commission seraient portés devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, dont la décision serait sans appel.

Les deux Gouvernements décidèrent par la suite que la commission se conformerait aux dispositions de l'article 29 du Traité de Sévres relatives aux lignes à déterminer sur le terrain.

La commission se réunit en juin 1921 et procéda à l'abornement de la frontière depuis la Méditerranée jusqu'à El Hammé.

Au delà de ce point, elle se heurta à la difficulté d'établir un tracé qui tint compte des conditions locales. La commission ayant constaté l'impossibilité dans laquelle elle se trouvait de résoudre cette difficulté, suspendit ses travaux, qui ne furent pas repris depuis lors.

La reprise de ces travaux supposait l'envoi à la commission de directives, concertées entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni, et un examen des conditions d'application de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920 ne pouvait être utilement entreprise entre ces deux Gouvernements avant l'attribution définitive de toutes les parties des territoires auxquels s'appliquait ladite Convention.

Cette dernière condition s'étant trouvée réalisée du fait de la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations, en date du 16 décembre 1925, et de la signature du Protocole franco-turc du 22 juin 1929, le Gouvernement de la République et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni procédèrent en commun à une étude du problème de la frontière non encore délimitée, telle qu'elle est définie par la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920.

La frontière qui reste à délimiter comprend deux sections :

- (a) La frontière entre la Syrie, le Djebel Druze et la Transjordanie;
- (b) La frontière entre la Syrie et l'Iraq.

En ce qui touche (a), la section Syrie-Djebel Druze-Transjordanie, le Gouvernement de la République et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni sont parvenus à résoudre les problèmes auxquels ils avaient à faire face, et ils sont tombés d'accord, sous réserve de l'approbation du Conseil de la Société des Nations, sur une ligne qui serait abornée sur le terrain par la commission prévue à l'article 2 de ladite convention.

En ce qui touche (b), la section Syrie-Iraq, les deux Gouvernements se trouvèrent placés devant des difficultés analogues à celles qui avaient arrêté les travaux de la commission en 1921. Ces difficultés étaient de deux sortes. En premier lieu, des divergences d'opinions existaient au sujet de l'interprétation exacte de la définition de la frontière qui faisait l'objet de l'article 1^{er} de la convention. En second lieu, il fut constaté que, quelle que pût être l'interprétation donnée à l'article 1^{er} de la convention, une frontière tracée en stricte conformité avec cette interprétation serait vraisemblablement peu satisfaisante dans certains secteurs pour des raisons militaires, politiques, administratives, de tribus, économiques, géographiques ou autres.

Le Gouvernement de la République et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni considèrent qu'il n'entre pas dans la compétence d'une commission de délimitation telle que celle qui se trouve visée par l'article 2 de la convention d'apporter à la frontière définie par l'article 1^{er}, en ce qui touche la section de frontière Syrie-Iraq, des modifications suffisantes pour faire disparaître les inconvénients mentionnés ci-dessus.

Le Gouvernement de la République et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne se trouvant pas en mesure, en raison de ces considérations, d'établir pour la commission, en ce qui touche la section de la frontière Syrie-Iraq, des instructions communes appropriées, et animés du désir de favoriser un règlement prompt, définitif et équitable d'une question d'importance primordiale pour les populations des territoires sur lesquels s'exercent leurs mandats respectifs, ont convenu d'inviter le Conseil de la Société des Nations à examiner tous les aspects des difficultés mentionnées ci-dessus, et après avoir établi ses conclusions en ce qui concerne les intentions que traduit l'article 1^{er} de la convention, à indiquer une frontière entre la Syrie et l'Iraq, définie sur la base de cette convention, mais modifiée pour tenir compte des considérations susvisées, la définition de la frontière ainsi établie devant être acceptée par toutes les parties en cause comme constituant une solution définitive de la question de frontière.

Les deux Gouvernements suggèrent que la tâche du Conseil serait facilitée par la désignation d'une commission qui recueillerait sur le terrain telles informations et ferait telles recommandations qui seraient susceptibles d'aider le Conseil dans l'élaboration de sa décision.

Paris, le 31 octobre 1931.

H. P.
F. H.

Enclosure 4 in No. 77.

Lord Tyrrell to M. Briand.

(Confidential.)

M. le Président,

Paris, October 31, 1931.

WITH reference to the protocol annexed to the notes exchanged this day (Annex A), in so far as it defines the frontier in the sector east of Nasib-Jaber, and, in particular, the 2-mile (3 kilom. 200) zone of security lying in Transjordan territory to the north of the line Samma Tell-Romah, between the meridians of those two points, I have the honour to give your Excellency the following explanations which will be considered as forming an integral part of the agreement reached between our two Governments:—

- (i) For reasons of general security affecting equally the two countries on either side of the frontier owing to the semi-desert character of the regions in question, the Governments concerned will abstain from favouring the establishment, by the populations under their control, of new villages within the 2-mile zone defined above. This undertaking will remain good so long as His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic are associated in the maintenance of order on either side of the frontier.

[6707]

R 4

- (ii) It is understood, for the same reasons, that, without prejudice to the application of the frontier régime as provided in a general manner for the frontier as a whole, the dues and taxes levied upon real property owned, within the 2-mile zone defined above, by the inhabitants of the Syrian and Druse villages, will continue to be paid as in the past, and exclusively for the benefit and at the discretion of the Syrian and Druse Governments. The provision made in this paragraph will remain in force as long as that made in paragraph (i) above.

I have, &c.
TYRRELL.

Enclosure 5 in No. 77.

M. Briand to Lord Tyrrell.

(Confidentiel.)

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 31 octobre 1931.

ME référant au protocole annexé aux lettres échangées en date de ce jour (Annexe A), en tant qu'il définit la frontière dans le secteur situé à l'est de Nasib-Jaber, et en particulier la zone de sécurité de 2 milles (3 kilomètres 200) située en territoire transjordanien au nord de la ligne Samma Tell-Romah, entre les méridiens de ces deux points, j'ai l'honneur de donner à votre Excellence les précisions suivantes, qui seront considérées comme faisant partie intégrante de l'accord intervenu entre nos deux Gouvernements :

1. S'inspirant des raisons de sécurité générale qui intéressent également les deux pays limitrophes à raison du caractère semi-désertique de ces confins, les Gouvernements intéressés s'abstiendront de favoriser l'établissement, par les populations dont ils ont le contrôle, de nouveaux villages dans la zone de 2 milles définie ci-dessus. Cet engagement vaudra aussi longtemps que le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni seront associés au maintien de la sécurité de part et d'autre de la frontière.
2. Il est entendu, pour les mêmes raisons, que, sans préjudice de l'application du régime frontalier tel qu'il est stipulé d'une manière générale pour l'ensemble de la frontière, les impôts et taxes dont sont passibles les immeubles possédés, dans la zone de 2 milles précitée, par les habitants des villages syriens et druses continueront à être payés comme ils l'ont été jusqu'ici au bénéfice et à la diligence exclusifs des Gouvernements syrien ou druse. La stipulation inscrite au présent paragraphe restera en vigueur aussi longtemps que celle inscrite au paragraphe 1 ci-dessus.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
A. BRIAND.

[E 5872/206/89]

No. 78.

Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister to Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 27.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

Downing Street, November 27, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to refer to Major Young's telegram No. 338 of the 14th September and connected correspondence regarding the possibility of the establishment of a monarchy in Syria, and the proposals reported to have been made by the French Government to King Feisal and his brother, ex-King Ali.

2. This question has now been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, and their conclusions have been telegraphed to you in my secret telegram No. 285 of the 21st November. As explained in that telegram, this statement of His Majesty's Government's views is for your own personal

information and guidance only, and not for communication to King Feisal, ex-King Ali, or the Iraqi Government. It is, however, considered that, being in possession of the views of His Majesty's Government, you will be in a position to advise and influence King Feisal and others in accordance with those views.

3. In considering the question of the future government of Syria, it is necessary, first, to define the term "Syria." It seems clear that, when they use the term "Syria" for the present purposes, the French Government mean the State of Syria only, excluding the States of the Alawites (Latakia) and the Jebel Druze, which would remain, at any rate at first, under French military government. So far as concerns the Jebel Druze, it is believed that the French intend to retain control so long as His Majesty's Government retain control of Transjordan. It is also thought probable that the French Government intend to hold the Lebanon, which includes the important towns of Tripoli and Beirut, as long as His Majesty's Government remain in Palestine, and there would, therefore, appear to be little prospect of the Lebanon being included in a Syrian kingdom.

4. From information received from various sources, there seems to be little doubt that the French Government's attitude towards the question of establishing a monarchy in Syria has been gravely misrepresented by King Feisal. That the French Government are contemplating a change of policy in Syria is clear from the statement made by their accredited representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission in June last. This statement records the intention of the mandatory to conclude with the Governments of Syria and the Lebanon in the near future treaties which will take into account the evolution which has taken place, and the progress which has been achieved, in those territories. The statement appears on page 5 of the commission's report to the Council of the League, a copy of which was sent to the Acting High Commissioner under cover of my predecessor's miscellaneous despatch of the 10th September. The exact nature of the impending change of policy is, however, difficult to forecast. What indications there are suggest that the treaties referred to by the French accredited representative would be on the lines of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1922, and would entail the selection of a suitable person who would be proposed to the Syrians for election by plebiscite either as King or President. Nevertheless, it seems likely that, while the French Government would be content to leave the Syrians to choose their own form of government, either a monarchy or a republic, they have from time to time reviewed the merits of various possible candidates for the throne of Syria, including those of certain members of the Hashimite family.

5. Whatever the intentions of the French Government may be, it is clear from Major Young's secret despatch of the 9th October that, since his return to Bagdad, King Feisal has shown that he regards it as settled that he is to be King of Syria as well as of Iraq, and that he is satisfied in his own mind both that the French Government have seriously made the proposal and that His Majesty's Government would raise no objection. It is for this reason that it has been thought necessary to furnish you with an expression of the considered views of His Majesty's Government.

6. So far as the interests of His Majesty's Government are concerned, it would be preferable that Syria should be a republic with a Syrian as President. In that case, the Syrians could develop their country in their own way, possibly on similar lines to Iraq, and would be free from the inevitable intrigues which would result from a connexion with the Hashimite family, or, for that matter, with the Royal families of the Hejaz-Nejd or Egypt.

7. If the crown of Syria is offered to King Feisal, he will almost certainly wish to accept it, as he cannot be expected to resist the opportunity of returning to Damascus as King. It is not clear whether, in this event, the thrones of Iraq and Syria would be united, or whether King Feisal would transfer his crown from Iraq to Syria, but both events are undesirable.

8. Any attempt to unite the crowns of Iraq and Syria would appear to be open to grave objection. King Feisal would probably reside in Syria, as that country has the better climate, and would leave a Regent in Bagdad. His position in Bagdad is already weak, and, as the extent of Iraqi independence increased and British influence and support decreased, his position would almost certainly grow weaker and more difficult to maintain. The ultimate result might well be the subjection of Iraq to Syrian, and thus to French, influence and control.

9. There would also be grave objection to any suggestion that King Feisal should transfer his crown from Iraq to Syria. If such a transfer were to take place, the result might well be the usurpation of power in Iraq by the extreme Nationalist party and the establishment of a republic. Relations between the future British Ambassador in Iraq and the Iraqi Government would be much more difficult if Iraq became a republic than if it remained a monarchy.

10. For these reasons, it seems desirable that King Feisal should be definitely discouraged from pursuing either project, or from giving favourable consideration to any future overtures on the part of the French Government.

11. The same objections would not apply if the choice of a King for Syria should fall on King Feisal's brother, ex-King Ali. Ex-King Ali is, however, a weak character, and it is difficult to forecast whether, in the long run, this solution of the problem would leave the predominating influence with King Feisal and Iraq, or with Syria, and thus with the French. However this may be, it is not easy to see how His Majesty's Government could oppose the candidature of ex-King Ali. Moreover, if a monarchy for Syria is decided upon, a candidate will almost certainly be sought for from Egypt, Hejaz-Nejd or Iraq, and, in that case, it might be in the interests of His Majesty's Government that the choice should fall upon a candidate from Iraq.

12. The considered views of His Majesty's Government may, therefore, be summarised as follows:—

- (i) That the outcome most likely to be to the advantage of His Majesty's Government would be the constitution of Syria as a republic with a Syrian as President.
- (ii) That for a single individual to hold the crowns both of Syria and Iraq would be most undesirable, and would, in any case, be likely to prove unworkable.
- (iii) That any attempt by King Feisal to transfer his crown from Iraq to Syria would be contrary to British interests.
- (iv) That, should the crown of Syria be offered to ex-King Ali, no grounds exist for opposing his candidature.

13. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the High Commissioner for Transjordan for his confidential information.

I have, &c.

P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER.

[E 5980/656/89]

No. 79.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 94.)
Sir,

Damascus, November 23, 1931.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 7 of the 20th November, reporting the dismissal of Sheikh Tajeddin and the proclamation of elections to be held in January, I have the honour to transmit the text of three decrees and the covering letter addressed to the late President of the Council.

2. The first decree creates a consultative council to advise the High Commissioner with regard to the application of the organic statute. The council is composed of past and present high officers of the State of Syria, the rector of the Syrian University, and the presidents of the Chambers of Commerce of Damascus and Aleppo.

3. The functions of the council are purely advisory, and the High Commissioner has power to invite to its sessions (which he will call himself) any person whose views he wishes to hear.

4. I have extracted the list of members from decree No. 1 of the 19th November, and appended it, with notes on the political colouring of individuals, as Enclosure No. 2^(*) to this despatch.

5. Nationalist circles expressed some dissatisfaction with the composition of the council, holding that the number of Nationalist members in no way reflected

^(*) Not printed.

the proportion of Nationalists in the electorate; but, as soon as the terms of the decree had been more carefully digested, it was seen that there was little danger of the council's doing them any harm.

6. The second decree provides for carrying on the administration of the State of Syria until the elections. Its effect is to discard the President of the Council and his unpopular Minister of the Interior, Jemil-el-Ulchi, and to leave the business of the Government in the hands of the four other members of the Cabinet, with the assistance of a Secretariat-General.

7. The question of the Secretariat-General excited some apprehension among Nationalists, who assumed that it was a disguise for direct and autocratic government by the High Commissioner, and that the chief rôle in the Secretariat would be played by a French official. These fears have been in part allayed by the appointment as Secretary-General of Tawfiq-el-Hayani, the Mutassarif of the Hauran, in conjunction with Bedi' Beg El-Muayyad, the present Minister of Agriculture and Commerce and the Acting Minister of Public Works. The former is a native of Aleppo, and not unknown in Damascus; I understand that he is a capable official, without political leanings, and not obnoxious to the Nationalist group. Bedi' Beg El-Muayyad is admittedly Francophile, but his personal reputation is not such as to excite any apprehensions.

8. By the third decree, the High Commissioner assumes the functions of the Chief of the State of Syria for the purpose of the elections, the only other article providing for his consulting the Advisory Council should occasion arise.

9. The promulgation of these decrees is too recent for me to report on their full effect. Nothing in M. Ponsot's past administration had prepared the Syrians for such rapid and decisive action. The first impression of complete shock was followed by a suspicion, not yet quite dissipated, that it was all too good to be true. Two inconclusive meetings have been held by the Nationalist party to decide what reception to accord to the High Commissioner's proclamations; on the arrival of the outlying representatives, a plenary meeting will be convened, and an attitude decided on.

10. In spite of the very remarkable concessions to Nationalist feeling made by the High Commissioner in dismissing Sheikh Tajeddin and Jemil-el-Ulchi, who might be counted on to do their best to rig the elections against them, the Nationalist leaders are still very suspicious. They assert that the presence of the Administrative Governor of Damascus, Wasseq Bey Muayyad, the Acting Director of Police, Bahij Bey Khatib, and the Vali of Aleppo, would be sufficient to exclude any possibility of impartial elections. Their experiences in connexion with the last elections (see my despatch No. 36 of the 27th April, 1928, paragraph 3) justify to a certain extent this attitude, but I have advised one of the leaders, who discussed the point with me, to give the French High Commissioner credit for sincerity of purpose, and at any rate to put their fears before him.

11. It is evident that M. Ponsot's plans were complete before his arrival, and that a cardinal point of his policy is the resumption of friendly relations with the Nationalists. M. Véber, acting High Commissioner's delegate at Damascus, presumably acting under instructions, succeeded in inducing the leaders to travel to Beirut in order to welcome M. Ponsot, for the first time within my recollection. There are various versions of the interview, but it is fairly certain that his words may be taken to convey goodwill and encouragement. On the other hand, the evolution of the Nationalists has been far greater than they themselves are aware, and the extremist of three years ago is very much a moderate to-day. Prophecy is dangerous, but it may at least be said that the field is set under happier auspices than I have yet had to record.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

Enclosure in No. 79.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française en Syrie et au Liban à son Excellence le Cheikh Tadjeddine-el-Hassani, Président du Conseil de l'Etat de Syrie.

M. le Président,

A L'HEURE où s'ouvre pour la Syrie la période de mise en vigueur du Statut organique promulgué le 14 mai 1930, il a paru nécessaire que le représentant de la Puissance mandataire assume plus directement la responsabilité qui lui appartient en vue de l'application de l'Acte de Mandat.

Ainsi prendra fin, conformément aux prévisions exposées à la Société des Nations par les représentants qualifiés du Gouvernement français, et approuvées par elle, le régime provisoire qui devait précéder la mise en vigueur du statut.

Depuis bientôt quatre ans, votre Excellence a bien voulu me donner son concours à la tête du Gouvernement provisoire, et elle en a assumé les charges dans l'esprit défini par les déclarations officielles, qui en avaient par avance fixé, d'accord entre nous, le cours et le terme.

Nous arrivons aujourd'hui au terme de cette étape, et votre Excellence est appelée à prendre place, avec les éminentes personnalités qui ont assumé avant elle la charge du pouvoir depuis l'origine du mandat, au sein du Conseil appelé à m'assister de ses avis au cours de la période où nous entrons jusqu'à l'établissement d'un Gouvernement régulier reconnu.

A cette occasion, il m'est particulièrement agréable de vous exprimer toute mon appréciation pour le concours que vous avez bien voulu m'apporter en des heures parfois difficiles dans l'accomplissement d'une tâche toujours délicate.

De libres élections pour la nomination des membres de la Chambre des Députés de Syrie auront lieu normalement dans le courant de janvier.

Tout mon dessein est qu'elles aient lieu dans l'atmosphère la plus favorable à la confiante collaboration qui sera nécessaire, demain autant qu'aujourd'hui, pour assurer, avec le concours de toutes les bonnes volontés, le succès de l'évolution progressive du mandat suivant les prévisions inscrites à l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Votre Excellence voudra bien trouver ci-joint les trois arrêtés, en date de ce jour, qui fixent, pour cette période transitoire, la répartition et les modalités d'exercice des pouvoirs.

Veuillez, &c.

HENRI PONSOT.

Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire—1931—Syrie No. 1—du 19 Novembre 1931 créant un Conseil consultatif en vue de la mise en vigueur du Statut organique en Syrie.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu les décrets du Président de la République française en date des 23 novembre 1920 et 3 septembre 1926;

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 3111 du 14 mai 1930 promulguant la Constitution syrienne,

Arrête :

Article 1^{er}. Un Conseil est créé pour assister le Haut-Commissaire de ses avis en vue de la mise en vigueur du Statut organique en Syrie.

Art. 2. Le Conseil est ainsi composé :

Sont membres de droit, à titre nominatif, les personnalités qui ont rempli les charges éminentes de l'Etat, suivant la liste chronologique donnée en annexe.

Sont également désignés pour faire partie du Conseil les titulaires actuels des hautes fonctions suivantes :

Président du Conseil d'Etat,
Président de la Cour de Cassation,
Recteur de l'Université de Damas,
Président du Conseil administratif du Sandjak d'Alexandrette,
Présidents des Chambres de Commerce d'Alep et de Damas.

Art. 3. Pourront en outre prendre part aux réunions du Conseil toutes personnes que le Haut-Commissaire estimerait opportun de consulter en Conseil ou de faire entendre par le Conseil.

Art. 4. Le Conseil se réunira à Damas sur la convocation du Haut-Commissaire, soit pour être instruit de la situation, soit pour donner avis sur toute question qui lui serait soumise aux termes de l'article 1^{er}.

Damas, le 19 novembre 1931.

Le Haut-Commissaire,
HENRI PONSOT.

Le Secrétaire général,
D. TETREAU.

*Annexe à l'Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire—1931—Syrie No. 1.—
Liste des Membres du Conseil.*

(A)—Membres de Droit.

Leurs Excellences :

1. Djemil Bey Ulchi, Chef du Gouvernement provisoire 1920.
2. Hakki Bey El Azem, Gouverneur de l'Etat de Damas 1920.
3. Mustapha Bey Barmada, Gouverneur de l'Etat d'Alep 1923.
4. Soubhy Bey Barakat, Président de la Fédération des Etats de Syrie 1923.
5. Son Altesse le Damade Ahmed Namy Bey, Chef de l'Etat de Syrie 1926.
6. Le Cheikh Tageddine-el-Hassani, Président du Conseil 1928.
7. Hachem Bey El Atassy, Président de l'Assemblée constituante 1928.

(B)—Autres membres.

1. Le Président du Conseil d'Etat (Hakki Bey El Azem, déjà membre de droit).
2. Le Président de la Cour de Cassation (Mustapha Bey Barmada, déjà membre de droit).
3. Le Recteur de l'Université de Damas, Riza Bey Said.
4. Le Président du Conseil administratif du Sandjak d'Alexandrette, Ibrahim Bey El Moumen.
5. Le Président de la Chambre de Commerce d'Alep, M. Sélim Djambart.
6. Le Président de la Chambre de Commerce de Damas, M. Aref Halbouni.

Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire—1931—Syrie No. 2—du 19 Novembre 1931, réorganisant les Services du Gouvernement syrien jusqu'à la mise en vigueur de la Constitution de l'Etat de Syrie.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu les décrets du Président de la République française en date des 23 novembre 1930 et 3 septembre 1926,

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 3111 du 14 mai 1930 promulguant la Constitution syrienne,

Arrête :

Article 1^{er}. Jusqu'à la mise en vigueur de la Constitution syrienne et la formation d'un Gouvernement régulier reconnu, les services de l'Etat sont assurés par :

Le Ministère de la Justice,
Le Ministère des Finances,
Le Ministère de l'Instruction publique,
Le Ministère des Travaux publics et de l'Agriculture,

Et par un Secrétariat général, qui assurera, à titre provisoire, l'expédition des affaires courantes rattachées au Ministère de l'Intérieur et à la Présidence du Conseil dans les conditions définies ci-après.

Art. 2. Le Secrétariat général du Gouvernement syrien assure l'expédition des affaires courantes rattachées au Ministère de l'Intérieur, sous la signature d'un Ministre en exercice désigné à cet effet, et avec le concours du délégué du Haut-Commissaire siégeant en Conseil.

Tous documents officiels, arrêtés et décisions dont l'approbation est réservée au Chef de l'Etat par les textes en vigueur, sont centralisés, avant signature, au Secrétariat général.

La signature dans ce cas sera donnée conjointement par deux Ministres en exercice, à la diligence du Secrétariat général et avec le concours du délégué du Haut-Commissaire siégeant en Conseil.

Le Secrétariat général assure enfin la promulgation et la publication de tous actes officiels au "Journal officiel."

Le conseiller délégué du Haut-Commissaire auprès de l'Etat de Syrie exerce, en contact direct avec le Secrétariat général, le contrôle qui lui appartient en vertu des textes en vigueur.

Art. 3. Restent en fonctions à la tête de leurs Départements respectifs les titulaires actuels des Ministères de la Justice, des Finances, de l'Instruction publique, des Travaux publics et de l'Agriculture.

La direction du Secrétariat général est assurée par un haut fonctionnaire désigné à cet effet.

Damas, le 19 novembre 1931.

Le Haut-Commissaire,
HENRI PONSOT.

Le Secrétaire général,
D. TETREAU.

Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire—1931—Syrie No. 3—du 19 Novembre 1931, portant Modification, en vue de la mise en vigueur de la Constitution syrienne, de l'Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 1889 du 20 Mars 1928 relatif aux Elections.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu les décrets du Président de la République française en date des 23 novembre 1920 et 3 septembre 1926;

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 3111 du 14 mai 1930 promulguant la Constitution syrienne;

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire créant un Conseil consultatif en vue de la mise en vigueur du Statut organique en Syrie;

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire réorganisant les services du Gouvernement syrien jusqu'à la formation d'un Gouvernement régulier reconnu;

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 1889 du 20 mars 1928 relatif aux élections en Syrie,

Arrête :

Article 1^{er}. En ce qui concerne la procédure des élections, le Haut-Commissaire de la République française exercera les attributions spéciales déléguées au Chef de l'Etat par l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 1889 du 20 mars 1928, notamment celles prévues aux articles 3, 29, 31, 42, 51, 56 et 95, rappelées en annexe.

Art. 2. Dans les cas prévus à l'article précédent, le Haut-Commissaire est assisté, s'il y a lieu, par le Conseil consultatif créé en vue de la mise en vigueur du Statut organique.

Damas, le 19 novembre 1931.

Le Haut-Commissaire,
HENRI PONSOT.

Le Secrétaire général,
D. TETREAU.

Annexe à l'Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire—1931—Syrie No. 3.—Dispositions de l'Arrêté No. 1889 du 20 Mars 1928 relatif à la Procédure électorale visées par l'Arrêté No. 3 du 19 Novembre 1931.

Article 3. Un arrêté du Chef de l'Etat fixe, avant chaque période électorale, le nombre des représentants pour chaque circonscription électorale et la communauté religieuse à laquelle ils doivent appartenir.

Art. 29. . . . il n'y a pas vote au premier degré dans les cazas de Hassetché et Khérou; les électeurs au deuxième degré dans ces cazas sont désignés, au jour fixé par les élections, par le Conseil des Anciens de chaque tribu sédentaire ou semi-sédentaire; le nombre des électeurs du deuxième degré à désigner est fixé par un arrêté du Chef de l'Etat.

Art. 31. . . . Les collèges électoraux sont convoqués par arrêté du Chef de l'Etat. Cet arrêté fixe le jour et les heures d'ouverture et de clôture du scrutin; il doit être publié dix jours au moins avant la date fixée pour le scrutin du premier degré.

Art. 42. Dans les agglomérations urbaines, il est procédé au scrutin selon les formes prévues à l'article ci-dessus.

Un arrêté du Chef de l'Etat déterminera, avant l'ouverture des opérations électorales, la liste de ces agglomérations.

Art. 51. Vingt-cinq jours au plus tard avant les élections du second degré, le Chef de l'Etat fixera le jour auquel il sera procédé au scrutin pour ces élections, ainsi que les heures d'ouverture et de clôture. Ces dispositions, et celles qui sont prévues par l'article 31 ci-dessus, peuvent faire l'objet d'un seul et même arrêté, les deux délais impartis peuvent partir de la même date.

Les électeurs du second degré doivent recevoir officiellement notification de cet arrêté.

Art. 56. . . . Cinq jours au maximum après la réception au Ministère de l'Intérieur des procès-verbaux de vérification, la proclamation du résultat des élections au Conseil représentatif est faite par le Chef de l'Etat, qui en prescrit et en fait assumer immédiatement l'affichage dans chaque circonscription électorale.

Art. 95. Les arrêtés du Chef de l'Etat ordonneront toutes mesures utiles pour l'application du présent arrêté.

[E 6291/656/89]

No. 80.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 100. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, December 11, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 94 of the 23rd November, regarding the political situation, I have the honour to report that the primary elections have been fixed for the 20th December and the secondary elections for the 5th January.

2. Progress has been a little painful, the Nationalists finding M. Ponsot less tractable than the first effusions had led them to hope. Their endeavours to extract a statement of the broad lines of the future treaty and guarantees of impartial elections were unsuccessful, M. Ponsot eluding an interview with Hashem-el-Atassi by paying a flying visit to Sueida and returning direct to Beirut.

3. A meeting of the new Advisory Council was convened on the 7th November, not so much to advise as to listen to the High Commissioner's statement of his intentions. Hashem-el-Atassi did not attend. A slight passage of arms occurred between the High Commissioner and two of the members (Subhi Bey Barakat and Damad Ahmad Namy Bey) on the expediency of again inviting him, which revealed a somewhat more vigorous sympathy with his action than might have been expected. The High Commissioner then read his speech and distributed copies to the press.

4. M. Ponsot's utterances are rare and intended to be final; I have therefore appended the full text as Enclosure No. 1 to this despatch. The chief passages of interest, besides the proclamation of the elections, deal with the impossibility

of preliminary discussion of the treaty or modification of the existing Electoral Law, in spite of its many admitted imperfections.

5. The disappointment of the Nationalist party was aggravated by the arrival of reports from the rural districts that the French Administration is exerting pressure to secure the return of secondary electors who may be counted on to vote as directed. (I may remark that my own information corroborates these reports.) There was not, however, any serious probability of their abstention, and the two days that elapsed before the publication of their manifesto were spent rather in elaborating its style than in reaching a decision on its subject-matter.

6. The manifesto, after a long and eloquent rehearsal of the Nationalists' past efforts and disappointments in the service of the best interests of Syria, announces their intention to contest the elections, in spite of the refusal of the High Commissioner to satisfy any of their legitimate demands; they have been impelled to make this concession by the official declarations at Geneva and Damascus that France will conclude with the Government elected a treaty which will replace the hated unilateral mandate. They must take their place in the Assembly with full liberty of action to defend their country's interests. However, any sign of loyalty or sincerity on the French side will call forth an immediate response on their part.

7. This document is too long to translate in full; a brief and fairly exact summary from the local press forms Enclosure No. 2.⁽¹⁾

8. One may read between the lines a certain apprehension that they will find themselves in a minority in the new Assembly. The Electoral Law has many clauses which work in their disfavour, and the officials who will be in charge of the poll have already shown in 1928 that the Nationalists have reason to distrust them. It is, however, probable that the High Commissioner will not countenance any open manipulation of the votes, but rely on subtler methods, such as a reshuffling of Deputies under the Electoral Law. For example, the Greek Catholic community of Damascus, which in 1928 returned a Nationalist member, will have no representative this year, while the Aleppo community will have its turn. Similarly, the Meidan quarter, which returned about 170 Nationalist secondary electors, is now discovered to have a much smaller population and will only return 140.

9. All these questions are very academic. The High Commissioner will probably find that, however the majority may label itself, it will in the main trend towards the Nationalist view as soon as the Chamber meets. Arabs are extremely susceptible to eloquence, which, indeed, they rate among the three cardinal virtues, and it is evident that the Nationalist theme lends itself to oratory. There is, however, very little difference in view between Nationalists, moderates, and indeed the High Commissioner himself, and it should not be too hard for them to work together as far as the signature of a treaty on the lines of ours with Iraq. Unfortunately, both French and Syrians are unnecessarily insistent on maintaining their formulas and generally saving face, and the event is continually at the mercy of a childish fit of petulance on one side or the other. For the moment there is a most unusual display of sweet reasonableness on all sides, and Ramadan may well find the lion lying down with the lamb according to the best precedents.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

Enclosure in No. 80.

Discours du Haut-Commissaire.

Messieurs,

LE conseil institué par l'arrêté du 19 novembre en vue de l'application du Statut organique se réunit pour la première fois.

Je suis heureux de rencontrer ici les hautes personnalités qui, à des titres divers, ont été associées aux responsabilités du Gouvernement en Syrie depuis dix ans.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Je fais à nouveau appel à leur concours et leur demande aujourd'hui de m'aider à franchir la première étape dans l'application du Statut organique que marquent des élections destinées à permettre la constitution d'un Gouvernement régulier, étape décisive vers le règlement définitif auquel tous aspirent.

Est-il besoin de rappeler ici que, suivant un vœu maintes fois exprimé, ce règlement durable des relations entre la France et la Syrie prendra forme de traité?

J'en ai fait la première déclaration, le 15 février 1928, à la veille des dernières élections, et l'ai renouvelée le 14 mai 1930 en transmettant à M. Aristide Briand, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, le Statut organique.

Il n'a pas dépendu de moi que ces prévisions fussent plus tôt suivies d'effet.

Je m'en suis expliqué sans détour et de la façon la plus complète à la Société des Nations devant la Commission permanente des Mandats, le 27 juin 1930, et, si vous vous référez à cet exposé, publié au Procès-verbal de la dix-huitième Session (pages 120 à 129), vous vous rendrez compte que mon habituel silence n'est pas fait d'indifférence et connaît, lorsqu'il le faut, d'importantes exceptions.

Depuis lors, la politique du traité a fait son chemin en France comme à Genève. J'en veux pour preuve le remarquable rapport présenté en 1931 par M. Paganon à la Chambre française des Députés, à l'occasion de la discussion du budget des Affaires étrangères.

A Genève, le Gouvernement français a pris position cette année en des termes qui vous sont déjà connus par la presse, soit à l'occasion de l'examen du rapport annuel à la Commission permanente des Mandats, le 11 juin 1931, soit surtout au cours de la soixante-quatrième session du Conseil, le 4 septembre dernier, à l'occasion d'un débat plus large, qui devait fixer la doctrine de la Société des Nations elle-même en ce qui concerne l'évolution et la fin des mandats.

Les hommes politiques à qui incombera la tâche de guider l'évolution de la Syrie vers les destinées qui lui sont assurées par l'article 22 du Pacte, trouveront dans ces textes les déclarations officielles et les apaisements qu'ils recherchent, et l'indication des garanties qui doivent nécessairement entourer cette évolution.

C'est ainsi, en pleine clarté, je vous invite à collaborer avec moi.

La période électorale s'ouvrira demain. Je me propose de fixer le premier tour de scrutin au 20 décembre et le second au 5 janvier.

Ces élections, comme je l'ai dit, doivent permettre de former un Gouvernement régulier qualifié pour engager, le moment venu, la négociation destinée à fixer par traité les relations définitives entre la France et la Syrie.

C'est, en effet, avec les représentants autorisés de la Syrie, et avec eux seuls, que le Haut-Commissaire de la République française peut suivre une négociation qui permette, en dégagant les éléments essentiels du problème, d'atteindre un règlement qui satisfasse à un égal degré les parties en cause.

Il eût donc été prématuré, autant que peu conforme aux principes constitutionnels, d'ouvrir avant l'heure un tel débat par des consultations officieuses. Mais l'étude approfondie de tous les aspects internationaux aussi bien que nationaux du problème, à laquelle j'ai procédé, tant à Paris qu'à Genève, me permet de renouveler aujourd'hui mes déclarations antérieures, avec le sentiment qu'un règlement rapide—qui tiendra compte cependant des étapes nécessaires—sera désormais possible, si le Gouvernement issu des élections est animé de dispositions analogues aux nôtres.

C'était un des principaux desseins que j'avais en vue en instituant le conseil qui nous réunit aujourd'hui, de pouvoir m'expliquer librement devant vous, assuré que seuls des entretiens poursuivis à ciel ouvert permettraient d'élever les points de vue particuliers au plan de l'intérêt général.

De multiples questions ont été portées devant l'opinion.

Des points d'interrogation ont été posés, comme pour demander si l'opération politique actuelle pouvait se suffire à elle-même sans que fussent au préalable données ou promises certaines satisfactions qu'il n'est pas besoin, pour être entendu, de préciser davantage devant des esprits aussi avertis que les vôtres.

Il n'est rien de nouveau dans la position de ces problèmes. Ils ne sont point liés à l'opération en cours. Ils ne sont point à l'ordre du jour.

Il s'agit aujourd'hui des élections.

A ce sujet, je dirai hautement et clairement que, quelque imparfait que soit le système électoral actuel—et bien des critiques pourraient être faites en sens divers par toute personne ayant, comme nous l'avons tous ici, quelque expérience

[6707]

du sujet—il y a plus de justice à maintenir ce système connu et pratiqué depuis longtemps, qu'à le modifier aujourd'hui en dehors des prévisions constitutionnelles pour donner satisfaction à des intérêts qui, quelque respectables qu'ils soient, en certains cas, du point de vue individuel ou au regard des communautés, ne sauraient dans les conditions présentes l'emporter sur l'intérêt général.

Ce qui importe c'est l'atmosphère dans laquelle se déroulera cette consultation électorale, et c'est pour la fixer, en quelque sorte, au-dessus des partis, que je vous ai conviés à cette réunion, désireux de bien marquer que la Puissance mandataire, malgré le cours inéluctable des événements, n'oublie pas les services rendus au pays et fait appel à la bonne volonté de vous tous pour établir, sur une base inébranlable, les rapports amicaux et confiants qui doivent unir, pour leur bien et leur prospérité commune, la France et la Syrie.

De l'équilibre politique que nous recherchons, résulteront, en effet, d'autres bienfaits. Ce ne sera pas le moindre de pouvoir travailler plus activement, avec les garanties de sécurité nécessaires, dans le domaine économique et social qui, au delà des élites, intéresse la masse entière de la nation.

A cette œuvre, il conviendra que collaborent les organismes, municipalités, conseils administratifs, chambres de commerce, chambres d'agriculture trop peu associés jusqu'ici à la gestion des affaires publiques dans le plan économique et social, où leur action, cependant plus proche des intérêts à satisfaire, doit s'avérer féconde.

Je ne doute point, en formulant ce vœu, de répondre à votre pensée commune.

Au regard des grands desseins qui viennent d'être mentionnés, il ne nous reste aujourd'hui à régler que des questions de moindre portée et d'intérêt plus spécialement technique touchant les élections.

Voici le texte des projets d'arrêtés destinés à convoquer le collège électoral et à fixer le nombre des Députés et la communauté religieuse à laquelle ils doivent appartenir conformément à la loi en vigueur.

HENRI PONSOT.

Annexes.^(*)

1. Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire (Syrie, No. 6) portant convocation des Collèges électoraux en vue de la Désignation des Membres de la Chambre des Députés.

2. Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire (Syrie, No. 7) fixant le Nombre des Représentants à la Chambre des Députés et la Communauté religieuse à laquelle ils doivent appartenir.

(*) Not printed.

[E 6399/656/89]

No. 81.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 102. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, December 17, 1931.

SINCE I last reported to you in my despatch No. 100 of the 11th December, the political atmosphere has changed for the worse.

2. The immediate cause was a gang-fight which occurred on the 13th December, the outcome of a long-standing feud between Sheikh Taj-ed-Din-el-Hassani and Fakhri Baroudi. It is difficult to assign responsibilities, but there seems to be some justification for the Nationalist assertion that the intervention of the police was far from impartial. The customary strikes and demonstrations ensued, with the old threat of abstention from the elections. According to this morning's press this threat will be carried out, but I have reason to believe that the National party will behave more sensibly.

3. In the meantime, political groups have formed and re-formed with something of the easy speed of the kaleidoscope. There are four parties in the field—the Government party (Sheikh Taj-ed-Din-el-Hassani), the Monarchists (Rikabi Pasha), the Reform party (Hakki-el-Azm), and the Nationalists. The monarchical idea has made great progress during the summer; the moderate pro-French views of the Reform party have also gained favour among thinking people. The Nationalists themselves had swung very near to the moderates, and had quite given up their old ideas of getting rid of the mandatory Power at any price. The election seemed to be an open event, with very small chance of a large majority for any party.

4. The upshot of last week's political manoeuvres has been the formation of a loose coalition of the three parties against the Nationalists. The list of candidates (the only one yet published) is as follows:—

Sheikh Taj-ed-Din-el-Hassani, ex-Acting President.

Bedi-el-Muayyad, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce and the Acting Minister of Public Works, Reform party.

Hussein Auni Beg El Qudmani, member of the Reform party.

Rida Pasha Rikabi, chief of Monarchist party.

Nessib Beg El Bakri, rebel in 1925, now supporter of Sheikh Taj-ed-Din-el-Hassani.

Ata Beg El Ayoubi, moderate, has held office under Hakki Beg El Azm.

Reshid Beg Tarabishi, moderate, and a notable of the Shaghour quarter.

Zeki Beg Sukkar, a Meidan notable, colourless.

Tawfiq Shamié, Minister of Finance (Greek Orthodox seat).

Yussuf Liniado, colourless (Jew seat).

5. There are men of undoubted capacity in the group. However much Sheikh Taj-ed-Din-el-Hassani may be detested by a large section of the electorate, there can be no doubt of the political subtlety which has kept him in power for nearly four years. Rikabi Pasha has a very strong personality and long experience of government. Ata Beg El Ayoubi is one of the cleverest men in Syria. Bedi Beg El Muayyad and Tawfiq Shamié have both a good deal of administrative experience without any remarkable talents. The group thus presents the elements of a capable Government, while subject to the unavoidable internal strains of every coalition.

6. It is, however, a matter for sincere regret that the French Administration has not been successful in maintaining the excellent atmosphere which I recorded in my despatch No. 94 of the 23rd November. At that moment there was every prospect of the election of an Assembly of moderate views, enjoying popular confidence and fully prepared to co-operate with the mandatory Power. All that the High Commissioner needed to do was to keep the ring, to allow the parties to fight the elections between them, while they themselves maintained an attitude of impartial benevolence.

7. This has unfortunately proved to be beyond their powers. If in point of fact they have not interfered, they have been so clumsy as to have every appearance of doing so. The Nationalists have consequently received a new accession of strength, and signs are not wanting that, instead of a contest between one moderate Nationalist party and another slightly less moderate, the election will be fought as between the Nationalists and the mandatory Power.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

[E 6376/206/89]

No. 82.

Mr. Morgan to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 433.)

Sir,

Angora, December 23, 1931.

WITH reference to your secret despatch No. 594 of the 30th November last, regarding the question of the possible establishment of a monarchy in Syria, I have the honour to report that, in this connexion, public attention has recently been focussed by the press on the ex-Khedive, Abbas Hilmi Pasha.

2. Abbas Hilmi Pasha is a frequent visitor to Turkey, but his movements usually excite little public comment. For the last three weeks, however, he has been the subject of numerous allusions in the press, which has recorded that he visited Angora on the 6th December and had a long interview with Ismet Pasha; that, later, he was received by the President of the Republic, whom he first met, some twenty years ago, during the Turco-Italian war; and that, before his departure from Angora, on the 10th instant, he was the guest of honour at a public luncheon offered by Tevfik Rüstü Bey in the Angora Palace, the Egyptian Minister being one of the guests. Finally, it was announced that he left Constantinople by the Taurus Express on the 19th December (accompanied by Arif Pasha, Hasan Nasir Bey and Mahmoud Azmi Bey, who is presumably the person referred to in Sir P. Loraine's Confidential telegram No. 8, Saving, of the 29th November to you) in order to visit Transjordan, at the invitation of the Emir Abdullah, and that he would break his journey at Beirut, where he would be officially received by the French High Commissioner, and an official banquet would be given in his honour, and at Jerusalem, where he would stay for some days.

3. The conclusion drawn by the press is that Abbas Hilmi Pasha aspires to the Throne of Syria, and that his interviews at Angora had reference to his aspirations. Against this are to be set Abbas Hilmi Pasha's own denial that his journey has any connexion with the question of the Syrian Throne, and a *démenti* of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, published on the 18th December by the Anatolian Agency, of the reports that M. Ponsot and the French Government had approved the ex-Khedive's candidature for the Throne of Syria, and that a monarchy would shortly be established in that country.

4. It may be mentioned here that Abbas Hilmi Pasha was reported in the "Son Posta" as having sent a telegram of congratulation on the occasion of the opening of the Moslem Congress. He has now denied this, and added that although invited to the congress he declined the invitation.

5. Turkey's interest in the future of Syria is known, and, as mentioned in my despatch No. 432 of to-day, she would prefer a completely independent Syria to one wholly or partly under French control. She would, I think, not object to see Abbas Hilmi on the Throne of Syria, as he could be counted on to be sufficiently pliant in her regard. It may be, too, that Turkey considers that Abbas Hilmi's Francophile sentiments will render him acceptable as a candidate, and will enable him to avert what Turkey considers a disagreeable probability, namely, that Syria will not be given independence as a whole, but will be divided into numerous States, with each of which France will maintain the closest contact and relations.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 6413/206/89]

No. 83.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 23. Saving. Most Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, December 21, 1931.

MY telegram No. 8, Saving (see No. 112).

Prime Minister informs me privately that he has questioned French Minister about reported support by French High Commissioner of candidature of ex-Khedive to Throne of Syria. French Minister expressed his conviction that report was unfounded, and his opinion that French Government and Parliament

would be opposed to having ex-Khedive as King of Syria; at Sidky's request French Minister is asking French Government's authority to give Sidky a definite assurance on the point and expects to secure it. Sidky has also ascertained that French Government would not favour candidature of King Feisul either. He gathers position to be that French have not invited candidatures, but if they did these two particular ones would not be agreeable to them. I am of course aware of semi-official French denial which has appeared in the press on both these subjects.

Prime Minister's *démarche* had the deliberate object of blocking the candidature of ex-Khedive.

I gather—

1. That King Fuad as well as his Excellency would view with grave concern any prospect of his Highness filling Syrian Throne.
2. That they would dislike choice of any member of Shereefian family.
3. That at an opportune moment they will press for choice of a prince of House of Mohammed Ali.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut and Jedda.)

CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

[E 3450/1/93]

No. 84.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Graham (Rome).(No. 834.)
Sir,*Foreign Office, July 2, 1931.*

THE Italian Ambassador called upon me this morning. In the course of conversation he raised the question of the admission of Iraq to the League, and reverted to the idea of the despatch of a commission to Iraq to investigate conditions on the spot.

I explained to the Ambassador exactly the position of His Majesty's Government in the matter. The Iraqis felt that a sufficient stage of progress had been reached in their country to justify their becoming a member of the League of Nations. His Majesty's Government felt that it was very difficult to resist this point of view, and for this reason they were ready to support the application of the Iraqis for membership of the League of Nations. As regards the conditions of entry, I told the Ambassador that that was a matter for the League to decide, but that as regards the despatch of a commission to Iraq to investigate conditions on the spot, that was a step which His Majesty's Government would deprecate, having regard to the political difficulties which the despatch of such a commission would raise in Iraq.

The Italian Ambassador said that it was the intention of Signor Grandi to write me a letter setting out the views of the Italian Government. I told Signor Bordonaro that I would await that letter and would give careful consideration to the Italian point of view.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 3506/1/93]

No. 85.

M. Bordonaro to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 7.)

Dear Mr. Henderson,

Italian Embassy, July 6, 1931.

REFERRING to what I had the honour of telling you the other day about the end of the Iraq mandate, I wish to call your attention on certain considerations my Government have directed me to explain on the subject.

The Italian Government have nothing, in principle, against the end of the Iraq mandate, but they wish to make some reservations about the way chosen by the mandatory Power to reach this end. They desire to avoid public differences at Geneva on this subject, hoping that a preliminary and frank exchange of views and a comprehensive examination of the position may conciliate in a cordial agreement the attainment of the British Government's aim without prejudicing the procedure to be adopted in future cases and safeguarding, at the same time, Italian interests.

In admitting that the Council of the League should be called upon to judge about Iraq's capacity to self-government, on the only base of the elements provided by the representatives of the mandatory Power, one would create a dangerous precedent for the day in which the end of any other mandate would be discussed.

It would seem that the mandatory Power, in her own interest, should leave to the League of Nations the right to investigate and have full knowledge of the matter. The League should have the right to proceed to a direct enquiry to be able to form a judgment if the ward is ripe for emancipation.

This point of view of the Italian Government does not arise from any feeling of distrust towards the mandatory Power, but from the wish on one side to put the League in a position to be able to fully judge if the finality of the mandate, as established by article 22 of the Covenant, has been reached, and, on the other, to avoid a precedent which could be invoked on future occasions.

The periodical reports of the mandatory Power to the Permanent Mandate Commission may be considered sufficient for the control of the normal working of the mandate. But in the case of the end of a mandate you will agree that a more exhaustive examination of the whole achievement of the mandatory Power and of the present conditions of the State in question would be necessary to be able to judge whether this State has reached the desired maturity for self-government.

This enquiry should be trusted to the League of Nations, as representative of all the Allied Powers who share an equal right of sovereignty on the territories under mandate.

The Italian Government are also anxious to be assured that a situation will never arise by which their citizens and interests should have a treatment of inferiority to that of any other foreign nation, and that they should enjoy equal rights to those which they have enjoyed during the mandate.

I hope, my dear Mr. Henderson, that you will find your way to pay some attention to this matter, to which my Government attach a considerable importance, in so far as it is connected with the good general relations between our two countries.

Believe me, &c.

A. BORDONARO.

[E 3276/38/93]

No. 86.

Mr. A. Henderson to United States Chargé d'Affaires.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 9, 1931.

I HAVE received with pleasure the note which you were good enough to address to me on the 19th June, to the effect that the Government of the United States, under the terms of article 6 of the Tripartite Convention of the 9th January, 1930, consent to the substitution of the Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of the 4th March, 1931, for the agreement of the 25th March, 1924, and to the application of the new agreement to nationals of the United States in Iraq, upon its entry into force in accordance with its terms.

2. I have the honour to request that you will inform the United States Government that the ratifications of the Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of the 4th March, 1931, were exchanged at Bagdad on the 29th May, and that the agreement has therefore now entered into force.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 3634/3137/93]

No. 87.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 223.)

Sir,

Angora, July 8, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 196 of the 10th June last, I have the honour to report that King Feisal arrived here from Bagdad on the 6th instant on an official visit, which ends this evening.

2. The arrangements for His Majesty's journey from the Turkish frontier onwards and for his entertainment here were very similar to those made for the visit of the Earl of Athlone and Princess Alice in April, the only difference being that, since the visit was an official one from the Head of a State, the President of the Republic met the King at the station here, and a salute of twenty-one guns was fired as the Royal train came in. The three days spent in Angora have been fully occupied with the usual luncheons, dinners and receptions. King Feisal was accompanied by Rustam Haidar, Minister of Finance, his Chamberlain and an aide-de-camp. Nuri Pasha, the Prime Minister of Iraq, who is returning from Europe to Bagdad, met His Majesty at Angora.

3. The origin of the visit still remains wrapped in a certain obscurity, but I am inclined to think that the simple explanation which I have deduced from my talks with the King and Nuri Pasha is right, namely, that the King

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wished to come into personal contact with the Gazi and to get by personal observation some idea of the development of Turkey and its capital. The King's journey to Europe afforded a natural opportunity for this, and it was equally natural to arrange for the Iraqi Prime Minister to pass through Angora on his way back to Bagdad in order that outstanding questions between the two countries might be discussed at the same time. But I do not think that these discussions were in themselves the motive of the visit. In fact, when I asked Nuri Pasha on Monday evening how the various questions were getting on, he replied that, while of course prepared to talk on any point that the Turks chose to raise, neither the King nor he himself intended to initiate such discussions. Yesterday evening he told me that in the course of the day the Turks had touched upon the three outstanding points, the Treaty of Commerce and Residence, frontier incidents, and oil royalties.

4. The talk about the treaty of commerce was rather for the purpose of speeding up the negotiations than for settling disputed points. As regards the violation of the frontier, the Turkish Government had undertaken to send strict instructions to their frontier authorities to punish the offenders and prevent the recurrence of these regrettable incidents, and Nuri Pasha expressed himself as quite satisfied with the assurances that he had obtained and said that there was now no need for me to associate myself with, or support, the Iraqi protest. Accordingly, unless and until there is some fresh development, I do not propose to take action under the instruction conveyed to me in your telegram No. 20 to Constantinople of the 3rd June.

5. As for oil, Nuri Pasha's account was not very clear, and we were continually interrupted during our conversations, but both he and Tefik Rüstü Bey gave me to understand that there was a possibility of meeting the wishes of the Turkish Government by acceding to its claim that the twenty-five years of payment of royalties should date from the new agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company, and not from the Mosul Treaty. Nothing definite had been settled as yet, but both parties seemed hopeful of reaching agreement.

6. As regards the visit itself, there is no doubt that it has given considerable pleasure to the Turks, partly because it gratifies their national vanity, which sees in such events a pleasing and public tribute to the importance of their country, and partly because it is an undeniable proof of genuinely good and friendly relations. The formal speeches exchanged between the Gazi and King Feisal at the President's dinner on Monday, of which I enclose the text herein,⁽¹⁾ are more or less platitudinous, but Turkish sentiment is more precisely set forth in a leading article in the "République" of yesterday, of which I also enclose a copy.⁽²⁾ Incidentally it is perhaps worth noting that Yunus Nadi, the writer of the article and no particular friend of ours, observes that the excellent relations prevailing between Turkey and Iraq owe their birth to the uprightness of England in its character of mandatory Power, a point to which the Gazi also deliberately drew King Feisal's attention when I was talking with them yesterday evening. I have also the impression that King Feisal has been genuinely pleased with his reception here and feels that his idea of making the visit has been completely justified.

7. The visit seems to have caused a certain flutter in the French dove-cote, and my French colleague admitted to me that he had been a little harassed by requests from his Government as to the meaning to be attached to this political manifestation. I gave M. de Chambrun my own opinion as to the genesis of the visit in the same words as I have used in this despatch, very greatly to his relief, for he told me that he had already, failing to find any other reasonable explanation, telegraphed in much the same sense to Paris, and he was frankly delighted to have his views confirmed by me. He did not tell me that it was not surprising that our views coincided, for, as I have since discovered, his were based on a conversation with a member of my staff.

8. I should perhaps also put on record that both King Feisal and the Gazi have been almost demonstratively friendly to me personally during the visit. In the case of the Gazi the method employed was to call me to stand between him and King Feisal, while he held forth at length on his great pleasure at the visit, his sincere feeling of mutual friendliness between the two countries, his appreciation of our share in bringing this about, all of these happy sentiments being

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

pledged, much, I surmise, to the King's discomfort, in bumpers of sweet champagne. King Feisal, for his part, has gone out of his way to show a desire to meet and talk with me and his pleasure at my tentative offer to entertain him at Constantinople, which he admitted he had hoped I would make.

9. The King left for Constantinople this evening, the departure being marked by the same ceremonial as the arrival, with the added thrill of Turkey's foremost airman performing evolutions in a machine constructed entirely by himself at a height of a few feet over our heads. In Constantinople the King's visit becomes a private one, although he will be lodged in the Palace of Dolmabahçe. I shall have the honour to entertain King Feisal to dinner at His Majesty's Embassy on Saturday next, and he intends to leave on the Sunday or Monday for Berne, where he will spend a month for medical treatment and then go on to London.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

[E 3580/5/93]

No. 88.

Sir L. Oliphant to Mr. Atherton.

My dear Atherton,

Foreign Office, July 17, 1931.

IN the absence of the Secretary of State and of General Dawes, I write to let you know that the questions raised in his Excellency's letter of the 23rd April to Mr. Henderson on the subject of oil concessions in Iraq, have been carefully considered and have been brought to the notice of the Iraqi Government.

To obviate any misunderstanding which may exist, I would draw attention to the fact that article 11 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, and article (1) of the protocol attached to the Tripartite Convention of the 9th January, 1930, relate only to discrimination on grounds of nationality. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, they do not require that every concession shall, before being granted, be put up to public tender, but only that in all matters relating to the grant of concessions, the decision of the Iraqi Government must be based upon the best interests of Iraq, to the exclusion of all considerations of nationality. The Iraqi Government did not of course themselves seek out or approach the British Oil Development Company. It was the company which took the initiative and approached the Iraqi Government with certain offers, and it is the opinion of His Majesty's Government that other oil interests have had similar opportunities and sources of information, and that it has been open to them to approach the Iraqi Government in the same way as did the British Oil Development Company. Had they done so, the Iraqi Government would have felt themselves bound to consider, and undoubtedly would have considered, their offers in the same way as they have considered the offers made by the British Oil Development Company.

In fact, however, the Iraqi Government have not at present granted any concession to the British Oil Development Company, and, although they cannot bind themselves to postpone indefinitely the grant of concessions in the remaining available oil-bearing land in Iraq, the United States Government will see from the terms of a notice issued in the Iraq "Official Gazette" on the 21st June (a copy of which I enclose for convenience of reference), that they are still free and willing to consider offers which may be made to them before the 30th September next, by any other oil interests, in respect of the whole or any part of the area remaining outside the concessions already granted to the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Yours very sincerely,
LANCLOT OLIPHANT.

Enclosure in No. 88.

Extract from English Version of Iraq "Official Gazette" of June 21, 1931.

NOTICE.

THE Government is prepared to consider applications from responsible corporations, firms, or individuals for the grant of an oil concession or concessions for the whole or any portion of Iraq over which concessionary rights have not already been granted to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) by the agreement dated the 24th day of May, 1926, between the Government and the said company and to the Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), by the agreement dated the 24th March, 1931, between the Government and the said company.

Applications should be submitted by registered letter to the Minister of Economics and Communications, the Serai, Bagdad, before the 30th day of September, 1931, and should indicate the area over which concessionary rights are required, the general conditions upon which the applicant would accept a concession, and also the financial ability of the applicant to fulfil the obligations of such a concession.

The Government reserves absolute discretion to select for further discussion such applications (if any) as may appear to it to be in the best interests of the State, but such selection shall not bind the Government to grant a concession.

[E 3760/3137/93]

No. 89.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 229.)

Sir,

Constantinople, July 14, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 223 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that King Feisal, accompanied by the Minister of Finance and the Grand Chamberlain, left Turkey to-day for Vienna and Berne on the conclusion of his visit to this country, Nuri Pasha having already left direct for Bagdad yesterday. I enclose a copy of the official communiqué recording the political results of the visit.

2. The King's stay in Constantinople has been entirely unofficial, though His Majesty has remained the guest of the Gazi in Dolmabahçe Palace. The time has been occupied by excursions to Yalova, the forest of Belgrade, and the Bosphorus, and visits to His Majesty's relations and the haunts of his youth, the only social engagements accepted by the King being to dine with me and to lunch with the Egyptian Minister, who is an old personal friend of His Majesty's, having been, in an earlier stage of his career, the King's lawyer.

3. Both at my dinner-party and to-day, when I said good-bye to King Feisal at the station, His Majesty and his suite all expressed themselves, and, I think, genuinely, as delighted with the visit and its excellent effect on the relations between the two countries, a sentiment which I am tempted to share. One tangible, and, for the Turks, gratifying, result has been that the Iraqi Government has agreed to give Turkey the 10 per cent. of the £400,000 to be paid to Iraq by the Iraq Petroleum Company under the new agreement concluded in March last.

4. I am recording the impressions derived from my conversations with King Feisal and Nuri Pasha in a separate despatch, No. 230, of to-day.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 89.

*Extract from the "Akham" of July 9, 1931.**Le Voyage du Roi Fayçal et l'Amitié turco-irakienne.*

AU cours de la visite par laquelle Sa Majesté le Roi de l'Irak a bien voulu honorer Ankara, plusieurs entrevues, empreintes d'une sincère cordialité, se déroulèrent entre lui et son Excellence le Président de la République. Au cours des prises de contact et des conversations qui eurent lieu également entre le Président du Conseil et Saïd Nouri Pacha, le Ministre des Finances irakien Rustem Haydar Bey et le Premier Ministre Ismet Pacha ainsi que les Ministres des Affaires étrangères, de l'Intérieur et de l'Economie nationale des échanges de vue ont eu lieu au sujet des relations économiques entre les deux pays et des conditions de séjour des ressortissants des deux parties sur leur territoire respectif.

Un accord intervint pour que des négociations soient entreprises immédiatement en vue de la conclusion d'un traité de commerce et d'une convention de séjour.

Les deux parties tombèrent également d'accord pour reconnaître que les liens d'amitié et de bon voisinage entre la Turquie et l'Irak sont conformes aux intérêts mutuels et à la politique de paix et de tranquillité des deux pays. Il a été également constaté de part et d'autre avec satisfaction que les mesures prises pour assurer la sécurité sur les frontières ont été appliquées avec sincérité et qu'elles ont donné les meilleurs résultats. On a confirmé encore une fois le principe de l'interdiction des mouvements hostiles de part et d'autre des frontières et la nécessité de poursuivre avec persévérance cette politique de vigilance.

[E 3506/1/93]

No. 90.

Mr. A. Henderson to M. Bordonaro.

My dear Ambassador,

July 25, 1931.

IN your letter of the 6th July your Excellency expressed to me the apprehensions felt by the Italian Government lest the League of Nations should base a decision regarding the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq solely upon the information supplied to it by the mandatory Power without proceeding to a direct and independent enquiry in Iraq itself.

I share the hope of your Government that an amicable exploration of this question in advance may prevent public differences at Geneva. I therefore appreciate the frankness with which your Excellency has explained to me your doubts, and gladly take the opportunity of communicating the views of His Majesty's Government to you.

Your Excellency refers to "the way chosen by the mandatory Power" to end the Iraq mandate. The phrase arises, I think, from a misapprehension, for it imputes to the mandatory Power something which they have not done and would not presume to do. His Majesty's Government believe, as I explained to your Excellency at our interview on the 2nd July, that Iraq has reached a sufficient stage of progress to justify admission to membership of the League of Nations, a step which involves the termination of the mandatory régime. They have, indeed, openly proclaimed their intention of supporting Iraq's candidature for membership of the League in September 1932, but they have not attempted to lay down the way in which the mandatory régime should be terminated. It would, in fact, be improper for them to attempt to do so, as their view agrees entirely with what I understand to be the Italian Government's view, namely, that the question is one which lies solely within the competence of the League of Nations.

His Majesty's Government have been careful to supply the League with all the information which the latter has requested in order to enable it to come to a decision, and for this particular purpose they have recently submitted for the consideration of the Permanent Mandates Commission, an organ of the League which has always been scrupulous in the discharge of its duties, a special report

on the progress of Iraq during the period 1920-31. But His Majesty's Government would be the last to question the right of the League to have any further information which it may require, or to seek that information in whatever way it may think fit.

At the same time, I feel bound to repeat what has already been orally explained to your Excellency, namely, that, if the suggestion were put forward that a special League commission of enquiry should be sent to Iraq, His Majesty's Government would feel it their duty to invite the League, before coming to a decision, to consider the serious practical objections to such a course. It is, in the first place, doubtful whether such a commission, sent out to Iraq for a necessarily short period, would be able to reach any valuable or reliable conclusions, or usefully to supplement the full information which His Majesty's Government have unreservedly placed at the disposal of the Permanent Mandates Commission. But, apart from this, the arrival of a League commission in Iraq would, in the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government, be undesirable from a political point of view. Your Excellency will appreciate how easily, in view of the nature of its task, such a commission might become the focus of discontented elements, and how difficult it might therefore find it to form a just view of the situation. Its arrival might serve only to rouse political feelings, and to reawaken differences which it is hoped are in progress of being healed; and local disturbances might well result. For these reasons His Majesty's Government would view the despatch of a League commission to Iraq with misgiving, and they feel that the League would be assuming a grave responsibility if it decided, with a full knowledge of the objections, to despatch a commission of enquiry to Iraq.

With regard to the rights and interests of Italian nationals after the termination of the mandatory régime—a point to which your Excellency refers in the latter part of your letter of the 6th July, I would remind you that the conditions which should govern the termination of mandates in general are at present under consideration by the Permanent Mandates Commission. In these circumstances Italian nationals will naturally receive the same treatment as the nationals of all other States members of the League under any general or particular arrangements which the League may lay down as a condition for the termination of the mandatory régime. The Italian Government will, I feel sure, find that the recommendations of the commission will be of such a nature as to remove whatever apprehensions they may at present entertain.

Believe me, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 5020/3137/93]

No. 91.

Mr. Hoare to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 874.)

My Lord,

Ramleh, September 26, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that King Feisal of Iraq arrived in Alexandria from Europe on the 22nd September, and left by train for Jerusalem on the 25th September. During his stay in Egypt, His Majesty was the guest of Dr. Ahmed Qadry, Iraq consul-general in Egypt and brother to King Feisal's aide-de-camp, in whose villa the Emir Zeid and his sisters have also, since the death of ex-King Hussein, found a home.

2. King Feisal was met on board the steamship "Champollion," after the conclusion of quarantine formalities in the outer harbour, by the Grand Chamberlain, representing King Fuad, and landed in the Royal launch. He was received by King Fuad on the 23rd September, and His Majesty returned the visit the same afternoon. A garden-party was given by the Prime Minister in King Feisal's honour on the 24th September. Palace motor cars and a saloon railway-coach were placed at his disposal during his visit, and the Grand Chamberlain was again deputed to convey King Fuad's adieux when His Majesty left on the 25th September. These courtesies contrast happily with the unpleasant memories of recent years.

3. I called upon His Majesty on the 23rd September, and he dined with me more or less informally that evening. The acting oriental secretary welcomed His Majesty on arrival and attended his departure on my behalf.

4. Nahas Pasha, who left Alexandria by the same train on his way to Cairo, is reported to have visited King Feisal's saloon *en route*, and to have conveyed the greetings of the Wafd to Egypt's sister, Iraq.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE,

Acting High Commissioner.

CHAPTER IV.—PALESTINE.

[E 4259/304/31]

No. 92.

Mr. Peake to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 116.)

Sir,

Berne, August 12, 1931.

WITH reference to Sir H. Kennard's despatch No. 86 of the 1st July last, I have the honour to report that the 17th Zionist Congress, which was opened at Basle on the 30th June, terminated a fortnight later. The congress was succeeded by the second session of the Jewish Agency Council. Contrary to fears which were generally expressed before the congress took place, there occurred no pronounced division of opinion as to the general policy to be pursued, and the methods to be employed to evoke a more generous response than, in the opinion of the congress, has been obtained hitherto from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

2. As had been anticipated, a strong minority of delegates took no pains to conceal their dissatisfaction with the attitude of the mandatory Power to Zionist aims, and the Administration in Palestine also came in for a good deal of criticism. The charge was made, with both violence and bitterness, that public opinion in England had been misled by the Government, that the Prime Minister's letter of February last to Dr. Weizmann was unsatisfactory and that confidence could only be restored if the policy hitherto pursued by the mandatory Power was radically changed. Such was the prevailing tone of a good deal of the discussion, and a number of delegates, larger perhaps than might have been expected, took the view that the British Government did not really represent the British nation, which was not hostile to the Jews, and was anxious to see justice done to them.

3. There is no doubt, however, that, due to the demands made by the Revisionists, who presented a united front on this occasion, the Weizmann policy has been endangered, and a resolution was unanimously carried that, in conformity with the declaration given by the British Government, immigration on a larger scale than had hitherto been sanctioned should be allowed, with a view to establishing in Palestine a community with all the features of a distinctively Jewish nation.

4. The future political policy of Zionism was reviewed in detail, and in the course of a violent discussion on the Prime Minister's letter, great disappointment was expressed, even by the more moderate delegates, at the failure of the mandatory Power to act in the spirit of the mandate, or in the sense of the letter in question. Complaints were both sharp and numerous about the difficulties encountered by Jews in purchasing land in Palestine, and on the restrictions placed both on their immigration and on their employment in Government enterprises. Dr. Weizmann himself, in his final speech, drew attention to what he described as the way the Government of the mandatory Power had minimised their obligations, and said that they were running a great risk of completely alienating Jewish sympathies. In this connexion, the attack of Dr. Wise, the American Zionist leader, formerly an enthusiastic supporter of British policy, who alleged that the mandatory Power had tragically fallen short of its moral obligations to the Jewish people, is also noteworthy.

5. The congress spent some time in discussing the question of the land development scheme for Jewish colonisation. A number of resolutions on the subject were passed, of which perhaps the most typical was one, the tenor of which was that Great Britain should once more be begged to carry out the scheme in the spirit of the mandate, and thereby find the opportunity of regaining the sympathies of the many Zionist centres which had been lost in recent years.

6. Dr. Weizmann's resignation from the presidency, which took place after the publication of the White Paper on Palestine, was accepted by the congress, and Mr. Nahum Solokov, his collaborator for many years, was elected president in his place. Professor Brodetsky, of Leeds University, will co-operate with him. The executive council will be composed of two representatives of the Labour group, Dr. Arlosoroff and Mr. Berl Locker; M. H. Farbstein, a former Deputy of the Polish Sejm, representing the Orthodox Wing (Mirzichi), and Mr. Newman, a representative of the so-called American Zionists. The list was

approved by the congress with the exception of the Revisionist group, who declared that they would have no confidence in the new executive.

7. The new Zionist Executive may be expected to carry on the policy of their former leader, but in all probability they will be forced to occupy themselves more closely with what they conceive to be Jewish claims, and will devote an even larger part of their time and energy to pressing these upon the mandatory Power. Their election, in view of the fact that they represent a coalition of hitherto conflicting interests, will mean a strengthening of the Zionist organisation, and has probably been brought about in order to speed up the contributions to Zionist funds.

8. The Jewish Agency, which met on the termination of the congress proceedings, approved the various resolutions voted in congress, and then passed to the consideration of budget questions. Mr. A. Goldsmith, of London, was elected chairman in place of Mr. Marshall.

9. The results of the congress, the personnel of the new executive, and the programme decided on for the coming two years, were generally to be expected. While the Revisionists have gained in strength since 1929, one may be allowed to hope that the accession of Dr. Sokolow to the presidency will strengthen the counsels of moderation, while Dr. Weizmann, the retiring president, performed a service by reminding the Jewish Agency Council that peace in Palestine and the sympathetic understanding of enlightened British opinion, and of the public opinion of the world, were essential if their ideals were to be crowned with success.

10. The creation of the scheme of a world-wide United Zionist Federation, adopted by thirty-four countries, with a view to hastening the completion of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, is a point worthy of attention, for as more Jewish money becomes available, counsels of prudence and moderation are likely to increase. Indeed, it is significant that, in spite of the numerous highly controversial topics which were debated, the subject which provoked by far the greatest was the budget. This was subjected to the very closest scrutiny, and those who previously had been divided by the sharpest hostility, on questions of general policy, were united in demanding the fullest details regarding apparently unimportant items of expenditure. It is hard to imagine the consideration of the budget losing its present place of chief importance in the congress programme, and as with the growth of contributions to the cause, its total becomes more imposing, so, it may be conjectured, will the present caution in expenditure tend to increase likewise, and policy will be shaped accordingly.

I have, &c.

CHARLES PEAKE.

[E 4685/304/31]

No. 93.

Mr. Osborne to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 1385.)

My Lord,

Washington, September 3, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an article from the "New York Times" of the 30th August, giving the text of a statement on the work and achievements of the United States delegates to the recently-concluded Congress of Zionists at Basle.⁽¹⁾ The administration of the Zionist Organisation of America takes full responsibility for the action of its delegates as described in the statement, which included "giving expression to the protest of American Jewry against the actions of those officials of the mandatory Power which violated the mandate and constituted a breach of trust." According to the statement, the United States delegates contributed much to the consolidation of the World Zionist movement and to the framing of a sound economic policy for Palestine. They had also approved acceptance of the resignation of Dr. Chaim Weizmann from the presidency of the world organisation and the election of Nahum Sokolow to succeed him.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

2. As regards the work of the Basle Congress itself, I quote the following from an interesting article on the subject published by the "Boston Transcript" on the 13th August:—

"There is, indeed, an historic parallel to be drawn between the first congress of 1897 and that of 1931. At the first World Zionist Congress the paramount question was the aims of Zionism. The primary battle in which the delegates to the seventeenth congress were engaged was the resuscitation as a result of certain unfortunate circumstances, of a definition of the ultimate aims of Zionism.

"What were the unfortunate circumstances?"

"Dr. Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organisation, on different occasions, and without the authorisation of the congress, made several public statements regarding a bi-national State in Palestine, and issued a statement to the effect that Zionism does not aim at a Jewish majority in Palestine or at driving out the Arabs.

"These unauthorised statements, plus the record of the hostile administration of Palestine by the Palestine Government, aroused the ire of rank and file Zionists.

"The problem of the new leadership in the Zionist movement was regarded by a majority of the delegates as the most important one, only next in importance to the restatement of Zionist aims.

"How did the congress meet these two problems?"

"The congress adopted by a vote of 123 to 103 a resolution of the political committee which in effect amounts to a vote of non-confidence in Dr. Weizmann. Almost the entire American delegation voted for the resolution of censure.

"On the same day the congress unanimously adopted the following resolution as to the ultimate aims of Zionism:—

"Zionism is a national movement to secure the freedom of the Jewish people and to bring about in Eretz Israel a solution of the Jewish problem. The homeless and landless Jewish people strives to overcome its abnormal conditions by re-establishing itself in the historic homeland through large and uninterrupted immigration and settlement and recreating in Eretz Israel its national life with all the essential features of a people's existence. The congress emphatically rejects any attempt to minimise this fundamental aim of Zionism."

"Another great accomplishment by this congress was the victory won by the American Zionists, led by Judge Julian W. Mack, in obtaining approval of the congress for separation of the private economic development programme in Palestine from the political programme. This plan, known as the Brandeis plan, was put forward in 1920 by Justice Brandeis in London, but was rejected by the Weizmannites, and it was the cause of the historic split in the Zionist movement ten years ago. The resolution adopting the economic programme was proposed by Israel B. Brodie, of New York, and committed the congress to a recommendation of the establishment in all countries of private corporations to assist the flow of private capital into all the economic fields of Palestine and their union into a single association.

"This association will undertake the following activities:—

- "(1) Recommending safe and profitable investments for the small investor.
- "(2) Assisting persons of small or average means to settle on plantations or engage in small industries or handicrafts.
- "(3) Attracting large capital for industrial enterprises, concessions and long-term credit institutions.
- "(4) Organising an efficient information service in Palestine and the more important Jewish centres.
- "(5) Organising and marketing Palestine products and studying opportunities for new investments and for opening new fields of industry.

"The adoption of the Brandeis economic programme for Palestine is the greatest achievement of this congress.

"The congress, in adopting the Brandeis economic plan for Palestine, has relegated political Zionism to a position next in importance to the practical upbuilding to the Jewish Homeland in Palestine."

3. The above-mentioned pronouncement by the Administration of the Zionist Organisation of America has, however, provoked a retort from Mr. Louis Lipsky, the text of which I also enclose, declaring that the present administration are totally unfit to control the destinies of the American Zionist movement, and that neither Mr. Justice Brandeis nor Judge Julian Mack "are personally involved in the group that uses their names." (?)

I have, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE

(?) Not printed.

[E 5012/5012/31]

No. 94.

M. Bordonaro to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received October 5.)

(Translation.)

THE Italian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to thank the Marquess of Reading for his note of the 8th instant, in which his Lordship informs him that, after having considered the possibility of exempting foreign consuls in Palestine from the payment of motor car licence duty and of granting them a higher position in the order of precedence at public ceremonies, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not feel able to concur in the view expressed by the Italian Government, since it does not appear to them that the representatives of the Mandating Powers [*sic*] in the territory under mandate can be accorded treatment different from that of other consuls in territories under direct British sovereignty.

In taking note of the communication made to him, Signor Bordonaro, while venturing to insist on the different position of the territories under mandate and the special legal position which the States members of the League of Nations enjoy in respect of such territories, has the honour to draw the attention of Lord Reading to the fact that his memorandum of the 25th June also expressly referred to other matters which, in the view of the Italian Government, are the outcome of a policy which would not appear always to conform to the letter of the Palestine mandate, and which the Italian Government therefore consider prejudicial to the rights and interests which Italy derives from international agreements and specific understandings between the two Governments.

Signor Bordonaro therefore ventures to renew his request to Lord Reading that consideration may kindly be given to the questions regarding the treatment of Italian employees of the Palestine Administration and the manner in which the concession and execution of public works in Palestine are dealt with, which questions have already been raised in the memorandum of the 25th June, and the terms of which he repeats below in order to secure a larger measure of clarity.

These particular matters are, however, only one aspect of the general question of the interpretation of the provisions of the mandate and of the respective rights as between States members of the League of Nations and the mandatory Power. In accordance with instructions from his Government, Signor Bordonaro has, therefore, the honour to invite the attention of Lord Reading to this matter, and to recapitulate all the grounds of complaint, with which the British Government are already in part acquainted, and which the Italian Government cannot fail to notice in regard to the exercise of the mandate for Palestine. They note, in effect, therein a departure from the principles confirmed by international agreements in the matter, with consequent prejudice to the general political interests of Italy and to the particular interests of Italian nationals resident in that territory.

2. The Embassy of His Majesty the King of Italy have more than once been charged to represent to the Government of His Britannic Majesty how disagreeably surprised the Italian Government were to observe that the principle of equality of treatment in economic matters for all the nationals and companies of States members of the League of Nations, which underlies the fundamental theory of the mandatory system and is, moreover, explicitly guaranteed by

article 18 of the Palestine mandate, should be subject to frequent, even if sometimes not patent, infractions, and should consequently fail in its object of securing that identical possibilities and economic opportunities are always afforded, without distinction, to the enterprise and the labour of the nationals of all the member States.

To confine himself to more recent cases, it is appropriate to mention the one connected with the Haifa Harbour works, entrusted to the British firm of Palmer, Harrison and Tritton [*sic*], and that of the plans for the construction of the Haifa-Bagdad Railway, which has been granted to the same firm. It is true that, in the first-mentioned case, the work has been undertaken under the direction of the mandatory Government, and that in the second the engineers of Messrs. Palmer, Harrison and Tritton [*sic*] have been attached to the Palestine Department of Public Works, and thus, as in the more recent case of the drainage of the town of Haifa, the work in question was withdrawn from the competence of the municipality in order to be assigned to the Department mentioned above. But even if that may be in conformity with the mere letter of the agreements, which affirm that there is freedom of opportunity for "the participation of Italian enterprises in public works, services and utilities and in the development of the national resources of the country so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration," it would appear to be permissible to doubt whether it can be shown to be in accordance with the spirit of article 11 of the mandate and with the assurances given to the Italian Government by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in his note of the 29th April, 1926, and the memorandum annexed thereto.

It must, it seems, in fact, be held that, according to the principles which governed the grant of the mandates, all works of a certain importance have to be thrown open to competitive offers by public tender. If any exception to the system of public bidding is admissible in the case of works or services of strict public utility and of minor financial importance, this cannot be maintained in the case of works affecting the whole economic structure of the territory under mandate, directed towards the development and exploitation of its resources, and, moreover, involving considerable expenditure, with the possibility of profitable employment of capital and labour. Since it is recognised that an international mandate does not constitute a right or prerogative for the mandatory, but rather a mission which has been entrusted to it in the execution of which no direct advantage should accrue to it—being on the same footing of equality in the economic field as the other members of the League of Nations—the Italian Government consider that they are correct in regarding the direct assumption by the Palestine Administration of the more important public works as a policy contrary to the spirit of the international agreements on the subject and detrimental to Italian interests.

3. The Italian Ambassador had also occasion at the time to draw the attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the "ordinances relative to exemption from taxation in favour of religious and charitable institutions, and to the customs exemptions in favour of charitable institutions," published in the "Official Gazette" of the Government of Palestine on the 1st July, 1928. He then set forth the reasons for which the Italian Government considered that the ordinances were not in entire accord with the provisions of the mandate and the assurances given by the British Government on the 29th April, 1926, inasmuch as certain regulations, such as that which made the grant of exemption subject to the condition that the religious, scholastic and charitable institutions *should be recognised as such* by the competent authorities, appeared to be contrary to paragraph 5 of the assurances mentioned above, in the sense that "the supervision of the mandatory will be strictly limited to that required for the maintenance of the public order and good government," and gave rise to the fear that what is precluded by those assurances, namely, "an arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of any religious community," would be realised. Further, the said ordinances, taken as a whole, appeared to be such as would encroach upon those previously existing conditions and acquired rights which the mandate explicitly makes it obligatory to respect and safeguard. Finally, by subjecting certain institutions to taxes and impositions never before borne by them, their financial situation was injured, their very existence being jeopardised, thus involving a risk of altering the *status quo*, contrary to what is laid down in the text of the mandate.

No reply was received from His Britannic Majesty's Government to the observations to the above effect submitted by the Italian Embassy in their note of the 5th September, 1928. Assurances were, on the other hand, furnished by the British Government concerning the Public Education Ordinance, to which the Italian Embassy had also raised certain objections with regard to the obligations imposed on the teachers of any school—including thus Italian private schools—to effect registration and obtain a licence to teach, subject to the examination of diplomas by the Government Director of Schools. This provision, in consequence of the kind intervention of the Foreign Office, was modified in the sense that the Director of Schools had the power to refuse registration, in the case of teachers in private schools, only where persons convicted of immorality were concerned. In the ordinance as thus modified and published in the "Official Gazette" of the Government of Palestine on the 16th January, 1928, there remain, however, provisions, such as article 7 ("the director, a district commissioner, any inspector of the Department of Education, and any other officer authorised in writing by the director, may at all times enter and inspect any school, and the manager, or the person for the time being in charge of the school, shall furnish any information which the inspecting officer may demand with regard to the care and tuition of pupils, the general management of the school and the names and qualifications of the teachers"), which imply an interference on the part of the mandatory Government authorities going beyond that which appears to be permitted by article 15 of the mandate, which limits the right of different communities to maintain and conduct their own schools only in respect of "such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose."

The Italian Government must therefore reiterate their reservations regarding the compatibility of this ordinance with the spirit and letter of the mandate, and must request that it be modified or, at all events, applied in such a manner that the freedom of the Italian institutions to maintain schools and to conduct them in accordance with the religious and educational principles held by them to be most suitable is not infringed.

4. The question of the treatment of Italian employees of the Palestine Administration has already been represented by Signor Bordonaro in his memorandum of the 25th June, 1931. He considers, however, that it may be opportune to revert to this subject, regarding which the Embassy have received no reply.

By circular No. 41 of the 17th July, 1929, signed by Mr. E. Mills, Acting Chief Secretary, relative to the conditions of service of persons in the employment of the Palestine Government, the latter provided, *inter alia*, as follows: (Article 7) "A pensionable employment will be granted to officers of British and Palestinian nationality only. Officers of foreign nationality who are in other respects fitted for pensionable employment will be granted contracts terminable at three months' notice."

The result of the *démarche* made by the Italian Embassy was merely the transmission by the Foreign Office on the 12th November, 1930, by way of information, of circular No. 41, the very document against the provisions of which the objections had been raised.

The Italian Government are therefore compelled once again to express their regret at this measure, which they consider to be contrary to the provisions of the text of the mandate regarding the equality of treatment of nationals of the other States members of the League of Nations, to whom the same rights must be reserved and the same facilities granted as are accorded to the nationals of the mandatory Power, the possibility being excluded of any discrimination being exercised by reason of their nationality. This is, it appears, clearly to be inferred from the general legal theory of the establishment of the mandate and from the specific provisions of article 18 of the text, within which, by analogy, it is impossible not to include paid employment. As, moreover, both British subjects and Palestine citizens, as well as nationals of other States members of the League, have hitherto competed under equal conditions for employment in the subordinate posts of the Administration, it is legitimate to infer from this that all such employees should have equal rights to pension, without any discrimination in virtue of nationality, which the mandate does not permit. For that reason, and while making every reservation regarding the right of the Palestinian Administration to engage, from now onwards, candidates for Government employment of nationality other than British or Palestinian only on three months' contracts, the

Italian Embassy venture to state that the Italian Government regard as contrary to international treaties the refusal of a pension to Italian employees who have been for years, and in any case from dates previous to that of the circular in question, in the pay of the Palestine Government.

Signor Bordonaro desires to refer in this connexion to the case of the Italian subject, Luigi di Bella, telegraphist at Haifa, and to the case of the Italian employees of the Palestine Railways, who were refused the gratuity of £50 sterling upon discharge, which was granted to employees of the same rank and category who were of British or Palestinian nationality.

5. On the question of consular immunities and privileges in Palestine, Lord Reading has already replied to Signor Bordonaro in the note of the 8th inst., but the latter wishes again to submit certain considerations in virtue of which it might be possible for the Foreign Office to reconsider the matter.

His Britannic Majesty's Government are undoubtedly aware of the very special importance which continues to attach to consular functions in the countries of the Levant, where consular representatives have always enjoyed special immunities and privileges and have occupied a very high position, thus permitting them to fulfil their delicate task with the maximum authority and the necessary freedom. The importance and delicacy of the functions assigned to them are not less but are rather greater in those countries which are now subject to mandate and in which, owing to the peculiar constitution of the same, the consuls in a certain sense and within certain limits discharge diplomatic duties also.

The text of the mandate does not affect the special situation of the consuls of the Mandating Powers [*sic*] in Palestine, but rather endorses the respect due to it by requiring the strictest maintenance of the *status quo*.

It is indeed true that article 8 of the mandate suspends the capitulations in Palestine, but the very fact that the mandate expressly deals with the capitulatory régime, in order to establish that its application is only temporarily suspended until the re-establishment of that régime at the will of the Powers on the expiration of the mandate, must prevent the article being ascribed an interpretation in the least degree wide. It gives rise instead to the belief that, in view of the said temporary character of the mandate, none of the other privileges attaching to consular functions in these territories can be regarded as suppressed, but rather that the position of consuls must remain unimpaired, because the position of the Powers which they represent remains unimpaired in respect of Palestine, which position automatically reacquires the privilege of the capitulations as soon as the mandate terminates and in the absence of previous arrangements to the contrary.

6. The Italian Government have had to observe with regret that the facts mentioned above are not isolated manifestations resulting from frequently inevitable mistakes of interpretation or excessive zeal on the part of subordinate administrative officials, but appear to be an indication and the outcome of a higher directing policy.

The Italian Government have, moreover, unwillingly been obliged to observe a certain reluctance on the part of the British authorities in Palestine to accede to the requests made by the Italian consul-general there with a view to safeguarding general or particular Italian interests. The fact that the anti-Italian newspaper campaign in Palestine has not been prevented or repressed by those authorities could not but convey a disagreeable impression to the Italian Government. This is the more noteworthy, inasmuch as the lack of legislative provisions against press abuses, which was alleged by the High Commissioner's Department, did not prevent the suspension, in the latter days of August, of the Arab daily paper, "El Carmel" for a violent article on the local situation. The Arab press campaign against the alleged Italian atrocities in Libya has, on the other hand, been allowed to continue undisturbed, threatening disorders and acts of violence which such incitement might provoke.

His Britannic Majesty's Government are aware of the very special interest which, owing to her geographical and political position, Italy is bound to display in everything which concerns the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, the ancient and complex historical, religious and cultural relations which exist between Palestine and Italy are well known. In addition, numerous Italian subjects have been established there for years and possess interests of some importance, while spiritual contacts are of a continuous nature and there

is a fair flow of trade between the two countries. The Italian Ambassador therefore has no need to explain and emphasise the reasons which induce the Italian Government to give the greatest prominence to the foregoing considerations and to request His Britannic Majesty's Government that they may be good enough, with the necessary despatch and the interest which the circumstances require, to take the requisite measures in order that the objectionable elements complained of may be eliminated.

The more than cordial relations existing between Great Britain and Italy, and the spirit of friendship in which questions happening to arise between the two countries have always been reciprocally considered and settled, assure the Italian Government that His Britannic Majesty's Government will do whatever is in their power to eliminate the causes of friction which, while they distinctly prejudice a *de facto* position that Italy cannot but wish to have jealously respected, might, on the other hand, create a shadow in that atmosphere of mutual sympathy and friendly collaboration which the Italian Government desire to maintain at all costs and with all means in their power.

Italian Embassy, September 26, 1931.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 3453/134/31]

No. 95.

Mr. A. Henderson to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 10, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum which your Excellency was good enough to communicate to me on the 17th June regarding the claim of a French group in respect of an alleged concession for the extraction of salts from the Dead Sea.

2. His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to this memorandum, but regret that they find themselves unable to entertain the fresh proposal put forward in the eighth paragraph thereof for a form of arbitration under The Hague Convention of the 18th October, 1907.

3. I informed you of the willingness of His Majesty's Government to refer the matter to arbitration on the 15th July of last year, subject to four conditions which the French Government have never accepted, and which your memorandum of the 17th June shows that they are even now unwilling to accept. One of the conditions, indeed, namely, the reference to arbitration of the British claims arising out of the disturbances in Syria in 1925 and 1926, has been definitely rejected, and you will appreciate the difficulty which His Majesty's Government find in understanding the French Government's request to them to agree to the arbitration of an unacceptable claim while the French Government themselves decline to accord similar treatment regarding claims in respect of which His Majesty's Government have long been pressing for arbitration.

4. I had hoped that your memorandum, though received after the 1st May, might be of such a nature as to enable His Majesty's Government to reconsider the decision which I conveyed to you in the last paragraph of my note of the 22nd April. In the circumstances, however, I regret that I can only confirm to you, and request you so to inform the French Government, that the offer of arbitration which was made in my note of the 15th July, 1930, must now definitely be regarded as having lapsed, and that His Majesty's Government feel it no longer incumbent upon them to give further consideration to a claim which, in their view, is, for reasons already fully explained in previous notes, without any legal foundation.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 3953/1831/91]

No. 96.

*Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies:—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, July 29.)*

My Lord,

Bagdad, June 30, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy in translation of the Treaty of Friendship recently concluded at San'a between Iraq and the Yemen.

2. The Council of Ministers at their meeting on the 27th June passed a resolution approving a draft law empowering the King to ratify this treaty which, I understand, will be presented to Parliament during the next session, beginning the 1st November, 1931.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Political Resident, Aden.

I have, &c.

E. R. LUDLOW-HEWITT,
Acting High Commissioner for Iraq.

Enclosure in No. 96.

(Translation.)

*Treaty of Friendship between the Kingdoms of Iraq and Yemen, signed in
San'a on May 11, 1931.*

In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate!

HIS Majesty King Feisal the First, King of Iraq, son of King Hussein, and Al Imam Yahya, son of Hamid-ud-Din, King of the Yemen, being desirous of establishing friendly and amicable relations between the two Arab Kingdoms of Yemen and Iraq, and preliminary to the execution of the efforts and to the realisation of the aspiration of the leaders of the Islamic nation for the unification of the word of the Arab nation, have decided to conclude a treaty, and appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of Iraq:

Taha Pasha-al-Hashimi.

His Majesty the King of the Yemen:

His Grace Qadhi Abdullah-al-Umari.

Who, having communicated their full powers, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

His Majesty the King of the Yemen recognises the Kingdom of Iraq, and His Majesty the King of Iraq recognises the Kingdom of Yemen.

ARTICLE 2.

There shall reign perpetual peace and stable friendship between the two contracting kingdoms.

ARTICLE 3.

The present treaty has been drawn up in Arabic in duplicate. It shall come into force with effect from the date of its exchange subsequent to its ratification by the two contracting kingdoms. Exchange to be effected in a place to be agreed upon by the two parties.

Done at San'a on the 23rd of Dhul Hijjah, 1349, Hijrah.

TAHA-AL-HASHIMI.
ABDULLAH-AL-UMARI.

[E 5382/1205/65]

No. 97.

Mr. Hoare to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 348.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, October 28, 1931.

FOLLOWING addressed to Jerusalem, No. 26:—

"Egyptian Government have enquired privately what is the attitude of the Government of Palestine towards proposed Islam Conference. I assume reply is that you are observing complete detachment except as regards possible reaction on public security. Is this correct?"

[E 5489/1205/65]

No. 98.

Officer Administering the Government of Palestine to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, November 4.)

(No. 257.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Jerusalem, October 30, 1931.*

YOUR telegram No. 242 of 29th October: Islamic Congress.

Assumption made in Cairo telegram No. 26 to me is correct, and, subject to your approval, I propose to reply accordingly.

[E 5656/1205/65]

No. 99.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, November 12, 1931.

YOUR despatch No. 526.

Turkish Government have just received letter from Mufti of Jerusalem asking for delegates to be nominated to forthcoming Moslem Congress there.

The mufti had already asked Turkish consul at Jerusalem to forward invitation, but latter very properly refused to receive it unless it came through High Commissioner, whereupon it was sent by ordinary post.

Turkish Government consider both form of invitation from a non-official individual to the Head of State improper, and subjects for congress fraught with danger. Question of Caliphate is not specifically mentioned in programme, but it is certain to be discussed, for letter states that essential purpose of congress is Islamic union, which can only be achieved under Caliph, while actual agenda are mischievous enough. They are—

1. To inculcate mutual help amongst Moslems, and to insist on duties imposed by Moslem religion (which according to Minister for Foreign Affairs are, as laid down by Koran, that non-Moslems must be converted or reduced to dependence).
2. Strengthen Moslem religion against attack of irreligious (which Minister for Foreign Affairs said meant especially Turkey), and save Holy Places, especially Jerusalem, from all foreign ambition and domination.
3. Establish university at Jerusalem to keep Moslem youth from foreign schools.
4. Examine question of Hejazi Railway, which is a Moslem "Wakf."
5. Consider any question raised by any member of congress.

Minister for Foreign Affairs dilated at length upon dangers, which could not be lightly dismissed, because the mufti and Shaukat Ali (whom he had turned down heavily on his visit here in the spring) were irresponsible persons. His Excellency was sure that His Majesty's Government were alive to the situation, and Turkish Government were anxious to know your views before taking any action.

I am sending despatch by bag, but as proposed date of congress is 7th December, Minister for Foreign Affairs would be very grateful for earliest possible intimation as to attitude of His Majesty's Government.

[E 5667/1205/65]

No. 100.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 240.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, November 14, 1931.

PROPOSED Moslem Conference at Jerusalem.

Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, by direction of King Ibn Saud, has asked me to ascertain urgently attitude of His Majesty's Government towards conference to be held next month. Hejazi Government have been invited by Grand Mufti to send a delegate. Leading personages such as Fuad Bey Hamza and Sheikh Yussuf Yasin have also been invited to be present.

Under-Secretary emphasised the obviously anti-Ibn Saud and probable anglophobe complexion of the proposed conference. Ibn Saud was undecided whether to nominate a delegate to protect his interests or to remain aloof and abide by the consequences. Items on the agenda have made him somewhat anxious, and he was confused at having received the invitation from the Mufti, whom he regards as a Palestine official. He made special reference to his conversation with His Majesty's Minister in June last regarding co-operation (see Sir A. Ryan's despatch No. 233, enclosure C), and stated that he relied on a lead from His Majesty's Government.

Please inform me by telegram of the reply which I should return.

[E 5742/1205/65]

No. 101.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, November 19.)

(No. 262. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, November 18, 1931.

REFERENCE my telegram No. 250 of 5th November.

Hitherto His Majesty's Government have been in favour of maintaining an attitude of detachment towards the proposed Moslem Congress, except for its possible reactions on public security, on the ground that, in general it is politically less objectionable to acquiesce in than to oppose the holding of such conferences, and in particular because it is difficult to separate the avowedly religious from the underlying political objects aimed at by the promoters and the obvious objections to taking any action which could plausibly be represented as an interference in Moslem religious matters.

Recently, however, representations and enquiries have been received by His Majesty's Government from various foreign Governments, notably, Turkey, Italy, the Hejaz-Nejd, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Spain, which show clearly that these countries view the congress with great misgiving, and which may cause serious international difficulties.

Italian Government, who believe that Grand Mufti intends to raise at congress whole question of Italy's recent action in Tripoli, fear inflammatory pronouncements and propaganda, which they would resent bitterly, and for which they would hold His Majesty's Government partly responsible, on the ground that the congress is to take place in territory under British mandate, apparently with the approval or at least with the acquiescence of His Majesty's Government, and that Mufti, in his capacity of President of Supreme Moslem Council is technically official of Palestine Administration. Foreign Office think that anti-Italian propaganda at congress might react unfavourably on Anglo-Italian relations elsewhere.

Turkish Government look on possibilities of congress with utmost misgiving. Despite disclaimers of Mufti they particularly fear revival of Caliphate agitation, especially if any attempt should be made to bring ex-Caliph to Jerusalem, as this would clearly constitute a focus for all reactionary elements in Turkey and for fresh intrigues in favour of former Ottoman régime.

Hejaz-Nejd Government who regard congress as obviously anti-Saudi, are greatly perturbed by items on agenda, and confused by receiving an invitation from a Palestinian official, as they regard Mufti to be.

Both Turkish and Hejaz-Nejd Governments have asked to be informed at earliest possible moment what attitude His Majesty's Government are adopting towards the congress in order that they may regulate their own attitude accordingly.

Foreign Office are very perturbed about possible international repercussions of congress, and are anxious to return definite and reassuring replies to Turkish, Hejaz-Nejd and Italian Governments at the earliest possible moment. Two following alternative suggestions have been made:—

1. That Mufti should be held personally responsible for ensuring that nothing is said or done at congress which might offend foreign Powers' susceptibilities, and that an endeavour should be made to obtain guarantee from him, on the lines which he appears, according to the "Times" of 9th November, to have given to the Egyptian

Government, that questions of Caliphate and of Italian action in Tripoli will not be raised, under threat that in such an event he would be regarded as having shown himself unfit to hold official position of President of Supreme Moslem Council under Palestine Administration, and would be deprived of that office, or under any other threat that may be thought effective. You will be in a position to judge to what extent such a threat would be practicable and, if practicable, how far it would be likely to prove an effective deterrent, especially in view of probable presence of Shaukat Ali and other representative Moslems from outside Palestine.

2. That holding of congress in British mandated territory should be forbidden in interests of public order and in view of international complications for which mandatory cannot disclaim responsibility if congress takes place with their acquiescence.

Suggestion has been made that such action might be more easily justified if a definite request that congress should be prohibited were received from foreign Power or Powers or from League of Nations. Foreign Powers, particularly Italy, might possibly be willing to take initiative in suggesting this, but there would be considerable difficulties in arranging for League to take such initiative, and it would probably be necessary for His Majesty's Government themselves to take initiative, basing their action on general ground of anxiety already expressed by numerous foreign Powers.

You will be in a position to judge how far proposed congress has aroused enthusiasm of Arabs of Palestine and Transjordan, and will doubtless be aware of the extent to which arrangements for congress have already been made.

I should be glad to receive your earliest possible advice on the two alternative suggestions, with special reference to probable effect on political situation and on public order and security in both Palestine and Transjordan should either course be adopted. If you are unable to recommend either course suggested, can you make alternative suggestion which will help His Majesty's Government to allay misgivings of foreign Governments concerned? In any case, it is matter of great urgency to reply to Turkish and Hejaz-Nejd enquiries as to proposed attitude of His Majesty's Government.

Turkish Government have also expressed hope that if Abdul Mejid, the ex-Caliph, applies for permission to enter Palestine it will be refused. Please telegraph separately on this point as early as possible, and report whether in all circumstances you think that it would be practicable to refuse visa on grounds of public order should an application for one be received.

[E 5712/1205/65]

No. 102.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Hope Gill (Jedda).

(Nos. 142 and 143.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 19, 1931.

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 240 of 14th November: Proposed Moslem Congress at Jerusalem.

His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot assume responsibility of advising Ibn Saud whether to send delegates to Jerusalem. They are, however, in no way associated with proposal to hold congress, which has neither their support nor encouragement, and have been observing attitude of complete detachment except as regards possible reaction on public security in Palestine. Mufti, in issuing invitations, presumably acted as religious dignitary and not as Palestinian official, i.e., President of Supreme Moslem Council. You may inform Hejaz-Nejd Government accordingly. (End of R.)

(For your confidential information.)

As result of representations from Turkish, Italian and other Governments, Acting High Commissioner is being consulted as to possibility of prohibiting congress or preventing its indulgence in such activities as might have undesirable international reactions. I will telegraph further on receipt of his reply.

(Repeated to Angora, Nos. 57 and 58; and Jerusalem, Nos. 263 and 264.)

[E 5760/1205/65]

No. 103.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 21.)

(No. 250.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, November 5, 1931.

REFERENCE your telegram No. 257 of the 30th October: Islamic Conference.

I concur generally in sense of your proposed reply to Egyptian Government, but I request that wording of reply should be as follows: "Palestine Government propose to observe complete detachment except as regards possible reaction on public security." Despatch follows.

[E 5831/1205/65]

No. 104.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, November 24.)

(No. 265. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, November 20, 1931.

REFERENCE my secret telegram No. 262 of the 18th November regarding the Moslem Congress.

Please furnish (a) full information, if this is not already being given in reply to my telegram under reference, with regard to any communications which have been exchanged between Palestine Government and organisers of Congress; (b) any information obtained from reliable sources regarding invitations issued, acceptances or refusals, and agenda.

I assume that, in view of attitude of detachment so far adopted, no facilities of any kind, e.g., accommodation for meeting, have been promised or offered by Palestine Government. If request for facilities should be made, it should be refused, but if you are in any doubt on receipt of any specific request, you should refer to me before returning any reply.

[E 5831/1205/65]

No. 105.

High Commissioner for Palestine to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, November 24.)

(No. 282. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, November 21, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 262 of the 18th November: Proposed Moslem Congress.

Following are Mufti's intentions as expressed in interview with myself and Chief Secretary:—

Main object is to assist Palestine with contributions of Moslem world, particularly as regards education generally and spread of Moslem universities in Jerusalem. There is to be no discussion of political questions. Definite decision has been reached that question of Caliphate is not to be raised, and the mufti is able to give positive assurance to this effect. It is for this reason it has been decided not to invite Abdul Majid to attend. Mufti gives personal assurance that it is not his desire, and has never been his intention, that subject of Italy's action in Tripoli shall be raised at the present. He cannot give equally definite guarantee on this question as on Caliphate question, since he has not consulted others on the point, but he anticipates that he will be able to give equally positive guarantee. It has also been decided, and Mufti can guarantee, that nothing provocative will be said about alleged Jewish encroachment on Holy Places. Wailing Wall question will be raised only in order to determine whether constitutional appeal against finding of commission can be made. Mufti realises his responsibilities and expresses himself as most anxious to conduct congress in such a manner that goodwill between Great Britain and Moslem world, as constantly preached by Shaukat Ali and other notable Moslems, may be enhanced

and so as to cause no embarrassment to His Majesty's Government or to Palestine Government. I have informed Mufti that I rely upon him to permit nothing to be said at congress as regards Wailing Wall which will bring finding of commission into contempt, and nothing on the subject of Italian action in Tripoli which will cause resentment in Italy, and I have told him that, if anything objectionable on either subject should be said, it will be for him to suppress the speaker. He gave me an assurance that he would do this. I considered that he genuinely intends to implement his assurances, and that his description of object of congress can be relied upon as accurate, except that he omitted to mention self-aggrandisement as one of them. I advise prohibition of congress should not be contemplated. It would cause deep resentment and would, in addition, be impossible wholly to enforce, since even if Shawkat Ali and other intending participants from abroad were to be refused entrance into Palestine, local adherents of the Mufti would meet probably in Haram area and go through agenda of congress. At present there is considerable opposition to congress from local faction, which is hostile to the mufti. Prohibition would enhance mufti's prestige and increase number of his adherents, and, in my view, might create unrest in Palestine. As regards alternative suggestion in your telegram that guarantee shall be obtained from mufti by threat of dismissal, or any other threat, I should strongly deprecate this course. I suggest replies should be returned to enquiries of foreign Governments that His Majesty's Government will maintain attitude of detachment as in second sentence of Foreign Office telegram to Jedda, No. 142 of the 19th November, adding that His Majesty's Government, as a result of enquiries made, see no reason to anticipate that political issues will be raised or that proceedings of congress will cause any embarrassment to Government addressed. Specific assurance as regards Caliphate question may be added if you think fit.

With reference to your telegram No. 265, no communications have taken place apart from above-mentioned interviews with Chief Secretary yesterday and myself to-day. Number of invitations issued is not known, but is probably very large. Mufti now expects that only about 150 to 200 persons will participate in congress, of whom about 100 will be Palestinians. No agenda have yet been published in Palestine, which is a subject of complaint locally. I hope to obtain from mufti and forward to you in next two days copy of agenda. No request for facilities has been made.

[E 5784/1205/65]

No. 106.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 388.)

Sir,

Angora, November 12, 1931.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 68 of to-day, I have the honour to report that I received a telephone message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening asking me to be good enough to come and see him as soon as possible, as he had an important matter which he wished to discuss with me. When I arrived at the Ministry, his Excellency informed me of the invitation from the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, which the Turkish Government had just received.

2. Tefik Rüstü Bey said that, other considerations apart, the form of the invitation was improper, a fact which could be held to justify its being left unanswered. Haj Amin-el-Huseini might be the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, but he held no representative office in Palestine which qualified him to invite officially the head of a foreign State to nominate delegates to an unofficial gathering, whether it was called a congress or conference or anything else. His Excellency said he might tell me that, as a matter of fact, the Mufti had visited the Turkish consul in Jerusalem, and asked him to forward an important communication to Angora. The consul had very properly enquired whether the High Commission was aware of the request. The Mufti had replied that the matter had nothing to do with the High Commission, on which the consul had observed that, in that case, he could not undertake to forward it. Thereupon the Mufti had sent the invitation through the ordinary post.

3. But the question of the propriety or otherwise of the invitation was comparatively indifferent. What really mattered was the purpose and probable consequences of the congress, if it were held. The Mufti's letter stated that the essential purpose of the congress was the Union of Islam, which meant, first of all, the revival of the Caliphate (for, said Tefik Rüstü, by its constitution Islam could only be united under a Caliph), and, further, the erection of yet another subversive force in the world. This could only result in a focus of intrigue and rebellion against the British Empire, while it would stir up reaction in Turkey and inevitably lead to a recrudescence of violent nationalism, with its attendant evils. It was not that the Turkish Government were in any way alarmed at the thought of the reinstatement of the actual ex-Caliph. He was a harmless old gentleman, and the Turkish Government had been quite happy that his daughter should marry the son of a wealthy Indian Prince, and he himself thereby presumably find a comfortable home for his declining years. It was the institution and not the figure-head which disturbed the Government. Furthermore, there was a so-called congress of irresponsible people who proposed to deal with a series of questions which were purely matters for Governments and not for private individuals to consider. The subjects laid down in the Mufti's letter to be examined by the congress were as follows:—

- (1) The development of a spirit of general and mutual help among Moslems and the emphasising to the Moslem world of the social duties imposed by their religion. If, Tefik Rüstü observed, this resolution were to be carried out according to the precepts of the Koran, it meant that the non-Moslem world must be either converted or reduced to dependence.
- (2) The rescue of the Moslem religion from the ills it has suffered and from the attacks of the irreligious—a point which was obviously aimed at the modern Turkish State first and foremost. Further, the congress was to discuss how best to assure and strengthen Moslem interests and how to save the holy places, especially Jerusalem, from all foreign ambitions and domination.
- (3) The establishment of a Moslem university at Jerusalem, in order to keep Moslem youth away from foreign schools and influence.
- (4) The study of the question of securing possession of the Hejaz Railway, which is Moslem Vakuf, by Moslems.
- (5) The consideration of any motion proposed by any member of the congress.

4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he was sure that the mischievous nature of such discussions would be as patent to the British Government as to himself. Even though it were held that the Grand Mufti and Shaukat Ali, whom his Excellency clearly considered the moving spirit of the business, were irresponsible people of no great importance or influence, the repercussions of such a congress could not fail to be troublesome. Incidentally, his Excellency said he would tell me in confidence that when Shaukat Ali visited Turkey on his way back to India in the spring, he demanded to see the Gazi, whereupon his Excellency asked him for his passport, explaining that, if he were a Turkish subject he should apply for an audience to the Secretary-General, and if he were a foreigner, through his Ambassador or Minister. Thereupon Shaukat Ali indignantly departed and subsequently, when he got to Syria, attacked Tefik Rüstü with much bitterness.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs continued that his Government felt that His Majesty's Government were principally and most directly concerned in this question, and, therefore, the Turkish Government, before deciding as to its own action, was very anxious to know what was the British attitude. He had asked me to come at once, as soon as the Mufti's letter had arrived, because he felt he could give no better proof of the goodness of our relations and of the loyalty of the Turkish Government to our friendship than by informing me of these views and wishes of the Turkish Government. But, inasmuch as the congress was due to meet on the 7th December next, he would be very grateful for as early an intimation as possible of the position adopted towards it by His Majesty's Government.

6. I ventured to thank his Excellency for the friendly spirit to which he had given expression, and which I was sure would be as much appreciated by my Government as by myself, and I said that I would at once inform you of all he

had told me. I was not in a position to give any indication of your views, since the only knowledge I possessed of anything connected with the matter was probably already shared by his Excellency, namely, the opinion of His Majesty's Government as to the activities of Shaukat Ali in Palestine and elsewhere, as conveyed to the Turkish Ambassador in London. I would, however, speaking quite personally, remind his Excellency that there were millions of Moslem subjects in the British Empire, and that anything that savoured of interference in their religious concerns was contrary to our whole practice and tradition, a fact which must necessarily carry its weight with my Government when deciding on its attitude.

7. While Tevfik Rüstü's appeal is in its way a gratifying sign of the growth of Turkish confidence in His Majesty's Government, one must not attach too much weight to his action as a proof of established friendship, for it is natural that the Turkish Government, to whom pan-Islamism, or anything like a general union of Moslem religious feeling, represents the worst form of reaction and directly threatens modern Turkish policy, should try to get us to suppress the congress. None the less, the attitude of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs shows that we have moved a long way forward since Lausanne—much further than is perhaps generally realised, for otherwise I find it hard to understand why the Grand Mufti should have gone to such pains to invite the Turkish Government to nominate delegates to the congress. He must have known that the religious questions to be discussed thereat would not interest Angora; I should doubt his wishing to split the Moslem world openly into two; and I can only conclude that he counted on the anti-British spirit of the agenda to bring Turkey into the conference.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5896/1205/65]

No. 107.

Sir John Simon to Mr. Hope Gill (Jedda).

(Nos. 145 and 146.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 28, 1931.

(R.) MY telegram No. 142 to Jedda of 19th November: Proposed Moslem Congress at Jerusalem.

If further reply is necessary to representations of Government to which you are accredited you may inform them that His Majesty's Government will maintain the attitude of detachment which they have hitherto adopted, and that in view of recent conversations between High Commissioner for Palestine and Mufti of Jerusalem, His Majesty's Government do not anticipate that political issues will be raised or that proceedings of congress will cause embarrassment to Government to which you are accredited. You may add that mufti has given specific assurance that Caliphate question will not be raised. (End of R.)

For your own information, it has proved impracticable to prohibit congress, and there are strong objections to any further direct intervention by His Majesty's Government, unless public order or security is threatened.

(Repeated to Jerusalem (Palestine Series), Nos. 274 and 275.)

[E 5920/1205/65]

No. 108.

High Commissioner for Palestine to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, December 1.)

(No. 284. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, November 25, 1931.

REFERENCE my secret telegram No. 282 of the 21st November regarding the proposed Moslem Congress.

A statement as given in my telegram No. 285 has now been received from the mufti, who states that it is to be communicated to all participants in congress.

I have pointed out to him that the reference in the statement to the Mosque Al Aqsa is ill-advised, inasmuch as it may lead to mention being made of the alleged desire of the Jews to encroach on the Holy Place within Haram Esh Sherif; also, with regard to the concluding words of statement, that, in accordance with mufti's assurances, it ought to be made clear that discussions which may result in division not only amongst Moslems, but also as between Moslems and non-Moslems, are to be avoided. At an interview which I afforded the mufti this morning with a view to drawing his attention to the above-mentioned two points he renewed his assurances and undertook to consider alterations in the wording of the statement to meet these objections.

[E 5920/1205/65]

No. 109.

High Commissioner for Palestine to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, December 1.)

(No. 285.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, November 25, 1931.

FOLLOWING is statement referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"The Preparatory Committee of the General Moslem Congress has prepared following proposals, which it is to place before the congress when convened. If congress agrees, these proposals will be put for discussion:—

"(1) To propagate and disseminate means of co-operation among Moslems, and to remind Moslems of social responsibilities imposed upon them by virtue of Moslem Sharia Law, and to promote among them a spirit of brotherhood.

"(2) To preserve Moslem religion free from any evil to which it has been subjected; to strengthen its principles and to guard its traditions against evils of atheism; to safeguard its interests and its Holy Places, especially Masjed-al-Aqsa and Holy Buraq (Western or Wailing Wall).

"(3) To establish a Moslem university at Jerusalem with a view to creating conformity in Moslem culture and instruction, both religious and otherwise, which will enable Moslems to dispense with foreign institutions.

"(4) To discuss any other Islamic matters which are of concern to Moslems, such as Hejaz Railway, which was created as a Waqf with Moslem funds, and similar matters which are of importance to the Moslem world.

"Every member of the congress will be entitled to put forward any proposal with regard to any matter of Moslem benefit. Such proposals will not be placed before congress for discussion unless agreed to by Proposals Committee."

"As fundamental object underlying this congress is to bring Moslems into unity and to make mutual co-operation among them a reality, the congress will avoid discussion of any matter which may cause dispute or division among Moslems."

[E 5920/1205/65]

No. 110.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine.—
(Received in Foreign Office, December 1.)

(No. 277. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

November 30, 1931.

I DESIRE to thank you for the full and helpful reply returned in your telegram of the 21st November, No. 282, and to express my appreciation of the way in which you have been handling this difficult question of Moslem Congress.

Nos. 284 and 285. I approve language held to mufti in connexion with statement prepared by Preparatory Committee for Congress as indicated in your telegrams of the 25th November. I assume that the result of any further conversations with Mufti will be reported to me by telegram.

I notice that in point (4) of the statement Hejaz Railway is referred to as having been created as a Waqf. This, however, has never been admitted by His Majesty's Government, and it appears undesirable to allow Arabs to argue that by acquiescing in terms of statement His Majesty's Government have admitted that railway is so constituted. I therefore suggest that you should inform mufti, in order to guard against this possibility, that, while His Majesty's Government do not wish to intervene, it must be understood that they cannot be taken as accepting as accurate or approving any statements or implications contained in this document. (In this connexion, see my telegram of the 8th August, No. 172, regarding an amendment to the section of the O'Donnell report dealing with the Hejaz Railway.)

Consular and passport control officers likely to be concerned have been instructed, in view of the information contained in your telegram of the 20th November, No. 281, that Abdul Mejid should not be granted visa for Palestine without prior reference to Foreign Office.

[E 6040/1205/65]

No. 111.

High Commissioner for Palestine to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated by Colonial Office, December 7.)

(No. 296. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, December 4, 1931.

REFERENCE your secret telegram No. 277: Moslem Congress.

Words to which I objected have been deleted from agenda statement by mufti, and a copy of amended statement has been sent to you under cover of my despatch of the 28th November, Secret C. Mufti has confirmed that statement so amended will be issued as preliminary agenda. As regards question of Hejaz Railway, I have caused mufti to be informed as suggested in your telegram. As regards Italian action in Tripoli (see my telegram No. 282), mufti now states that he has consulted Preparatory Committee and that he and they are determined to do everything in their power to prevent discussion of this subject, but he cannot definitely undertake that the proposals of committee, which has not yet been formed, and which will partly consist of delegates who have not yet arrived, will prohibit mention of subject. He added that, if any mention was made of Tripoli, it would probably be confined to a prayer for Moslems who lost their lives there and a word of appreciation of their heroism.

The mufti has now furnished following further particulars of congress: On the opening day, the 6th December, delegates will assemble at a private Moslem school adjoining Haram area, where they will be introduced to the Palestinian Moslem notables who have been invited to attend for this purpose. They will then proceed to Mosque of Al Aqsa, where, after prayers, mufti will make a speech declaring the congress open. Other speakers will follow. A large crowd is expected during the procession from the school to the Mosque of Al Aqsa, and mufti has asked for special police precautions, as he anticipates that an attempt to disturb proceedings will be made by Arabs subsidised by Jews. Although I do not share these apprehensions, all necessary police precautions will be taken. Thereafter meetings of congress will be held at above-mentioned Moslem school, to which public will not be admitted. It is now not expected that total number attending congress will exceed 150, of whom about seventy are delegates from foreign countries who have accepted invitation. At a recent interview mufti took every opportunity of repeating his assurances, and said that Palestine Government had trusted him and that he intended to prove himself worthy of that trust. He also referred more than once to the reliance that could be placed on the good sense and character of the delegates. There would be no agitators among the delegates, and he anticipated that they would all agree readily to refrain from saying anything that would prove undesirable. I have told mufti that it is most undesirable that members of congress should go to Wailing Wall in a body, and reminded him that nothing in nature of a procession to the Wall could be permitted. He has given me satisfactory assurances on this point. On the 3rd December I told mufti that I had received his further assurances with great pleasure. I said he had given me his word, and I knew I could rely on his

word. He answered that he was really pleased I had shown real confidence in him, and because I had done so I could trust in him to act accordingly. I believe he will carry out his pledges, and so he will go far to make me feel that we can work together when his word has once been given in the case of law and order. Should he fail to keep his pledges, I shall feel that he is unreliable and unfit to wield great powers he does in this country. There may be loud talk at the congress, but I shall be deeply disappointed if the mufti does not prevent anything that might cause disturbance in this country or provocation to the Italian Government. It is my considered judgment that the Caliphate question will not be discussed.

[E 6078/4294/65]

No. 112.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 8. Saving. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, November 29, 1931.

PRIME MINISTER, by direction of King, informed me yesterday evening that a gentleman attached to service of ex-Khedive, Abdul Hamid Bey of Shedid, had recently arrived in Cairo as an emissary of his Highness and had requested an audience of King Fuad for the purpose of delivering an important communication from his master. King Fuad had instructed Zaki-el-Ibrashi Pasha to receive him, and Abdul Hamid Bey Shedid made following statement orally, of which Zaki-el-Ibrashi had taken written note:—

"When the ex-Khedive had observed that Islam was in a critical situation and was being persecuted by the Powers, and that the Caliph Abdul Mejid was not the man who fulfilled the requisite conditions for that position, his Highness placed himself in communication with the Moslem world, and he is in a position to say that the Caliphate is almost at his disposal. His Highness desires to know whether His Majesty the King wishes to have this position for himself, and in that case he begs the King to send him a delegate who will keep him acquainted with the conduct which His Majesty proposes to follow, or, alternatively, that the King should charge Abdul Hamid Bey Shedid himself with this mission. His Highness, however, urges that an answer should be returned to him at once in order that the opportunity may not be lost. His Highness Abbas Hilmi added that his wish was to restore to Egypt that which the Sultan Selim had deprived her of—that is to say, the Caliphate. Furthermore, his Highness desired that this great honour should fall to the family of Mohammed Ali during the reign of the present King. In any case, Abbas Hilmi, while informing the King to this effect, is especially desirous not to act otherwise than in conformity with his wishes, and anxious that everything should be done with His Majesty's knowledge."

Sidky Pasha pointed out that there was a historical inaccuracy in ex-Khedive's statement, inasmuch as there had never been a Caliph of Egyptian Royal house. Up to the time of Sultan Selim's assumption of Caliphate there had, however, been an Abbassid Caliph resident in Egypt.

His Excellency said that the King's reply had been decided on in consultation with himself and had been given to the following effect:—

"King Fuad thanks his Highness Abbas Hilmi for communication which he has been good enough to make. In 1924 the then Prime Minister, Saad Pasha Zaghlul, had told His Majesty that he was disposed to help him and to take necessary steps in order to obtain Caliphate for his family, but the King had declined proposal, and His Majesty considers nothing has since then been changed in political situation of Egypt which would justify modification of his attitude."

Sidky Pasha, furthermore, informed me the ex-Khedive clearly had aspirations to the Throne of Syria, and that a certain amount of propaganda which was intended to put him forward as a candidate had already been made.

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Agent whom he had principally employed for this purpose was Mahmoud Azmy, a sort of free-lance journalist of no high reputation. Azmy was suspected of having Communist connexions. He had intended to make a journey to Syria in order to press Abbas Hilmi's candidature for Syrian Throne, but had been unable to start, as the French had refused him a visa. Sidky Pasha surmised that refusal of French was probably due to similar suspicions on their part of Azmy's Communist tendencies or frequentations.

I thanked Prime Minister for his courteous communication and asked him to express my gratitude to the King. With reference to Caliphate, I enquired whether it was the particular present political situation in Egypt which, in the opinion of the King and his Prime Minister, rendered it undesirable that any attempt should be made to create a Caliphate in Egypt, or whether it was general political position of this country. Sidky Pasha replied that it was general political situation.

[E 6050/1205/65]

No. 113.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 397.)
Sir,

Angora, December 1, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to report that, on receipt of your telegrams Nos. 61 and 62 of the 28th November regarding the coming Islamic Congress in Jerusalem, I asked for an interview with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose of communicating to him your decision, which he had been awaiting with interest, and saw him late on the 30th November.

2. I recalled to him that he had asked to be informed of the attitude which His Majesty's Government would adopt in regard to the congress, and also that the President of the Republic had, but two or three days previously, expressed a similar wish. I added that the telegram containing the decision of His Majesty's Government had been despatched from London before the arrival there of news of the Gazi's enquiry. I then informed him as follows:—

As a result of conversations which have taken place between the High Commissioner in Palestine and the Mufti of Jerusalem, His Majesty's Government do not anticipate that political issues will be raised during the proposed congress—which has neither the support nor the encouragement of His Majesty's Government—or that the proceedings of the congress will be such as to cause embarrassment to the Turkish Government. In particular, the mufti has given specific assurances that the Caliphate question will not be raised.

For these reasons, and taking into consideration the important Moslem interests of the Empire, His Majesty's Government, whose guiding principle is not to take any action which might be represented as interference in Moslem religious matters, has decided that it will maintain an attitude of complete detachment towards the congress.

I added that this attitude of detachment was conditional on public security in Palestine not being threatened.

3. Tefik Rüstü Bey was distinctly disconcerted, and somewhat cross and resentful, on learning the decision. He expressed the fear that the congress would threaten not only security in Palestine, but throughout the British Empire. He was inclined to question the complete "detachment" of His Majesty's Government as he knew that great preparations for the congress were being made throughout Jerusalem, but agreed in the end that these were to be ascribed to the local authorities. He then said that it was now Turkey's duty to let her own people know through the press that the congress had no support from the Turkish Government nor, as he knew, from those of Persia and Afghanistan, and that it was, as it were, a parochial gathering, at the invitation of a person of no great authority, of Moslems from different Dominions and mandated territories. The harmful influence of the congress might thus perhaps be checked. Turkey would watch the proceedings of the congress closely. It seemed to him inevitable that if, for instance, the Şariat

(Moslem Canon Law) were discussed, there might arise a situation which would possibly constitute an interference in Turkish internal affairs, for the prescriptions of the Şariat in regard to civil and penal matters were incompatible with those of the Turkish codes, and the decisions of a Moslem congress might unsettle Turkish minds.

4. I gathered from Tefik Rüstü Bey that he had confidently anticipated that His Majesty's Government would prohibit the congress, firstly, in their own interests, the appeal to Moslems to rally to the cause of religion being a retrograde step in these modern days, and forming also a potential menace to Great Britain and Europe, secondly, for international considerations, in view of the possible reactions in foreign countries against His Majesty's Government for permitting the holding of such a congress in a country under British mandate, and, finally, out of friendship to Turkey. It appeared to me that he thought it an easy matter to prohibit what purported to be a pan-Moslem conference summoned by a minor religious dignitary of a town of secondary sacred importance who had no standing for issuing invitations to Governments, and that the anti-British and anti-Jewish character of the mufti's initiative would have afforded sufficient cause for the suppression of the congress. However, the decision in the matter, he said, lay with His Majesty's Government and had now been taken.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned that he would, of course, communicate the decision of His Majesty's Government to the President of the Republic and to Ismet Pasha. If, as hinted by Tefik Rüstü Bey, the order is given that a campaign of belittlement of the congress should be begun in the Turkish press in the pious hope that the Turkish people will be led to attach little importance to its proceedings, it is to be feared that His Majesty's Government will not escape criticism of its attitude, or accusation of responsibility for, or association with, the congress. In any case, the question is likely to cause a check on the friendly feelings of late manifested by Turkey to Great Britain, and it certainly indicates the great importance which Turkey attaches to any movement that may stir up dormant religious feelings in Turkey and thus unsettle Turkish minds and lead to discontent with the present régime.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 6172/1205/65]

No. 114.

Mr. Morgan to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 415.)
Sir,

Angora, December 8, 1931.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 74 of the 3rd December regarding the Moslem Congress in Jerusalem, I have the honour to report that, during a reception given on the 2nd December on the occasion of the visit to Angora of the Bulgarian Prime Minister, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs took me aside to tell me that the freedom with which he had expressed his views, on learning from me two days previously the decision of His Majesty's Government not to prohibit the congress, was a sign of friendliness towards His Majesty's Embassy, for he would not have expressed himself in such strain, and at such length, if he had not been speaking as between friends. He went on to say that he deeply appreciated the consideration given to the views of the Turkish Government by His Majesty's Government, and the helpful attitude of this Embassy from the time when he had first raised the topic of the congress. He would not fail to make mention, in any public utterance he might have to make, of the sympathetic part played by His Majesty's Government. I was duly appreciative, and did not fail to let him know that His Majesty's Government did not wish, by suppressing the congress, to give it the publicity of martyrdom and an importance it did not now possess.

2. On the following day Dr. Tefik Rüstü was questioned about the congress in the Grand National Assembly. Seeing me that evening engaged in conversation with the Bulgarian Prime Minister, he interrupted the conversation to ask if I

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had read his reply to the question. On my confessing that I had not, the Afghan Ambassador, who was standing by, was despatched, at the run, to obtain a copy of the Anatolian News Agency sheet containing the text. In handing this to me Dr. Tevfik Rüstü remarked that Turkey wished to live on terms of friendship with all States, and that Turkish relations with His Majesty's Government were of so friendly a nature that during the last three years no note likely to injure that friendship had been written by either party to the other.

3. The following is a translation of the Anatolian News Agency account of Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Bey's reply to a question by Dr. Mazhar Bey (Denizli) about the nature of the Moslem Congress to be held at Jerusalem:—

"The Moslem Congress which is to be held at Jerusalem on the initiative of the mufti of that town, aided by associates from various places, will, according to the published agenda, deal with matters connected with the Seriat (Moslem canon law). The significance of this word is present in no uncertain fashion to all who are familiar with the incidents formerly committed from time to time in its name under the Ottoman sultans, in other countries too, and, but a few years ago, in Afghanistan. Immediately on receipt of the news of the congress, your Ministry for Foreign Affairs did not fail to get in touch with the Governments concerned, and, in a friendly fashion, requested information on the matter from the British Government, as that Government holds the reins of administration in Palestine.

"It was ascertained that political issues would not be raised during the proposed congress; that its proceedings would be such as not to cause embarrassment to the Government of the Turkish Republic; that, in particular, the Caliphate question would in no way be raised; and that the British Government neither supported nor encouraged the congress, and maintained an attitude of detachment towards it.

"Our contacts with the Governments of Persia, Afghanistan, Albania and the Hejaz enabled us to learn that these friendly States would not participate in any way in the congress. Through our friendly contacts with the Governments of Iraq and Egypt we understood that these Governments could not be officially represented at the congress, but that certain individuals from the two countries would proceed, without having any official or public character, to the congress."

(Here the French edition of the "République" inserts a passage missing in the Turkish text, viz.:—

"In these circumstances it is clear that, apart from countries having private or political interests with the British Empire, no independent country containing a Moslem majority has any connexion with the congress, the composition of which is therefore limited to representatives of peoples inhabiting regions subjected to certain political conditions.")

"It is a truth, proved to the satisfaction of nationalities of all countries, by many examples, that undertakings of this nature have not been and will not be advantageous to countries or to the masses.

"It is true that we also received invitations from the promoters of the congress, but republican Turkey can have nothing to do with undertakings of this kind, which aim at holding peoples back on the way of progress, and which have, undeniably, deplorable consequences. We are especially opposed to the use of religion as a political instrument in internal and foreign policy. We are watching developments closely. As long as it shows no near or distant connexion with our national affairs, this undertaking will remain a matter of local importance for the regions represented by those assembled there, but immaterial to us."

The Anatolian Agency adds:—

"Dr. Mazhar Bey thanked the Minister for Foreign Affairs for his explanation, and said that Turks were profoundly sensitive where their revolution was concerned, and therefore could not regard with indifference events of universal appeal taking place in a near-by country, nor could they allow any sort of outside interference in the revolution they had so willingly made."

4. In a leading article in the "République" of the 5th December, Yunus Nadi, after referring to the irritation created in the country which had abolished the Caliphate by the report that this question would be discussed at the Moslem Congress at Jerusalem, reproduces Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Bey's statements to the Assembly and expresses satisfaction with them. At the same time, Yunus Nadi calls on Turks to follow the proceedings of the congress with attention, and to react at once if anything resembling criticism or discussion of Turkey's decision to separate the spiritual and temporal powers is heard at the Jerusalem congress. He further proves to his own satisfaction that, if the congress confines itself to advocating religious reforms, or internationalism based on the tie of Islam, it is doomed to failure. He recalls that the declaration of the Holy War in 1914 by the Ottoman Empire did not prevent Moslems fighting against Turks. Moslem peoples, who ought rather to seek for their own independence, should not be led away by the mirage of the international Caliphate and the subjection of other peoples, who are all entitled to follow their own consciences in the matter of belief. The greatest happiness of any people is its independence.

5. Apart from the leader in the "République" there has been no Turkish press comment on the congress.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.